People vs. Mabuyo

A conviction may be had even if the crime was committed at a place different from that alleged in the information, provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court and the particular place is not an essential element of the offense charged. The Court further held that alibi cannot be sustained where the accused had been clearly and positively identified by an eyewitness who knew him well and who saw him under adequate lighting.

The case concerns the prosecution of Domingo Mabuyo for the murder of Norberto Anillo, committed on June 18, 1966, in Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas. Prior to Mabuyo's trial, a certain Juan Mendoza had been separately charged as principal by inducement for the same killing, but was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The acquittal of the alleged instigator formed part of the backdrop against which Mabuyo, later charged as the direct author of the crime, sought to challenge the credibility of the same prosecution witnesses.

On June 18, 1966, at about midnight, Norberto Anillo was shot dead at the doorstep of his house in Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas. A police team headed by Lt. Roque Garcia, Deputy Chief of Police of Tanauan, recovered fifteen empty carbine shells from the premises. Agaton Anillo, the father of the deceased, and Adelaida Mirania, the widow, initially declined to name the assailants but promised to disclose their identities after the interment. Dr. Francisco M. Garcia, the Municipal Health Officer, found eleven gunshot wounds on the victim's body.

On June 20, 1966, Agaton Anillo and Adelaida Mirania submitted to a formal investigation and named Domingo Mabuyo as the triggerman, alluding to a certain Juan Mendoza as the instigator. A complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Tanauan against both Mendoza and Mabuyo, and warrants of arrest were issued, but Mabuyo was nowhere to be found. Mendoza waived his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation, and an information for murder was filed against him alone as principal by inducement. He was acquitted on January 7, 1967 on the ground of reasonable doubt.

On March 27, 1967, Mabuyo presented himself at the Office of the Chief of Police of Tanauan, only to be fingerprinted, as he had with him an order of release issued by the Municipal Court. He had previously prepared a bail bond in the sum of P30,000.00, approved by the Municipal Judge, and through counsel waived his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation. On April 5, 1967, the Provincial Fiscal filed the information for murder against Mabuyo, alleging treachery and evident premeditation.

The widow, the lone eyewitness, testified that at about midnight of June 18, 1966, while she was reading in bed, she heard her husband asking her to open the door. She stood up, took a lighted kerosene lamp, and went downstairs. Suddenly there were two successive gunshots, and she heard her husband cry out "aray," followed by the sound of a falling object. As she came near the door, there were other successive shots. She opened the door and, with the aid of the light of the kerosene lamp held over her head, saw Domingo Mabuyo firing at her prostrate husband with what appeared to be a carbine. Mabuyo aimed at her, so she closed the door and shouted for help. Her father-in-law arrived shortly thereafter, and she told him that it was Mabuyo whom she saw shooting her husband.

Aniceto Sumarraga, another prosecution witness, testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June 18, 1966, Mabuyo arrived at his house with a carbine and asked him to join in killing Norberto Anillo. Sumarraga refused, and Mabuyo said he would go alone. Sumarraga later went to a store where Anillo was watching a mahjong game but did not warn him. At about midnight, Anillo left the store, and a few minutes later gun reports were heard from the direction of his house. Agaton Anillo testified that on June 16, his son told him of a plot for his liquidation and that Mabuyo would carry it out; that on June 18 he saw Mabuyo passing in front of his house; and that after the killing, Mabuyo disappeared and went into hiding.

Mabuyo's defense was alibi. He claimed that early in the morning of June 3, 1966, he left Bo. Ambulong for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, and did not return to Tanauan until March 27, 1967, when he surrendered. He worked in the logging concession of Gabaldon Vice-Mayor Isabelo Aquino in Dingalan, Quezon. In the evening of June 18, 1966, he was detained in the municipal jail of Gabaldon for drunkenness and was released at about 8:00 o'clock the next morning. He claimed he had no motive to kill the deceased, who was his friend and a nephew of his wife. Corroborating witnesses included Vice-Mayor Aquino, who testified to Mabuyo's employment and identified a time book and payrolls; Gabaldon Police Chief Francisco Gamit, who testified on the police blotter entries showing Mabuyo's detention; and Atty. Juan Mendoza, who testified to Mabuyo's whereabouts and his advice to surrender.

The trial court rendered judgment of conviction, and Mabuyo appealed.

• Variance in Place of Commission: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him of a crime not properly charged in the information, since he was charged with murder allegedly committed in Bo. Bagumbayan, Tanauan, Batangas, but was found guilty of the crime committed in Bo. Ambulong, some 12 kilometers away in the same municipality and province.
• Denial of Preliminary Investigation: Appellant claimed that he was denied the right to preliminary investigation.
• Incredibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant vigorously assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the widow who identified him as the murderer, urging that since the testimonies of said witnesses as regards the guilt of Juan Mendoza were not given credence, the same should likewise be rejected in his case in order to be consistent.
• Mistaken Identity: Appellant insisted that the widow could not have possibly seen the assailant because, as testified to by Mateo Simbahan, she was not at home at the time of the incident but in the house of her father-in-law watching a game of "bingo."
• Motive for False Accusation: Appellant insisted that the widow pointed to him as the assailant because she was angry with him for refusing to stop helping her late husband in his extra-marital affairs.

• Positive Identification: The prosecution presented the testimony of the widow, who positively identified the appellant as the person who shot her husband, aided by the light of a kerosene lamp she was holding.
• Corroborating Witnesses: The prosecution presented Aniceto Sumarraga, who testified that Mabuyo invited him to join in killing Anillo, and Agaton Anillo, who testified to his son's warning of the plot and to the widow's immediate identification of Mabuyo.
• Flight and Hiding: The prosecution's theory was that Mabuyo's flight immediately after the commission of the crime was not for any innocent reason, as he disappeared and went into hiding.

• Variance in Place of Commission: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused of murder committed in Bo. Ambulong when the information alleged the crime was committed in Bo. Bagumbayan, some 12 kilometers away in the same municipality and province.
• Preliminary Investigation: Whether the accused was denied his right to preliminary investigation.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, having been rejected in the case against the alleged inducer Juan Mendoza, should likewise be rejected against the accused.
• Identification by Eyewitness: Whether the widow's identification of the accused as the assailant was credible.
• Alibi: Whether the accused's defense of alibi should be sustained.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in favor of the accused.

• Variance in Place of Commission: No. Unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged in the information, provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court.
• Preliminary Investigation: No. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence; the record showed the accused renounced his right to the second stage thereof and did not raise the question at any stage of the trial.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The incredibility of the witnesses against Juan Mendoza as principal by inducement did not necessarily mean that said witnesses were also incredible when they testified against the very person who allegedly shot the victim.
• Identification by Eyewitness: Yes, credible. The widow knew the accused very well, and the lighted kerosene lamp she carried was sufficient to light an area within a radius of five meters.
• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot be sustained where the accused had been clearly and positively identified; moreover, the alibi had the aspect of fabrication.
• Treachery: Yes. The attack was sudden, and the circumstances, including the use of a high power firearm, rendered the victim defenseless.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. The fact that it took the accused almost nine months after the issuance of the warrant of arrest before he presented himself to the police authorities negates the spontaneity of his surrender.

• Variance in Place of Commission: The Court applied the settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if the crime was committed at a place different from that alleged in the information, provided the actual place of commission was within the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the place of commission did not constitute an essential element of the offense charged, and the evidence disclosed that the offense was in fact committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, there was no reason to believe that the appellant was misled or surprised by the variance.

• Preliminary Investigation: The Court found the claim to be without factual basis, as the order dated March 27, 1967 of the Municipal Court of Tanauan showed that the appellant "had renounced his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation." Furthermore, the record did not show that he raised the question of lack of preliminary investigation at any stage of the trial in the court of first instance. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The Court noted that Juan Mendoza was prosecuted on the theory that he directly induced the appellant to kill Norberto Anillo, while the appellant was charged as the sole author of the crime after the acquittal of his supposed inducer. The trial court aptly observed that the incredibility of the witnesses against Mendoza as principal by inducement did not necessarily mean that said witnesses were also incredible when they testified against the very person who allegedly shot the victim. The Court quoted People vs. Malillos: "It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts."

• Identification by Eyewitness: The Court held that Adelaida Mirania could not possibly have been mistaken as to the identity of the appellant, as she knew him very well, he being from the same barrio where his house was not far away from hers. At the time of the incident, she was carrying a lighted kerosene lamp, described as a bottle of beer with the wick held in place at its mouth by means of a tin plate, which was sufficient to light an area within a radius of five meters. The Court also noted that although she did not report immediately to the Deputy Chief of Police the identity of the assailant, she promised to identify him after her husband was interred, which she readily did. The testimony of Mateo Simbahan, who claimed the widow was not at home at the time of the incident, was found to contain flaws rendering it unworthy of belief, including the implausibility that a woman with nine children and pregnant would leave her house to watch a bingo game until midnight. The alleged motive of anger was insufficient for her to falsely accuse the appellant of so grave a crime as murder.

• Alibi: The Court held that the appellant having been clearly and positively identified by the widow, his alibi could not be sustained. Moreover, the alibi had the aspect of fabrication. The police blotter of Gabaldon was not properly accomplished: while the Chief of Police testified that the appellant was brought to the municipal jail at about two o'clock in the afternoon of June 18, 1966, the blotter showed detention at 9:00 o'clock in the evening; and while the appellant was supposedly released on June 19, 1966 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, the release was entered on the page for June 18, 1966. The payrolls from April 1966 to November 1966 appeared to have been prepared at the same time. The appellant's protestation that he never knew he was being implicated until March 23, 1967 was belied by the fact that his bondsmen secured papers for their properties on February 28, 1967 and the bail bond was prepared on March 4, 1967. Finally, if he were truly working and not hiding, he would at least have returned home to visit his family during that long period, even on Christmas day.

• Treachery: The Court held that the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The attack was sudden: the victim was knocking at the door and asking his wife to open it when he was shot. Although he was apparently aware of the plot to liquidate him, the circumstances, including the use by the appellant of a high power firearm, rendered the victim defenseless.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Court held that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could not be considered in favor of the appellant, as the fact that it took him almost nine months after the issuance of the warrant of arrest before he presented himself to the police authorities negated the spontaneity of his surrender.

• Rule on Place of Commission of Offense — Unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged in the information, provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court. The Court applied this rule to uphold the conviction despite the variance between Bo. Bagumbayan (alleged) and Bo. Ambulong (proven), both within the same municipality and province.

• Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation — The right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the appellant's claim of denial of preliminary investigation, as he had renounced his right to the second stage thereof and did not raise the question at any stage of the trial.

• Credibility of Witnesses — Partial Belief — It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts; even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the credibility of the prosecution witnesses against the appellant despite their having been disbelieved in the case against the alleged inducer.

• Alibi — Positive Identification Prevails — Alibi cannot be sustained where the accused had been clearly and positively identified by an eyewitness who knew him well and saw him under adequate lighting; more so if the alibi was found to have the aspect of fabrication. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the appellant's alibi, which was corroborated by several witnesses but bore indicia of fabrication, including irregularities in the police blotter and the timing of the preparation of the bail bond.

• Treachery — Sudden Attack with High Power Firearm — The attack was sudden where the victim was knocking at the door and asking his wife to open it when he was shot; although he was apparently aware of the plot to liquidate him, the circumstances, including the use of a high power firearm, rendered the victim defenseless. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm the trial court's appreciation of treachery as the qualifying circumstance.

• Voluntary Surrender — Spontaneity Required — The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be considered where the accused took almost nine months after the issuance of the warrant of arrest before presenting himself to police authorities, as the delay negates the spontaneity of the surrender. The Court applied this doctrine to deny the mitigating circumstance in favor of the appellant.

• "It is a settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged in the information, provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court." — This passage states the controlling rule on variance between the allegation and proof of the place of commission, which the Court applied to reject the appellant's first assigned error.

• "It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited." — This quotation from People vs. Malillos articulates the doctrine of partial belief in witness testimony, which the Court applied to uphold the credibility of the prosecution witnesses against the appellant notwithstanding their rejection in the case against the alleged inducer.

• "The appellant having been clearly and positively identified by the widow, his alibi cannot be sustained. Moreover, after examining the evidence in support of his defense We find that his alibi has the aspect of fabrication." — This passage states the core ratio on the alibi defense: positive identification prevails, and the alibi's indicia of fabrication further undermine it.

• "The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be considered in favor of the appellant. The fact that it took him almost nine months after the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him before he presented himself to the police authorities negates the spontaneity of his surrender." — This passage defines the requirement of spontaneity for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which the Court applied to deny the same to the appellant.

• People vs. Malillos, No. L-26568, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 133 — Cited as authority for the doctrine that it is reasonable to believe a witness's testimony with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts, and that portions of testimony deemed worthy of belief may be credited even where witnesses have deliberately falsified in some material particulars.
• U.S. vs. Smith, 3 Phil. 20; U.S. vs. Archos, 11 Phil. 555; U.S. vs. Tan Goy, 36 Phil. 974 — Cited as authorities for the settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if the crime was committed at a place different from that alleged in the information, provided the actual place was within the jurisdiction of the court.
• People vs. Mijares, 90 Phil. 102; People vs. Baluran, No. L-28582, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 71 — Cited as authorities for the doctrine that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence.

• Rule 110, Section 9, Rules of Court — Cited in connection with the rule on the place of commission of the offense, supporting the principle that conviction may be had even if the crime was committed at a place different from that alleged in the information, provided the actual place was within the jurisdiction of the court.

Fernando, Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concurred.