People vs. Manallo

A rape conviction may be sustained on the victim’s straightforward and credible testimony corroborated by medico-legal findings, and the sweetheart defense, being an affirmative defense, must be supported by convincing proof; a plea for forgiveness may be treated as an implied admission of guilt. The trial court’s grant of bail in a capital offense without hearing violates the prosecution’s right to due process.

Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay tenanted a coconut plantation in Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay, where they lived with their daughter Rosaldiza. Alex Manallo was engaged by Romeo in 1989 as a coconut gatherer and worked for the Nabor spouses once a week. The charge against Alex was rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the prosecution relying on Rosaldiza’s testimony and the medico-legal findings of Dr. Ma. Crispa Loria-Florece.

Rosaldiza Nabor, the daughter of Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay, lived with her parents in the coconut plantation they tenanted in Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay. Rosaldiza helped with household chores by washing the family’s dirty laundry every Saturday at the barangay reservoir, a long trek along an uninhabited route that usually took her fifteen minutes to negotiate from the reservoir to their house. In 1989, Romeo engaged Alex Manallo as a coconut gatherer; Alex helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produce once a week and was paid P150.00 per day.

In the early morning of March 30, 1992, Liliosa left their house for the market, and Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash clothes, bringing a pail and a basin and wearing a t-shirt and short pants. After washing her clothes, Rosaldiza took a quick bath. At around 11:00 a.m., drenched all over, she left the reservoir and trekked the same route home. On her way, Alex suddenly appeared from the bushes and grabbed her from behind; he was completely naked. He covered her mouth and poked a knife on her neck. Rosaldiza dropped the basin and pail and fought to extricate herself, but Alex was too strong. He dragged her to a grassy portion, pulled her down, and pinned her to the ground. She cried and shouted for help while resisting, but when Alex boxed her on her thighs and abdomen, she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, Rosaldiza noticed that she was completely naked; she felt weak and tired, her private parts and body ached all over, and she noticed semen in her vagina. She cried bitterly, and Alex dressed up and warned her not to tell her parents, brothers, and sisters of the incident, otherwise he would kill them all. Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home.

By the time Rosaldiza reached home, Liliosa was already there, and Rosaldiza related to her mother what had happened. Stunned, Liliosa accompanied Rosaldiza to the house of the barangay captain, but the latter was out. The distraught mother and daughter proceeded to the house of barangay kagawad Elesio Obal, to whom they related that Alex had raped Rosaldiza. Liliosa, Rosaldiza, and Elesio boarded a tricycle and went to the Camilig Police Station, where Liliosa and Rosaldiza had the incident reported in the police blotter. The trio then proceeded to the Rural Health Unit of Camilig, where Dr. Ma. Crispa Loria-Florece, the Municipal Health Officer, conducted a physical, pelvic, and smear examination of Rosaldiza and issued a medico-legal certificate. The certificate noted a contusion on the right cheek; a hematoma on the distal third, anterior aspect of the right thigh; fresh bleeding hymenal lacerations at the 3:00, 5:00, 6:00, and 8:00 o’clock positions; a smooth, small, and firm cervix; negative adnexa; bloody and whitish stick mucous per examining finger; a cervix with pinkish and whitish secretion at the post fornix; and a vaginal smear with motile sperm cells. Dr. Loria-Florece testified that the contusion and hematoma could have been caused by a fist blow or slapping, that the fresh bleeding and multiple hymenal lacerations could have been caused by sexual intercourse or the entry of a hard object, and that Rosaldiza was still a virgin when examined but lost her virginity about an hour before the examination because fresh hymenal bleeding usually stops in about one or two hours from laceration. Rosaldiza and Liliosa later returned to the police station and executed their respective sworn statements.

On April 27, 1992, an information was filed with the RTC of Legaspi City charging Alex with rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. No bail was recommended. On May 8, 1992, Alex filed a motion for bail with no specific date and time for its hearing; on the same day, the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and fixing the bail bond at P50,000.00. Alex posted a property bond, which was immediately approved, and he was forthwith released from detention. At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. The prosecution prayed that the trial court cancel the bond because the petition for bail had been granted without due hearing, but the trial court held resolution in abeyance until after the prosecutor presented its witnesses on June 18, 1992, stating that the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in Alex’s petition for bail and trial on the merits. On June 18, 1992, the trial court issued an order that Alex would remain free on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date set for the hearing on his petition for bail. Alex failed to attend the trial on June 22, 1992, and the trial court issued an order for his arrest, but he could no longer be found at his address. He was arrested only on January 22, 1998, six years later.

At trial, Alex denied sexually assaulting Rosaldiza on March 30, 1992, and claimed that they had been lovers engaging in sexual intimacies for over a year before that date. He said that whenever they had sexual intercourse, he gave her P100.00 to P150.00; that he came to know Rosaldiza in 1989 when he started working for the Nabors; that he was then 26 years old and Rosaldiza was barely in her teens; that Rosaldiza gave him special attention by personally serving him lunch and flirted with him; that he teased her by asking her to become his second wife; that she bought cigarettes for him and kept the change; that he gave her pocket money for her schooling; and that their relationship blossomed and in 1991 they started having sexual intercourse, either at Honrado’s nipa hut or in the grassy wilderness. Alex recalled that on March 27, 1992, at around 7:00 a.m., he left his house and played basketball, then went to Laura’s house for water; while drinking, Rosaldiza called him and asked for P300.00 for a new pair of shoes; he told her he would give the money at their usual tryst after his rounds; she agreed and said she would drop by her house to get laundry clothes so her parents would not get suspicious; they met at the agreed place, she demanded the P300.00, he refused and insisted on sexual intercourse first, she agreed, but after the act he still refused to give the money; Rosaldiza got furious and warned she would tell her mother, and Alex pacified her by promising to give the money on Monday and assuring her that if she got pregnant he would leave his wife and they would settle in Manila. Alex said that after appeasing Rosaldiza they went home, he ate lunch and slept, and at about 1:00 p.m. his wife woke him and told him that four policemen were looking for him; he went with the policemen to the police station, where he was placed under arrest. He also testified that when his wife Teresita visited him that day, he admitted to her his relationship with Rosaldiza, and his wife cried and got angry. Teresita testified that when she visited Alex in his cell after his arrest, he confided that he had already admitted the charge and instructed her to talk to Liliosa to ask for forgiveness and, if possible, to settle the matter with the Nabors; on her way out of the municipal jail she chanced upon the Nabors and relayed Alex’s instructions, but the Nabors rejected the offer, and Liliosa was resolute in filing a case against Alex. The RTC found Rosaldiza’s testimony credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the ordinary course of things; it found that her conduct and the subsequent events immediately after the sexual assault credibly established the truth of her charge, that Dr. Florece’s findings supported her story, and that the physical evidence showed forcible sexual intercourse on March 30, 1992. The RTC also considered Alex’s flight, his jumping bail, and his eluding arrest for six years as evidence of his guilt.

• Conviction Based on Weakness of Defense: Alex argued that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him not on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence but rather on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. He conceded that his defense was inherently weak but maintained that the trial court dwelt mainly on discrediting the defense and did not sufficiently explain why it gave credence to Rosaldiza’s testimony; even assuming his testimony was unbelievable, that alone could not sustain a conviction because the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence and is not relieved of the onus of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt by the weakness of the defense.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the RTC erred in convicting Alex Manallo not on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence but on the weakness of the defense.
• Sweetheart Defense: Whether Alex’s claim that he and Rosaldiza were lovers should be credited.
• Plea for Forgiveness: Whether Alex’s plea for forgiveness and settlement may be considered an implied admission of guilt.
• Bail: Whether the trial court’s grant of bail without a hearing deprived the prosecution of due process.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.
• Damages: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are proper.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: No. The RTC convicted Alex on the strength of Rosaldiza’s credible testimony and Dr. Florece’s medico-legal findings, not merely on the weakness of his defense; the prosecution established rape beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sweetheart Defense: No. The sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense requiring convincing proof; Alex’s self-serving assertions and his wife’s testimony were not corroborated by love notes, mementos, pictures, or tokens.
• Plea for Forgiveness: Yes. A plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to compromise and may be received as an implied admission of guilt.
• Bail: No. The trial court granted bail without a hearing and without allowing the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt, depriving the prosecution of due process.
• Penalty: Yes. The use of a knife was a special aggravating circumstance, but with no other aggravating circumstance proven, reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Damages: Partly. Civil indemnity was reduced to P50,000 because the rape was committed before Republic Act No. 7659; moral damages of P50,000 were affirmed, and exemplary damages of P25,000 were awarded due to the use of a deadly weapon.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The SC rejected Alex’s contention that the RTC convicted him on the weakness of his defense. It said even a cursory reading of the RTC decision showed that the conviction rested on Rosaldiza’s testimony, Dr. Loria-Florece’s testimony, and the physical evidence. The RTC found Rosaldiza’s testimony credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the ordinary course of things; her conduct and immediate report to her mother, barangay officials, and police credibly established her charge. Dr. Loria-Florece examined Rosaldiza at 12:15 p.m. on March 30, 1992, about one hour after the rape; the external examination showed a contusion on the right cheek and a hematoma on the right thigh, compatible with her testimony that Alex slapped her and boxed her thigh, causing her to lose consciousness. The internal examination showed fresh bleeding hymenal lacerations at the 3:00, 5:00, 6:00, and 8:00 o’clock positions, which the doctor said were sustained about one or two hours before the examination because hymenal lacerations stop bleeding after one or two hours; Rosaldiza was still a virgin, and the motile sperm cells were alive, indicating recent sexual intercourse. The SC held that Rosaldiza’s testimony bore the hallmarks of truth, was consistent on material points, and was unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by material inconsistencies; under the rule, such testimony must be given full faith and credit, and her credibility was augmented because there was no evidence of a motive to testify against Alex. The medico-legal findings buttressed her testimony: the fresh lacerations were the best physical evidence of defloration, the motile sperm cells affirmed her charge, and the contusion and hematoma proved struggle and resistance. The SC also took judicial notice that it is highly inconceivable for a young barrio lass to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her family’s honor unless motivated by a desire to seek justice. It noted the trial court’s consideration of Alex’s flight, jumping bail, and six years in hiding as evidence of guilt.
• Sweetheart Defense: The SC agreed with the RTC in discounting Alex’s sweetheart defense. Alex failed to establish the existence of the alleged relationship; Rosaldiza specifically denied that Alex was ever her sweetheart. In People vs. Apostol, the SC described the sweetheart defense as a much-abused defense that sorely tests the SC’s patience; being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof. Alex failed to discharge that burden. Other than his self-serving assertions and his wife’s testimony, there was no support for his claim that he and Rosaldiza were lovers; the sweetheart defense cannot be given credence without corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures, or tokens. Even assuming that they were lovers, that fact would not preclude rape because a love affair did not necessarily mean there was consent; a love affair would not justify subjecting Rosaldiza to his carnal desires against her will. The SC also noted that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she had been raped unless that was the truth, and that in rural areas young ladies by custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence; even assuming Rosaldiza was a girl of loose morals, moral character is immaterial in rape because even prostitutes can be rape victims.
• Plea for Forgiveness: The SC held that the prosecution’s case was fortified by Alex’s own evidence. His wife Teresita testified that Alex instructed her to plead for Rosaldiza’s forgiveness and for the settlement of the case, and that she relayed Alex’s plea to Liliosa, who turned it down. The SC considered a plea for forgiveness and for settlement as an implied admission of guilt in a case of similar factual backdrop. It explained that a plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to compromise; in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on account of a wrong committed, and to give up claim to requital from or retribution upon an offender. It cited People vs. Calimquim, which stated that the fact that the appellant’s mother sought forgiveness for her son from the victim’s father is an indication of guilt, and People vs. Olmedillo.
• Bail: The SC expressed concern and displeasure at the trial court’s egregious procedural lapse in granting bail to Alex. Alex was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Under Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, at the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed by a person in custody for an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong; evidence presented during the bail hearings is automatically reproduced at trial. The trial court was mandated to notify the prosecutor of the hearing, conduct a hearing where bail is a matter of discretion regardless of whether the prosecution refuses to present evidence, decide whether guilt is strong based on the summary of the prosecution’s evidence, and discharge the accused upon approval of the bail bond if guilt is not strong, otherwise deny the petition. In this case, Alex filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992, with no specific date and time for hearing, yet on the same day the trial court granted the motion and fixed the bail bond at P50,000.00 without any factual basis stated in the order. Even when the prosecutor prayed for cancellation of the bond on June 17, 1992 because the motion was granted without giving the prosecution a chance to be heard and adduce evidence, the trial court held resolution in abeyance and allowed Alex to remain free on his bond. The prosecution was patently deprived of its right to due process. In Go vs. Judge Bongolan, et al., the SC emphasized that a bail application involves not only the accused’s right to temporary liberty but also the State’s right to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements; these rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence the necessity for a hearing to guide the exercise of jurisdiction. The presiding judge exposed his gross ignorance of the law, and Alex jumped bail and eluded arrest for six years, to the prejudice of the administration of justice.
• Penalty: The SC agreed with the trial court that Alex was guilty of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The use of a knife to consummate the crime was a special aggravating circumstance that warranted the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. However, the prosecution failed to prove any other aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, so the trial court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Damages: The SC held that the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages, resting on the jural foundation that rape necessarily brings with it shame, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock, and social humiliation. The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be reduced to P50,000.00 in line with People vs. Banela, which held that if the crime of rape was committed before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, the amendatory law restoring the death penalty, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party shall remain P50,000.00. Exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be awarded pursuant to People vs. Catubig, which justified the award under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code; since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was attendant in the commission of the rape, the offended party was entitled to exemplary damages.

• Credibility of a rape victim — When a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions on material points, it must be given full faith and credit; credibility is augmented when the victim has no motive to testify against the accused. The SC applied this to Rosaldiza, whose testimony was consistent on material points and corroborated by medical evidence.
• Sweetheart defense — An affirmative defense in rape that must be supported by convincing proof; self-serving assertions are insufficient, and corroborative evidence such as love notes, mementos, pictures, or tokens is required. Even if a love affair is proven, it does not necessarily mean consent and does not preclude rape. The SC rejected Alex’s defense for lack of corroboration.
• Plea for forgiveness as implied admission of guilt — A plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to compromise; in criminal cases, except quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. The SC applied this to Alex’s instruction to his wife to seek forgiveness and settlement.
• Bail in capital offenses — At the hearing of a bail application by a person in custody for an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong; the court must notify the prosecutor, conduct a hearing, and decide whether guilt is strong based on the summary of the prosecution’s evidence. A grant of bail without hearing deprives the prosecution of due process. The SC applied this to criticize the trial court’s grant of bail to Alex.
• Use of deadly weapon in rape — The use of a knife to consummate rape is a special aggravating circumstance that warrants the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; where no other aggravating circumstance is proven, the penalty is reclusion perpetua under Article 63. The SC applied this to affirm the penalty.
• Civil indemnity for rape committed before RA 7659 — If the rape was committed before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, the civil indemnity to the offended party remains P50,000.00. The SC applied this to reduce the RTC’s P75,000.00 award to P50,000.00.
• Exemplary damages for special aggravating circumstance — Exemplary damages may be awarded under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code when a special aggravating circumstance, such as the use of a deadly weapon, attends the commission of the crime. The SC applied this to award P25,000.00 exemplary damages.
• Flight as evidence of guilt — The trial court considered Alex’s jumping bail and hiding for six years as evidence of guilt. The SC noted this in its review.

• “The rule is that when a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.” — The SC used this rule to uphold Rosaldiza’s credibility despite Alex’s challenge to the RTC’s reliance on her testimony.
• “Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof.” — The SC cited this in rejecting Alex’s sweetheart defense for lack of corroboration.
• “A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.” — The SC used this to treat Alex’s instruction to his wife to seek forgiveness and settlement as an implied admission of guilt.
• “A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction.” — The SC quoted this in criticizing the trial court’s grant of bail without hearing.

• People vs. Apostol, 320 SCRA 327, 339 (1999) — Controlling precedent for the rule that the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense requiring convincing proof and corroboration.
• People vs. Calimquim — Cited for the rule that a plea for forgiveness may be received as an implied admission of guilt.
• People vs. Olmedillo, L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193 — Cited in Calimquim for the proposition that a mother’s seeking forgiveness for her son from the victim’s father is an indication of guilt.
• People vs. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 (1999) — Controlling precedent for reducing civil indemnity to P50,000 where rape was committed before Republic Act No. 7659.
• People vs. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001) — Controlling precedent for awarding exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code due to the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon.
• Go vs. Judge Bongolan, et al., 311 SCRA 99 (1999) — Controlling precedent for the necessity of a hearing in bail applications and balancing the accused’s liberty against the State’s right to protect the community.
• People vs. Peñero, 276 SCRA 564 — Cited in the RTC findings quoted by the SC for the inference that hymenal lacerations indicate forcible insertion of the penis.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Defines and penalizes rape. Alex was convicted under Article 335(1) for rape by using force and intimidation; the use of a knife was a special aggravating circumstance.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the penalty when there are aggravating circumstances. Because only the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon was proven and no other aggravating circumstance attended the crime, the SC affirmed reclusion perpetua.
• Section 5, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that at the hearing of a bail application by a person in custody for an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong, and evidence presented during the bail hearing is automatically reproduced at trial. The trial court violated this by granting bail without hearing.
• Sections 18, 7, 8, and 19, Rule 114, Rules of Court, as amended — Cited in the SC’s list of duties of the trial court in resolving bail: notify the prosecutor, conduct a hearing where bail is discretionary, decide whether guilt is strong based on the prosecution’s summary of evidence, and discharge or deny accordingly. The trial court failed to comply.
• Article 2230, New Civil Code — Basis for exemplary damages when a special aggravating circumstance, such as the use of a deadly weapon, attends the commission of the crime. The SC used this to award P25,000.00 exemplary damages.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Amendatory law restoring the death penalty, which took effect on January 1, 1994. Because the rape was committed before its effectivity, the civil indemnity remained P50,000.00 under People vs. Banela.