People vs. Manansala

In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, and every co-conspirator is equally liable for robbery with homicide even if the evidence does not pinpoint him as the one who fired the fatal shot. Treachery is present when the victim is shot from behind, but evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide and must be proved as relating to the killing.

On March 17, 1986, at about 9:30 o’clock in the evening, Pat. Hector Colmo and his girlfriend Fe Nisperos were sitting at one end of a bench in a shed at the Food Terminal Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal, waiting for a ride home. At the other end of the bench were three men talking among themselves. Nisperos was looking at the approaching bus they were to take when she suddenly heard a shot and scampered in fright. She realized seconds later that she had left her boyfriend behind, so she turned back. She froze in horror: Colmo was slumped on the ground with a bleeding head. One of the three men jumped over the bench and pointed a gun at her; she stopped short. He took the pistol from the fallen victim, looked at her, but did not harm her or speak to her. He fled with his two companions. Nisperos started shouting for help; some people succored her, but it was too late. Colmo expired from “cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound in the head.”

Danilo Manansala was in due time picked up and investigated for the offense. He was subsequently charged with robbery with homicide committed in conspiracy with two unidentified persons and with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. The principal witness for the prosecution was Fe Nisperos. She testified that she saw Manansala clearly by the several lights in the FTI compound as he aimed his gun at her and took the pistol from the dying Colmo. She said she was able to see his face; that he was the one seated nearest to her and trying to hide his face; that she looked at him three to four times for quite some time; and that when she went to the jail with seven or eight persons present, she readily pointed to him. She was sure of her identification based on his face. The defense questioned her credibility, claiming that when she was taken to the detention cell and later to the fiscal’s office to identify Manansala, she hesitated and could not readily point to him as the assailant.

For his part, Manansala testified that at the time of the incident he was not in Bicutan but in Caloocan City. At eight o’clock that evening, he was in the house of Fely Bodomo with his father, his stepmother, and his brothers and sisters. At ten o’clock, he went to sleep, and he stated categorically that he did not leave the house from that hour until he awoke between 5 and 6 o’clock the following morning. Only Bienvenida Bodomo Manansala corroborated him. She testified that at the time of the shooting in Bicutan, Manansala was in her sister-in-law’s house, which was near her own house; she added that Manansala returned home at 10 o’clock that night and went to bed, where he stayed until morning. But she also said under oath that she retired at 9:30 o’clock that evening, so she could not have known of Manansala’s return a half-hour later, when she was already asleep. The sister-in-law, who was in the best position to affirm the statement, was not called to the stand.

The defense made much of the fact that after the shooting of Colmo, Manansala changed his residence from Caloocan City to Bicutan, suggesting that he would not have done so if he were guilty because he would be exposing himself to recognition by witnesses to the shooting and robbery. The autopsy performed by Dr. Desiderio Moraleda showed that the fatal bullet entered the back of Colmo’s head and passed through his mouth. The culprits evidently knew Colmo to be a policeman, although he was in civilian clothes at the time, and killed him because of the firearm he was carrying.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Accused-appellant argued that the RTC gave undue credence to the prosecution evidence and that Fe Nisperos’s identification was not positive or credible because she hesitated and could not readily point to him when taken to the detention cell and the fiscal’s office.
• Presumption of Innocence: Accused-appellant argued that the RTC disbelieved his defense despite the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.
• Alibi: Accused-appellant maintained that he was in Caloocan City at the time of the incident, at the house of Fely Bodomo with his father, stepmother, and siblings, and that he slept there from 10 p.m. until 5 or 6 a.m. the next morning.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Identification: Whether the RTC erred in giving undue credence to Fe Nisperos’s identification of Manansala despite her alleged hesitation at the detention cell and the fiscal’s office.
• Alibi and Presumption of Innocence: Whether the RTC erred in disbelieving Manansala’s alibi and rejecting the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.
• Conspiracy: Whether Manansala is liable for robbery with homicide when the evidence did not pinpoint him as the person who actually shot Colmo, given that he acted in concert with two companions.
• Treachery: Whether treachery aggravated the killing of Colmo.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation aggravated the offense.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Identification: No. The RTC did not err; Nisperos positively identified Manansala by his face under several lights, and any hesitation after more than five months did not necessarily vitiate her credibility.
• Alibi and Presumption of Innocence: No. Alibi is inherently weak, and the testimonies of Manansala and his lone corroborating witness were conspicuously flawed; the prosecution evidence overcame the presumption of innocence.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Manansala acted in concert with two companions in killing and robbing Colmo; in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, so he is liable even if another fired the fatal shot.
• Treachery: Yes. The victim was shot from behind, the fatal bullet entering the back of his head and passing through his mouth, ensuring execution without risk to the offender.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide and must relate to the killing; there was no proof of how and when the plan to kill was hatched or sufficient time for reflection.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Identification: The SC rejected the contention that Nisperos’s identification was not positive enough. Nisperos was definite that it was Manansala whom she saw clearly by the several lights in the FTI compound as he aimed his gun at her and took the pistol from the dying Colmo. She testified that she saw his face, that he was seated nearest to her and trying to hide his face, that she looked at him three to four times for quite some time, and that she readily pointed to him in the jail among seven or eight persons. Even assuming she hesitated when she identified him to police investigators, such hesitation would not necessarily vitiate her credibility because more than five months had elapsed and she had to think back on the night her fiance died before her eyes and focus on her remembrance of the face of the man who had confronted her then.
• Alibi and Presumption of Innocence: The SC held alibi inherently weak, and weaker here because of Nisperos’s positive identification and because the testimonies of Manansala and his lone corroborating witness were conspicuously flawed. Manansala claimed he was in Caloocan City at Fely Bodomo’s house with his father, stepmother, and siblings, and slept there from 10 p.m. until 5 or 6 a.m. Only Bienvenida Bodomo Manansala corroborated him; the sister-in-law, who was in the best position to affirm the statement, was not called. Bienvenida also said Manansala returned home at 10 p.m. and went to bed until morning, but she retired at 9:30 p.m. and could not have known of his return a half-hour later. The SC also rejected the change-of-residence argument: Manansala did not really transfer but returned to Bicutan where he grew up and was at home; it was convenient because he worked in Bicutan and was picked up there walking to work; and he did not feel threatened because none of those who had seen the shooting months before had come forward. The prosecution evidence was strong enough to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• Conspiracy: The SC held it was not necessary to pinpoint Manansala as the person who actually shot Colmo because it was established that he acted in concert with his two companions in killing and robbing their victim. The culprits evidently knew Colmo to be a policeman although in civilian clothes and killed him because of the firearm he was carrying. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, and every co-conspirator is equally liable for the offense committed. Hence, even if it was not Manansala but one of his co-conspirators who fired the gun that killed Colmo, Manansala would still be subject to the penalty imposed by the Revised Penal Code for the crime they had all committed.
• Treachery: The SC held the killing was aggravated by treachery because the victim was shot from behind. Dr. Desiderio Moraleda, who performed the autopsy, testified that the fatal bullet entered the back of Colmo’s head and passed through his mouth. Under Article 14, paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code, there is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. Colmo never knew what hit him and was totally unprepared for the attack that caused his death.
• Evident Premeditation: The SC held evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide; in such an offense, evident premeditation must relate to the killing and not to the robbery. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, where conspiracy is directly established with proof of attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of executing the crime, evident premeditation can be taken for granted; but in implied conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated absent proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it cannot be determined if the accused had sufficient time between its inception and fulfillment to dispassionately consider and accept the consequences. There must be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for reflection and persisted in effectuating his criminal design. No such showing was made, so evident premeditation was rejected.

• Conspiracy — act of one is act of all — In a conspiracy, every co-conspirator is equally liable for the offense committed, and the act of one is the act of all. The SC applied this to hold Manansala liable for robbery with homicide even though the evidence did not pinpoint him as the actual shooter, because he acted in concert with two companions in killing and robbing Colmo.
• Alibi — Alibi is an inherently weak defense, and it becomes weaker when the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and when the accused’s and his corroborating witness’s testimonies are flawed. The SC rejected Manansala’s alibi because Nisperos positively identified him and because his lone corroborating witness retired at 9:30 p.m. and could not confirm his return at 10 p.m., while the sister-in-law was not called.
• Eyewitness identification — A witness’s hesitation in identifying an accused after a long lapse does not necessarily vitiate credibility, especially where the witness positively identifies the accused at trial by his face under sufficient lighting. The SC upheld Nisperos’s identification because she saw Manansala clearly by the several lights in the FTI compound, looked at him three to four times for quite some time, and readily pointed to him in the jail.
• Treachery (alevosia) — There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The SC applied it because Colmo was shot from behind, the fatal bullet entering the back of his head and passing through his mouth, so he never knew what hit him and was totally unprepared.
• Evident premeditation in robbery with homicide — Evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide; it must relate to the killing and not to the robbery. In implied conspiracy, it may not be appreciated absent proof of how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed, and there must be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for reflection and persisted in effectuating his criminal design. The SC rejected it because no such showing was made.

• “In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, and every co-conspirator is equally liable for the offense committed.” — This states the conspiracy rule the SC used to hold Manansala liable even if a co-conspirator fired the fatal shot.
• “Alibi is an inherently weak defense.” — This states the doctrine the SC applied in rejecting Manansala’s alibi despite his claim that he was in Caloocan City at the time of the shooting.
• “Evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide.” — This states the rule the SC used to reject evident premeditation because it must relate to the killing and not to the robbery.
• “There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.” — This defines treachery, which the SC applied because Colmo was shot from behind and was totally unprepared.

• People vs. Pasco, 181 SCRA 233 — Cited as support for the conspiracy rule applied.
• People vs. Quiñones, 183 SCRA 747 — Cited as support for the conspiracy rule applied.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 183 SCRA 763 — Cited as support for the conspiracy rule applied.
• People vs. Baybayon, 184 SCRA 13 — Cited as support for the conspiracy rule applied.
• U.S. vs. Landasan, 35 Phil. 359 — Cited as support for the rule that evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide.
• People vs. Valeriano, 90 Phil. 15 — Cited as support for the rule that evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide.

• Article 14, paragraph (16), Revised Penal Code — Defines alevosia; the SC applied it because Colmo was shot from behind, the fatal bullet entering the back of his head and passing through his mouth, making him unprepared for the attack.
• Constitutional presumption of innocence — The SC considered Manansala’s invocation of the presumption but held that the prosecution evidence was strong enough to overcome it.
• Revised Penal Code (robbery with homicide) — The SC applied the penalty for the crime committed by all co-conspirators, holding Manansala liable even if a co-conspirator fired the fatal shot.