People vs. Marcial

The modification of the order of trial when an accused admits the act or omission charged but interposes a lawful defense is discretionary upon the trial court, not mandatory.

Six Philippine National Police officers were charged with homicide and frustrated homicide following a shooting incident on December 18, 1999, that resulted in the death of Junnyver Dagle and the injury of Wendell Sales. The officers responded to a call for police assistance and encountered the victims riding a motorcycle. Shots were fired from the direction of the officers, hitting the victims. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty, and the parties entered into a partial stipulation of facts admitting the occurrence of the shooting and the resulting injuries, but left the existence of justifying circumstances—such as hot pursuit and self-defense—for trial.

• The Incident: On December 18, 1999, respondents, all PNP members, responded to a call for police assistance and proceeded toward Plaridel, Misamis Occidental. After the Solsolon Bridge, they saw Dagle and Sales riding a motorcycle. Shots were fired from the direction of the respondents, resulting in Dagle's death and Sales's injury.
• The Charges: Two informations were filed against the respondents for homicide and frustrated homicide, alleging conspiracy, intent to kill, and grave abuse of office.
• Stipulations and Defenses: Respondents pleaded not guilty. The parties stipulated to the identity of the respondents, their presence at the scene, the firing of shots from their direction, and the injuries sustained by the victims. The issues left for trial included whether there was a hot pursuit, whether warning shots were fired, whether the victims fired at the respondents first, and whether a firearm was found near the fallen victim.
• Motion to Reverse Order of Trial: The prosecution moved to reverse the order of trial, arguing that respondents admitted the acts charged but were interposing a lawful defense. The RTC denied the motion, finding no clear admission of guilt, noting that a reverse order would cause delay, and emphasizing that the pre-trial order did not include an agreement to reverse the order of trial.

• Entitlement to Reverse Order of Trial: Petitioner argued that a modification or reversal of the order of trial is warranted under Section 3(e), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court because respondents expressly admitted committing the acts charged but interposed an affirmative defense.
• Consistency with Speedy Trial Act: Petitioner maintained that a reverse order of trial aligns with Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493 and its implementing Circular No. 38-98, which provide that an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial.
• Judicial Economy: Petitioner contended that reversing the order of trial would promote the objectives of the Speedy Trial Act, preserve the rights of the parties, and prevent a confusing and disorderly trial.

• Lack of Clear Admission: Respondent countered that the stipulation of facts did not contain a clear admission of guilt by the accused.
• Risk of Delay: Respondent argued that a reverse order of trial would cause delay rather than expedite the proceedings.
• Pre-trial Agreement: Respondent asserted that the course of the trial is better governed by the usual order under Section 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the sequence set forth in the pre-trial order, which did not include an agreement to reverse the order of trial.

• Appealability: Whether an order denying a party's motion to modify or reverse the order of trial in a criminal case is appealable.
• Mandatory Nature of Modification: Whether it is mandatory for a trial court to modify or reverse the order of trial when an accused admits the offense but interposes a lawful defense.

• Appealability: The denial of a motion to reverse the order of trial is interlocutory in nature and, therefore, not appealable.
• Mandatory Nature of Modification: The modification of the order of trial is discretionary upon the trial court. The use of the word "may" in Section 3(e), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, and Section 3 of Circular No. 38-98 clearly indicates that a reverse order of trial is permissive, not mandatory. The trial court correctly exercised its discretion in denying the request.

• Interlocutory Order Doctrine — An order that does not finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be decided upon, is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of an appeal until a final judgment is rendered. The denial of a motion to reverse the order of trial is interlocutory because it merely determines the procedure to be followed during trial and does not adjudicate the merits of the case.
• Discretionary Modification of Order of Trial — When an accused admits the act or omission charged but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified. The trial court has the discretion to grant or deny the modification based on the circumstances of the case, such as the clarity of the admission and the potential for delay.

• "In any event, a denial of a motion to reverse the Order of Trial is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not appealable."

• Section 3(e) [now Section 11(e)], Rule 119, Rules of Court — Provides that when the accused admits the act or omission charged but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified. The provision was applied to show the discretionary nature of the modification.
• Section 7, Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) — States that an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. The provision was applied to reinforce the discretionary nature of the modification.
• Section 3, Circular No. 38-98 — The implementing circular for the Speedy Trial Act, mirroring the language of Section 7 of RA 8493 regarding the discretionary modification of the order of trial.

Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Garcia