People vs. Magbanua

The death penalty for qualified incestuous rape cannot be imposed where the information charges only simple rape without alleging the victim's minority and relationship to the offender, and where the rapes charged antedate Republic Act No. 7659, whose retroactive application is barred as an ex post facto law. Conviction for simple rape was nevertheless sustained because the precise date is not a material element and the information otherwise stated all essential elements.

Charito Isug Magbanua was the father of seven children with his wife Aniceta Magbanua, the eldest being Poblica Magbanua, residents of Barangay Pawican, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Republic Act No. 7659, restoring the death penalty for certain heinous crimes including qualified rape, took effect on 31 December 1993. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 thereof, imposes death when rape is committed against a victim under eighteen by a parent, ascendant, or specified relative.

Poblica Magbanua was the eldest of appellant's seven children with Aniceta Magbanua. In 1991 she was barely thirteen years old, born on 3 March 1978, and had not yet menstruated. Around noon on the first occasion, appellant approached her, poked a knife at her, removed her panty, laid her down, removed his own underwear, placed himself on top of her, and pushed his penis up and down into her vagina. She felt pain and vaginal bleeding, cried without resisting because of the knife, and was warned not to tell anyone.

Thereafter until 1995, appellant abused her several times a month, usually at noontime when her mother went to town to buy basic needs and her siblings were at their grandmother's house far from their own. According to Poblica, she did not report the incidents because appellant threatened to kill her. When her mother noticed the pregnancy, Poblica, on appellant's suggestion, named one Ricky Pacaul, whom she later said she did not know. She gave birth to a baby boy, Roger Roldan Magbanua, on 15 November 1995 at her grandmother's house, registering the birth without naming the father, but testified that appellant sired the child because he was the one who abused her from 1991 until pregnancy.

Three months after giving birth, Poblica transferred to the house of her uncle Leonilo Magbanua, appellant's older brother, and his wife at Malvar Street, San Jose. There she disclosed to her aunt that her father had abused her. Leonilo summoned appellant to discuss the matter but appellant did not respond, so Leonilo assisted Poblica in filing the rape complaint. She executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before SPO2 Resurrecion Atlas. On 20 February 1996, Rural Health Physician Dra. Arlene S. Sy examined her and found the vagina admitted two to three fingers with less resistance, the hymen no longer intact, with cervicitis, pus cells and moderate RBC, negative for spermatozoa.

Appellant, the sole defense witness, admitted Poblica was his daughter but denied raping her and causing her pregnancy, attributing both to Ricky Pacaul. He admitted he did not know any Ricky Pacaul, could not recall when Poblica allegedly named him, made no effort to locate or complain against him for lack of money, and knew of no reason why Poblica and Leonilo would testify against him. His wife Aniceta refused to testify in his favor. The trial court credited Poblica as positive, credible, unschooled and without motive to fabricate against her own father except to protect her younger sisters.

• Sufficiency of Information: Petitioner argued that the Information was insufficient to support conviction for failure to state the precise date of the offense, alleging only sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter, although each sexual act is a separate crime that must be established and set forth as executed on certain dates or times, citing US vs. Dichao, and that the indefiniteness could not be cured by evidence without violating his right to be informed.
• Retroactive Application of Death Penalty Law: Petitioner maintained that the trial court erred in imposing death by retroactively applying Republic Act No. 7659, since the Information stated no actual dates and the unspecified 1991 rapes should not have been deemed within the coverage of a law that took effect only on 31 December 1993.

• Sufficiency of Information as to Time: Whether the Information's failure to state the precise date of commission, alleging rape in 1991 and the days thereafter, renders it fatally defective and incapable of supporting conviction.
• Imposition of Death Penalty and Retroactivity: Whether death under Republic Act No. 7659 may be imposed where the time frame charged antedates the law and where minority and relationship were not alleged as qualifying circumstances.

• Sufficiency of Information as to Time: No. The Information was sufficient, time not being a material ingredient of rape and all essential elements having been alleged, with any formal defect waived for failure to move to quash or seek a bill of particulars.
• Imposition of Death Penalty and Retroactivity: No. Death cannot be imposed retroactively for 1991 acts nor for unpleaded qualifying circumstances; appellant is liable only for simple rape punished with reclusion perpetua, with civil indemnity plus moral damages.

• Sufficiency of Information as to Time: The date or time of rape is not a material ingredient because its gravamen is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation, and precise time has no substantial bearing on commission. Under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, allegation as near as possible to the actual date suffices, and an information withstands scrutiny if it distinctly states the statutory designation and constitutive acts. Here the phrase in 1991 and the days thereafter apprised appellant of the charge, and Poblica's testimony clarified that defilement began when she was barely thirteen, having been born 3 March 1978, with repeated noon-time assaults until pregnancy and birth on 15 November 1995. Reliance on US vs. Dichao was misplaced because no demurrer or motion to quash was filed, unlike in Dichao where one sexual act between October 1910 to August 1912 was held too indefinite; under People vs. Garcia and Rocaberte vs. People, failure to object before plea waives formal defects, objections cannot be raised first on appeal, and the remedy is amendment or a motion for bill of particulars under Rule 116.
• Imposition of Death Penalty and Retroactivity: Republic Act No. 7659 took effect 31 December 1993 and applies only to crimes committed thereafter, retroactive application being barred by the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws that aggravate a crime or inflict greater punishment than annexed at commission. The prosecution bore the burden of proving coverage beyond doubt but the Information's 1991 timeframe antedated effectivity. Nor could continuous rape until early 1995 justify death, since under People vs. Perez the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender under Article 335, as amended, are qualifying circumstances that must be specifically pleaded conformably with the right to be informed; charging simple rape but convicting of the qualified form punishable by death denies due process. Despite proof of minority and paternity, and despite many rapes, only a single reclusion perpetua could be imposed because the Information stated a lone allegation of rape. Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 was sustained, with additional P50,000.00 moral damages presumed from rape without need of proof.

• Time Not Material in Rape — The date or time of commission is not a material ingredient of rape because its gravamen is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation; precise time has no substantial bearing. It need not be stated with absolute accuracy, it being sufficient under Section 11, Rule 110 that the act be alleged as near to the actual date as the complaint or information permits, provided all essential elements are stated.
• Waiver of Formal Defects; Bill of Particulars — A defect in averment as to time is not a ground for quashal that survives plea where curable by amendment; failure to move to quash before plea waives formal defects except no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction, extinction, and jeopardy, following People vs. Garcia and Rocaberte vs. People. The remedy for indefinite time is a motion for bill of particulars, and objections as to form or substance cannot be made for the first time on appeal. US vs. Dichao, involving a granted demurrer to a grossly indefinite single-act charge, was distinguished.
• Qualifying Circumstances Must Be Pleaded — Special circumstances under Republic Act No. 7659 increasing rape penalty to death, including minority under eighteen concurring with parentage or specified relationship, partake of qualifying circumstances and must be specifically alleged in the information, following People vs. Perez. Conviction of the qualified form on a simple-rape indictment denies the right to be informed and due process, precluding death despite proof at trial.
• Non-Retroactivity; Ex Post Facto Prohibition — Republic Act No. 7659, effective 31 December 1993, applies only prospectively; retroactive application to aggravate punishment violates Section 22, Article III of the Constitution. The prosecution must establish coverage beyond doubt before death may be imposed.
• Denial as Weak Defense; Credibility in Incestuous Rape — Denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification unless supported by strong evidence of non-culpability. Absent dubious reason or improper motive to falsely implicate a father in a heinous crime, the daughter-victim's direct testimony merits full faith and credit.
• Single Penalty for Single Charge; Damages — Despite proof of multiple rapes, only one penalty corresponding to the lone allegation in the information may be imposed. Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is sustained and P50,000.00 moral damages is awarded without need of proof, wounded feelings and besmirched reputation being assumed.

• "Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face." — States the controlling rule rejecting the attack on the information and anchoring the sufficiency analysis for rape prosecutions.
• "The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation." — Defines why precise time need not be alleged with absolute accuracy and why the 1991 allegation sufficed.
• "It would be a denial of the right of the appellant to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment were not set forth in the indictment on which he was arraigned." — Articulates the due-process bar to imposing death for unpleaded minority and relationship.

• US vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 421 (1914) — Cited by appellant for indefinite time; distinguished because it involved a sustained demurrer to a single-act charge spanning October 1910 to August 1912, whereas no motion to quash was filed here and repeated assaults focused on 1991 were proved.
• People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997) — Followed as controlling on waiver, amendment, adjournment for variance, and bills of particulars, and on the bar to raising formal defects first on appeal and to convicting of qualified rape not pleaded.
• Rocaberte vs. People, 193 SCRA 152 (1991) — Adopted for the less restrictive rule that defective averment of time is curable by amendment and remediable by bill of particulars rather than quashal.
• People vs. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998 — Followed for holding that minority and relationship under Republic Act No. 7659 are qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded to justify death.
• People vs. Dimapilis, G.R. Nos. 128619-21, December 17, 1998 — Cited for time not being material and for sufficiency of an information stating the statutory designation and constitutive acts.
• People vs. Mijano, G.R. No. 129112, July 23, 1999 — Basis for awarding moral damages without necessity of proof to a rape victim.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines when and how rape is committed and imposes death when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent or specified relative; applied to deny death here for lack of pleading and retroactivity, reducing liability to simple rape.
• Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides precise time need not be stated except when material, allegation as near as possible to actual date sufficing; applied to sustain the 1991 and the days thereafter allegation.
• Section 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits ex post facto laws, including laws aggravating a crime or inflicting greater punishment than annexed at commission; applied to bar retroactive death penalty for 1991 acts.
• Section 6, Rule 116, Rules of Court of 1964 — Provides motion for bill of particulars as remedy against indefinite allegation of time; invoked to show appellant waived objection by silence.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, JJ., concur. No separate concurring opinion with additional reasoning appears in the text.