People vs. Maceda

A qualifying circumstance that increases the penalty and changes the nature of the offense must be alleged in the information; if proved but not alleged, it may be appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance. Thus, knowledge of the victim’s mental disability under Art. 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code could not justify the death penalty where the information did not allege it, and the conviction was reduced to reclusion perpetua for simple rape.

Edgardo “Boboy” Maceda and Maribeth Quinto were neighbors in Area B, Group 5, Payatas, Quezon City, with Maceda living about 35 meters from the Quinto house. Maribeth, 32 years old, was a mental retardate who lived with her mother Editha Quinto. Maceda had known the family for years and admitted that he knew Maribeth had a low mental capacity or was retarded. The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997), governed the charge, particularly Arts. 266-A and 266-B on rape and its penalties.

Maribeth Quinto, a 32-year-old mental retardate, lived with her mother Editha Quinto at Group 5, Area B, Payatas, Quezon City, while her siblings lived elsewhere in the neighborhood. Edgardo “Boboy” Maceda was their neighbor, residing about 35 meters from the Quinto house, and he knew that Maribeth had a low mental capacity or was retarded. On the morning of February 18, 1998, Editha went to Camarin, Caloocan City to wash clothes for her employer, leaving Maribeth in the care of her sister Veronica. When night came, Veronica left Maribeth alone in the house because she expected Editha to arrive soon, but Editha was unable to return that night because her employer had some problems.

Alone in the house, Maribeth fell asleep while waiting for her mother. At around 1:30 a.m. on February 19, 1998, she was awakened by the barking of a dog and heard someone knocking at the door. When she opened the door, she found her neighbor Maceda asking where her youngest brother Nonoy was. After she answered that Nonoy was not there, Maceda entered the house, closed the door behind him, and told her not to make any noise. He then forced her to lie down and began kissing her on the lips and neck. Maribeth became scared and cried. Maceda pulled down her panty, spread her legs, and had sexual intercourse with her. After he left, she covered herself with a blanket.

Editha arrived home at around 11 o’clock in the morning on February 19, 1998. She noticed that Maribeth was quiet but thought she was merely moody. Later, Maribeth, crying, approached her mother and told her what had happened, saying, “tulo ng luha ko. Hirap hirap ako.” Editha took her daughter to the barangay captain and reported the incident. Following the barangay captain’s advice, they went to Camp Crame for a physical examination. The next day, February 20, 1998, Editha and Maribeth went to the police station and gave sworn statements, on the basis of which Maceda was arrested and detained at the Quezon City Jail. Dr. Emmanuel Reyes examined Maribeth and found an abraded posterior fourchette, congested vestibule, an elastic fleshy congested hymen with deep-healed lacerations at the 3, 6, and 9 o’clock positions, moderate resistance to the examining index finger, a narrow vaginal canal with prominent rugosities, and a firm and closed cervix. Dr. Reyes explained that the abraded posterior fourchette and congested vestibule were probably caused by a rough or dry surface such as an erect penis, or by forcible sexual intercourse without lubrication; that the findings indicated the victim was no longer a virgin; that no spermatozoa was found; and that an ecchymosis or “kiss mark” was located at the right lateral part of Maribeth’s neck.

Maceda denied the allegations. He testified that he lived with his parents and other relatives for 18 years in Area B, Group 5, Payatas, Quezon City, about 35 meters from complainant’s house. He said he drove a passenger jeepney every day from 4:30 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. on the Lagro-Queens route. On the night of February 18, 1998, after arriving home from work, he rested for 20 minutes and then went to sleep; he woke up the following morning at around 4:30 a.m. and went to work. He testified that the victim and her family had been his neighbors for 15 years, that Nonoy would sometimes accompany him during his trips, and that he had no quarrel with complainant’s family, although he had some misunderstandings with Nonoy’s wife. Defense witness Owen Santos corroborated Maceda: he lived with Maceda’s family at the time of the incident; at around 9:30 p.m. on February 18, 1998, he slept beside Maceda and was sure Maceda did not leave the house that night; he woke up at around 4:30 a.m., took a bath, and went out with Maceda. Maceda’s sister, Rosa Dantes, also testified that they lived in a semi-concrete house surrounded by a 5-foot steel gate; she slept in a room outside their house within the compound; she was the gatekeeper; when every member of the household was inside, usually around 9 p.m., she would close the main door and would not open it until around 4:00 a.m. the next day; no one could leave without her permission because she alone had the key to the main door and it could only be opened from the outside with that key; she was therefore sure Maceda did not leave the house at the time of the incident.

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of complainant and the other prosecution witnesses. It observed that although complainant had some difficulty expressing herself, she was able to intelligently and clearly make known to the court that she was raped by Maceda. It found nothing in the record to show that either complainant or her mother had any ulterior motive to falsely testify against Maceda, and it considered it unimaginable that complainant, who could hardly make sense of what she said, could invent a story of rape and point to Maceda with such certainty if it did not indeed happen. The medical findings of Dr. Reyes were found to corroborate complainant’s testimony, and the defense’s denials and alibi were rejected.

• Force or Intimidation and Mental Age: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape absent any showing that force or intimidation was employed, or that the mental age of the complaining witness was equivalent to that of a girl below twelve years of age.
• Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant argued that the lower court erred in not acquitting him at least on the ground of reasonable doubt.
• Civil Damages and Costs: Accused-appellant maintained that the lower court erred in ordering him to pay civil damages and costs.
• Alibi: Accused-appellant put up the defense of alibi, claiming that he was at home sleeping at the time of the incident, corroborated by his sister and cousin.
• Credibility and Inconsistencies: Accused-appellant claimed that complainant’s mental condition rendered her testimony vague, uncertain, and incoherent, and cited alleged inconsistencies in her testimony.
• Medical Evidence: Accused-appellant contended that no rape could have been committed as shown by the deep healed lacerations and the absence of spermatozoa.

• Force or Intimidation: Whether the prosecution proved force or intimidation in the commission of rape.
• Mental Disability and Penalty: Whether the death penalty may be imposed for rape of a mental retardate where the information did not allege the offender’s knowledge of her mental disability, and whether proof of mental age below twelve is required.
• Competence and Credibility: Whether the mental retardate complainant was competent to testify and whether alleged inconsistencies impaired her credibility.
• Alibi: Whether accused-appellant’s alibi and corroborating testimonies warranted acquittal.
• Medical Evidence: Whether healed lacerations and the absence of spermatozoa negated rape.
• Damages and Costs: Whether the award of civil damages and costs was proper.

• Force or Intimidation: Yes. Force in rape is relative; the force or intimidation need only be sufficient to consummate the purpose. The victim’s mental retardation meant less force was needed, and the evidence showed Maceda closed the door, told her to keep quiet, made her lie down, and overpowered her.
• Mental Disability and Penalty: No as to the death penalty. Although Maceda knew of the victim’s mental disability, that qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the information, so it could only be a generic aggravating circumstance; simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. No proof of mental age below twelve was required under Art. 266-A(1)(b).
• Competence and Credibility: Yes. A mental retardate is competent if she can perceive and make known her perceptions; mental unsoundness affects credibility only. The alleged inconsistencies, read in context, did not damage the essential integrity of her testimony.
• Alibi: No. Alibi is weak and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence of physical impossibility; the defense witnesses did not establish that, and the victim positively identified Maceda.
• Medical Evidence: No. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, and the absence of spermatozoa was explained by the possibility that the victim washed herself.
• Damages and Costs: The death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua; civil indemnity of P50,000 was awarded in addition to moral damages of P50,000 and costs.

• Force or Intimidation: Under Art. 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape may be committed by carnal knowledge through force, threat, or intimidation. The force necessary in rape is relative; it need not be so great or of such character as could not be resisted, but only sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation is judged in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard-and-fast rule. Complainant did not possess the intelligence of an average individual; her mental faculties were different from those of a fully functioning adult, so the degree of force or intimidation needed to overwhelm her was less than what it would take to frighten an ordinary woman. Maceda’s acts may not have intimidated a normal person, but he succeeded in instilling fear in the mind of the victim. The evidence showed that upon entering the house, Maceda closed the door and told complainant to keep quiet; she was made to lie down; she resisted but he succeeded in overpowering her and having sexual intercourse with her. Additionally, under Art. 266-A(1)(b), having sexual intercourse with a woman deprived of reason constitutes rape even if accomplished without force or intimidation. The term “deprived of reason” includes those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency, some form of mental retardation, the feebleminded but coherent, or those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency of reason. There is no requirement to prove the mental age of the offended party for this provision to apply; that requirement pertains to statutory rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d). The Court relied on People vs. Moreno, People vs. Almacin, and People vs. Cabingas.

• Mental Disability and Penalty: Art. 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, authorizes the death penalty when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder, and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Maceda admitted in open court that he knew complainant had a low mental capacity or was retarded. However, this circumstance increases the penalty and changes the nature of the offense, so it must be alleged in the information. In this case, while Maceda admitted knowledge of complainant’s mental retardation, this fact was not alleged in the information. Therefore, even if proved, it could not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance but only as a generic aggravating circumstance. Simple rape under Art. 266-A(1) is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the death sentence was reduced to reclusion perpetua. The Court cited People vs. Fraga and People vs. Bayron.

• Competence and Credibility: Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to another, may be witnesses. Section 21 disqualifies those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others. The defense and prosecution stipulated during pre-trial that complainant is a mental retardate. Although the trial court observed that she had some difficulty expressing herself, she was able to intelligently and clearly make known to the court, beyond dispute, that she was raped by Maceda. The mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the fact to be testified to occurred affects only her credibility. As long as the witness can convey ideas by words or signs and give sufficiently intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if she is a mental retardate. The alleged inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant were isolated excerpts; read in their entirety, complainant’s testimony repeatedly stated what Maceda had done to her. Inconsistencies or lapses in her testimonies did not affect the substance of her statements, damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, or reflect adversely on her credibility. The Court cited People vs. Goles, People vs. Gerones, People vs. Palma, People vs. Cula, and People vs. Mitra.

• Alibi: Alibi is a weak defense and is viewed with suspicion because it is inherently weak, unreliable, and easily fabricated. It must be established with clear and convincing evidence showing that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Owen Santos admitted that although he slept in the same room as Maceda, he could not say for sure that Maceda did not leave the house because he was not guarding Maceda’s movements that night. Rosa Dantes did not categorically state that she saw Maceda inside the house on the night of February 18, 1998 until early morning of the following day; she testified that she was the gatekeeper and that nobody could leave without her permission, but she never stated that Maceda did not leave the house at the time of the incident because the door and gate were locked. Even if Maceda was inside the house from 9:00 p.m. on February 18, 1998 to 4:30 a.m. the following day, it was not improbable that he sneaked out, considering that his house was only 35 meters from complainant’s house. The testimonies of his witnesses were rendered suspect because their relationship to him made it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense of alibi may not prosper if established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives, and not by credible persons. The victim positively identified Maceda and harbored no ill motive against him. The Court cited People vs. Gopio, People vs. Luzorata, People vs. Pano, People vs. Rio, and People vs. Flores.

• Medical Evidence: The fact that the lacerations found were healed, and not fresh, does not necessarily negate rape. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. The medical examination of the victim in rape cases is not an indispensable element for successful prosecution because her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused. As regards the absence of spermatozoa, Dr. Reyes explained that this could be due to the fact that the victim may have washed herself several hours after she had been raped. The Court cited People vs. San Juan.

• Damages and Costs: The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and ordered accused-appellant to pay the costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the award by adding civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, which must be given even if there is neither allegation nor evidence presented as basis therefor. The Court cited People vs. Prades.

• Qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information — A circumstance that increases the penalty and changes the nature of the offense must be alleged in the information. If proved but not alleged, it can be appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance. In this case, knowledge of the victim’s mental disability under Art. 266-B(10) was proved but not alleged, so the death penalty could not be imposed; the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua for simple rape.

• Rape of a woman deprived of reason — Under Art. 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason constitutes rape even if accomplished without force or intimidation. “Deprived of reason” includes those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency, some form of mental retardation, the feebleminded but coherent, or those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency of reason. No proof of mental age below twelve is required for this provision; that requirement applies to statutory rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d).

• Relative force in rape — The force necessary in rape is relative. It is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be judged in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. Where the victim is a mental retardate, the degree of force or intimidation needed to overwhelm her is less than what it would take to frighten an ordinary woman.

• Competence of a mental retardate as witness — Mental unsoundness of a witness at the time the fact to be testified to occurred affects only her credibility, not her competence. As long as the witness can perceive, convey ideas by words or signs, and give sufficiently intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if she is a mental retardate.

• Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak, unreliable, and easily fabricated. It must be established with clear and convincing evidence showing that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. It cannot prevail against positive identification by the victim, especially where the corroborating witnesses are relatives of the accused and do not adequately account for his whereabouts.

• Medical evidence not indispensable in rape — A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, and healed lacerations do not negate its commission. The medical examination of the victim is not indispensable; the victim’s credible testimony alone is sufficient to convict. The absence of spermatozoa may be explained by washing after the incident.

• Civil indemnity in rape — Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is awarded to the rape victim even if there is neither allegation nor evidence presented as basis therefor, in addition to moral damages.

• "The force necessary in rape is relative. It has been held in one case that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind." — This passage states the Court’s ratio for rejecting accused-appellant’s argument that force or intimidation was not proved, and it is the canonical formulation of the relative-force doctrine in rape.

• "This circumstance must, however, be alleged in the information because it is a qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty and changes the nature of the offense. In this case, while accused-appellant admitted that he knew complainant to be a mental retardate, this fact was not alleged in the information. Therefore, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying, but only as a generic aggravating, circumstance." — This is the decisive ruling that reduced the death penalty to reclusion perpetua, and it articulates the pleading requirement for qualifying circumstances.

• "The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to include those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency; or some form of mental retardation; the feebleminded but coherent; or even those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency of reason." — This passage defines the coverage of Art. 266-A(1)(b) and supports the holding that no proof of mental age below twelve was required.

• "It has been held that the mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the fact to be testified to occurred affects only her credibility. As long as the witness can convey ideas by words or signs and give sufficiently intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if she is a mental retardate." — This passage states the rule on competence of mental retardate witnesses, which the Court applied to uphold complainant’s testimony.

• People vs. Gopio, G.R. No. 133925, Nov. 29, 2000, citing People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 (1998) — Cited for the alibi doctrine: alibi is weak when not substantiated by a credible witness; it must be established with clear and convincing evidence of physical impossibility; and it fails against positive identification by the victim who harbored no ill motive.

• People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 (1996), citing People vs. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991) and People vs. Flores, 195 SCRA 295 (1991) — Cited for the rule that alibi may not prosper if established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives, rather than by credible persons.

• People vs. Goles, 192 SCRA 663 (1990) — Cited in support of the assessment that a complainant with low intelligence would not concoct so grave a charge as rape.

• People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 (1991) and People vs. Palma, 144 SCRA 236 (1986) — Cited for the competence of a mental retardate to testify where she can convey ideas and give sufficiently intelligent answers.

• People vs. Cula, G.R. No. 133146, March 28, 2000 — Cited for the rule that testimony must be read in its entirety and not in isolated parts when assessing inconsistencies.

• People vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 130669, March 27, 2000 — Cited in connection with the treatment of inconsistencies or lapses in a witness’s testimony.

• People vs. Moreno, 294 SCRA 728 (1998) — Cited in support of the relative force or intimidation doctrine in rape.

• People vs. Almacin, 303 SCRA 399 (1999) — Cited for the definition of “deprived of reason” under the rape law.

• People vs. Cabingas, G.R. No. 79679, March 28, 2000 — Cited for the rule that mental abnormality or deficiency is enough to constitute deprivation of reason and that a feebleminded complainant is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent.

• People vs. San Juan, 270 SCRA 693 (1997) — Cited for the rule that a freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and that medical examination is not indispensable for prosecution.

• People vs. Fraga, G.R. No. 134130-33, Apr. 12, 2000 and People vs. Bayron, 313 SCRA 727 (1999) — Cited for the requirement that a qualifying circumstance increasing the penalty and changing the nature of the offense must be alleged in the information.

• People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998) — Cited for the award of civil indemnity in rape even without allegation or evidence as basis therefor.

• Art. 266-A, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353 — Defines rape. Paragraph (1)(a) covers carnal knowledge through force, threat, or intimidation; paragraph (1)(b) covers carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason; paragraph (1)(d) covers statutory rape. The Court applied (1)(a) and (1)(b), holding that force was relative and that no proof of mental age below twelve was required under (1)(b).

• Art. 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Provides the penalties for rape. Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua; death may be imposed for qualifying circumstances, including under paragraph (10) knowledge of the offended party’s mental disability. The Court held that this circumstance must be alleged in the information; because it was not, death could not be imposed.

• Rule 130, Sections 20 and 21, Revised Rules on Evidence — Section 20 qualifies all persons who can perceive and make known their perception as witnesses; Section 21 disqualifies those whose mental condition at the time of examination makes them incapable of intelligently making known their perceptions. The Court applied these provisions to hold the mental retardate complainant competent to testify.

• R.A. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — Amended the Revised Penal Code and became effective on October 22, 1997. It supplied the governing rape provisions in this case.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concurred.