People vs. Macaraig

A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when the accused simultaneously denies having committed the killing act, because self-defense necessarily implies an admission that the accused inflicted the fatal injury. Without unlawful aggression — the foremost requisite of self-defense — being clearly established by credible and corroborated evidence, the plea collapses. A dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when: (a) it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it was made under consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) it is offered in a case involving the declarant's death.

On the night of May 30 to the early morning hours of May 31, 2011, a Sta. Cruzan dance party was held at the basketball court of Barangay Salvacion-Baybay, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Joven Celeste attended the festivities with friends, including Francis Losano. Also present was Godofredo Macaraig y Gonzales, a resident of Paolbo, Calabanga, who had been invited by a friend to visit Barangay Sogod. Earlier that evening, Joven had been throwing stones at the window of the house where Macaraig was staying. Macaraig told Joven to stop, and Joven left. The fatal encounter occurred hours later as Joven was walking home from the dance.

The Prosecution's Version:

• On May 31, 2011, at approximately 1:00 a.m., after attending a Sta. Cruzan dance party at the basketball court of Barangay Salvacion-Baybay, Francis Losano and Joven Celeste decided to go home.
• As Francis walked home, he saw accused-appellant Macaraig following Joven from behind. Macaraig approached Joven, placed his left arm over Joven's shoulder, and suddenly stabbed Joven using his right hand.
• After stabbing Joven, Macaraig saw Francis and ran after him. Francis rushed inside his house, retrieved a bolo and flashlight, and went back outside. Upon seeing Francis armed, Macaraig ran away. Francis pursued, maintained his distance, and asked Macaraig why he had stabbed Joven. Macaraig did not answer. Francis shouted for help, and a friend responded, but Macaraig escaped into a rice field.
• Despite his wounds, Joven managed to get home and sought help from his parents, Julio and Corazon Celeste. Herson Heles, Joven's cousin, saw Julio carrying Joven outside their house. Together, they boarded Joven in a tricycle to Poblacion, then transferred to an ambulance bound for the Bicol Medical Center.
• En route to the hospital, Herson asked Joven who had stabbed him. Joven, speaking in a weak, low voice, stated that "Godo Macaraig" was the one who stabbed him. Those were his last words; Joven was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
• Dr. Daniel Tan testified that Joven sustained a single stab wound measuring 8 cm by 3 cm in the midepigastric area extending to the left upper quadrant, penetrating the liver, abdominal aorta, and small intestine, with non-clotted blood pooled in the peritoneal cavity. The wound was caused by a pointed, sharp-edged instrument such as a knife or bolo.
• A search for Macaraig lasted until morning; he was found near the Trade School in Sta. Cruz, Ratay.

The Defense's Version:

• Macaraig testified as the sole witness for the defense. He claimed that on May 29, 2011, he was invited by his friend Jeffrey Crobalde to visit Crobalde's place in Barangay Sogod, Calabanga.
• On the evening of May 30, 2011, Joven was throwing stones at the window of Crobalde's house. Macaraig told Joven to stop, and Joven left.
• At around 3:00 a.m. on May 31, 2011, after a drinking spree at the basketball court, Macaraig was on his way to Crobalde's house when two unidentified men followed him and another man waited for him. One of the men tried to stab him with a balisong, but the attacker's companion was hit instead. When Macaraig noticed one of them was carrying a bolo, he ran away.
• Macaraig did not identify Joven as one of the assailants and expressly stated that it was not he who stabbed the victim, but the victim's own companion.

• Self-Defense: Macaraig argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him of murder and in not considering his theory of self-defense. He maintained that he was attacked by unidentified men and that the victim was stabbed by his own companion during the scuffle.

• Established Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the prosecution sufficiently established Macaraig's culpability through the eyewitness testimony of Francis Losano, the medical findings of Dr. Tan, and the victim's dying declaration. Macaraig's self-defense claim was negated by his own admission that he did not stab the victim, rendering the plea untenable.

• Self-Defense: Whether Macaraig's plea of self-defense was validly invoked and proven by clear and convincing evidence.
• Culpability and Treachery: Whether the prosecution proved Macaraig's guilt for the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt, including the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• Self-Defense: The plea of self-defense could not be appreciated because Macaraig simultaneously denied committing the act, stating that it was the victim's companion, not he, who stabbed Joven. Self-defense necessarily implies an admission of the killing. Without such admission, there is no self-defense to speak of. Even assuming the plea could be entertained, unlawful aggression — the most essential element — was not proven. Macaraig's account was vague, uncorroborated, and implausible; he could not identify the alleged assailants nor show that Joven was among them.
• Culpability and Treachery: The prosecution established Macaraig's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The eyewitness testimony of Losano — corroborated by the nature and location of the fatal wound — proved that Macaraig followed Joven from behind, placed his left arm over Joven's shoulder, and suddenly stabbed him with his right hand. The victim's dying declaration, wherein Joven named "Godo Macaraig" as his assailant, met all four requisites under the Rules of Court for admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule. Treachery attended the killing: Macaraig employed a method that ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself, the attack being swift and unexpected, affording the unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to defend himself. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

• Self-Defense Requires Admission of the Act — Self-defense, as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, necessarily implies that the accused admits having committed the criminal act. When the accused denies killing the victim, there is no self-defense to speak of in the first place. Where the accused does invoke self-defense, three requisites must concur by clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the foremost element; without it, self-defense cannot exist, whether complete or incomplete. In this case, the accused's plea failed at the threshold because he denied the act, and unlawful aggression was not established.
• Dying Declaration (Ante Mortem Statement) as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule — Under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if four requisites concur: (a) it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it was made when death appeared imminent and the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. A dying declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence, as no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.
• Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim might make. The sudden and unexpected stabbing of an unarmed and unsuspecting victim from behind constitutes treachery.

• "That said, the presence of the elements of self-defense need not be discussed as there is no self-defense to speak of in the first place." — The Court adopted the appellate court's observation that Macaraig's denial of the stabbing act rendered his self-defense plea legally non-existent.
• "There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense." — This reiterates the indispensable nature of unlawful aggression as the foundational element of any self-defense claim.
• "It is considered as 'evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.'" — The Court underscored the weight accorded to a properly admitted dying declaration.

• People v. Cristina Samson, G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015 — Cited for the rule that when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts from the prosecution to the defense, who must prove the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.
• Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014 — Cited for the principle that unlawful aggression is the primary and most essential element of self-defense, without which self-defense cannot exist.
• People v. Jay Mandy Maglian y Reyes, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011 — Cited for the requisites of a dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule and for its characterization as evidence of the highest order.
• People v. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016 — Cited as the basis for modifying the awards of moral and exemplary damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Justifying circumstances, specifically the requisites of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court found that unlawful aggression was not proven, negating the defense.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Murder. The Court affirmed the conviction under this article, finding that the killing was attended by treachery, and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
• Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Governs the admissibility of dying declarations. All four requisites were satisfied by Joven Celeste's statement to Herson Heles identifying Macaraig as his assailant.

Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, and Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. concurred. Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires was on leave.