People vs. Marcos

A conviction for murder cannot stand where the principal evidence is the testimony of an alleged co-conspirator that is inherently improbable, full of contradictions on material details, and unexplained by a three-year silence, for such polluted-source testimony must be received with caution and closely scrutinized. Corroborative evidence necessarily fails when the basic evidence it seeks to support fails, and motive alone is not proof of commission or guilt.

Mariano R. Marcos of Batac, Ilocos Norte, father of Ferdinand Marcos and brother of Pio Marcos, was the political rival of Julio Nalundasan for representative of the second district of Ilocos Norte. Quirino Lizardo was the brother-in-law of Mariano and Pio Marcos, having married their sister Maria Marcos, although family litigation including a criminal complaint for attempted homicide had strained that relationship. Calixto Aguinaldo was presented by the prosecution as Lizardo's trusted attendant and bodyguard and as a participant in the alleged planning.

In the 1934 elections Mariano Marcos and Julio Nalundasan, both of Batac, Ilocos Norte, were rival candidates for representative for the second district, and Nalundasan was elected. That term was cut short by approval of the Constitution of the Philippines, with general elections for the National Assembly set for September 17, 1935, in which Nalundasan and Marcos again opposed each other for assemblyman in the same district and Nalundasan again prevailed. In the afternoon of September 19, 1935, followers of Nalundasan paraded in cars and trucks through Currimao, Paoay and Batac and passed in front of the Marcos house in Batac, a parade described as provocative and humiliating to the defeated Mariano Marcos. On the night of September 20, 1935, Nalundasan was shot and killed in his house in Batac, the bullet striking his right side and injuring internal vital organs causing instantaneous death.

Intensive investigation by the Government, particularly the Philippine Constabulary, led to the prosecution of Nicasio Layaoen, a Batac businessman, for the murder, with Gaspar Silvestre identifying Layaoen as the shooter and Constabulary agents relying on eighty-one rounds of .22 long Lubaloy Western rifle ammunition found in a house adjoining Layaoen's under his wife's care, the same brand and class alleged to have killed Nalundasan. Layaoen was nevertheless acquitted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After protracted further work by governmental agencies, particularly the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo were charged on December 7, 1938 with having conspired, armed with firearms and with treachery and evident premeditation, to shoot Nalundasan.

According to the prosecution, Aguinaldo was present at conferences in the Marcos house, including meetings on the morning of September 15 and the morning and afternoon of September 20, 1935, at the last of which Nalundasan's killing was decided with Ferdinand chosen as triggerman because he was a marksman and supposedly a minor who would only be sent to Lolomboy. About nine o'clock on the night of September 20, Ferdinand allegedly armed with an automatic pistol and Lizardo with a police positive revolver left with Aguinaldo for Nalundasan's yard, posted themselves unseen with full view of the target, and assigned Aguinaldo to watch; Aguinaldo claimed he became afraid, started back to the Marcos house, and on the way heard the fatal shot fired by Ferdinand while Nalundasan's back was turned. The defense was one of complete denial of participation by any defendant. During trial, while Aguinaldo was still under cross-examination and before the defense had completed its evidence, the four accused filed eight separate complaints on June 10, 1939 before the justice of the peace of Laoag charging Aguinaldo with false testimony in the December 7, 1938 preliminary investigation and at trial, which the trial court dismissed on motion of the provincial fiscal and treated as basis for contempt. The trial court credited Aguinaldo and convicted Ferdinand and Lizardo while acquitting Mariano and Pio, finding dwelling aggravating, provocation mitigating for Lizardo, and minority mitigating for Ferdinand.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioners argued that greater credibility was erroneously accorded to the prosecution witnesses, particularly Calixto Aguinaldo.
• Inconsistent Conviction and Acquittal: Petitioners argued that two accused were erroneously convicted and two acquitted upon the same evidence.
• Character Evidence: Petitioners argued that the character of Quirino Lizardo was erroneously considered against the accused.
• Electoral Census: Petitioners argued that the electoral census, Exhibit 84 for the defense, was erroneously denied any probative value.
• Reopening and New Trial: Petitioners argued that the motions for reopening and new trial were erroneously denied.
• Contempt: Petitioners argued that the finding of guilt for contempt and the P200 fine with subsidiary imprisonment were erroneous.

• Conspiracy and Murder: Respondent maintained that Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo conspired from electoral defeat and the September 19 parade to kill Nalundasan, with Ferdinand as triggerman and Lizardo as companion, as shown by Aguinaldo's presence at the conferences and at the scene on September 20, 1935.
• Credibility and Penalty: Respondent maintained that Aguinaldo's testimony deserved credit and prayed for affirmance with modification to impose the extreme penalty of death, on the ground that Ferdinand Marcos was more than eighteen years old at commission.

• Sufficiency of Co-Conspirator Testimony: Whether the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo, an alleged co-conspirator, proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo for murder.
• Contempt by False-Testimony Complaints: Whether the filing of eight false-testimony complaints against the principal prosecution witness during trial constitutes contempt obstructing the administration of justice and what penalty is proper.

• Sufficiency of Co-Conspirator Testimony: No. Acquittal was required because the basic prosecution evidence was inherently improbable, contradictory on material points, and from a polluted source, leaving guilt unproven to moral certainty.
• Contempt by False-Testimony Complaints: Yes. Contempt was properly found because the premature complaints tended to obstruct justice, but the fine was reduced to P50 each in line with the preservative, corrective purpose of contempt.

• Sufficiency of Co-Conspirator Testimony: The prosecution rested on Aguinaldo, whose own account made him a co-conspirator present at the planning and execution, so his testimony required great caution and close scrutiny. It was discredited by approximately three years of silence until November 1938, explained only as loyalty to Lizardo despite Aguinaldo's admission that he abandoned his assigned watching role and that Lizardo had testified against him administratively causing loss of government employment; by the improbable claim that a father would send his son to kill while going to Laoag and that Ferdinand was chosen for minority though both sides agreed he was over eighteen; by the incredible claim that the domineering, robust Lizardo needed the half-sized, inexperienced Aguinaldo as bodyguard and confidant; by the false claim of meeting Ferdinand in Batac at noon September 15 when Ferdinand arrived only at 8:30 p.m. from Manila; by the unlikely zeal attributed to Lizardo despite prior family animosity and an attempted-homicide complaint; and by motive and the earlier Layaoen acquittal proving nothing as to these appellants, with corroboration necessarily falling with the principal evidence.
• Contempt by False-Testimony Complaints: The complaints could not yet be decided because punishment for false testimony under Revised Penal Code Article 180 depends on the sentence in the principal murder case, so filing while Aguinaldo was under cross-examination and before the defense case closed was premature. The act was calculated or at least tended directly or indirectly to obstruct the administration of justice, justifying contempt under controlling precedent. The preservative and corrective, not vindictive or retaliatory, purpose of contempt, combined with acquittal in the principal case, warranted reduction of each fine from P200 to P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

• Appellate review of credibility — As a general rule, the appellate court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of weight and credibility, but it may determine guilt or innocence itself and modify or reverse factual conclusions where a fact or circumstance of weight and influence was overlooked or its significance misinterpreted. Applied to re-examine Aguinaldo's testimony with utmost caution because the Government sought the death penalty.
• Testimony from a polluted source — Testimony of an admitted co-conspirator comes from a polluted source, must be received with great caution, and must be closely and carefully scrutinized. Applied to decline any credit to Aguinaldo in view of his admitted presence at the conspiracy stages and at the killing, his long silence, and internal improbabilities and contradictions.
• Motive is not proof of guilt — Existence of motive, though perhaps important, is not proof of commission of a crime, much less of guilt of particular defendants. Applied to hold that irritation from electoral defeat and the provocative September 19 parade did not establish that Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo killed Nalundasan.
• Failure of principal evidence defeats corroboration — Where the principal and basic evidence upon which the prosecution rests fails, all evidence intended to support or corroborate it must likewise fail. Applied to make examination of corroborative prosecution evidence unnecessary once Aguinaldo's testimony was rejected.
• Prematurity of false-testimony prosecution — A charge of false testimony under Revised Penal Code Article 180 cannot be decided until the main case is disposed of, since penalty depends on the sentence in the principal case. Applied to hold that the June 10, 1939 complaints against Aguinaldo should have awaited termination of the murder trial.
• Contempt power is preservative and corrective — The inherent power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment. Applied to reduce the contempt fines from P200 to P50 each following acquittal in the principal case, as illustrated in Villavicencio vs. Lukban and In re Lozano and Quevedo.

• "His testimony accordingly comes from a polluted source and should be received with a great deal of caution and, for this reason, should be closely and carefully scrutinized." — States the controlling evidentiary standard for Aguinaldo as an admitted co-conspirator and frames the rejection of his credibility.
• "As a general rule, this court will not interfere with judgment of the trial court in passing upon the weight or credibility that should be attached to the testimony of witnesses; but this court may determine for itself the guilt or innocence of the defendant and may modify or reverse the conclusions of fact laid down by the trial court if there is some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been over- looked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted." — Defines the scope of appellate review justifying independent scrutiny despite the trial court's contrary credibility finding.
• "Where the principal and basic evidence upon which the prosecution rests its case fails, all evidence intended to support or corroborate it must likewise fail." — States the ratio for disregarding corroboration once Aguinaldo's testimony was disbelieved.
• "it is our view that this purpose is sufficiently achieved and the principle amply vindicated with the imposition upon each of the four accused above mentioned of a fine of fifty (50) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." — States the remedial contempt disposition after affirming that the premature complaints obstructed justice.

• In re Gomez, 6 Phil., 647 — Cited with U.S. vs. Jaca as authority that conduct calculated or tending directly or indirectly to obstruct administration of justice constitutes contempt, supporting the contempt finding.
• U.S. vs. Jaca, 26 Phil., 100 — Cited with In re Gomez as authority for punishing as contempt acts obstructing justice, supporting the contempt finding.
• Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil., 778 — Cited for the principle that contempt power is exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle, supporting reduction of the fine.
• In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801 — Cited for the principle that contempt punishment is corrective and not retaliatory, supporting reduction of the fine.

• Article 180, Revised Penal Code — Governs punishment for false testimony, with penalty calibrated to the sentence in the principal case. Applied to hold that the false-testimony complaints against Aguinaldo were premature because the murder case had not yet been decided and no penalty for Aguinaldo could yet be determined.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.