People vs. Magdueño

A murder conviction based on positive identification by multiple eyewitnesses and a constitutionally compliant extra-judicial confession is sustainable, but the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority cannot apply where the victim himself is the public authority.

Fernando M. Dilig was the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City. Hermogenes Magdueño was a former inmate of Muntinglupa who had served time on death row as a leader of the Sputnik Gang and was released in 1973, thereafter working as a sidewalk vendor in Divisoria, Manila. The amended information charged Magdueño together with five other accused—Apolinario Sison, Teodorico Ramirez, Alejandro Guevarra, Alfredo Guevarra, and Edgardo Casabay—with murder, alleging conspiracy, illegal possession of a firearm, treachery, evident premeditation, and the aggravating circumstances of price or reward and insult to public authority. The other accused were acquitted by the trial court for insufficiency of evidence, leaving Magdueño as the sole appellant.

On October 15, 1980, a few minutes past 8:00 in the morning, Fiscal Fernando M. Dilig had just seated himself at the driver's side of his jeep, parked near his house at the corner of Roxas and Dendoza Streets in Puerto Princesa City, when two successive gunshots rang out. The gunman, approaching from Dilig's left side, fired directly into his body, inflicting two fatal wounds—one at the lateral aspect of the neck and another at the lumbar region—that instantaneously caused his death. Dr. Rufino P. Ynzon, the City Health Officer who performed the autopsy, described both wounds as fatal and stated that "death will definitely occur."

Three eyewitnesses positively identified Hermogenes Magdueño as the assailant. Elena Adion Lim, seated at the gate of her fence approximately 20 to 30 meters from Dilig's house, saw the gunman pass by her house carrying a short gun and a clutch bag as he hurried toward Liwanag Street; she identified Magdueño on October 30, 1980. Ernesto Mari Gonzales, a security guard riding a tricycle past Dilig's house, heard the shots and saw the gunman still holding the firearm pointed at Dilig; when the gunman turned, Gonzales observed a scar on his left temple below the left eyebrow—a distinctive mark that Magdueño bore. Cynthia Canto, a taxi dancer waiting for a tricycle near Dilig's house, saw the gunman stand by, approach Dilig seated in his jeep, and fire two successive shots before exiting toward Mendoza Street; she likewise identified Magdueño when brought face to face with him at the invitation of the police in Plaridel, Aborlan, Palawan. All three witnesses were strangers to Magdueño prior to the incident, and the shooting occurred in broad daylight.

Magdueño executed an extra-judicial confession in which he admitted killing Fiscal Dilig for a price or reward. He stated that during the last week of September 1980, at his residence in Divisoria, Metro Manila, he agreed to a proposition from Leonardo Senas, the representative of a "mysterious mastermind," to kill Dilig for a fee of P80,000.00, of which he would receive P30,000.00. He was given an advance payment of P5,000.00, with the balance of P25,000.00 to be paid upon completion. The weapon used was a 9mm automatic pistol. During the custodial investigation, Magdueño was assisted by Atty. Clarito A. Demaala, Jr. of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), who interviewed him before the interrogation began, informed him of his constitutional rights, and was present from start to finish. Senas and Mauricio de Leon, whom Magdueño implicated, were later dropped from the amended information for lack of a prima facie case.

For his defense, Magdueño claimed alibi, asserting that at the time of the shooting he was at the house of Leonardo Senas in Plaridel, Aborlan, Palawan, and learned of the killing only from the radio. He explained his presence in Palawan by stating that Senas had suggested he bring assorted merchandise to Aborlan, prompting him to board the M/V Leon on September 28, 1980. However, prosecution witness Andres Factors, a former fellow inmate in Muntinglupa, testified that Magdueño was known as a "tirador" or killer in prison and that he had seen Magdueño in Palawan on October 12 or 13, 1980—days before the killing. The trial court found the alibi uncredible, noting that a bus ride from Aborlan to Puerto Princesa City would take only a little more than two hours, and that Magdueño had not shown it was impossible for him to have been at the scene.

• Error in Conviction: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in convicting him for murder, presumably challenging the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, including the identification of the assailant and the presence of qualifying circumstances.
• Admissibility of Extra-Judicial Confession: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in admitting his extra-judicial confession, contending that it was extracted through violence and torture and thus violated his constitutional rights.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder Conviction: Whether the lower court erred in convicting the accused for murder.
• Admissibility of Extra-Judicial Confession: Whether the lower court erred in admitting the accused's extra-judicial confession in evidence.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder Conviction: No. The conviction was proper, the prosecution having established through three eyewitnesses the positive identification of the appellant as the gunman, the presence of treachery qualifying the killing to murder, and corroborative evidence including the extra-judicial confession showing the appellant was a hired killer.
• Admissibility of Extra-Judicial Confession: No. The confession was admissible, the accused having been properly informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, provided with independent CLAO counsel who was present throughout the interrogation, and the confession being voluntary and corroborated by other evidence.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder Conviction: The three eyewitnesses—Elena Adion Lim, Ernesto Mari Gonzales, and Cynthia Canto—each had a clear view of the gunman in broad daylight and positively identified Magdueño upon confrontation. Their identification was further corroborated by Gonzales's observation of a scar on the gunman's left temple, a distinctive physical mark that Magdueño bore. No motive to falsely testify was shown on the part of any witness; the appellant's claim that Cynthia Canto testified "to claim a reward" was unsupported by evidence. The defense of alibi failed because Magdueño did not demonstrate the physical impossibility of being at the crime scene, and the distance from Aborlan to Puerto Princesa City was traversable in a little over two hours by bus. Treachery was present: the appellant fired two successive shots at the defenseless fiscal seated in his jeep, deliberately adopting means that ensured execution without risk to himself. The fact that the appellant called out "Fiscal" before shooting did not negate treachery, as the call was made to confirm the target's identity, and the shots were fired immediately upon the victim turning, affording no opportunity for defense. The two conditions for treachery—deliberate adoption of means of execution and absence of risk to the offender—were satisfied. Evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of price or reward were established through the extra-judicial confession and corroborating testimony. However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of the crime with insult to public authority was improperly appreciated by the lower court, because the victim himself was the public authority, and the circumstance requires that the crime not be committed against the public authority himself.

• Admissibility of Extra-Judicial Confession: Section 20, Article IV of the Bill of Rights requires that any person under custodial investigation be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement made may be used against him. The records showed that Magdueño was properly informed of these rights, was allowed to communicate with and was given a lawyer in the person of Atty. Clarito A. Demaala, Jr. of the CLAO, who entered his appearance as counsel and was present from the start of the investigation until its conclusion. Before the interrogation began, Atty. Demaala interviewed the accused and informed him of his constitutional rights, a fact affirmed by NBI Officer-in-Charge Celso A. Castillo. The confession was presumed voluntary, and no contrary evidence was shown. Its voluntariness was further evidenced by details that could not have been furnished by the investigators—specifically, how the killing was planned, the reward to be received, and the scenario of the killing. The confession was also corroborated by other evidence establishing the true sequence of events. The appellant's allegations of violence and torture were rejected by the trial court, which found spontaneity and voluntariness in the confession.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim might make. Two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means of execution. In this case, the appellant fired two successive shots at the fiscal seated in his jeep, calling out "Fiscal" only to confirm the target's identity before immediately firing, rendering the victim unable to defend himself. The call did not negate treachery because it was not intended to give the victim a chance to defend but to ensure the correct target was killed.

• Admissibility of Extra-Judicial Confessions — An extra-judicial confession is admissible when the accused was informed of and understood his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, was provided with competent and independent counsel, and the confession was voluntary. The confession is presumed voluntary absent contrary evidence, and its voluntariness is strengthened when it contains details that could not have been supplied by investigators. Corroboration by other evidence further supports admissibility. In this case, the CLAO lawyer's presence from start to finish, his pre-interrogation interview of the accused, and the confession's detailed and corroborated contents satisfied constitutional requirements.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Insult to Public Authority — For the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to or in contempt of public authority to be appreciated, it must be shown that the crime was not committed in the presence of the public authority and that the crime was not committed against the public authority himself. Where the victim is himself the public authority, the circumstance cannot apply. The lower court erred in appreciating this aggravating circumstance because Fiscal Dilig was the public authority and the victim of the crime.

• "The fact that the appellant called out, 'Fiscal' before shooting the victim does not negate the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Since the appellant was a hired killer, he wanted to insure that he was shooting the correct person. When Dilig turned his face to find out who was calling him, the appellant fired immediately rendering no opportunity for Dilig to defend himself." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on treachery, clarifying that a verbal call before an ambush does not negate treachery when its purpose is target confirmation rather than fair warning.

• "For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be shown that the crime was not committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime was not committed against the public authority himself." — This defines the requisites of the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority and explains why it was deleted, a point frequently relevant in bar examinations on aggravating circumstances.

• "There is spontaneity and voluntariness in his extra-judicial confession which contains details that cannot be furnished by the investigators on how the killing was planned, the reward to be received and the scenario of the killing." — This passage states the doctrinal basis for finding voluntariness in an extra-judicial confession based on the presence of details only the accused could know.

• People vs. Macariola, 120 SCRA 92 — Cited as authority for the two conditions necessary for treachery to exist; followed.
• People vs. Rhoda, 122 SCRA 909 — Cited as authority for the elements of treachery; followed.
• People vs. Mahusay, 138 SCRA 452 — Cited as authority for the elements of treachery; followed.
• People vs. Radomes, 141 SCRA 548 — Cited as authority for the elements of treachery; followed.
• U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 — Cited as authority for the requisites of the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority; followed to delete the lower court's erroneous appreciation of the circumstance.
• People vs. Rizal, 103 SCRA 282 — Cited alongside U.S. vs. Rodriguez for the proposition that the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority cannot apply when the victim is the public authority himself; followed.
• Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, L-61016; Moncupa, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, L-61107, April 26, 1983 — Cited in support of the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession where the accused was given counsel and allowed to converse with counsel; followed.
• People vs. Dorado, L-23464, 36 SCRA 452 — Cited for the presumption of voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession absent contrary evidence; followed.
• People vs. Opiniano, 22 SCRA 177 — Cited for the proposition that spontaneity and voluntariness are shown where the confession contains details the investigators could not furnish; followed.
• People vs. Pontanosal, 20 SCRA 249 — Cited for the proposition that a confession corroborated by other evidence reciting the true sequence of events is admissible; followed.

• Section 20, Article IV, Bill of Rights (1973 Constitution) — Requires that any person under custodial investigation be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement made may be used against him. Applied to uphold the admissibility of Magdueño's extra-judicial confession, as the trial court found compliance with all constitutional safeguards including the provision of independent CLAO counsel.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concurred.