People vs. Maramara

The Court held that the use of a firearm, without convincing proof that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the means to ensure the crime's execution, does not constitute treachery; consequently, the accused can only be convicted of homicide.

A benefit dance was held in the yard of accused-appellant Cresenciano Maramara's house in Barangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate on the evening of November 18, 1991. A confrontation occurred involving the victim, Miguelito Donato, his brother Ricardo, and a certain Dante Arce. The accused-appellant shot Miguelito Donato, hitting him on the left breast. Miguelito died the following morning. Before dying, Miguelito identified the accused-appellant as his assailant to his father, Regarder Donato.

• The Prosecution's Version: During the benefit dance, Dante Arce boxed Ricardo Donato, who retreated toward a fence. Miguelito Donato stood about two meters away. The accused-appellant then drew a handgun and shot Miguelito, hitting him in the left breast. When Ricardo attempted to help Miguelito, an unidentified person struck Ricardo with an iron bar, knocking him unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, Ricardo went home and informed their father, Regarder Donato. Regarder rushed Miguelito to the hospital. Before Miguelito died, Regarder asked who shot him, and Miguelito identified the accused-appellant.
• Medical Findings: Dr. Nora L. Presbitero's autopsy of Miguelito revealed a gunshot wound on the left breast, a lacerated wound on the left temporal area, an incised wound on the left parietal area, and an incised wound on the right iliac area. Dr. Presbitero testified that the wounds could have been inflicted by more than two persons. The accused-appellant also suffered four penetrating stab wounds—two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm—which were treated by Dr. Gil Geñorga.
• The Defense's Version: Ricardo and Miguelito Donato arrived at the dance and ganged up on Dante Arce. The accused-appellant, approximately eight meters away, rushed to pacify the group. Ricardo held the accused-appellant's hands from behind while Miguelito repeatedly stabbed the accused-appellant. The defense argued that the accused-appellant could not have shot Miguelito because Ricardo was holding and dragging him away during the attack.

• The prosecution maintained that the accused-appellant was positively identified by the eyewitness and the victim's dying declaration. Petitioner argued that the relationship of the prosecution witnesses to the victim does not impair their credibility, especially absent any showing of improper motive. Petitioner further asserted that the killing was attended by treachery because the accused-appellant used a firearm against the victim.

• Respondent assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Ricardo and Regarder Donato, claiming their relationship to the victim gave rise to bias. Alternatively, respondent argued that he should only be held liable for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, asserting that a rumble occurred and that he was stabbed by the victim while attempting to pacify the group.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the relationship of the prosecution witnesses to the victim discredits their testimony.
  • Whether the victim's statement identifying the accused qualifies as a dying declaration.
  • Whether the killing constitutes murder with treachery, or homicide, or death in a tumultuous affray.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of bias or impair credibility. Absent evidence of improper motive, relatives who witness the killing of a loved one are naturally interested in implicating only the real culprit; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
  • The Court held that the victim's identification of the accused-appellant qualifies as a dying declaration. All requisites were met: death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of it, the declaration referred to the cause and circumstances of death, the declarant was competent to testify, the declarant subsequently died, and the declaration was offered in a criminal case where the declarant's death was the subject of inquiry. The gravity of the victim's wounds and his subsequent death provided substantial evidence that the declaration was made with full realization of his dying condition.
  • The Court ruled that the accused-appellant is guilty of homicide, not murder or death in a tumultuous affray. Treachery was not adequately proved because the mere use of a firearm is insufficient to establish that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the means to ensure the crime's execution without risk to himself. Article 251 on tumultuous affray does not apply because the prosecution witnesses positively identified the accused-appellant as the killer, negating the requisite uncertainty of authorship inherent in a tumultuous affray.

• Dying Declaration — A statement made by a dying person concerning the cause and circumstances of their death. The requisites are: (1) death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry. The Court applied this to uphold the victim's identification of the accused-appellant, noting that at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabrication are stilled.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — The employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against a person that directly and specially ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The Court held that the mere use of a firearm does not automatically constitute treachery; there must be convincing proof that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted such means to ensure the execution of the crime.
• Credibility of Related Witnesses — Relationship to the victim does not ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. The Court applied this principle to uphold the testimonies of the victim's brother and father, emphasizing that family members who witness a killing usually strive to remember the real culprit, for otherwise, the true assailant would gain immunity.

• "The use of a firearm is not sufficient indication of treachery. In the absence of any convincing proof that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the means by which he committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant."
• "Relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness."
• "A victim's utterance after sustaining a mortal wound may be considered pure emanations of the incident... at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabrication are stilled."

• People vs. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 [1998] — Followed for the rule that the use of a firearm, without proof of conscious adoption of means to ensure execution, is insufficient to establish treachery.
• People vs. Real, G.R. No. 121930, June 4, 1999 — Followed for the rule that where treachery is not adequately proved, the accused can be convicted only of homicide.
• People vs. Enciso, 225 SCRA 361 [1993] — Followed for the principle that relationship per se does not impair the credibility of a witness.
• People vs. Umadhay, 293 SCRA 545 [1998] — Followed for the enumeration of the requisites of a valid dying declaration.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of homicide. Applied as the proper conviction instead of murder due to the absence of treachery.
• Article 251, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes death in a tumultuous affray. Distinguished and held inapplicable because the identity of the assailant was positively established.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides the rule for applying penalties when neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present. Applied to impose the medium period of reclusion temporal.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J.