People vs. Lualhati

Conviction for illegal possession of firearm under P.D. 1866 requires affirmative prosecution proof both of the existence of the firearm and that the possessor had no license or permit therefor; absent the latter proof, acquittal must follow even where possession itself is established. The killing was nevertheless qualified to murder by treachery where an unarmed victim with raised arms was suddenly shot in the chest.

Juliliuto Pentuyen and Ernesto Vertudazo were factory workers at Stayman Plastic Manufacturing Corporation on Industrial Road, Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Angelito Lualhati was a complete stranger to them prior to the encounter. P.D. 1866 punishes a private person's willful possession of a firearm without authority of law.

On August 18, 1991, at around 6:30 p.m., Juliliuto Pentuyen and Ernesto Vertudazo, factory workers at Stayman Plastic Manufacturing Corporation on Industrial Road, Karuhatan, Valenzuela, left the factory and bought and drank two bottles of beer at a nearby store. In the same store, Angelito Lualhati with four companions was also drinking. According to the prosecution, Lualhati approached them and told Pentuyen, "Pare, mayabang ang kasama mo," which Pentuyen parried by saying Vertudazo had done nothing wrong. Sensing trouble, Pentuyen and Vertudazo quickly finished their beer and headed back toward the factory, but Lualhati and two companions followed them.

Violence ensued on the way. Without provocation, Lualhati slapped Vertudazo's face twice while Pentuyen tried to pacify Lualhati and restrain Vertudazo from retaliating. Outnumbered, Pentuyen and Vertudazo proceeded on their way when a gunshot was heard from behind. Pentuyen ran toward the factory and reached it alone. Security guard Antonio Mariquit saw Lualhati fire a shot in the air, after which Vertudazo faced him and raised his arms in capitulation; notwithstanding, Lualhati shot Vertudazo in the chest and fled. Pentuyen, then at the factory gate about ten meters away, likewise witnessed the shooting. Vertudazo managed to walk to the factory gate where he collapsed and was brought to Fatima Hospital but was declared dead on arrival.

Lualhati, for his part, testified to a different sequence. He claimed he went to the store only to buy cigarettes, was approached and offered beer by the previously unknown Pentuyen, and was met with dagger looks and reproach from the drunk Vertudazo. He said he finished his drink to leave but agreed to accompany the two toward the factory, where Vertudazo taunted him as mayabang, rushed him, broke free from Pentuyen, threatened "Pare, babalikan kita," and left, only to return holding a gun and saying "Patay ka ngayon. Titingnan ko ang tapang mo." Lualhati claimed they grappled for the gun which accidentally fired, that he wrested it and pointed it only to frighten Vertudazo when it again unintentionally fired, after which he fled, later surrendering to barangay captain Boy de Guia in the presence of Pat. Arenas with hands raised.

Responding to a radio report, PO3 Fernando Arenas and Pat. Jerry Coyenichea proceeded to Industrial Road, learned the victim had been brought to the hospital and the shooting occurred along Tercias Compound, an alley leading to Industrial Road, and upon reaching the scene saw two persons running away. Ordered to stop and frisked, Lualhati yielded from his waistband a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver, described in the Information as a homemade Smith and Wesson without serial number with three live ammunitions and two spent shells of cal. .38. At headquarters, Pentuyen and Mariquit identified Lualhati as the assailant. The trial court credited the prosecution eyewitnesses, who had no shown ill-motive and to whom Lualhati was a stranger, and rejected self-defense.

• Self-Defense: Accused-appellant argued that he acted in self-defense and that the trial court erred in finding that he fired upwards first, claiming he never made such allegation as it was the prosecution witnesses who did.
• Treachery: Accused-appellant contended that he could only be held liable for homicide since the prosecution failed to prove that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
• Illegal Possession of Firearm: Accused-appellant contended that conviction for violation of P.D. 1866 was erroneous in the absence of any evidence showing that the gun recovered from him was an unlicensed firearm.

• Self-Defense: Whether accused-appellant acted in self-defense so as to exculpate him from the killing of Ernesto Vertudazo.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the commission of the crime so as to qualify the killing to murder rather than homicide.
• Illegal Possession of Firearm: Whether accused-appellant was properly convicted of violation of P.D. 1866 absent proof that the firearm recovered from him was unlicensed.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established, the accused having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of means, and lack of sufficient provocation.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing to murder, the sudden chest shot having left the unarmed victim with raised arms with no opportunity to defend himself.
• Illegal Possession of Firearm: No. Conviction was improper, the prosecution having adduced no documentary or testimonial evidence that accused lacked a license or permit for the gun.

• Self-Defense: By invoking self-defense, the onus probandi shifted to accused-appellant to prove by clear and convincing evidence unlawful aggression by the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part. The uncorroborated account was found to stretch credulity: a stranger Pentuyen inexplicably befriended and apologized for Vertudazo yet was branded a fabricator; Lualhati claimed to avoid animosity yet escorted the two home; and the alleged voluntary surrender to the barangay captain was uncorroborated despite availability. In contrast, the prosecution eyewitnesses corroborated each other in all material points, had no ill-motive, and were strangers to accused before the incident, establishing a face-to-face, unwavering chest shot followed by flight.
• Treachery: At the time of assault the victim was unarmed with arms raised in capitulation and without sufficient provocation placing him on guard. Under People vs. Cruz, treachery exists where commission was sudden and unexpected even if the armed attack was made face to face. The victim was thus in no position to defend against the unreasonable and unexpected attack, satisfying treachery to qualify murder.
• Illegal Possession of Firearm: Under People vs. Damaso, illegal possession requires prosecution proof of the existence of the subject firearm and that the owner-possessor had no corresponding license or permit. No documentary or testimonial evidence on lack of license or permit was adduced regarding the recovered .38 revolver. For insufficiency of evidence, the conviction under Section 1 of P.D. 1866 could not stand.

• Self-defense; burden and elements — One who invokes self-defense admits the killing and bears the onus probandi to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, pursuant to Art. 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code. Failure on any element defeats the plea, as where the accused's uncorroborated version is implausible and contradicted by mutually corroborative, disinterested eyewitnesses.
• Treachery — Treachery exists where the attack was sudden and unexpected, depriving the victim of any real opportunity to defend himself, even if made face to face. Applied here, shooting in the chest an unarmed victim whose arms were raised in capitulation and who was given no provocation to be on guard constituted treachery, qualifying the killing to murder as in People vs. Cruz.
• Illegal possession of firearm; elements and burden of proof — Under P.D. 1866, the prosecution must prove (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same, as settled in People vs. Damaso. Mere recovery of the gun from the accused's waistband without any documentary or testimonial evidence of absence of license mandates acquittal.

• "by advancing the defense that the killing of Vertudazo arose out of an impulse to defend one's self, the onus probandi rests upon accused-appellant to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements thereof, i.e., that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; that reasonable necessity of the means was employed to prevent or repel it; and, that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — States the burden and three elements of self-defense that the accused failed to discharge.
• "we held that there is treachery if the commission of the crime was sudden and unexpected even if the armed attack was made face to face." — Recites the controlling formulation from People vs. Cruz applied to sustain murder despite a face-to-face shooting.
• "this Court ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the subject firearm, and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same." — Recites the two-element test from People vs. Damaso that compelled acquittal on the P.D. 1866 charge.

• People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 94375, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 611 — Followed as authority that sudden and unexpected commission constitutes treachery even where the armed attack was made face to face.
• People vs. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992, 212 SCRA 547 — Followed as controlling on the elements and prosecution burden in illegal possession of firearm cases, leading to acquittal for lack of proof of absence of license.

• Art. 11(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides the justifying circumstance of self-defense with its three requisites of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity, and lack of sufficient provocation; applied to reject the defense for failure of proof.
• Section 1, P.D. 1866 — Punishes a private person's willful possession of a firearm without authority of law; applied to acquit where the prosecution proved possession of the .38 revolver but not the absence of license or permit.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.