People vs. Manijas

Positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction beyond reasonable doubt, and a paraffin test serves merely as corroborative evidence that cannot override such identification.

Accused-appellant AM Wilson Manijas y Lim and the victim M/Sgt. Emerme S. Malit were both members of the Philippine Air Force. Manijas was assigned at the 3rd Air Wing Base in Zamboanga City, while Malit was assigned with the Composite Tactical Group 9 at Jolo, Sulu. The eyewitnesses T/Sgt. Henry Bona and M/Sgt. Armando Agadier were also PAF personnel assigned at Jolo who had known both Manijas and Malit for years prior to the incident. The case arose under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for murder qualified by treachery.

In the afternoon of May 27, 1999, T/Sgt. Henry Bona arrived in Zamboanga City from Jolo, Sulu, intending to board a C-130 plane to Manila en route to his home in Sorsogon after receiving word that his father was gravely ill. That same afternoon, he met M/Sgt. Emerme Malit, a fellow PAF member assigned in Jolo whom he had known for nineteen years. Malit was escorting his daughter to the C-130 so she could study in Manila. Later that evening, Bona, Malit, and M/Sgt. Armando Agadier drank liquor in the barracks, consuming two bottles of Tanduay until 10:00 p.m. At around 11:00 p.m., the three proceeded to the "Real Meeting Place," a karaoke bar near Edwin Andrews Air Base, where they sang and drank beer until about 2:40 a.m. on May 28, 1999. Malit was wearing a white T-shirt, short maong pants, and Topsider leather shoes, and carried a concealed .45-caliber service pistol tucked in his waistband. Bona and Agadier were unarmed.

From the karaoke bar, the group went to the "Roadside Snack House" along Gov. Camins Road to eat tapsilog. The snack house was a small structure with walls of wooden slabs, a single door about one meter wide, and was well-lighted by two fluorescent lamps. After eating, the three stood to leave. Malit stepped out first to call a tricycle, with Bona following about a meter behind. Suddenly, a burst of gunfire erupted from the right side of the snack house door. Bona saw Malit fall on the shoulder of the road and instinctively dropped to the ground, crawling inside the snack house for cover. Peering through the slits between the wooden slabs, Bona saw accused-appellant AM Wilson Manijas holding a Baby Armalite rifle, approximately three meters from where Malit fell. Manijas took the .45-caliber pistol from Malit's waistband and walked toward a taller, short-haired companion waiting near a blue tricycle. Bona recognized Manijas because of the street lamp illumination and because Manijas had been his cadet at Mindanao State University in Jolo, where Bona was in charge of the ROTC in 1996 and 1997. Agadier, who was still inside the snack house, also peeped through an opening near the door and saw Malit sprawled face up with the top of his head blown off. He saw Manijas walking away holding a Baby Armalite; as Manijas turned around, Agadier clearly saw his face, recognizing him as a neighbor from the Airman's Village in Jolo since the 1990s. Manijas and his companion boarded the tricycle, plate number JU-2068, and sped toward the Zamboanga International Airport.

After the assailants left, Bona told Agadier to guard the body while he took a tricycle to the air base to seek help. Bona reported to Captain Jose Torres, Jr., the duty officer, that Malit had been shot and killed by Manijas. A team of seven soldiers proceeded to the crime scene and found Malit's body sprawled on the road with its head blown off. At the Central Police Station, Bona did not reveal the identity of the assailant, testifying that he feared for his life because the incident appeared planned. Later that day, at the air base investigation section, Bona identified Manijas as the shooter to M/Sgt. Nonilo Aquino, and executed a sworn statement to that effect. On June 16, 1999, Bona signed an affidavit before a city prosecutor again identifying Manijas. Agadier executed a similar affidavit on June 17, 1999. A paraffin test conducted on Manijas on May 28, 1999 yielded positive results for gunpowder nitrates on his right hand. A postmortem examination revealed five gunshot wounds — to the head, right deltoid area, right arm, and right axillary area — with the cause of death being hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds.

For his defense, Manijas testified that on the evening of May 27, 1999, he was with classmate Airman Allan Artazo at the air base, after which they went to Shoppers Square and then to the house of Artazo's girlfriend in Tugbungan, where they drank beer until past 11:00 p.m. They then proceeded to the "Daishita Karaoke Bar," where Artazo left him at around 2:30 a.m. Manijas claimed he stayed behind waiting for his girlfriend, who never arrived, and left at 3:30 a.m. He rode a tricycle to his cousin's house in Baliwasan Chico, but no one answered when he knocked, so he walked home to Guiwan, passing by Gov. Camins Road where he saw people and a police vehicle. He arrived home at about 5:00 a.m. Artazo corroborated that he was with Manijas until 2:30 a.m. but could not account for his whereabouts thereafter. Manijas's wife testified he arrived home at about 4:50 a.m. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and convicted Manijas of murder.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellant argued that serious doubts surrounded the truthfulness of T/Sgt. Bona and M/Sgt. Agadier's statements, pointing to conflicting statements by Bona — who stated in his affidavit that it was "quite dim" or "dark" and that he did not recognize the assailant, but later testified in court that the scene was well-lighted and he identified Manijas. Accused-appellant also cited the absence of any record of Bona's report in the air base logbook and questioned Bona's ability to observe the assailant while in a squatting position inside the snack house.
• Paraffin Test Reliability: Accused-appellant contended that the forensic chemist who testified on the paraffin results was not present when the cast was taken and was therefore incompetent to testify. He also argued that the results were inconsistent with the allegation that an M16 Baby Armalite was used, since firing such a weapon requires both hands, yet only his right hand tested positive for gunpowder nitrates.
• Uninvestigated Suspect: Accused-appellant questioned why Frank Anuddin, brother-in-law of the victim and an initial suspect whose hands both tested positive for gunpowder nitrates, was not investigated.
• Alibi and Denial: Accused-appellant maintained that at the time of the shooting he was at the "Daishita Karaoke Bar" and then proceeded to his cousin's house in Baliwasan Chico before going home, and that he could not have been at the crime scene.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: The prosecution maintained that T/Sgt. Bona and M/Sgt. Agadier were credible witnesses whose testimonies dovetailed on pertinent points, that they candidly explained the discrepancy in Bona's affidavit as motivated by fear for his personal safety, and that no reason was shown why they would testify falsely against the accused.
• Paraffin Test as Corroborative Evidence: The prosecution argued that the paraffin test constituted corroborative evidence of guilt, that the presumption of regular performance of official duty applied, and that several factors could explain why only one hand tested positive for nitrates, including hand overlap on the trigger and the passage of more than twelve hours since the incident.
• Sufficiency of Positive Identification: The prosecution contended that even without the paraffin test, the positive identification by two eyewitnesses was sufficient to convict.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved the accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding alleged inconsistencies in the eyewitnesses' testimonies and the defense of alibi.
• Paraffin Test: Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight to the paraffin test results and in not giving exculpatory weight to the defense evidence.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between the accused-appellant and his unidentified companion was established.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Whether treachery attended the commission of the crime.
• Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm should be appreciated.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The positive identification of the accused by two credible eyewitnesses, whose testimonies dovetailed on material points and who had no motive to testify falsely, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Paraffin Test: No error. The paraffin test results were corroborative only, and the presumption of regular performance of official duty was not rebutted; the positive identification by eyewitnesses was independently sufficient to convict.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not proven, as mere suspicion, association, or companionship does not establish conspiracy, and no evidence was adduced to show a prior agreement or connivance.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Yes. Treachery was present, the attack having been so sudden and unexpected that the victim could not draw his concealed firearm, and the use of an M16 Baby Armalite rendered any defense impossible.
• Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. The aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm was offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the accused having surrendered to authorities upon learning of the positive paraffin results.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The testimonies of T/Sgt. Bona and M/Sgt. Agadier were found credible and consistent on material points. Bona's initial failure to identify the assailant in his police statement was satisfactorily explained by his fear for his personal safety, given that the crime appeared planned and he was alone. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility was accorded full faith, no improper motive having been shown for the witnesses to testify falsely. The defense of alibi failed because accused-appellant's own witness, Airman Artazo, left him at the karaoke bar at 2:30 a.m., leaving his whereabouts unaccounted for during the period the crime was committed. Moreover, it was not shown to be physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene; the places he claimed to have visited were not far from Gov. Camins Road, and he himself admitted passing by that road on his way home. Alibi requires proof both that the accused was elsewhere and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.

• Paraffin Test: The presumption of regular performance of official duty was not rebutted, as accused-appellant presented no evidence of falsification or ill motive on the part of the examiners. The argument that both hands should have tested positive was rejected: the forensic chemist explained that hand overlap on the trigger could result in only one hand being affected by gunpowder nitrates, and the scattered nature of the victim's wounds suggested the assailant may not have controlled the rifle with both hands. Additionally, the paraffin test was conducted more than twelve hours after the incident, making partial or total absence of nitrates possible. The absence of nitrates is not conclusive proof that a person did not fire a gun, as factors such as washing, gloves, or wind direction may account for such absence. In any event, the paraffin test was merely corroborative; the positive identification by two eyewitnesses was independently sufficient for conviction.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy must be proven as clearly and conclusively as the commission of the crime itself. Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, and companionship do not prove conspiracy. Although T/Sgt. Bona testified that the crime was "planned," no evidence was adduced to support this allegation or to explain how, why, and when such connivance was contrived. The presence of an unidentified companion who fled with the accused did not, without more, establish conspiracy.

• Qualifying Circumstance: Treachery exists when the attack is sudden and unexpected, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, and the means employed directly and specially insure execution without risk to the offender from any defense the offended party might make. The attack was so sudden that the victim could not draw his concealed .45-caliber pistol, and the M16 Baby Armalite used by the assailant made it virtually impossible for the victim to defend himself.

• Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances: The use of an unlicensed firearm — an M16 Baby Armalite rifle not issued to the accused, as certified by the Supply Accountable Officer — constituted an aggravating circumstance. This was offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as the accused, upon learning he had tested positive for gunpowder nitrates and that a warrant had been issued, lost no time in reporting to the authorities and surrendering.

• Positive Identification as Sufficient for Conviction — Positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses, without any showing of ill motive or bias, is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, even without corroborating physical or scientific evidence. The Court applied this doctrine by relying on the testimonies of T/Sgt. Bona and M/Sgt. Agadier, both of whom personally knew the accused and identified him at the crime scene under adequate lighting conditions.

• Paraffin Test as Merely Corroborative — A paraffin test is not indispensable for conviction and serves only as corroborative evidence. The absence of gunpowder nitrates on a suspect's hands is not conclusive proof that the suspect did not fire a gun, as several factors — washing of hands, use of gloves, wind direction, hand overlap on the trigger, or lapse of time — may account for such absence. The Court held that even without the paraffin test, the eyewitness identification sufficed.

• Alibi and Denial; Requisites — For alibi to be considered exculpatory, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene. The Court rejected the accused's alibi because his own witness could not account for his whereabouts during the critical period, and the locations he claimed to have visited were near the crime scene.

• Treachery; Elements — Treachery exists when the attack is sudden and unexpected, without provocation from the victim, and the means employed directly and specially insure execution of the crime without risk to the offender from any defense the offended party might make. The Court found treachery present because the victim was shot without warning and could not draw his concealed firearm.

• Conspiracy; Proof Required — Conspiracy must be proven as clearly and conclusively as the commission of the crime itself. Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, and companionship do not prove conspiracy. The Court found no evidence of prior agreement or connivance between the accused and his unidentified companion.

• Presumption of Regular Performance of Official Duty — Official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed, and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. The Court applied this presumption to uphold the paraffin test results, the accused having presented no evidence of falsification or ill motive by the examiners.

• "Even without the paraffin test, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses T/Sgt. Bona and M/Sgt. Agadier of accused-appellant as the assailant is more than sufficient to convict him of the crime charged." — This passage states the ratio decidendi that eyewitness identification, standing alone, suffices for conviction, subordinating scientific evidence to testimonial evidence.

• "Alibi may be considered exculpatory when the guilt of the accused is not established beyond cavil. In such a case, the accused must not only prove that he was elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene when the crime took place." — This formulation of the two-pronged test for alibi is frequently cited in Philippine criminal law jurisprudence and defines the standard the Court applied to reject the defense.

• "Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It exists when any of the crimes against person is committed with the employment of means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This is the canonical definition of treachery applied to qualify the killing as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

• "Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, and companionship do not prove conspiracy." — This concise statement of the standard for proving conspiracy was applied to reject the allegation of conspiracy between the accused and his unidentified companion.

• People vs. Tumanon, 351 SCRA 676 (2001) — Cited for the proposition that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded full faith and credit, especially where no improper motive is shown.
• People vs. Bongalon, G.R. No. 125025, January 23, 2002 — Cited for the presumption of regular performance of official duty, applied to uphold the paraffin test results.
• People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995) — Cited for the recognition that several factors may account for the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman.
• People vs. Pama, 216 SCRA 385 (1992) — Cited for the rule that the absence of nitrates in a suspect's hand is not conclusive proof that he did not fire a gun.
• People vs. Dela Tongga, 336 SCRA 687 (2000) — Cited for the principle that alibi may be considered exculpatory only when the accused's guilt is not established beyond cavil.
• People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 143703, November 29, 2001 — Cited for the two-pronged requirement of alibi: presence elsewhere and physical impossibility of being at the crime scene.
• People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 131200, February 15, 2002 — Cited for the rule that conspiracy must be proven as clearly and conclusively as the commission of the crime itself.
• People vs. Suyum, G.R. No. 137518, March 6, 2002 — Cited for the definition of treachery applied to qualify the killing as murder.
• Maandal vs. People, G.R. No. 144113, June 28, 2001 — Cited for the proposition that a paraffin test constitutes only corroborative evidence of guilt.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision to classify the killing, qualified by treachery, as murder and to determine the applicable penalty range.
• Revised Penal Code provisions on mitigating and aggravating circumstances — The Court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, offsetting one against the other to arrive at the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred. Austria-Martinez, J., was on leave.