People vs. Malasugui

A warrantless search and seizure is valid when it is incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest based on probable cause, or when the person searched voluntarily consents to the search. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived, and such waiver may be express or implied.

The accused, Kagui Malasugui, was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide for the death of Tan Why, a Chinese merchant and palay buyer for the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company in Cotabato. The case arose under the Revised Penal Code and the Revised Administrative Code, which governed warrantless arrests by members of the Constabulary and municipal police. The constitutional provision on the inviolability of one's right against unreasonable searches and seizures, found in Article III, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1935 Constitution, was at issue, being identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

At about 5:30 in the morning of March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant and palay buyer for the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, was found lying on the ground with several wounds in the head on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato. He had a fatal wound on his upper forehead that fractured his skull, and he died shortly afterward in the Cotabato Hospital. When Moro Alamada, among the first to approach him, asked who had attacked him, Tan Why laconically answered "Kagui," the name by which the appellant was known in Cotabato. Lieutenant A. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered the appellant's immediate arrest, and he was arrested shortly after eight o'clock the same morning.

After the appellant was brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, who had been informed that the appellant had just redeemed two pairs of bracelets from pawnshops and carried money, the lieutenant asked him for the bracelets. The appellant voluntarily and without protest produced them, and these became Exhibit A. He was later searched without opposition or protest, and it was discovered that he had a pocketbook (Exhibit B) containing P92 in bills (Exhibit C), Tan Why's identification card, and a memorandum of amounts with Chinese characters (Exhibit D). In one of his pants pockets was found some change, making the total money found in his possession P92.68.

The deceased had carried the pocketbook, Exhibit B, a few hours before his body was found, and it was full of bills because he was on his way to purchase palay. The memorandum of amounts, Exhibit D, was in Tan Why's handwriting. The afternoon before his death, Kaw Tin of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company had given him P150 to invest in the purchase of palay, in addition to P80 that remained from a previous delivery. About four meters from where Tan Why's body was found, there was a coconut tree with two dangling leaves arranged as if to hide someone, and at the spot where the leaves touched the ground were fresh footprints exactly the same size as the appellant's foot. A bloodstained club, Exhibit M, was found near the place where Tan Why was wounded.

The appellant testified that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through intimidation taken the bracelets, pocketbook, and money from him, and that the identification card was blank and the memorandum was not in Tan Why's handwriting, insinuating that the officers had fabricated the evidence. The Court found nothing in the record to corroborate this imputation, and found it unbelievable that the officers so acted, as they were induced by no other motive than to comply with their duties. The appellant permitted the search and made no objection or protest. The appellant also attempted to prove that the money found in his possession had been given to him by relatives, but the Court found that if he had enough money days prior, he would not have redeemed the bracelets on the very morning in question, and their testimony did not destroy the unexplained finding of the deceased's pocketbook and personal papers in his possession.

• Denial of Time to Prepare Defense: The appellant contended that the lower court did not grant him even twenty-four hours to prepare his defense, thereby denying him the right afforded to every accused by section 30 of General Orders, No. 58.
• Illegal Search and Seizure: The appellant contended that he was subjected to an unreasonable search and that the court should have ordered the return of the articles taken from him during the search of his person, which was done without a corresponding judicial warrant.
• Admission of Evidence: The appellant contended that there was error in the admission of Exhibits A, B, C, and D, alleging that they had been taken from him through force and intimidation.
• Denial of Motion to Dismiss: The appellant contended that the lower court erred in denying his petition to dismiss for lack of evidence, filed immediately after the fiscal had finished presenting his evidence.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: The appellant contended that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of robbery with homicide instead of acquitting him.

• Validity of Arrest and Search: The Office of the Solicitor-General, as appellee, maintained the validity of the warrantless arrest and the subsequent search, relying on the circumstances that warranted the arrest and the appellant's voluntary submission to the search.
• Admissibility of Evidence: The appellee argued that the effects found in the possession of a person detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto.

• Time to Prepare Defense: Whether the lower court erred in not granting the appellant a period of twenty-four hours to prepare his defense.
• Validity of Search and Seizure: Whether the lower court erred in denying the appellant's petition for the return of articles taken from him during a search of his person without a judicial warrant.
• Admissibility of Evidence: Whether the lower court erred in admitting Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, L and 1 as evidence in the case.
• Denial of Motion to Dismiss: Whether the lower court erred in denying the appellant's petition to dismiss for lack of evidence.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of acquitting him.

• Time to Prepare Defense: No. The appellant did not ask for time to prepare his defense; to be entitled to said time as a matter of right, the interested party must expressly ask for it. After his petition for the return of his effects was denied, he forthwith asked, through his counsel, to be arraigned and to proceed with the trial.
• Validity of Search and Seizure: No. The warrantless arrest was justified by probable cause, and the search was lawful as incidental to a valid arrest and because the appellant voluntarily submitted to it. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
• Admissibility of Evidence: No. The lower court committed no error in accepting Exhibits A, B, C and D as evidence, not only because the appellant did not object to the taking thereof when searched, but also because the effects found in the possession of a person detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto.
• Denial of Motion to Dismiss: No. The facts established by the prosecution's evidence were sufficient to constitute the crime of robbery with homicide, and the motion to dismiss was properly denied.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The unexplained possession of the deceased's pocketbook, money, and personal papers, together with the other circumstances, supported the conviction for robbery with homicide.

• Time to Prepare Defense: The Court examined the record and found nothing to convince it that the lower court had refused to grant the appellant time to prepare his defense. The law prescribes that the interested party must expressly ask for it, and the appellant not only did not ask for it but, after his petition for the return of his effects had been denied, he forthwith asked, through his counsel, to be arraigned and to proceed with the trial.

• Validity of Search and Seizure: The Court held that the appellant's contention that he was subjected to an unreasonable search was unfounded. The appellant voluntarily produced the bracelets and permitted the search, making no objection or protest. The Court cited Cooley's Constitutional Limitations for the principle that when one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may be waived, either expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, the circumstances warranted the appellant's arrest without a judicial warrant: he was charged with the crime imputed to him by Tan Why before his death; he was known to be carrying much money; and he had just redeemed two pairs of bracelets shortly after the assault. Under sections 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383 of the Revised Administrative Code, members of the Constabulary and municipal police may make arrests without judicial warrant when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested. The Court cited U.S. vs. Fortaleza, U.S. vs. Samonte, U.S. vs. Batallones, and U.S. vs. Santos. The Court also cited Section 105 of General Orders, No. 58, which provides that a person charged with a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The Court noted that Article III, section 1, paragraph (3) of the Constitution is identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which has been interpreted as not prohibiting arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. When the search of a person detained or arrested and the seizure of effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.

• Admissibility of Evidence: The Court held that the appellant's testimony that the articles were taken through force and intimidation could not prevail against the testimony of the government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who testified that the appellant did not show the least opposition to the search. The effects found in the possession of a person detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto, citing Adams vs. New York, Weeks vs. United States, and People vs. Mayen. The Court found it repugnant to maintain the opposite view because it would amount to authorizing the return to the accused of the means of conviction seized from him for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.

• Denial of Motion to Dismiss: The Court found that the facts established by the prosecution's evidence were sufficient to constitute the crime of robbery with homicide. The testimony of the government witnesses established the elements of the crime, and the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court found that the appellant's attempt to prove that the money found in his possession had been given to him by relatives was not credible. The four witnesses who testified in his favor were all relatives, and if the appellant had enough money several days prior to the aggression, the natural thing to assume is that he would not have redeemed the two bracelets on the very morning in question. Their testimony did not destroy the unexplained finding in the appellant's possession of the deceased's pocketbook, containing much money, and the latter's personal papers. In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of said person and of the robbery committed on him, citing U.S. vs. Merin and U.S. vs. Divino. The facts fully established constitute the crime of robbery with homicide defined and punished with reclusion perpetua to death in article 249, subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code. As no aggravating circumstance had been proven and the penalty imposed by the lower court was in accordance with law, taking into consideration the rules prescribed in article 63 of said Code, the appealed judgment was affirmed.

• Waiver of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures — The constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable search may be waived, and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. In this case, the appellant voluntarily produced the bracelets and permitted the search without objection or protest, thus waiving his right.

• Warrantless Arrest and Search Incident Thereto — A warrantless arrest is lawful when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested. A search and seizure incidental to such a lawful arrest cannot be considered unreasonable or unlawful. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the arrest and search of the appellant, who was identified by the dying victim and found with the victim's effects.

• Presumption of Guilt from Unexplained Possession of Stolen Effects — In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of said person and of the robbery committed on him. The Court applied this presumption to the appellant, who had no credible explanation for his possession of the deceased's pocketbook, money, and personal papers.

• "When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I page 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly." — This passage establishes the doctrine of waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which was central to the Court's ruling on the admissibility of the seized evidence.

• "Article III, section 1, paragraph (3), of our Constitution is identical in all respects to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; and said constitutional precept has been interpreted as not prohibiting arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable." — This passage defines the scope of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, clarifying that it does not prohibit all warrantless searches but only those that are unreasonable.

• "When the search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be considered unreasonable, much less unlawful." — This passage articulates the doctrine of search incident to a lawful arrest, which was the primary basis for upholding the search of the appellant.

• "In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of said person and of the robbery committed on him (U.S. vs. Merin, 2 Phil., 88; U.S. vs. Divino, 18 Phil., 425)." — This passage states the presumption of guilt from unexplained possession of stolen effects, which supported the conviction for robbery with homicide.

• U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472 — Cited as authority for the rule that members of the Constabulary and municipal police may make warrantless arrests when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that a crime has been committed by the person arrested.
• U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516 — Cited as authority for the validity of warrantless arrests under the circumstances described in the Revised Administrative Code.
• U.S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46 — Cited as authority for the validity of warrantless arrests under the circumstances described in the Revised Administrative Code.
• U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853 — Cited as authority for the validity of warrantless arrests under the circumstances described in the Revised Administrative Code.
• Weeks vs. United States, 232 U.S., 652 — Cited as authority for the rule that a search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest cannot be considered unreasonable, and for the admissibility of evidence seized in such a search.
• Adams vs. New York, 192 U.S., 585 — Cited as authority for the admissibility of effects found in the possession of a person detained or arrested if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto.
• People vs. Mayen, 205 Pac., 435 — Cited as authority for the admissibility of effects found in the possession of a person detained or arrested.
• U.S. vs. Merin, 2 Phil., 88 — Cited as authority for the presumption of guilt from unexplained possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed.
• U.S. vs. Divino, 18 Phil., 425 — Cited as authority for the presumption of guilt from unexplained possession of stolen effects.

• Article III, Section 1, paragraph (3), 1935 Constitution — The constitutional provision on the inviolability of one's right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures. The Court interpreted this provision as not prohibiting arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.
• Article 249, subsection 1, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and punishing the crime of robbery with homicide with reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision to affirm the conviction.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — The provision prescribing the rules for the application of indivisible penalties. The Court applied this provision in affirming the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the lower court.
• Article 269, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and punishing unlawful arrest. The Court held that the warrantless arrest of the appellant did not violate this provision because it was justified by reasonable motives.
• Sections 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383, Revised Administrative Code — The provisions authorizing members of the Insular Police or Constabulary, municipal police, and police of chartered cities to make arrests without judicial warrant when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that a crime has been committed by the person arrested.
• Section 30, General Orders, No. 58 — The provision affording every accused the right to time to prepare his defense. The Court held that to be entitled to said time as a matter of right, the interested party must expressly ask for it.
• Section 105, General Orders, No. 58 — The provision stating that a person charged with a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The Court cited this provision to support the validity of the search of the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concurred.