People vs. Manhuyod, Jr.

A conviction for rape cannot rest on the private complainants’ sworn statements and on NBI agents’ testimony recounting those statements when the affiants do not testify; such evidence is inadmissible hearsay and does not qualify as res gestae absent spontaneity. The father-daughter relationship in qualified rape is a special circumstance under Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, not an Article 15 alternative aggravating circumstance.

Restituto Manhuyod, Jr. is the husband of Yolanda Mahhuyod and the father of Relanne S. Manhuyod. The charge was governed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, which imposes the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent. The case therefore required the SC to assess a capital rape conviction under that statutory framework.

On 6 June 1995, before the Central Visayas Office (CEVRO) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Yolanda Mahhuyod, accused’s wife and mother of the offended party, Relanne S. Manhuyod, filed a complaint for rape charging accused with having raped Relanne, then 17 years of age, on 20 April 1995 and 3 May 1995. Immediately upon the filing of the complaint, Relanne was examined by Dr. Tomas Refe, Medico-Legal Officer III of the CEVRO, NBI, whose findings in Living Case No. 95-MI-II included no extragenital physical injury, old healed hymenal lacerations, and a hymenal orifice that admitted a tube 2.8 cms. in diameter with moderate resistance; his conclusion was that the hymenal orifice was distensible to allow complete penetration of an average-size adult penis in erection without producing further laceration.

On 8 June 1995, Yolanda and Relanne gave their sworn statements to Atty. Oscar Tomarong, Officer-in-Charge of the NBI Sub-office in Dipolog City. In a letter dated June 1995 to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Dipolog City, Atty. Tomarong recommended the prosecution of accused for rape as charged by Yolanda and Relanne. On even date, Relanne, assisted by Yolanda, filed a complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office charging accused with rape committed on 3 May 1995.

After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte, through Valeriano Lagula, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, filed with Branch 11 of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, sitting in Sindangan, an information charging that in the morning of on or about 3 May 1995, in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, accused, moved by lewd and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, had sexual intercourse with Relanne S. Manhuyod, his 17-year-old daughter, against her will and without her consent, as a result of which she became pregnant, contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. At his arraignment on 23 June 1995 following his arrest and commitment in the Provincial Jail, accused entered a plea of not guilty.

On 6 July 1995, the prosecution, with conformity of the accused, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Relanne and Yolanda had executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance declaring that they lost interest in the further prosecution of the case as it arose out of a family conflict which was already patched up, and the prosecution stated that without their testimonies it could not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In its resolution of 17 July 1995, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss because the affidavit of desistance could not justify dismissal, the pardon extended was made after the filing of the information, the State had become the offended party, and Section 20-A of R.A. No. 7659 disallowed plea-bargaining for an offense with an imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court set pre-trial and trial on 18 and 25 August and 1 September 1995.

Relanne and Yolanda did not appear at pre-trial on 18 August 1995, so the court declared pre-trial terminated and ordered trial to proceed on 25 August and 1 September 1995. On 25 August 1995 and on the succeeding dates set for their testimony—8 September 1995, 22 September 1995, 6 October 1995, and 27 October 1995—mother and daughter did not appear despite orders directing the prosecutor to file a complaint to hold them for indirect contempt and ordering NBI agents Atty. Oscar Tomarong and Atty. Friolo Icao, Jr. to arrest them. In a 1st indorsement, Atty. Tomarong reported that Relanne and Yolanda had left for Cebu probably to elude arrest after learning from print and broadcast media that the court had ordered their arrest; Yolanda, a public school teacher, had filed an indefinite leave of absence; and Relanne had not been attending her classes. The NBI asked for more time to arrest them, but because it failed to arrest and produce them in court at the scheduled hearings of 6 October and 27 October 1995, the prosecution rested its case solely on the testimonies of NBI agent Atty. Tomarong, NBI agent Atty. Icao, Jr., and NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Refe, together with the documents they identified or testified on.

In its formal offer of exhibits dated 9 November 1995, the prosecution offered Exhibit “A,” the complaint sheet accomplished and filed by Yolanda with the NBI CEVRO; Exhibit “B,” Yolanda’s sworn statement given before Atty. Tomarong and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; Exhibit “C,” Relanne’s sworn statement given before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; and Exhibit “D,” the medical certificate issued by Dr. Refe. Atty. Tomarong identified Exhibits “A” and “B,” Atty. Icao identified Exhibit “C,” and Dr. Refe identified Exhibit “D.” Accused objected to Exhibits “A,” “B,” and “C” as hearsay, and to Exhibit “D” on the ground that the medical certificate was not conclusive as to the commission of rape and its contents were not corroborated on material points by the offended party since she did not testify. The trial court admitted all the exhibits as exceptions to the hearsay rule and ordered the defense to present evidence on 15 December 1995. On 9 November 1995, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence, which the trial court denied on 23 November 1995 for being devoid of merit. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and reset the reception of accused’s evidence to 12 January 1996.

In his first and second manifestations, accused informed the trial court that he was waiving his right to present his evidence and asked that the case be submitted for decision. He reiterated this waiver at the hearing on 12 January 1996, which then prompted the court to order the parties to simultaneously submit their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of 20 days. The record, however, does not disclose that any of the parties so filed.

• Dismissal for Lack of Interest: Accused-appellant argued that the criminal complaint should have been dismissed because Relanne and Yolanda were no longer interested in prosecuting, as shown by their Joint Affidavit of Desistance and failure to appear.
• Hearsay Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the sworn statements of Relanne and Yolanda were inadmissible hearsay and could not be part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130, because the affiants did not testify and the NBI agents and medico-legal officer had no personal knowledge of the rape.
• Insufficient Proof: Accused-appellant argued that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, so the conviction should be reversed.

• Affirmance of Conviction: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, agreed with the trial court and prayed for the affirmance in toto of the challenged decision.

• Dismissal Based on Desistance: Whether the criminal complaint should be dismissed because the private complainants lost interest and executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.
• Hearsay and Res Gestae: Whether the sworn statements of Relanne and Yolanda, and the NBI agents’ testimonies recounting their narrations, were admissible as evidence, particularly as part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the accused’s guilt of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty may be imposed on the basis of relationship as an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, rather than under Article 335 as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

• Dismissal Based on Desistance: No. The trial court correctly denied dismissal; an affidavit of desistance or pardon after the institution of the criminal action does not bar prosecution, and plain desistance does not justify dismissal because the People is the true aggrieved party.
• Hearsay and Res Gestae: No. The sworn statements and the NBI agents’ narrations were inadmissible hearsay and did not qualify as res gestae; the medical certificate was admissible because Dr. Refe testified and was cross-examined.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; after the inadmissible hearsay was excluded, the evidence did not overcome the presumption of innocence.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: No. The death penalty could not be imposed under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code; the father-daughter relationship is a special qualifying circumstance under Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

• Dismissal Based on Desistance: The SC held that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss based solely on the affidavit of desistance. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, rape shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor if the offender has been expressly pardoned by said persons; but the pardon must have been granted prior to the institution of the criminal action. An affidavit of desistance filed after the institution of the criminal action, even if based on an express pardon, cannot be a ground to dismiss the action; plain desistance is even less sufficient. The true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines, whose collective sense of morality, decency, and justice has been outraged, and once the case is filed, control of the prosecution is removed from the offended party’s hands. The SC cited Alonte vs. Savellano and People vs. Soliao.
• Hearsay and Res Gestae: The SC applied Section 36, Rule 130: a witness can testify only to facts of personal knowledge derived from his own perception; otherwise, the testimony is hearsay. The NBI agents could identify the documents they prepared in the course of official duties, but their testimonies as to what Relanne and Yolanda told them about the rape were inadmissible hearsay. As to Yolanda, because she was not an eyewitness and learned of the rape only from Relanne, Atty. Tomarong’s testimony about what Yolanda told him was double hearsay. Affidavits are inadmissible unless the affiants take the witness stand, to respect the accused’s constitutional right to confrontation under Section 14(2), Article III, and Section 1, Rule 132 requires examination of witnesses in open court under oath. Exhibits “A,” “B,” and “C” could be admitted only as part of the NBI agents’ testimonies, but their contents relating to the truth of the rape should have been excluded. The medical certificate (Exhibit “D”) was not hearsay because Dr. Refe prepared it from his own examination and testified and was cross-examined. The trial court erred in treating the sworn statements as res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130. The requisites are: (1) the principal act is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. Spontaneity is critical, tested by the time elapsed, place, condition of the declarant, intervening events, and nature and circumstances of the statement. Relanne’s sworn statement was executed on 8 June 1995, 36 days after the alleged rape on 3 May 1995, giving her sufficient time to concoct a falsehood; it was made after she had resolved to file a rape case, after her pregnancy, the filing of the complaint sheet, and her referral for medical examination; and it was made in Dipolog City, far from Liloy where the alleged rape occurred. Yolanda’s statement was even less admissible: she did not witness the rape and learned of it from Relanne, who did not spontaneously tell her; Yolanda confronted Relanne only after the accused confessed, and the confrontation took place on 3 June 1995, a month after the alleged rape. The SC also noted that Section 42 concerns admissibility, not weight and sufficiency, which is covered by Rule 133.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The SC held that the prosecution failed to meet the quantum of proof required in criminal cases. Section 2, Rule 133 provides that an accused is entitled to acquittal unless guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt; proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty but moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. With Relanne and Yolanda not testifying and the sworn statements and NBI agents’ narrations excluded as hearsay, the prosecution was left with the charge sheet, the inadmissible sworn statements, the NBI agents’ testimonies, and the medical certificate. The conviction was based on hearsay evidence and a miscomprehension of the res gestae rule, so the presumption of innocence was not overcome and acquittal was compelled.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: The SC held that the trial court erred in imposing death by reason of relationship as an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 335, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if rape is committed with attendant circumstances, including where the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent. The father-daughter relationship is a special circumstance that makes the death penalty mandatory; relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15, appreciated as aggravating, should no longer be applied in view of R.A. No. 7659. Without the amendment, relationship would still be an aggravating circumstance in rape and acts of lasciviousness. If relationship were appreciated under Article 15, the penalty would not be death but reclusion perpetua, assuming Relanne’s testimony confirmed her sworn statement, because no circumstance attended the rape to bring it under a provision of Article 335 imposing a higher penalty. The SC also admonished prosecutors for the information’s citation of only Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code without reference to R.A. No. 7659, although it noted that the original provisions had already been amended by R.A. No. 2632 and R.A. No. 4111.

• Hearsay Rule — A witness may testify only to facts of personal knowledge derived from his own perception; testimony based on what he heard from others is hearsay and inadmissible unless an exception applies. The SC applied this to exclude the NBI agents’ narrations of what Relanne and Yolanda told them and the affidavits of the complainants who did not testify.
• Res Gestae — Statements made while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be admitted as part of the res gestae. Requisites: (1) the principal act is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. Spontaneity is critical; the SC considered the time elapsed, place, condition of the declarant, intervening events, and nature of the statement. The sworn statements made 36 days later and after intervening events were not spontaneous.
• Affidavit of Desistance and Pardon in Rape — Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, a pardon that would bar prosecution for rape must be granted prior to the institution of the criminal action. An affidavit of desistance filed after the case is instituted, even if based on an express pardon, cannot justify dismissal; plain desistance is even less sufficient. The People is the true aggrieved party, and control of the prosecution is removed from the offended party once the case is filed.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt — An accused is entitled to acquittal unless guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt; this requires moral certainty, not absolute certainty. The SC applied this after excluding the hearsay evidence and found the presumption of innocence not overcome.
• Relationship in Qualified Rape — The father-daughter relationship in rape is a special qualifying circumstance under Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, not an Article 15 alternative aggravating circumstance. When the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, the death penalty is mandatory under the amended Article 335.
• Admissibility vs. Weight — Section 42, Rule 130 governs admissibility of evidence, while Rule 133 governs weight and sufficiency. The SC distinguished the two in rejecting the trial court’s res gestae ruling.
• Medical Certificate as Hearsay — A medical certificate prepared by a physician from his own examination is not hearsay when the physician testifies to it and is cross-examined. The SC held Exhibit “D” admissible on that basis.

• “Acquittal then is compelled by law since the presumption of innocence was not overcome, the conviction having been based on hearsay evidence and a miscomprehension of the rule on statements forming part of the res gestae.” — This states the SC’s core basis for reversing the conviction.
• “It is a basic rule in evidence set forth in Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay.” — This is the hearsay rule the SC applied to the NBI agents’ testimonies.
• “In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.” — This sets out the requisites the sworn statements failed to meet.
• “Clearly then, the father-daughter relationship in rape cases, or between accused and Relanne, in this case, has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. Hence, relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, should no longer be applied in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659.” — This explains why the trial court’s reliance on Article 15 was wrong.

• People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70 [1992] — Controlling precedent on the definition and requisites of res gestae and the factors for spontaneity; followed by the SC.
• People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151 [1969] — Precedent on the admissibility of statements as part of res gestae; followed.
• People vs. Taneo, 218 SCRA 494 [1993] — Cited as further authority on the res gestae requisites; followed.
• Anciro vs. People, 228 SCRA 629 [1993] — Cited as further authority on the res gestae requisites; followed.
• Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477 [1993] — Precedent distinguishing admissibility under Section 42, Rule 130 from weight and sufficiency under Rule 133; followed.
• Alonte vs. Savellano, G.R. Nos. 131652 and 131728, 9 March 1998 — Precedent on the rule that an affidavit of desistance or pardon after institution cannot justify dismissal; followed.
• People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 [1991] — Precedent that the People is the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution; followed.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 — Defines rape and provides the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent. The SC held that the father-daughter relationship is a special circumstance under this provision, not an Article 15 aggravating circumstance.
• Article 15, Revised Penal Code — Lists alternative circumstances, including relationship. The SC held that relationship should no longer be applied as an aggravating circumstance in rape after R.A. No. 7659 because the amended Article 335 treats it as a special qualifying circumstance.
• Article 344, Revised Penal Code — Requires a complaint by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian for rape and allows dismissal only if the offender has been expressly pardoned prior to the institution of the criminal action. The SC applied it to reject the post-filing affidavit of desistance.
• Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court — A witness can testify only to facts of personal knowledge derived from his own perception; otherwise, the testimony is hearsay. The SC applied it to the NBI agents’ narrations.
• Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Defines part of the res gestae. The SC applied its requisites and held the sworn statements inadmissible as res gestae.
• Section 1, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Requires examination of witnesses in open court and under oath or affirmation. The SC cited it to support the exclusion of affidavits whose affiants did not testify.
• Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court — An accused is entitled to acquittal unless guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. The SC applied it in acquitting the accused.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the accused’s right to meet the witnesses against him face-to-face. The SC cited it as the rationale for excluding the affidavits.