People vs. Macadaeg

A judicial ruling on an issue expressly raised and deliberately determined by the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal is not obiter dictum but a final and conclusive adjudication that bars the same party from relitigating that issue before any tribunal, judicial or administrative, under the doctrine of res judicata.

Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, was convicted of murder by the Supreme Court on May 19, 1950 in G.R. No. L-2188 for the massacre of seven individuals during the Japanese occupation. The conviction arose from killings committed in the context of guerrilla activity in Ilocos Norte. Following the liberation, the President issued Proclamation No. 8 on September 7, 1946, granting amnesty to certain persons for acts committed in furtherance of the resistance movement, and created guerrilla amnesty commissions through Administrative Order No. 11 to screen and pass upon applications for amnesty. The Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, composed of three Court of First Instance judges sitting in Manila, was assigned cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court as of October 2, 1946. Guillermo, after his conviction became final, sought to invoke the amnesty proclamation before the Seventh Commission rather than pursue further executive clemency, prompting the People of the Philippines to file the present prohibition action.

On September 16, 1946, an information for murder was filed against Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, with an amended information filed on July 15, 1947. The case arose from the massacre of seven individuals during the Japanese occupation, in circumstances involving rival guerrilla units operating in Ilocos Norte. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment on March 29, 1948, convicting Guillermo, who thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court.

During the appeal in G.R. No. L-2188, Guillermo's counsel raised the argument that the victims had been charged with being spies for the Japanese, implicitly invoking the coverage of the amnesty proclamation. The Supreme Court, in its decision of May 19, 1950, rejected this contention, characterizing it as a "last-ditch plea," and expressly ruled that the massacre was committed "not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerrilla units," and therefore the amnesty proclamation was inapplicable. The Court found that stigmatizing the victims as spies and traitors in the absence of competent proof would be rank injustice.

On June 5, 1950, Guillermo's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on July 13, 1950. Even before the denial of his motion for reconsideration, on June 20, 1950, Guillermo filed a motion with the Supreme Court seeking suspension of the proceedings and referral of the case to the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission; this motion was likewise denied on July 13, 1950. On July 8, 1950, Guillermo filed a petition for amnesty with the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission. On August 2, 1950, the records of the criminal case were remanded to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for execution of judgment. On October 17, 1950, the Seventh Commission required the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to forward the records to it, and on November 9, 1950, the Commission set the case for hearing over the opposition of the Solicitor General. The People of the Philippines thereupon filed the present petition for prohibition.

• Prior Adjudication as Bar: Petitioner maintained that the Supreme Court had already expressly ruled in its judgment of conviction in G.R. No. L-2188 that Guillermo was not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because the murders were committed not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of fratricidal strife between rival guerrilla units, and that this ruling was final and conclusive.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission could take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court as of October 2, 1946, the date of Administrative Order No. 1 of the President, and that Guillermo's case was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte at that time.

• Ruling as Obiter Dictum: Respondents argued that the Supreme Court's pronouncement on amnesty in G.R. No. L-2188 did not prevent Guillermo from invoking his right to amnesty before the Commission, because the right to amnesty was not an issue at the trial, and the Court's pronouncement was merely obiter dictum—not final and conclusive.
• Liberal Interpretation of Administrative Orders: Respondents contended that under a liberal interpretation of the administrative orders implementing the President's Amnesty Proclamation, the Seventh Commission had jurisdiction over Guillermo's petition, citing Administrative Order No. 217 of the Department of Justice dated December 1, 1948.

• Nature of Prior Ruling: Whether the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. L-2188 that Guillermo was not entitled to amnesty was obiter dictum or a deliberate adjudication on a material issue.
• Res Judicata and Estoppel: Whether Guillermo, having voluntarily raised the amnesty issue before the Supreme Court on appeal, is barred by res judicata and estoppel from relitigating the same issue before the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission.
• Jurisdiction of the Commission: Whether the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Guillermo's application for amnesty.

• Nature of Prior Ruling: No. The ruling was not obiter dictum but a direct adjudication on an issue expressly raised by the appellant on facts and evidence adduced at trial, deliberately entered after arguments from both sides, and essential to a complete determination of the case.
• Res Judicata and Estoppel: No. Guillermo is barred from relitigating the amnesty issue before any tribunal, judicial or administrative, under the doctrine of res judicata, and is estopped from contesting the judgment and the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling.
• Jurisdiction of the Commission: No. The Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission lacked jurisdiction, as Administrative Order No. 11 assigned it only cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court as of October 2, 1946, at which date Guillermo's case was still pending trial in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

• Nature of Prior Ruling: An obiter dictum is an opinion uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, or an opinion which does not embody the court's determination and is made without argument or full consideration. A cursory reading of the decision in G.R. No. L-2188 reveals that the ruling on amnesty was a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by Guillermo on appeal—that the victims were spies for the Japanese and the killings fell within the amnesty proclamation. The ruling was not unnecessary; it was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and law directly in issue. It was deliberately entered after arguments from both sides. The Court could not have avoided determining the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision. Accordingly, the pronouncement was not obiter dictum but a material adjudication.

• Res Judicata and Estoppel: The Court distinguished its earlier ruling in Viray vs. Crisologo, where the defendant had not invoked amnesty at trial or on appeal and only did so after conviction, holding that Guillermo, by contrast, did raise the amnesty issue on appeal. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 1, Rule 113), amnesty need not be expressly pleaded; a defendant may submit evidence that his act falls within the amnesty proclamation, and the court is duty-bound to declare the fact if justified. Guillermo's counsel expressly raised the amnesty issue before the Supreme Court, and the Court ruled against him. Under the general rule that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs upon a disputed state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated (citing Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 310, and Section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court), Guillermo is barred by res judicata from raising the issue again. Having voluntarily raised the issue in the Supreme Court, he is estopped from contesting the judgment and the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling. The Court further noted that Guillermo never filed an application for amnesty during the one-and-a-half-year period the case was pending in the CFI, never claimed amnesty as a defense at trial, and only thought of amnesty after the Supreme Court had found him guilty—characterizing the petition as a "last desperate attempt by technicality to avert or delay the execution of the judgment of conviction."

• Jurisdiction of the Commission: Administrative Order No. 11, which created the guerrilla amnesty commissions, expressly assigned to the Seventh Commission "cases from the different provinces and cities now pending appeal in the Supreme Court," the word "now" referring to October 2, 1946, the date of promulgation. On that date, Guillermo's case was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and was assigned to the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission. Respondents relied on Administrative Order No. 217 of the Department of Justice dated December 1, 1948, but the Court held that this order was issued "in view of the appointments of new Judges of First Instance," not for the purpose of reassigning cases among commissions, and could not be interpreted to modify the President's administrative order apportioning cases. The Seventh Commission therefore had no jurisdiction over Guillermo's application.

• Obiter Dictum — An obiter dictum is an opinion uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects; or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide; or an opinion which does not embody the court's determination and is made without argument or full consideration. The Court held that its ruling on amnesty in G.R. No. L-2188 was not obiter dictum because it was a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by the appellant, deliberately entered after hearing arguments from both sides, and essential to a complete determination of the case.

• Res Judicata in Criminal Cases — The solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs upon a disputed fact or state of facts, is a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated and forever sets the controversy at rest. The Court applied this principle to bar Guillermo from relitigating the amnesty issue before the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission after the Supreme Court had already adjudicated and rejected his amnesty claim on appeal.

• Estoppel from Contesting Jurisdiction — A party who voluntarily raises an issue before a court of competent jurisdiction and receives an adverse ruling is estopped from contesting both the judgment and the authority of the court that rendered it. The Court held that Guillermo, having raised the amnesty issue on appeal, was estopped from contesting the Supreme Court's adverse ruling and from seeking a contrary determination before an administrative body.

• Amnesty as a Defense Without Formal Plea — Under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and the terms of Proclamation No. 8, a defendant need not expressly plead amnesty as a defense; he may submit evidence that his act falls within the amnesty proclamation, and if the court finds the case covered, it is the court's duty to declare the fact and extend the benefits of amnesty. However, once the issue is raised and adjudicated, the accused is bound by the determination.

• "We are satisfied from the proofs that the massacre in question was committed not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fracticidad strife between two rival guerrilla units. That was to hinder and not a further the resistance against the Japanese enemy." — This passage from the prior decision in G.R. No. L-2188 was quoted by the Court to demonstrate that its ruling on amnesty was a deliberate determination on the merits, not obiter dictum, and forms the factual basis for the res judicata bar.

• "the general rule common to all civilized systems of jurisprudence that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest." — This formulation of the res judicata principle, quoting Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 310, and Section 44, Rule 39, was the doctrinal basis for barring Guillermo from relitigating the amnesty issue before the Commission.

• "It seems to us to be a last desperate attempt by technicality to avert or delay the execution of the judgment of conviction rendered against him. Of course, no court of justice would countenance such ill-advised attempt." — The Court's characterization of Guillermo's post-judgment amnesty petition as a dilatory tactic, underscoring the principle that courts will not permit procedural maneuvers designed solely to frustrate the execution of final judgments.

• Viray vs. Crisologo, 85 Phil. 354 — Distinguished. In that case, the defendant had not invoked amnesty at trial or on appeal and only did so after conviction, so the Court allowed him to seek amnesty. The Court held this inapplicable to Guillermo, who had raised the amnesty issue on appeal and received an adverse ruling.
• Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 310 — Followed. Cited for the principle that a solemn and deliberate sentence of the law is a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, forming the basis for the res judicata bar.
• Newman vs. Kay, 49 S.E. 926, 57 W. Va. 98 — Cited for the definition of obiter dictum as an opinion uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending.

• Article VII, Section 10(6), 1935 Constitution — Authorizes the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress. The Court noted that the amnesty proclamation was issued under this constitutional authority, expressly sanctioned by Congress through Resolution No. 13 dated September 18, 1946, and thus had the nature, force, effect, and operation of a law.
• Section 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Provides that defenses need not be expressly pleaded. The Court cited this rule to support the proposition that amnesty need not be formally pleaded as a defense; a defendant may submit evidence that his act falls within the amnesty proclamation without a previous formal announcement.
• Section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Codifies the principle of res judicata. The Court relied on this provision, together with Peñalosa vs. Tuason, to hold that the Supreme Court's prior ruling on amnesty was final and conclusive.
• Proclamation No. 8, September 7, 1946 — The President's amnesty proclamation granting amnesty for acts committed in furtherance of the resistance movement. The Court quoted its provision allowing an accused to present evidence during trial that his case falls within the amnesty terms.
• Administrative Order No. 11 — Created the guerrilla amnesty commissions and assigned to the Seventh Commission cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court as of October 2, 1946. The Court held that this order defined the Seventh Commission's jurisdiction and that Guillermo's case did not fall within it.
• Congress Resolution No. 13, September 18, 1946 — The congressional concurrence sanctioning the President's amnesty proclamation, giving it the force and effect of law.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concurred.