People vs. Marajas, Jr.

Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, even if the victim was transported from one place to another before the killing and ransom was subsequently demanded as an afterthought, provided no actual detention or deprivation of liberty for an appreciable period was effected or intended.

The accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos and his brothers were neighbors of the victim Francis Banaga, a fourteen-year-old fourth-year high school student, in Gatchalian Subdivision, Parañaque. One of the brothers, Leonardo Marajas alias "Eddie Boy," was the victim's schoolmate and playmate. The accused were originally charged before Military Commission No. 27 during the martial law period for kidnapping for ransom with murder and illegal possession of firearms, before the case was transferred to the civil courts. The prosecution's theory rested on Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which elevates the penalty for kidnapping to death when perpetrated for ransom.

The accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos and his brothers — Leopoldo, Leonardo alias "Eddie Boy," and others — resided in Gatchalian Subdivision, Parañaque, where they were neighbors of the Banaga family. Francis Banaga, the victim, was a fourteen-year-old fourth-year high school student who was a schoolmate and playmate of Eddie Boy Marajas. Romeo Padica, a professional taxicab driver and close friend (compadre) of Leopoldo Marajas, would later become the principal prosecution witness.

According to the prosecution, on the morning of February 8, 1978, appellant and Leopoldo visited Padica at his house in Muntinlupa. Leopoldo gave Padica P100 and asked him to drive for Eddie Boy and his classmates. Padica drove the car, with Leopoldo and appellant aboard, to Samson Tech in Pasay City, then to a restaurant in Sukat, Parañaque, and finally to Superville Subdivision, also in Sukat, where Eddie Boy Marajas and Francis Banaga were waiting. Leopoldo alighted and spoke with them; thereafter, Eddie Boy and Francis boarded the car. All proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, with Padica driving, Leopoldo in the front passenger seat, and appellant and Eddie Boy in the back seat with Francis between them. Upon reaching a sugarcane plantation in Calamba at about noon, Leopoldo directed Padica to drive inside and stop. Leopoldo ordered Francis to alight, but the boy refused and was forcibly pulled from the vehicle by Leopoldo, Eddie Boy, and appellant. They brought Francis about ten meters into the plantation, where Leopoldo delivered stabbing blows and appellant shot the boy with a handgun. The three then returned to the car; Leopoldo took the wheel, drove to Muntinlupa, and left Padica with the warning, "Pare, steady ka lang, isang bala ka lang."

Later that afternoon, Tomas Banaga, Francis's father, grew alarmed when his son failed to return home. Shortly after 6:00 P.M., an unidentified caller telephoned Tomas, told him not to look for his son, and demanded P500,000 for the boy's release. Tomas reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame. On February 9, a second call reduced the ransom to P200,000. On February 10, a further call lowered the amount to P23,000 and gave instructions: the money was to be wrapped in newspaper, placed in a paper bag, and delivered by a girl in a T-shirt to Luneta, in front of the National Library, under a tree with red flowers, at 8:30 P.M. Norma Camello, Tomas's sister-in-law, volunteered to make the delivery. Between 7:00 and 7:30 P.M., PC officers brought her to the Bayview Hotel on Roxas Boulevard. At about 8:00 P.M., she positioned herself under the designated tree. Minutes later, a taxicab arrived; appellant alighted, approached Camello, took the paper bag containing the money, and said, "Hihintayin na lang ninyo ang bata mamaya sa bahay." As appellant turned to board the taxicab, Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of the officers deployed to entrap the ransom recipient, apprehended and arrested him.

At about 2:00 P.M. on February 11, 1978, pursuant to information appellant gave during investigation, a PC team led by Lt. Napoleon Cachuela, accompanied by appellant, proceeded to Calamba to search for the body. Appellant led the team to the cadaver inside a sugarcane plantation about 75 meters from the road. Dr. Eusebio Panganiban of the Calamba Municipal Health Office conducted the autopsy and reported two entry gunshot wounds — one on the head and one on the chest — with two corresponding exit wounds, plus several lacerated wounds and hematomas. The cause of death was intra-thoracic brain hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds. Padica, who had gone into hiding for nearly three years out of fear for his life, eventually surrendered to Lt. Cesar Perez of the PC Regional Security Unit in Lucena City, where he had been working as a porter in the public market, and disclosed what he had witnessed.

Appellant presented a sharply divergent account. He claimed that on February 8, 1978, he was in Batangas province, where he resided. In the early morning of February 10, he traveled to Manila to attend to financial matters related to his buy-and-sell business. After failing to find his brother Leonardo at the office of his sister-in-law on Mabini Street, Malate, he went to the house of his sister Nelly Marajas, a neighbor of the Banagas in Gatchalian Subdivision. At about 9:30 A.M., as he was about to board a tricycle at the subdivision's main gate, two Metrocom officers in civilian clothes forcibly took him to a car. He was brought to the Siesta Court Hotel in Malate, where he was repeatedly beaten and tortured in an attempt to extract information about Francis Banaga's disappearance. That evening, he was transferred to an undisclosed safehouse where the maltreatment continued. To mislead his captors, appellant told them Francis could be found in Paete, Laguna, and led a group there, but no trace of the boy was found. He was later taken to an isolated sugarcane plantation together with another captive identified only as "Florentino," who led the military team to the cadaver. Appellant claimed he was kept at the safehouse for about two months before being turned over to the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, where he remained until trial.

The trial court, after more than eight years of proceedings, credited the prosecution's evidence, found Padica's testimony reasonable and convincing, and rejected appellant's alibi as uncorroborated and inherently weak. The court noted that appellant was not even certain of his whereabouts on February 8, offering only that he was "more or less" in Batangas.

• Reasonable Doubt: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in ruling that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, maintaining that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Credibility of State Witness: Appellant contended that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of Romeo Padica, characterizing it as incredible and inconsistent with the other evidence on record. He questioned why the Marajas brothers would hire Padica to drive when Leopoldo was himself a skilled driver, why Padica never conversed with the group during the trip, why Padica did not know Leopoldo's profession or the surname of their common compadre, and why the crime was carried out in broad daylight.
• Weakness of Defense: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in laying emphasis on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
• Inconsistencies: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in disregarding inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence — particularly between Padica's testimony that the victim was stabbed and shot four times and the necropsy report showing only lacerated wounds and two entry gunshot wounds — as minor and insubstantial.
• Defective Information: Appellant contended that the failure of the prosecution to include his name in the original information was a fatal defect that vitiated the proceedings against him.
• Improper Discharge of State Witness: Appellant argued that the trial court should not have granted the motion to discharge Romeo Padica, as the prosecution failed to show that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty.
• Questionable Surrender: Appellant raised as an issue the questionable manner in which Padica surrendered, after nearly three years of hiding, to Lt. Cesar Perez whom he met for the first time at the Lucena City marketplace.

• Credibility of Broad-Daylight Commission: The Solicitor General argued that it was not difficult to believe appellant and his co-accused committed the crime in broad daylight because there were no other persons at the scene, the crime having been perpetrated inside a desolate sugarcane plantation at noon.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Discharge: The prosecution maintained that it had presented enough evidence to support the discharge of Padica as a state witness, and that the trial court was in a better position to evaluate such evidence.
• Propriety of the Amended Information: The prosecution contended that the amended information correcting appellant's name was a matter of form that did not alter the nature of the offense or prejudice the rights of the accused.

• Nature of the Crime: Whether the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder or only murder.
• Credibility of State Witness: Whether the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of Romeo Padica despite alleged inconsistencies and incredibilities.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the guilt of appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Discharge of State Witness: Whether the discharge of Romeo Padica as state witness was proper.
• Validity of the Amended Information: Whether the failure to include appellant's name in the original information constituted a fatal defect.

• Nature of the Crime: Modified. The crime is murder, not the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder, the essential element of deprivation of liberty being absent and the ransom demand having been merely an afterthought.
• Credibility of State Witness: No error. The trial court's favorable appreciation of Padica's testimony was sustained, no ill motive having been shown and the alleged inconsistencies having been adequately explained.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses and the physical evidence outweighing the inherently weak and uncorroborated defense of alibi.
• Discharge of State Witness: No error. The discharge lay within the sound discretion of the trial court, which had evaluated the evidence and found Padica did not appear to be the most guilty; the CA had already sustained the discharge order with finality.
• Validity of the Amended Information: No fatal defect. Jurisdiction over appellant's person was acquired through his voluntary appearance and plea at arraignment; the amendment involved a matter of form and did not alter the nature of the offense.

• Nature of the Crime: The essential element of kidnapping — that the victim was restrained or deprived of his liberty, or transported against his will with the primary or original intent to effect that restraint — was absent. Francis Banaga voluntarily boarded the car and went with the Marajas brothers to Laguna, having every reason to trust them as neighbors, with Eddie Boy being his schoolmate and playmate. The malefactors evidently had only murder in their hearts when they invited the boy to go with them. The killing was swift and cold-blooded once they reached the isolated plantation, and there was no evidence that from the outset the killers intended to exchange the victim's freedom for ransom. The demand for ransom was relayed to the family only later that afternoon, approximately five hours after the killing, suggesting it arose as an afterthought following consultation among the felons. Under established jurisprudence, where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, even if the victim was taken from one place to another before the killing. The mere fact that ransom was demanded does not per se convert the act into kidnapping unless the victim was actually restrained or deprived of liberty for an appreciable period or such restraint was the basic intent. Treachery qualified the killing, as the victim was lured without the slightest inkling of the killers' nefarious design and was suddenly and unexpectedly assaulted in an isolated location, divesting him of any opportunity to resist or escape. Abuse of superior strength, though present, was absorbed by treachery and could not be appreciated separately. The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado) was appreciated, the accused having deliberately chosen the desolation of the sugarcane plantation to perpetrate the crime far from potential witnesses, at noon when passersby or assistance could hardly be expected — this circumstance was considered against appellant even though not alleged in the information, since it was duly proved.

• Credibility of State Witness: While the testimony of a particeps criminis is invariably viewed with caution as coming from a polluted source, the trial court's favorable appreciation of Padica's testimony was sustained. The trial court, having had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor, characterized his testimony as clear, straightforward, and convincing. Appellate courts normally accord finality to such factual findings. No evidence of ill motive on Padica's part was introduced by the defense, entitling his testimony to considerable credit. The alleged inconsistencies were adequately explained: Padica testified that appellant shot the victim four times without stating the victim was hit four times, and the necropsy report showing two entry gunshot wounds confirmed that Francis was shot; the absence of stab wounds despite Padica's testimony that Leopoldo stabbed the victim was reconcilable, as the stabbing blows may not have pierced the body but caused lacerations instead; and the hematomas and contusions were consistent with the victim's desperate struggle against his assailants. Padica's silence during the trip and his lack of knowledge about Leopoldo's profession or their compadre's surname were not implausible, as some persons are naturally taciturn. The commission of the crime in broad daylight was credible given the desolate location. The casual threat issued to Padica was explained as a reminder of what awaited him should he break his silence, the killers being confident that the brutality of the murder would sufficiently terrorize him.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Appellant's alibi was rejected as inherently weak, easy of fabrication, and negative in nature. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown not only that the accused was elsewhere but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene. Appellant was not even certain of his whereabouts, offering only that he was "more or less" in Batangas, and this allegation was completely uncorroborated. His denial that he was entrapped at Luneta was likewise rejected, as both Norma Camello and Sgt. Dulay positively and without hesitation identified him as the person arrested after receiving the ransom money. The police report corroborated the arrest pursuant to a prepared dragnet plan and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, which appellant failed to rebut.

• Discharge of State Witness: The discharge of an accused to serve as state witness lies within the sound discretion of the court before whom it is sought, and it is not required that the court be absolutely certain that all requirements for proper discharge are present. The prosecution presented enough evidence to support the motion, and the trial court's finding that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty must be respected. Moreover, the discharge order had already been sustained by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16302, which denied appellant's petition for certiorari and prohibition, the judgment having become final and executory on January 20, 1989. Padica's delayed surrender was understandable given that he had witnessed a heinous crime and had been threatened with bodily harm; his meeting with Lt. Perez at the marketplace was a natural intersection of people in a public place, and he had been seeking a trustworthy person in authority during his stay in Lucena.

• Validity of the Amended Information: Appellant was arraigned under the original information and entered a plea of not guilty, albeit under the name "Leonardo Marajas." At that juncture, he should have raised the error as to his identity by filing a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Having failed to do so and instead voluntarily appeared and pleaded, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person, and a valid judgment of conviction could have been rendered even without the amendatory information. The subsequent amendment to insert appellant's real name involved merely a matter of form, as it did not deprive him of a fair opportunity to present his defense, did not alter the nature of the offense charged, and did not introduce new and material facts. Such amendment is explicitly allowed under the second paragraph of Section 7, in relation to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Any irregularity in the inclusion of appellant's name in the amended information was waived by his subsequent appearance and entry of plea at the arraignment thereon.

• Taking Incidental to Killing — Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. The crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot serve as a component felony to produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder where the evident purpose of taking the victim was to kill and no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved. Applied in this case: the victim voluntarily accompanied the accused, was killed swiftly upon reaching the plantation, and the ransom demand was made only hours later as an afterthought, negating any intent to detain.

• Ransom Demand Alone Does Not Constitute Kidnapping — The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion. Applied: the ransom demand was made after the victim was already dead, and no detention occurred.

• Alibi as an Inherently Weak Defense — Alibi is an inherently weak defense, easy of concoction and negative in nature. When arrayed against positive declarations of prosecution witnesses, it is given little consideration. For it to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was not only at some other place but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Applied: appellant could not even state his whereabouts with certainty and offered no corroboration.

• Testimony of Particeps Criminis — The testimony of a particeps criminis is to be viewed with much caution as coming from a polluted source, but it is not per se inadmissible or unworthy of belief. Where the trial court has observed the witness's demeanor and found the testimony clear, straightforward, and convincing, and no ill motive is shown, the testimony may be given credence. Applied: Padica's testimony was sustained despite his participation, as no ill motive was shown and alleged inconsistencies were adequately explained.

• Uninhabited Place as Aggravating Circumstance Even Without Allegation — The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado) may be considered against the accused even if not alleged in the information, provided it is duly proved. Applied: the accused deliberately chose a desolate sugarcane plantation at noon to perpetrate the crime far from potential witnesses.

• Amendment of Information as to Form — An amendment that merely corrects the name of the accused involves a matter of form and does not alter the nature of the offense or prejudice the rights of the accused. Such amendment is allowed under Section 7, in relation to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Applied: the insertion of appellant's true name in the amended information was a formal amendment.

• Jurisdiction Over Person Through Voluntary Appearance — Where an accused is arraigned under a wrong name but voluntarily appears and enters a plea without raising the issue of identity by motion to quash, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over his person, and he is estopped from later questioning the defect. Applied: appellant pleaded not guilty under the name "Leonardo Marajas" without raising the identity issue, thereby waiving the defect.

• "We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another." — This passage articulates the controlling ratio decidendi distinguishing murder from the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, and is the canonical formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the subject.

• "The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused." — This defines the doctrinal boundary between kidnapping and murder where ransom is demanded, clarifying that ransom alone does not supply the element of deprivation of liberty essential to kidnapping.

• "The essential element in the crime of kidnapping that the victim must have been restrained or deprived of his liberty, or that he was transported away against his will with the primary or original intent to effect that restraint, is absent in this case." — This states the Court's application of the kidnapping elements to the facts, identifying the specific deficiency that precluded conviction for the complex crime as charged.

• "When the appellant was arraigned under the name of Pedro Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he merely entered his plea of 'not guilty' under the said name. It was on that occasion that he should have for the first time raised the question of his identity, by filing a demurrer based on the court's lack of jurisdiction over his person." — This quotation from People vs. Narvaes, adopted by the Court, establishes the rule that failure to challenge misidentification at arraignment constitutes a waiver of the jurisdictional defect.

• People vs. Masilang, et al., 142 SCRA 673 (1986) — Controlling precedent on the distinction between kidnapping and murder where ransom is demanded after the killing. The Court held that even where the accused planned to kidnap for ransom but killed the victim first and demanded ransom only later, the crime was only murder since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved. Directly applied in this case.

• People vs. Guerrero, et al., 103 Phil. 1136 (1958) — Followed for the proposition that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder.

• People vs. Narvaes, 59 Phil. 738 (1934) — Controlling precedent on the waiver of jurisdictional objections through voluntary appearance and plea at arraignment under a wrong name. The doctrine was applied to hold that appellant was estopped from questioning the defect in the original information.

• People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173 (1969) — Cited for the essential element of kidnapping requiring restraint or deprivation of liberty.

• People vs. Camo, et al., 91 Phil. 240 (1952) — Followed for the rule that where the evident purpose of taking the victim was to kill and no purpose to detain could be inferred, the subsequent killing constitutes murder.

• People vs. Tabayoyong, et al., 104 SCRA 724 (1981) — Cited for the cautionary rule that the testimony of a particeps criminis must be viewed with suspicion as coming from a polluted source.

• People vs. Ibañez, 92 Phil. 933 (1957) — Cited for the rule that the discharge of an accused as state witness lies within the sound discretion of the court and does not require absolute certainty that all statutory requirements are present.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 18 and 1984) — Defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention, elevating the penalty to death when the kidnapping is perpetrated for the purpose of ransom. The Court held that the element of deprivation or restraint of liberty must be present for the provision to apply; the mere demand for ransom without actual detention does not constitute kidnapping under this article.

• Section 7, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires that the complaint or information state the name and surname of the accused, and provides that if the true name is disclosed during the proceedings, it shall be inserted in the information. Applied to uphold the amendment correcting appellant's name from "Leonardo Marajas" to "Leon Marajas, Jr."

• Section 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Authorizes amendment of the information in form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. Applied to sustain the admission of the amended information as a matter of form.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concurred.