People vs. Lumayag

When the details and circumstances surrounding the commission of a killing are unknown and no evidence indicates the victim's situation at the time of death or conclusively establishes any qualifying circumstance under Article 248, the crime is homicide, not murder.

Agrecio Lumayag and Jose Pampilo were residents of Barrio Gumagamot, Municipality of Lala, Lanao del Norte. On July 8, 1958, Pampilo boxed Lumayag several times in the face, for which Pampilo was convicted of less serious physical injuries by the justice of the peace court of Lala; that conviction was still pending appeal before the Court of First Instance of Lanao at the time of the killing on April 12, 1959. Pedro Lumayag, the appellant's relative, was married to Luzviminda Pampilo, the deceased's daughter.

At about seven o'clock in the evening of April 12, 1959, in Barrio Gumagamot, Municipality of Lala, Lanao del Norte, Pedro Lumayag was up in a coconut tree gathering tuba while his wife, Luzviminda Pampilo, stood on the ground lighting him with a flashlight. Suddenly he heard a thud and a shout for help. Recognizing the shout as that of Jose Pampilo, his father-in-law, Pedro hurriedly descended, snatched the flashlight, and together with his wife ran toward the source. They heard the sound of hard beating and a man's groaning. Pedro directed his flashlight toward the sounds and saw Agrecio Lumayag, wearing a red shirt and maong pants, straddled over a person by the road with his hands around the person's neck. Agrecio jumped and ran toward his house, about 300 meters away.

The spouses approached the person lying face down and recognized him as Jose Pampilo, who had injuries on the nape and bruises on the right cheek and was bleeding. One meter away was his hat, and nearby were two empty liquor bottles. Upon verifying that Jose Pampilo was already dead, the spouses reported the incident to the barrio lieutenant, who sent a rural policeman to notify the chief of police. The spouses, accompanied by the barrio lieutenant, returned to the scene and found the body lying on its back with the hat on. The chief of police, several policemen, and the municipal health officer arrived later.

Acting on Pedro Lumayag's account, the chief of police dispatched policemen to summon Agrecio Lumayag. They found only his wife at his house but, upon further search, discovered him hiding in a nearby shack armed with a bolo and a cane. When brought before the chief of police and asked whether he killed Jose Pampilo, Agrecio said he would answer at the municipal building. Asked what attire he had worn that afternoon, he answered that he wore a red shirt and maong pants, which the chief of police later retrieved from Agrecio's house. The municipal health officer's postmortem examination revealed a fracture and contused wounds at the base of the skull, possibly inflicted by a blunt instrument, and swelling on the right side of the face, lower jaw, and neck.

At the municipal building that same evening, the chief of police interrogated Agrecio, but he refused to make a statement and promised to do so the following morning. No investigation was conducted the next morning because the chief of police left for Iligan City at about one o'clock and returned only at 5:30 in the afternoon. Upon being investigated again, Agrecio eventually confessed that he killed Jose Pampilo with a cane called "bahi" and indicated where he had thrown it when someone focused a flashlight on him. A policeman searched the indicated area and found the cane. The provincial fiscal thereafter filed an information charging Agrecio Lumayag with murder.

For his defense, Agrecio testified that at about four o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1959, he and his wife left Gumagamot by truck for Baroy, crossed Pangil Bay by banca to Tangub, arriving at about six o'clock, and stayed at the house of a quack doctor, Tranquilino Melbar, until the morning of April 14, during which time he was treated by Melbar. They returned to Gumagamot on April 14 at about eight o'clock, accompanied by Melbar, to whom Agrecio had promised a rooster. Shortly thereafter, a policeman arrived and arrested him. The trial court rejected the alibi as improbable and found the quack doctor's testimony unreliable, crediting instead the positive identification by Pedro Lumayag and Luzviminda Pampilo, the confession, and the recovery of the cane.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant questioned the credibility of the testimonies of Pedro Lumayag, Luzviminda Pampilo, and the chief of police of Lala, emphasizing the testimony of barrio lieutenant Luis Ecat that the spouses, when reporting to him, could not identify the killer.
• Alibi: Appellant maintained that he was in Tangub being treated by a quack doctor at the time of the killing and therefore could not have committed the crime.
• Absence of Qualifying Circumstances: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder despite the prosecution's failure to establish treachery and nocturnity as qualifying circumstances.

• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether the killing of Jose Pampilo qualified as murder given the prosecution's failure to prove treachery, evident premeditation, or nocturnity.
• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: Whether the trial court's findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and rejection of the alibi should be disturbed on appeal.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a Wrong: Whether the prior boxing incident of July 8, 1958, in which the deceased physically injured the appellant, constituted the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a wrong under paragraph 5, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Qualifying Circumstances: No. The crime is homicide, not murder, because treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity were not proved; the details and circumstances surrounding the killing being unknown, the doctrine in U.S. vs. Bañagale applies.
• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: No. The trial court's findings on witness credibility were not disturbed, no sufficient motive to testify falsely having been shown and no facts of substance having been overlooked.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a Wrong: No. Approximately nine months intervened between the boxing incident and the killing, precluding the immediacy or proximity required for the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 5, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Qualifying Circumstances: While sufficient evidence established that the appellant killed Jose Pampilo, there was none to show that the appellant acted with treachery or evident premeditation or that he specially sought the advantage of nighttime to facilitate the crime. The information cited treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity as qualifying circumstances, but these were not proved. Applying the doctrine in U.S. vs. Bañagale, when the details and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime are unknown and no evidence indicates the victim's situation when killed, or when it is not conclusively shown that the violent death was attended by any qualifying circumstance under Article 248, the crime must be classified as homicide, not murder. The Solicitor General himself recommended a judgment for homicide instead of murder.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: The appellant's alibi could not prevail against the positive testimonies of Pedro Lumayag and Luzviminda Pampilo, who definitively identified him as the person they saw on top of Jose Pampilo's prostrate body. The record disclosed no sufficient motive on the part of these witnesses or the chief of police to testify falsely. Although barrio lieutenant Luis Ecat testified that the spouses could not identify the killer when they reported to him, the defense itself showed that the deceased was hated in the community, such that a feeling of hatred may have influenced Ecat. The trial court did not believe Ecat, and appellate courts as a rule desist from disturbing trial court findings on witness credibility, the trial court being in a better position to observe the witnesses' behavior and manner of testifying. No reason was found to depart from this practice, as the trial court had not overlooked any facts of substance that might affect the result.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a Wrong: The record showed that on July 8, 1958, the deceased boxed the appellant several times in the face, for which the deceased was convicted of less serious physical injuries. However, approximately nine months elapsed between the boxing incident and the killing of Jose Pampilo on April 12, 1959. In view of the length of time between the two incidents, the killing could not be considered an immediate or proximate vindication of the prior wrong. Accordingly, the trial court should not have considered the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 5, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Doctrine from U.S. vs. Bañagale (24 Phil. 69) — When the details and circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime are unknown, and no evidence indicates the victim's situation when killed, or when it is not conclusively shown that the violent death was attended by any qualifying circumstance specified in Article 248, the crime must be classified as homicide, not murder. The Court applied this doctrine to downgrade the conviction from murder to homicide because the prosecution failed to prove treachery, evident premeditation, or nocturnity.

• Trial Court's Findings on Witness Credibility Generally Not Disturbed on Appeal — Appellate courts as a rule desist from disturbing the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses, the trial court being in a better position to appreciate the same having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. The Court found no reason to depart from this practice, as the trial court had not overlooked any facts of substance that might affect the result.

• Vindication of a Wrong Requires Immediacy or Proximity — The mitigating circumstance of vindication of a wrong under paragraph 5, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated when a considerable length of time intervened between the wrong claimed to be vindicated and the commission of the offense, as the second act must be an immediate or proximate vindication of the first. Nine months between the prior physical injury and the killing was held too remote.

• "When the details and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime are unknown, and there appears no evidence in the case that may indicate the situation of the victim when he was killed, or when it is not conclusively shown that the violent death of a person was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances specified in Article 248, the crime must be classified as homicide, and not murder." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for downgrading the conviction from murder to homicide and articulates the canonical formulation of the doctrine from U.S. vs. Bañagale.

• "In view of the length of time, approximately nine months, between the boxing incident and the killing of Jose Pampilo, it cannot be said that the second incident was an immediate or a proximate vindication of the first." — This passage explains why the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a wrong was rejected, establishing the immediacy requirement under paragraph 5, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Ramos, L-17402-03, August 31, 1963 — Cited for the proposition that alibi cannot prevail against positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
• People vs. Curiano, L-15256-57, October 31, 1963 — Cited for the principle that appellate courts generally do not disturb trial court findings on witness credibility unless facts of substance have been overlooked.
• U.S. vs. Bañagale, 24 Phil. 69 — Controlling precedent for the doctrine that when the circumstances of the killing are unknown and no qualifying circumstance is conclusively shown, the crime is homicide, not murder.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and enumerates its qualifying circumstances, including treachery, evident premeditation, and taking advantage of nocturnity. The Court held that none of these circumstances were proved, requiring reclassification of the crime as homicide.
• Paragraph 5, Article 13, Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a wrong. The Court held that the nine-month interval between the prior boxing incident and the killing precluded appreciation of this mitigating circumstance for lack of immediacy.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concurred.