People vs. Mangcol

Double jeopardy must be interposed in the court below after a prior arraignment and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, while treacherous ambush qualifies the killing as murder punishable separately for each victim.

Macabangon Mangcol and Maso Pangandog were charged with the murder of Datos Ramber and Maniri allegedly committed on or about June 7, 1946, at Sitio Talub, municipal district of Masiu, Province of Lanao, in company and in conspiracy with Kobla and Domato, who had not been arrested at the time of trial.

According to the prosecution, Pandara Pancoga, a public school teacher, and Bilia Baurak saw the four men hide behind a bush at Talub on June 7, 1946, and attack Ramber and Maniri as they walked by. Macabangon, Domato and Cobla shot the victims with firearms while Maso hacked them after they fell with a campilan. Deputy governor at large Tago Manalokon testified that on June 8, 1946, upon being informed of the murders, he went to Talub and saw the cadavers in Ramber's house, described the wounds, and exhibited in court a jacket with bullet holes which Ramber was wearing and which he ordered taken off and washed. Manalokon added that he thrice sent for the four men identified as killers, that they appeared only after the last summons claiming they had work to do, and that Macabangon, Maso and Domato refused to be sworn on the Koran but admitted that they had not slain the deceased, the testimony stating they admitted to him that they had not slain the deceased.

For their part, defendants and three witnesses undertook to prove that Maniri and Ramber were killed in Bacong during the Japanese occupation, about five years before trial. Their version was that one Lumangkulob killed one Arindig in Bacong, on the opposite side of the lake from Talub, after a quarrel over corn; that Mosur Kauring notified Gindolongan, Lumangkulob's cousin; that Gindolongan fled toward Dimapatoy but stopped in Bacong for lack of a baroto; that Ramber and Makapunong, Arindig's brother, followed and overtook him; that Ramber told Makapunong to fire, which he did; that Gindolongan, who had a rifle, fired back; and that Maniri, present at the shooting, was hit by a stray bullet, leaving Gindolongan, Maniri and Ramber dead in what was described as occurring one Friday followed by Saturday five years earlier. Maso Pangandog denied presence at the killing and said he knew of the shooting only by hearsay computed in Maranao years and from his priest as five years past, while Macabangon Mangcol testified he was at the market in Dansalan, did not see the killing, heard of it one Friday about five years earlier, and knew the deceased only by name.

The trial court credited the prosecution witnesses and convicted both accused, imposing reclusion temporal and P2,000 indemnity per set of heirs.

• Credibility and Contradictions: Petitioner argued that the prosecution evidence was flawed and manifested perjury, dissecting in detail alleged contradictions in the testimony of the eyewitnesses and the investigator.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner maintained that Maso was placed in double jeopardy because Case No. 277 for murder against appellants was dismissed as to Maso in 1947 on the Provincial Fiscal's motion for insufficiency of the offended parties' witnesses to convict beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility and Sufficiency: Whether the alleged contradictions and flaws in the prosecution witnesses' testimony destroy their credibility and warrant reversal.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the prior dismissal of Case No. 277 as to Maso bars the present prosecution for murder.
• Penalty and Indemnity: Whether appellants are guilty of two separate murders qualified by treachery warranting distinct penalties and increased indemnity.

• Credibility and Sufficiency: No. Read as a whole, the evidence fully sustained the findings of guilt, the alleged discrepancies being unsubstantial, satisfactorily explained, or attributable to translation, transcription, and incomplete examination.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The plea was barred where the record showed no prior arraignment and where the defense was not interposed below, pursuant to Rule 113, sections 1 and 10.
• Penalty and Indemnity: Yes. Two separate murders qualified by treachery without modifying circumstances were committed, each punishable by reclusion perpetua with combined service capped at forty years and P6,000 indemnity per set of heirs.

• Credibility and Sufficiency: The conviction was sustained because, notwithstanding detailed attacks on inconsistencies, the testimony engendered belief under more reliable tests of veracity and the discrepancies were unimportant or susceptible of interpretations consistent with good faith. Deficiencies of translation and transcription and lack of thoroughness in examination were taken into account. Deliberate falsehood on one side was inevitable since the defense placed the killing in Bacong across the lake with different assailants and a different date, while the prosecution placed it in Talub with known assailants; belief was given to the prosecution because the decedents' relatives had no motive other than vengeance, mistaken identity was impossible if the defense version of a daylight killing before bystanders were true, and it was inexplicable that relatives would implicate appellants while letting the real culprits go free, with the only impeachment attempt — an alleged P200 extortion demand — denied and unworthy of serious attention.
• Double Jeopardy: The plea was ruled out on two grounds: first, nothing in the record showed dismissal occurred after defendants had been arraigned; second, appellants did not interpose the defense in the court below. Because prior arraignment was unproven and timely invocation was absent, reliance was placed on Rule 113, sections 1 and 10, and on U.S. vs. Perez and Quintos vs. Director of Prisons to bar raising the defense for the first time on appeal.
• Penalty and Indemnity: Two separate crimes of murder qualified by treachery without any modifying circumstance were found, requiring two separate penalties of reclusion perpetua on each appellant, with combined imprisonment not to exceed forty years, and indemnity for each set of heirs raised to P6,000 as recommended by the Solicitor General.

• Credibility of witnesses — minor inconsistencies — Minor discrepancies, especially when satisfactorily explained or traceable to translation, transcription, or incomplete examination, do not destroy credibility where the testimony as a whole sustains the findings under more reliable tests of veracity. Applied to uphold the eyewitness accounts despite the dissected contradictions urged by appellants.
• Murder qualified by treachery — separate offenses per victim — A killing committed by treacherous ambush constitutes murder, and the killing of two victims constitutes two separate murders warranting distinct penalties without modifying circumstances. Applied to impose two reclusion perpetua penalties for the deaths of Ramber and Maniri, with service capped at forty years.
• Double jeopardy — prior arraignment and timely plea — The defense of double jeopardy requires, among others, a prior valid proceeding after arraignment, and under Rule 113, sections 1 and 10, must be interposed in the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as supported by U.S. vs. Perez and Quintos vs. Director of Prisons. Applied to reject Maso's claim based solely on the Fiscal's statement about the 1947 dismissal of Case No. 277.

• "We are of the opinion that, read as a whole, the evidence fully sustains the lower court's findings." — States the core affirmance of the trial court's credibility findings and guilt determination despite alleged contradictions.
• "The faults to which the appellants call our attention are not of sufficient weight to destroy the conviction engendered by other and more reliable test of a witness' veracity." — Defines the standard for disregarding minor flaws when overall testimony remains credible.
• "The conflicting theories of the parties as to the date of the crimes and the identity if the murderers cannot under the circumstances, be due to mistakes." — Frames the conclusion that one set of witnesses deliberately lied given the distant barrios, different dates, and known assailants.
• "By Rule 113, sections 1 and 10, of the Rules of Court, and on the authority of U.S. vs. Perez (1 Phil., 203), and Quintos vs. Director of Prisons (55 Phil., 304-306), the defense instance and can not be raised for the first time on appeal." — States the procedural bar applied to the double-jeopardy plea.

• U.S. vs. Perez, 1 Phil., 203 — Cited as authority that the double-jeopardy defense is waived if not timely interposed and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304-306 — Cited as authority supporting the same procedural bar on raising double jeopardy first on appeal.

• Sections 1 and 10, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Govern the requisites and manner of invoking double jeopardy; applied to rule out the plea where no prior arraignment was shown and the defense was not raised in the court below.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.