People vs. Macoy

When an unlicensed firearm is used to commit homicide or murder, there can be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm under Republic Act No. 8294; the use of the unlicensed firearm is treated as an aggravating circumstance instead. A new penal law may be given retroactive application under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code only insofar as it is advantageous to the accused, and not where it would unduly aggravate the crime or increase the penalty.

Victor M. Macoy, Jr. lived with his wife Marilou and their son Joglyn at 1612 Gil Tudtud St., Lahinglahing, Mabolo, Cebu City. He kept an unlicensed firearm in a belt bag stored in the aparador of their bedroom, which his wife recognized as a .38 caliber revolver. The relevant statutes are Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, penalizing parricide with reclusion perpetua to death, and Presidential Decree No. 1866, penalizing illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1997. The amendment lowered the penalty for illegal possession of low-powered firearms and provided that when homicide or murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm, no separate conviction for illegal possession shall lie, the use instead serving as an aggravating circumstance.

At about 12:20 in the morning of October 9, 1995, Victor M. Macoy, Jr. arrived drunk at his house in Lahinglahing, Mabolo, Cebu City, carrying a musical instrument. His wife, Marilou, called their son, Joglyn Macoy, to help his father. While walking toward the house, Victor complained in a low voice about the muddy road leading to their house, apparently unable to complain aloud because he was with friends from the Department of Public Services, the office responsible for dumping soil on the road. When Joglyn went out to help, he commented that the DPS people were foolish for dumping soil that made the road muddy. Thinking his son was blaming his friends, Victor angrily retorted in their defense, and a heated argument ensued between father and son.

Cresenciano Marikit, Marilou's younger brother, arrived at the house and prevailed upon Joglyn to calm down, inviting him to a nearby store about thirty meters away. Meanwhile, Victor went to his room and took from the aparador a belt bag containing a .38 caliber firearm, which Marilou recognized because Victor had told her so and she would often see him clean and return it to that bag. He tucked the gun in his waist and left the house despite Marilou's attempts to stop him. A few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire and saw a commotion at the store. When she arrived, she saw Cresenciano holding Victor while Joglyn was being carried to a taxicab. At Cebu Chong Hua Hospital, the attending physician declared Joglyn dead on arrival.

Cresenciano Marikit positively identified Victor as the assailant. He testified that he and Danilo Macasero were repairing his jeep outside his house when Victor and his musician-friends, all drunk, passed by. Hearing noise from Victor's house, Cresenciano went to investigate and found Victor and Joglyn arguing about the muddy road. Victor told him to shut up, saying it was none of his business. To prevent the argument from worsening, Cresenciano took Joglyn to the nearby store. While they were talking there, Victor arrived armed with a snub-nose .38 caliber revolver and fired at Joglyn. The first shot missed because the bullet got stuck in the barrel; the second shot hit Joglyn near the left shoulder, and he fell to the ground. Victor fired a third shot, but the bullet again got stuck. Cresenciano wrestled with Victor for possession of the gun; in the scuffle, the weapon fell to the ground, and Danilo Macasero picked it up and threw it into a nearby canal. Danilo's testimony corroborated Cresenciano's account in material details. The medico-legal officer, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, found the cause of death to be acute severe hemorrhage secondary to a gunshot wound at the left chest, with a .38 caliber slug recovered from the second thoracic vertebra. The wound was directed downward and from left to right, indicating the assailant was in a higher position and to the left of the victim, approximately twenty-four inches away.

Police officers who responded to the shooting report went to Victor's house and arrested him after explaining his constitutional rights. Victor admitted that he shot his son. When asked to present authorization to possess the firearm, he failed to produce any. Danilo Macasero led the police back to the scene and retrieved the .38 caliber revolver from the canal, turning it over to Patrolman Ruiz. Paraffin examination yielded positive results for gunpowder residue on both of Victor's hand casts, and the ballistic test on the revolver was likewise positive. In his defense, Victor denied shooting his son and denied owning the .38 caliber revolver. He claimed he carried a .22 caliber revolver that night, fired a warning shot in the air upon hearing a commotion, and that during a scuffle with Cresenciano, he heard gunfire and saw Joglyn fall — implying another gun was used. He hid his .22 caliber revolver under ipil-ipil trees in front of his house but never retrieved or presented it in evidence. He testified that he was not apprised of his constitutional rights during investigation and that the person who sold him the .22 caliber gun had promised to secure a license for it.

• Identity of Firearm: Petitioner argued that the .38 caliber revolver presented as prosecution evidence was not his gun, claiming he possessed a .22 caliber revolver and that the exhibit was the first time he had seen that weapon.
• Denial of Criminal Liability: Petitioner maintained that he did not shoot his son, asserting that during the scuffle with Cresenciano, he heard a burst of gunfire and saw Joglyn fall, implying a different firearm was used by another person.
• Lack of Constitutional Rights: Petitioner alleged that he was not apprised of his constitutional rights from the time he was asked searching questions at his house up to the filing of the cases, and that he was not assisted by counsel during investigation.

• Modification of Penalty Under RA 8294: The Solicitor General submitted that due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, the penalty for illegal possession of low-powered firearm should be modified, and that there can be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm when homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the use instead being considered an aggravating circumstance.

• Parricide: Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide for the death of his son Joglyn Macoy.
• Separate Conviction for Illegal Possession: Whether the accused may be separately convicted of illegal possession of firearm when the unlicensed firearm was used to commit parricide.
• Retroactivity of RA 8294: Whether Republic Act No. 8294 should be given retroactive application to the crimes committed on October 9, 1995.

• Parricide: Yes. The conviction was affirmed on the strength of positive identification by three prosecution witnesses whose testimonies were consistent and corroborative, and against whom no ill motive was established.
• Separate Conviction for Illegal Possession: No. Under Republic Act No. 8294, there can be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm when homicide or murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm; such use is treated as an aggravating circumstance.
• Retroactivity of RA 8294: Partially. RA 8294 was given retroactive application only insofar as it benefited the accused by sparing him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, but not insofar as it would aggravate the penalty for parricide from reclusion perpetua to death, as that would constitute an ex post facto law.

• Parricide: The prosecution established the elements of parricide through the positive identification of the accused as the assailant by three witnesses — Marilou Macoy, Cresenciano Marikit, and Danilo Macasero — whose testimonies were consistent and corroborative of each other. No ill motive was shown to have prompted these witnesses to falsely testify against the accused, and the presumption is that witnesses not actuated by improper motive are entitled to full faith and credit. The accused's defense of denial and his two-gun theory were unsubstantiated: he never retrieved or presented the .22 caliber revolver he claimed to have carried, and no one among the people gathered at the store saw his brother-in-law armed with a gun. The physical evidence further corroborated the prosecution's case: the paraffin examination yielded positive results for gunpowder residue on both of the accused's hands, and the ballistic test on the .38 caliber revolver was likewise positive. The medico-legal findings on the trajectory and distance of the gunshot wound were consistent with the prosecution's account. Denial, being a negative self-serving assertion unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over positive identification. The trial court therefore correctly found the accused guilty of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Separate Conviction for Illegal Possession: As held in People vs. Molina, People vs. Feloteo, and People vs. Narvasa, there can be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Such use shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. This rule flows from Republic Act No. 8294, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1866. Accordingly, the separate charge for illegal possession of firearm was dismissed.

• Retroactivity of RA 8294: Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, while the crimes were committed on October 9, 1995. As a penal law, it generally has only prospective application. However, under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, a new penal law may be given retroactive application when advantageous to the accused. Insofar as RA 8294 spares the accused from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, it is beneficial and may be applied retroactively. However, in line with People vs. Valdez, the provision treating use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance was not given retroactive application, because it would increase the penalty for parricide from reclusion perpetua to death, which is disadvantageous to the accused and would acquire the character of an ex post facto law. Since there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Presumption of Credibility of witnesses without improper motive — When there is no showing that prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the testimonies of Marilou Macoy, Cresenciano Marikit, and Danilo Macasero, against whom no ill motive was established.

• Denial as a weak defense — Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative self-serving assertion which deserves no weight in law and cannot prevail over positive identification by prosecution witnesses. The accused's denial of shooting his son and his two-gun theory were rejected for lack of corroborating evidence.

• No separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm when used in homicide or murder (RA 8294) — Under Republic Act No. 8294, when homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm; the use of the unlicensed firearm is instead considered an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder.

• Retroactivity of favorable penal laws (Article 22, Revised Penal Code) — A new penal law may be given retroactive application when it is advantageous to the accused. However, where a provision of the new law is not beneficial because it unduly aggravates the crime or increases the penalty, it will not be given retroactive application, lest it acquire the character of an ex post facto law.

• Application of indivisible penalties (Article 63, Revised Penal Code) — When the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court imposed reclusion perpetua for parricide, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties prescribed by Article 246.

• "It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative self-serving assertion, which deserves no weight in law." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the doctrine that bare denial cannot overcome positive identification, a principle frequently cited in Philippine criminal jurisprudence.

• "there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm. Such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed." — This passage states the rule under Republic Act No. 8294 as applied in this case, establishing that illegal possession merges into the homicide or murder when the unlicensed firearm is used to commit either crime.

• "In cases, however, where the new penal law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application." — This passage defines the Court's selective retroactivity approach: applying the new law only where it benefits the accused.

• "in so far as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law." — This passage establishes the limiting principle that favorable retroactivity does not extend to provisions that would increase the penalty, as that would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.

• People vs. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 [1998] — Followed. Held that there can be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm when homicide or murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm; the use is treated as an aggravating circumstance. This precedent was central to the dismissal of the separate charge for illegal possession.

• People vs. Feloteo, 295 SCRA 607 [1998] — Followed. Same rule as Molina regarding the merger of illegal possession into the homicide or murder offense.

• People vs. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637 [1998] — Followed. Same rule as Molina regarding the merger of illegal possession into the homicide or murder offense.

• People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 [1999] — Followed. Held that a provision of RA 8294 that is not beneficial to the accused because it unduly aggravates the crime will not be given retroactive application, lest it acquire the character of an ex post facto law. This precedent governed the Court's refusal to apply the aggravating-circumstance provision retroactively.

• People vs. Radel Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000 — Cited for the proposition that when there is no showing that prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

• People vs. Ramil Dacibar and Warlito Dicon, G.R. No. 111286, February 17, 2000 — Cited for the doctrine that unsubstantiated denial is a negative self-serving assertion deserving no weight in law.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The Court found that the accused killed his own son, satisfying the elements of parricide, and imposed reclusion perpetua as the lesser indivisible penalty.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties. The second paragraph provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this provision to impose reclusion perpetua rather than death.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive application. The Court applied this provision to give retroactive effect to RA 8294 insofar as it eliminated the separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm.

• Presidential Decree No. 1866 — Penalizes illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The accused was originally charged and convicted under this decree before the conviction was dismissed on appeal pursuant to RA 8294.

• Republic Act No. 8294 — Amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, lowering the penalty for illegal possession of low-powered firearms and providing that when homicide or murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm, no separate conviction for illegal possession shall lie, the use instead serving as an aggravating circumstance. The Court applied this law retroactively only insofar as it benefited the accused.

Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.

• Davide, Jr., C.J. — Chief Justice Davide agreed that RA 8294 should not be given retroactive effect insofar as it would aggravate the penalty for parricide to death. However, he parted ways with the majority on the consequence: he argued that because the aggravating-circumstance provision could not be applied retroactively, the illegal possession of firearm must remain a separate offense. He would have imposed the reduced penalty for illegal possession under RA 8294, applying that portion retroactively as it would be beneficial to the accused. In his view, the accused should be convicted and penalized for both parricide and illegal possession, with the latter punished under the reduced penalty of the new law.

• Bellosillo, J. — Took no part in the decision.