People vs. Mangulabnan

In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, it is sufficient that a homicide results by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, regardless of the circumstances, causes, modes, or persons intervening in the commission of the crime; and where conspiracy is established, each conspirator is liable for the acts of the others, including the homicide.

Agustin Mangulabnan, a surrendered Huk, was charged together with several co-defendants before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija with the crime of robbery with homicide arising from an armed intrusion into the home of Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. The prosecution's case centered on the eyewitness identification of Mangulabnan by Cipriana Tadeo and on his own sworn admissions executed before the Justice of the Peace of San Antonio. The legal framework governing the offense is Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when homicide results by reason of or on the occasion of robbery, with the proper penalty determined by Article 63 of the same Code in light of attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

At about eleven o'clock in the evening of November 5, 1953, the sound of gunfire awakened the spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, their four minor children, and Cipriana's mother, Monica del Mundo, in their home at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were ascending the house, then concealed himself inside the ceiling. Moments later, someone broke through the kitchen wall at the back of the house, and an armed intruder entered the dining room, demanding that the door to the living room be opened. When the household members did not comply, the intruder removed three boards from the wall and passed through the opening into the living room. Cipriana Tadeo recognized the intruder, who carried a hunting knife, as Agustin Mangulabnan, whom she had previously known.

Mangulabnan then removed the iron bar securing the balcony door and opened it, allowing two unidentified persons to enter. He approached Cipriana and snatched from her neck a necklace valued at P50, and also took P50 in paper bills and P20 in silver coins from her person. One of the two unidentified men searched Monica del Mundo and seized P200 in cash and a gold necklace valued at P200. Not satisfied with the loot, the same individual demanded a diamond ring from Monica, and when she could not produce it, struck her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. When one of the Pacson children, terrified, called out to his mother, the same man moved to strike the child, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her right arm. At that point, the second unidentified man pushed his companion aside, climbed onto a table, and fired his gun at the ceiling. Mangulabnan and the two unidentified men then departed.

After the intruders had left, Cipriana Tadeo called out to her husband. Receiving no answer, she climbed into the ceiling and found him lying face downward, already dead. Dr. Vicente P. Llado, who performed the autopsy, reported that Vicente Pacson sustained four gunshot wounds — including an entrance wound fracturing the frontal region of the head with an exit wound at the left side near the upper portion of the left ear, and a gunshot wound above the right clavicle with an exit wound at the back in the region of the spinal cord between the two scapulae. The cause of death was severe hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound of the frontal region of the forehead.

The incident was reported to the police authorities that same evening. During the investigation, Cipriana Tadeo informed the Chief of Police that Agustin Mangulabnan was one of the malefactors. When Mangulabnan was investigated, he voluntarily subscribed an affidavit before the Justice of the Peace of San Antonio admitting his participation in the robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson. He later subscribed a second affidavit before the Clerk of Court, in which he exculpated Crispin Estrella — whom he had implicated in the first affidavit — while affirming the truth of the other allegations contained therein.

A complaint was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court against Mangulabnan and ten other unidentified persons, and was amended on January 13, 1954 to include additional named defendants. After preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where the defendants were charged with robbery with homicide. The trial court found Mangulabnan guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with indemnities to Monica del Mundo (P400), Cipriana Tadeo (P132), and the heirs of Vicente Pacson (P6,000), plus costs. Co-defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was acquitted, and the information against the remaining defendants, who were still at large, was dismissed for lack of evidence. Mangulabnan moved for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied for lack of merit, prompting the present appeal.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Appellant argued that a new trial should be granted based on the affidavits of Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre, Marino Ventura, Marcosa Mudlong, and Patricio Gonzales, which he characterized as newly discovered evidence warranting reconsideration of the conviction.
• Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report: Appellant objected to the admission in evidence of the post-mortem report (Exhibit C) on the ground that it was a mere carbon copy.
• Rejection of Defense Exhibit: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in rejecting Exhibit 1, an affidavit purportedly executed by Sgt. Adan Fernando of the Philippine Constabulary, which referenced ballistic findings linking confiscated firearms to the crime scene.

• Requisites for New Trial Not Met: The Solicitor General maintained that the affidavits relied upon by appellant were not genuinely newly discovered, could have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence, and were not of such weight as would probably change the judgment if admitted.
• Conspiracy Established: The Soliciter General argued that appellant and his co-offenders came together to the victims' house to commit the robbery and departed together afterward, demonstrating conspiracy that rendered each liable for the acts of the others.
• Capital Punishment Recommended: The Solicitor General recommended the imposition of the death penalty, given the presence of aggravating circumstances.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether the motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence was properly denied.
• Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report: Whether the post-mortem report (Exhibit C) was inadmissible on the ground that it was a carbon copy.
• Defense Exhibit 1: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting Exhibit 1, the affidavit of Sgt. Adan Fernando.
• Guilt and Conspiracy: Whether appellant was guilty of robbery with homicide, and whether conspiracy was established among the offenders.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the proper penalty should be death given the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the offense.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: No. The motion for new trial was properly denied because the evidence was not genuinely newly discovered, could have been produced at trial with reasonable diligence, and was not of such weight as would probably change the judgment.
• Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report: No error. The carbon copy was admissible because it was signed by the physician who executed it and his signature was identified at the witness stand; moreover, appellant's objection came too late, having failed to object when the exhibit was presented at the hearing.
• Defense Exhibit 1: No error. The latter portion of Sgt. Fernando's affidavit was hearsay, and in any event it was immaterial because two of the three persons who entered the dwelling were unidentified.
• Guilt and Conspiracy: Yes. Appellant's own admissions and the eyewitness testimony of Cipriana Tadeo established his participation, and conspiracy was shown by the offenders' concerted actions in coming together to commit the robbery and departing together afterward.
• Proper Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. Although aggravating circumstances (nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men) warranted the capital penalty under Article 63, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the required number of votes for the imposition of the death penalty was not secured, so the next lower penalty was imposed pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 296.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: The settled rule in this jurisdiction requires, before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial, (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The affidavits of Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre, Marino Ventura, Marcosa Mudlong, and Patricio Gonzales failed to satisfy these requisites; they were not truly newly discovered and could not alter the conclusion reached by the trial court.

• Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report: The objection to Exhibit C on the ground that it was a carbon copy was untenable. The document bore the signature of the physician who executed it, and that signature was identified by the physician himself at the witness stand. Furthermore, appellant raised no objection when the exhibit was offered in evidence at the hearing, rendering his present objection too late under established procedural rules.

• Defense Exhibit 1: The affidavit of Sgt. Adan Fernando was properly rejected because its latter portion — stating that ballistic examination of confiscated firearms "appeared positive" — was hearsay, resting on information relayed to the affiant rather than on his personal knowledge. In any event, the exhibit was of no moment because two of the three persons who entered the Pacson dwelling were unidentified, making any ballistic link to specific firearms irrelevant to the identification of the perpetrators.

• Guilt and Conspiracy: There was no denial that the crime of robbery with homicide was committed as described in the information. Appellant's own sworn admissions (Exhibits A and B) and the testimony of Cipriana Tadeo, who identified him as one of the intruders, established his participation beyond doubt. The offenders came together to the house of the victims to commit the robbery and departed together from the scene, demonstrating conspiracy. Under settled doctrine, unity of purpose and action arising from a common design renders all parties jointly liable, each responsible for the result irrespective of the character of individual participation. Thus, even though the fatal shot was fired by one of the unidentified companions, Mangulabnan was liable for the homicide as a co-conspirator.

• Proper Penalty: The crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The Spanish text of the provision — "con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio" — controls, and it is sufficient that a homicide results by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, without reference to the circumstances, causes, modes, or persons intervening. The commission was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength, and aid of armed men. Pursuant to Article 63, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the presence of these aggravating circumstances called for the imposition of the capital punishment. However, because the required number of votes for the death penalty was not secured, the penalty imposed was the next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 (the Judiciary Act of 1948).

• Robbery with Homicide as a Special Complex Crime — Under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery with homicide is a single, special, and indivisible offense. It is sufficient that a homicide results by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery; it is immaterial that the death supervenes by mere accident, provided the homicide is produced by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. The result obtained is what matters, without reference to or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes, or persons intervening in the commission of the crime. The Court applied this doctrine to hold Mangulabnan liable for the homicide committed by an unidentified co-conspirator during the robbery.

• Conspiracy in Robbery with Homicide — Unity of purpose and action arising from a common design renders all parties to a conspiracy jointly liable, each being responsible for the result irrespective of the character of individual participation. Where offenders come together to commit a robbery and depart together from the scene, conspiracy is established, and each conspirator is liable for the acts of the others, including a homicide committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery.

• Requisites for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence — A new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence requires: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. Failure to satisfy any of these requisites warrants denial of the motion.

• Admissibility of Carbon Copies — A carbon copy of a document is admissible in evidence where it bears the signature of the person who executed it and that signature is identified by the signatory at the witness stand. An objection to admissibility must be timely raised when the document is offered; a belated objection on appeal comes too late.

• "in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason of on the occasion of the robbery" — This passage articulates the controlling interpretation of Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, drawing on the Spanish text and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, and establishes that the special complex crime requires only that homicide occur by reason of or on the occasion of robbery, regardless of the circumstances or persons involved.

• "it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration" — This formulation, drawn from Spanish jurisprudence and Cuello Calón's Código Penal, defines the scope of liability in robbery with homicide and clarifies that the identity of the person who actually committed the killing is immaterial to the existence of the complex crime.

• "unity of purpose and action arising from a common design makes all parties thereto jointly liable, each being responsible for the result, irrespective of the character of their individual participation" — This is the canonical statement of the conspiracy doctrine applied in the case, establishing that a conspirator is liable for all acts of co-conspirators committed in furtherance of the common design, regardless of the nature of his own participation.

• U.S. vs. Tan Jonjua, 1 Phil. 51 — Cited for the rule that newly discovered evidence must be such as could not have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
• U.S. vs. Zamora, 2 Phil. 582 — Cited for the same diligence requirement and for the standard that newly discovered evidence must be of such weight as would probably change the judgment if admitted.
• People vs. Cu-Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906 — Cited for the proposition that newly discovered evidence must be material and of sufficient weight to probably alter the judgment.
• People vs. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11 — Cited for the principle that conspiracy among offenders renders each liable for the acts of the others.
• U.S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188 — Cited for the doctrine that unity of purpose and action arising from a common design makes all parties jointly liable.
• U.S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil. 434 — Cited for the rule that each conspirator is responsible for the result irrespective of the character of individual participation.
• Hodges vs. Salas et al., 63 Phil. 567 — Cited for the proposition that an objection to the admissibility of evidence comes too late if not raised when the evidence is presented at the hearing.

• Article 294, No. 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason of or on the occasion of robbery, homicide is committed. The Court relied on the Spanish text to hold that it is sufficient that homicide results by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery.
• Article 63, No. 1, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties and provides that when the penalty contains two periods and aggravating circumstances are present but no mitigating circumstances, the higher penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this provision to determine that the capital punishment was warranted given the aggravating circumstances.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) — Provides that where the required number of votes for the imposition of the death penalty is not secured, the next lower penalty shall be imposed. The Court applied this provision to impose reclusion perpetua instead of death.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concurred.