People vs. Mactal

Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict for parricide when the proven circumstances form an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, killed the victim; the death penalty cannot be imposed where aggravating circumstances are not alleged in the information and are not proven as purposely sought or taken advantage of.

Ronnie Mactal y Azarcon and Evelyn Joaquin Mactal were spouses. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as the killing of one’s father, mother, child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any ascendant or descendant, or spouse, and punishes it with reclusion perpetua to death.

Ronnie Mactal y Azarcon and Evelyn Joaquin Mactal were married by a Catholic priest in Gapan, Nueva Ecija on March 23, 1985. Their union was not a happy one, beset by frequent violent quarrels due to appellant’s drinking, gambling and womanizing. The couple separated a number of times, but Evelyn always came back to her husband despite the physical abuse because she loved him. As appellant failed to earn a living for his family, Evelyn ran a small sari-sari store located in front of their house.

On the night of July 14, 1995, at around 7:00 p.m., appellant’s brother-in-law, Romeo Rivera, whose house was right beside the couple’s, heard the couple arguing but did not mind them because he was used to their arguments. At around 8:00 p.m., Liwayway Rillon, the deceased’s good friend, went to the store to buy something but did not stay long because Evelyn seemed to be in a bad mood and was getting ready to close the store. Through the door of the store, Rillon saw appellant inside the store and the couple’s children sleeping in bed; their living quarters were adjacent to the store.

At around midnight, appellant went to Rivera’s house to check whether his wife Evelyn was there. Rivera did not reply but instead asked if the two had a quarrel. Appellant answered in the negative. Rivera, his wife and appellant conversed in the former’s garage for about 30 minutes, with the Rivera couple suggesting places where appellant should look for his wife. Then appellant’s sister-in-law went to appellant’s house and peeped inside the unlighted room of the couple but did not find her sister, the deceased. After this, the Rivera couple returned to their house and went to sleep.

At around 1:00 a.m., Alfred Young, on board a tricycle, was passing by appellant’s house. From a distance of 15 meters, he saw Evelyn seated on a wooden chair in front of the window of the house. She appeared lifeless because her head was “hanging.” Appellant was about an arm’s length away from Evelyn and, when he saw the tricycle, he disappeared into an unlighted part of the house. At about the same time, Romeo Adayo, who was walking home, saw appellant about 20 steps away, carrying the body of his wife Evelyn over his right shoulder, face up, with the head at appellant’s back and the legs in front. Appellant was walking very fast towards a dark street. Adayo was very tired after his trip from Manila, so he did not call appellant and just continued walking. The body of Evelyn was discovered by a neighbor at around 5:00 a.m., 15 meters away from her house.

The autopsy conducted by Dr. Marcelo Gallardo revealed a 3.5-inch laceration in the middle part of Evelyn’s head, probably caused by a blunt object like wood, bamboo or round metal. The cause of death was shock secondary to laceration and contusion on the head; according to the doctor, timely medical attention could have saved the deceased. Upon investigation of appellant’s house, SPO1 Jose Jimenez, SPO2 Jose Galang and SPO3 Nicolas Salaysay found bloodstains on a yellow sando, electric fan, wooden chair and the cement floor. There were also bloodstains on items found outside the house, such as a wastebasket, newspaper and cigarette carton. Emetria San Pedro vda. de Joaquin, Evelyn’s mother, who arrived at her daughter’s house a few minutes before the police, also noticed bloodstains on the furniture and electric fan. When the bloodstains were sent to the national police crime laboratory in Camp Crame for analysis, they tested positive as human blood; the blood found on a yellow sando was of blood type B. When SPO1 Jimenez asked appellant what he did after finding out about his wife’s disappearance, he said that he looked for his wife in her friend Josie’s house, but Josie denied this upon questioning by SPO1 Jimenez.

For his defense, appellant denied the charges and testified that the last time he saw his wife alive was at 8:30 p.m. in their house because at 9:00 p.m. he went to sleep. He denied being seen by prosecution witnesses Young and Adayo as he was already asleep at 1:00 a.m. He denied that he beat up his wife and presented his son, Ronald, and his mother, Estrella Mactal, to corroborate this fact; Ronald testified that his father loved his wife Evelyn very much and could not have possibly killed her. An information charged appellant with parricide, alleging that on or about July 15, 1995, at Daang Bakal, San Nicholas, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, he, with intent to kill and with the use of a hard object, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon Evelyn Mactal y Joaquin, his lawfully wedded wife, who sustained injuries on her head that caused her instantaneous death. During arraignment on September 15, 1995, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded “not guilty” to the charge.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the RTC erred in giving faith and credence to the testimonies of Alfred B. Young and Romeo Adayo; their failure to investigate the “strange and startling” scene they witnessed should render their testimony unbelievable.
• Medico-Legal Findings: Appellant argued that the RTC erred in according weight to the testimony and findings of Dr. Jesusa Vergara; the bloodstains could not have belonged to Evelyn because Dr. Vergara testified that they were only two days old when she received the specimen four days after Evelyn’s death, and the prosecution failed to show that Evelyn had blood type B.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide based merely on circumstantial evidence that did not prove with certainty that he killed Evelyn, and that if Evelyn was deliberately killed, it was appellant alone who could have done it to the exclusion of all others.
• Penalty: Appellant argued that, assuming arguendo he was liable for Evelyn’s death, the RTC erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death.

• Conviction for Parricide: Respondent (Solicitor General) agreed that appellant ought to be convicted of parricide.
• Penalty: Respondent recommended reduction of the penalty to reclusion perpetua because there was no evidence showing that nighttime and notorious strength were purposely sought and used to facilitate the commission of the crime; nighttime could not be appreciated absent proof that nocturnity was especially sought or taken advantage of, and abuse of superior strength requires a deliberate intent to take advantage and a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of.
• Medico-Legal Findings: Respondent pointed out that Dr. Vergara’s actual testimony was that the blood submitted to her was more than four days old.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the RTC erred in giving faith and credence to the testimonies of Alfred B. Young and Romeo Adayo despite their failure to investigate the strange scene they witnessed.
• Medico-Legal Findings: Whether the RTC erred in according weight to the testimony and findings of Dr. Jesusa Vergara on the bloodstains.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant killed his wife Evelyn, to the exclusion of all others.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: Whether the RTC erred in imposing the death penalty based on nighttime and abuse of superior strength.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. There is no standard human behavioral response to a strange, startling or frightful experience, and the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is accorded great respect absent arbitrariness or error.
• Medico-Legal Findings: No. Dr. Vergara actually testified that the blood submitted to her was more than four days old, and the failure to show that Evelyn had blood type B was not fatal because guilt was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. Circumstantial evidence was sufficient because there was more than one circumstance, the facts were proven, and their combination produced conviction beyond reasonable doubt; the circumstances formed an unbroken chain leading to appellant as the killer to the exclusion of all others.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: No. Nighttime and abuse of superior strength were not alleged in the information and were not shown to have been purposely sought or taken advantage of; abuse of superior strength is also inherent in parricide, so the penalty must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The SC rejected appellant’s attack on Young and Adayo. It applied the rule that there is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience; their failure to question appellant about the strange sight of him carrying his wife’s body, or the deceased propped on a chair with her head bowed, did not detract from their credibility or render their testimony untruthful. The SC also applied the well-entrenched rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal because the trial court was in an advantageous position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor while testifying. It found no arbitrariness or error warranting a deviation.
• Medico-Legal Findings: The SC held that the RTC did not err in giving weight to Dr. Vergara’s findings. Appellant claimed the bloodstains could not have been Evelyn’s because Dr. Vergara supposedly testified they were only two days old when she received the specimen four days after Evelyn’s death, but the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Vergara’s actual testimony was that the blood submitted to her was more than four days old. The failure of the prosecution to show that Evelyn had blood type B was not fatal to the prosecution’s case because appellant’s guilt was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The SC applied Article 246 and the rule that direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for conviction when circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishes guilt. Circumstantial evidence is adequate if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The SC found the following proven circumstances: (1) the couple had a quarrel around 7:00 on the night of the incident; (2) their marriage was not happy due to appellant’s drinking, gambling and womanizing; (3) on the night of the incident, Evelyn was last seen at the couple’s house closing her sari-sari store; (4) appellant was also seen at the couple’s house watching television with his children; (5) appellant was seen an arm’s length away from the seemingly lifeless body of Evelyn propped up on a wooden chair near the window; (6) appellant was seen carrying Evelyn’s body toward a dark street; (7) the body was found in front of an abandoned house 15 meters from their house; (8) bloodstains were found on furniture and appliances inside appellant’s house and outside on a wastebasket, newspaper and cigarette carton; and (9) the laboratory test revealed the bloodstains were human blood. Their combination formed an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, killed Evelyn.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: The SC held that the RTC erred in appreciating nighttime and abuse of superior strength. Nighttime could not be appreciated where no evidence showed that nocturnity was especially sought by appellant or taken advantage of to facilitate the crime or insure immunity from capture. Abuse of superior strength requires a deliberate intent to take advantage and a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of; there was no evidence appellant purposely sought darkness or wielded strength notoriously selected and used. Abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated because it is inherent in parricide, as the husband is generally accepted to be physically stronger than the wife. These aggravating circumstances were also not alleged in the information; under Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, any aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information to be appreciated in imposing the penalty, and the rule can be given retroactive effect because it is favorable to the accused. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstance and a single indivisible penalty, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. The SC awarded P50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto based on current jurisprudence when the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

• Parricide — Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, parricide is the killing of one’s legitimate or illegitimate father, mother, child, any ascendant or descendant, or spouse, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The SC applied it because appellant killed his wife Evelyn.
• Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable. The SC found the nine circumstances formed an unbroken chain proving appellant killed Evelyn to the exclusion of all others.
• No Standard Human Behavioral Response — There is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. The failure of Young and Adayo to investigate or question appellant did not destroy their credibility.
• Trial Court’s Assessment of Witness Credibility — The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent arbitrariness or error because the trial court observed the witnesses’ demeanor. The SC found no reason to deviate.
• Aggravating Circumstances Must Be Alleged in the Information — Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information to be appreciated in imposing the penalty; the rule may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. Nighttime and abuse of superior strength were not alleged, so they could not justify death.
• Nighttime as Aggravating Circumstance — Nighttime is aggravating only when nocturnity is especially sought by the accused or taken advantage of to facilitate the crime or insure immunity from capture. No such evidence existed.
• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength requires a deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength and a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of. It cannot be appreciated in parricide because it is inherent, the husband being generally accepted as physically stronger than the wife.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — When the imposable penalty is a single indivisible penalty and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The SC applied reclusion perpetua instead of death.
• Civil Indemnity Ex Delicto — When the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the victim’s heirs are entitled to P50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto. The SC awarded this amount.

• “The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.” — The SC used this rule to uphold the parricide conviction despite the absence of direct evidence of the killing.
• “However, time and again, this Court has ruled that there is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.” — The SC rejected appellant’s claim that Young and Adayo were unbelievable for not investigating the strange scene.
• “Nighttime could not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where no evidence was presented showing that nocturnity was especially sought by the accused nor taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to insure his immunity from captive.” — The SC adopted the Solicitor General’s position in reducing the penalty.
• “Moreover, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case because it is inherent in the crime of parricide as it is generally accepted that the husband is physically stronger than the wife.” — The SC held that this aggravating circumstance could not raise the penalty to death.

• People vs. Abella et al., 339 SCRA 129 [2000] — Followed; direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable when circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishes guilt.
• People vs. Bago, 330 SCRA 115 [2000] — Followed; same rule on circumstantial evidence.
• People vs. Sanez, 320 SCRA 805 [1999] — Followed; stated the requisites for circumstantial evidence sufficiency.
• People vs. Alarcon, 335 SCRA 457 [2000] — Followed; no standard human behavioral response to strange, startling or frightful experience.
• People vs. Daroy, 336 SCRA 24 [2000] — Followed; trial court’s credibility assessment is respected.
• People vs. Saulog, 344 SCRA 756 [2000] — Followed; same credibility rule.
• People vs. Suelto, October 7, 1999 — Followed; same credibility rule.
• People vs. Cayago, 312 SCRA 623 [1999] — Followed; civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000 when penalty is reclusion perpetua.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines parricide and punishes it with reclusion perpetua to death. Applied because appellant killed his spouse.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty is applied for a single indivisible penalty. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua.
• Section 8, Rule 110, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requires the complaint or information to specify qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Applied retroactively because favorable to the accused; nighttime and abuse of superior strength were not alleged and could not justify death.