People vs. Maglian

A dying declaration is admissible as evidence when it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death, is made when death appears imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death, the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived, and the declaration is offered in a case where the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. The mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong requires a notable disparity between the means employed and the resulting crime, which was absent where the accused poured kerosene over his wife and lit a match, causing 90% third-degree burns.

The accused, a businessman engaged in lending and the buying and selling of cars and real estate, married Atty. Mary Jay Rios on January 29, 1999, and they had a son, Mateo Jay. The case involves the charge of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalties of reclusion perpetua to death for the killing of a lawfully wedded spouse. The prosecution and defense presented competing versions of the events surrounding the victim's death, with the central dispute being whether the burning was intentional or accidental.

The accused, Jay Mandy Maglian, a businessman engaged in lending and the buying and selling of cars and real estate, married Atty. Mary Jay Rios on January 29, 1999, and they had a son, Mateo Jay. On January 4, 2000, the accused and Mary Jay were having dinner at their home in Dasmariñas, Cavite when they got into an argument over the accused not wanting Mary Jay to attend a party. Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that Mary Jay had given him for Christmas, told her he would burn them all, and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to wrestle the can of kerosene from him and warned him not to pour it on her, but despite her plea, the accused still poured gas on her, setting both the clothes and his wife on fire.

The accused brought Mary Jay to the De La Salle University Medical Center in Dasmariñas, and after four days she was transferred by her aunt to the burn unit of the East Avenue Medical Center in Quezon City, where her condition improved. Subsequently, however, the accused transferred her to St. Claire Hospital, which did not have a burn unit. Since her condition deteriorated, Lourdes Rios, Mary Jay's mother, had her transferred to the Philippine General Hospital in Manila, but she was no longer able to recover. Before she expired, she told her mother what had happened to her, declaring, "Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. (Jay Mandy burned me.)" She passed away on February 24, 2000.

The accused, in his defense, claimed the burning incident was completely accidental. He said Mary Jay was being difficult while they were arguing, threatened to throw away the clothes he had given her, and to spite her, he took the clothes she had given him and told her he would burn them all. He then got a match and a gallon of kerosene, and Mary Jay caught up with him at the dirty kitchen and took the match and kerosene from him, with both getting wet from the spilled kerosene. She screamed, "Mandy, Mandy, wag yan, wag yan, ako na lang ang sunugin mo. (Mandy, don't burn that, burn me instead.)" The accused left his wife and went upstairs to his son, and while climbing the stairs, he heard Mary Jay shouting, "Mandy, Mandy, nasusunog ako. (Mandy, I'm burning.)" He ran down, embraced his wife, poured water on her, and brought her to the car while shouting for help, sustaining burns on his legs and arms in the process.

While Mary Jay was still confined at the East Avenue Medical Center, the accused learned from a certain Judge Tanguanco that using "red medicine" would help heal his wife's burn wounds, but the hospital did not allow him to use it on Mary Jay. He thus had his wife transferred to PGH, and when there was no space at the hospital, she was transferred to St. Claire Hospital with the help of a certain Judge Español. The doctors at St. Claire advised him to stop using the "red medicine" when her wounds started to get worse and began emitting a foul odor. The accused asserted that his mother-in-law, Lourdes Rios, and their laundrywoman, Norma Saballero, accused him of burning his wife since his wife's family had been angry with him ever since they got married, as they used to ask money from them and would get angry if they did not receive any help.

The accused likewise claimed that his late wife made a dying declaration in the presence of PO3 Celestino San Jose and Atty. Rosemarie Perey-Duque, who visited her at East Avenue Medical Center on January 13, 2000. PO3 San Jose testified that he took Mary Jay's statement, which was in his handwriting, and Atty. Duque testified that the statements of Mary Jay were reduced into writing and she helped in lifting the arm of the patient so that she could sign the document. The trial court conducted a demonstration in open court about the struggle for possession of the kerosene container, which showed that the contents did not spill owing to the little amount of liquid and its narrow opening, leading the court to conclude that to wet 90 percent of the body surface, the kerosene must have been poured over the head of the deceased.

• Guilt Not Established Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant contended that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt, arguing that he never intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, and that the victim's dying declaration showed that what happened to her was an accident, corroborated by three witnesses and the victim's attending physician.
• Mitigating Circumstance of No Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Accused-appellant argued that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code, relying on the statements of defense witnesses that Mary Jay told them what happened was an accident.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender: Accused-appellant argued that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities before criminal proceedings were commenced against him, claiming he voluntarily yielded to the police authorities on October 14, 2002, backed by the records of the case and a certification made by the Dasmariñas Police Station.
• Reduction of Sentence: In the alternative, accused-appellant argued that his sentence must be reduced due to the mitigating circumstances, contending that the reduction must be by at least another degree or to prision mayor or lower.
• Error in Not Admitting Deposition: Accused-appellant averred that the trial court erred in not admitting the deposition by oral examination of Atty. Ma. Angelina Barcelo which would corroborate the testimonies of the defense witnesses regarding the handwritten dying declaration of Mary Jay.
• Error in Crediting Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellant questioned the trial court for giving credence to the perjured and biased testimonies of prosecution witnesses Lourdes Rios and Norma Saballero.
• Error in Disallowing Psychiatrist: Accused-appellant averred that the trial court erroneously disallowed the defense from presenting Dr. Ma. Victoria Briguela, a qualified psychiatrist, who could testify that Mary Jay's mental, psychological, and emotional condition on February 24, 2000 was disoriented and she could not have made a dying declaration on said date.

• Adoption of Previous Arguments: The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested that it was adopting its previous arguments in its supplemental brief, without presenting new arguments before the Supreme Court.

• Dying Declaration: Whether the dying declaration made by Mary Jay to Lourdes Rios and Norma Saballero, identifying the accused as the perpetrator, satisfied all the requisites for admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• No Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Whether the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Monetary Awards: Whether the monetary awards ordered by the trial court were excessive and should be modified.

• Dying Declaration: Yes. The dying declaration made by Mary Jay to Lourdes and Norma satisfied all the requisites provided in the Rules of Court, as it concerned the cause and surrounding circumstances of her death, was made when death appeared imminent and she was under a consciousness of impending death, and was offered in a case involving her death.
• No Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong: No. The accused was not entitled to this mitigating circumstance because there was no disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third-degree burns on her body, as the physical evidence showed kerosene was deliberately poured over her head.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. All the elements for a valid voluntary surrender were present, as the accused had not been actually arrested, he surrendered to the police authorities, and his surrender was voluntary as borne by the certification issued by the police.
• Monetary Awards: Modified. The monetary awards were reduced, with civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000, moral damages of PhP 50,000, exemplary damages of PhP 30,000, and attorney's fees of PhP 50,000, while actual damages of PhP 500,000 were retained.

• Dying Declaration: The Court applied the requisites for admissibility of a dying declaration under the Rules of Court: (a) it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. The Court found that the prosecution's dying declaration satisfied all these requisites, as Lourdes and Norma both testified that at the time of Mary Jay's declaration, she was lucid and aware that she was soon going to expire. In contrast, the defense's dying declaration allegedly made to Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose did not show that Mary Jay's death at the time of said declaration appeared to be imminent and that she was under a consciousness of impending death, since the statements were made more than a month before Mary Jay died. The Court also noted that the defense's dying declaration was handwritten by PO3 San Jose but was not sworn under oath, and deferred to the factual finding that the prosecution witnesses were more credible, as no improper motive was shown for Norma to falsely accuse the accused.

• No Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong: The Court applied Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The Court held that this mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act, and is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The Court agreed with the trial court's finding that the accused knew the fatal injuries that he could cause when he poured kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to ignite a fire, as the demonstration in open court showed that the contents of the kerosene container did not spill owing to the little amount of liquid and its narrow opening, and to wet 90 percent of the body surface, the kerosene must have been poured over the head of the deceased. The Court found it extremely far-fetched that the accused could accidentally pour kerosene on his wife and likewise accidentally light her up and cause third-degree burns to 90% of her body.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Court applied the requisites for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The Court explained that the essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. The Court found that all the elements were present, as the accused at the time of his surrender had not actually been arrested, he surrendered to the police authorities, and his surrender was voluntary as borne by the certification issued by the police. However, the Court noted that parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death, and under Article 63(3), when a law prescribes a penalty with two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. But Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, so the proper sentence remained reclusion perpetua.

• Monetary Awards: The Court modified the monetary awards as being excessive, awarding civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 as mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for the death, moral damages of PhP 50,000 in accordance with jurisprudence, exemplary damages of PhP 30,000 as the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, and attorney's fees reduced to PhP 50,000 as reasonable in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

• Dying Declaration as Exception to Hearsay Rule — A report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case. It is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. The requisites are: (a) it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. In this case, the prosecution's dying declaration satisfied all requisites, while the defense's competing declaration failed because it was made more than a month before death and was not sworn under oath.

• Mitigating Circumstance of No Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong — Under Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code, this mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act. It is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed, with the intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed, and the injury sustained by the victim. In this case, the circumstance was not present because there was no disparity between the means used and the resulting third-degree burns on 90% of the victim's body.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender — The requisites are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. In this case, all elements were present, as the accused had not been arrested, surrendered to police authorities, and the surrender was voluntary as borne by the police certification.

• "While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is 'made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.'" — This passage establishes the doctrinal basis for admitting dying declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule, which was the central evidentiary issue in the case.

• "It is considered as 'evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.'" — This passage articulates the rationale for giving great weight to dying declarations, which the Court applied in crediting the prosecution's version over the defense's competing declaration.

• "This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act." — This passage defines the scope of the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code, which the Court applied in denying the accused's claim.

• "The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture." — This passage defines the essence of voluntary surrender, which the Court applied in appreciating the mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused.

• Marturillas vs. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 273, 305 — Cited as authority for the rule that a dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule when made under the consciousness of impending death.
• People vs. Cerilla, G.R. No. 177147, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 251, 262 — Cited for the proposition that a dying declaration is evidence of the highest order entitled to utmost credence.
• Geraldo vs. People, G.R. No. 173608, November 20, 2008, 571 SCRA 420, 430 — Cited for the requisites of a valid dying declaration under the Rules of Court.
• People vs. Badriago, G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 820, 837 — Cited for the definition of the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
• People vs. Gonzalez, Jr., G.R. No. 139542, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA 352, 379 — Cited for the rule that the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed and the resulting crime.
• De Vera vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 6, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 515 — Cited for the requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Español, G.R. No. 175603, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 326, 340 — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for the death.
• People vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 176354, August 3, 2010 — Cited for the items recoverable when death occurs due to a crime.
• People vs. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010 — Cited for the current jurisprudence pegging civil indemnity at PhP 50,000 and moral damages at PhP 50,000.
• People vs. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 510, 522 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages in the lowered amount of PhP 30,000 in cases charging parricide where the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines parricide and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the killing of a lawfully wedded spouse. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction and determining the applicable penalty.
• Article 13(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The Court applied this provision in denying the accused's claim to this mitigating circumstance.
• Article 63(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when a law prescribes a penalty with two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this provision in determining that reclusion perpetua was the proper penalty given the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines and provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103. The Court applied this provision in maintaining the penalty of reclusion perpetua despite the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Article 2208, Civil Code — Governs the recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, requiring that such fees must be reasonable. The Court applied this provision in reducing the attorney's fees to PhP 50,000.

• Corona, C.J. — Concurred as Chairperson of the First Division.
• Leonardo-De Castro, J. — Concurred as member of the First Division.
• Brion, J. — Concurred as additional member per Raffle dated October 11, 2010.
• Perez, J. — Concurred as member of the First Division.