People vs. Lora

The demand for ransom does not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder where the victim was killed almost immediately after being restrained and the restraint was merely a method of committing the murder; the crime is simple murder qualified by treachery.

Belinda Lora y Vequizo, using the name Lorena Sumilew, was employed as a housemaid by the spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap at their residence and store on Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City. The Yaps had two children, Emily and Oliver; Oliver was three years and five months old. The Revised Penal Code provisions on serious illegal detention, murder, and complex crimes supplied the statutory backdrop to the case. The penalty imposed made the case subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court.

Belinda Lora y Vequizo, using the name "Lorena Sumilew," applied on May 26, 1975 as a housemaid in the household of the spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap at 373 Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City. The spouses had a store on the ground floor, a mezzanine floor used as their residence, and a third floor used as a bodega for their stocks. They had two children, Emily and Oliver; Oliver was three years and five months old. Lora was accepted as a housemaid and reported for work the following day, May 27, 1975. Her duties were to wash clothes and to look after Oliver.

On May 28, 1975, Myrna Yap returned home from the market to find her mother-in-law and her husband panicky because Oliver and the maid were missing. The mother-in-law had found a ransom note at the stairway to the mezzanine floor; the note said that Oliver was to be sold to a couple and that the writer needed money for her mother's hospitalization. Four pieces of residence certificates were also found inside the paper bag of the maid, one bearing No. 1941785 with the name "Sumiliw, Lorena Pamintil." The incident was reported immediately to the police. Myrna Yap, accompanied by Mrs. Erlinda Velez, looked for Oliver and the housemaid; not finding them in Davao City, they went to Digos and Bansalan, Davao, and looked in the hospitals there. The residence certificate in the name of Lorena Sumiliw was issued in Digos, and the ransom letter stated that the mother of the defendant was very sick.

In the evening of May 28, 1975, the Yaps received two telephone calls at their residence. The first call was received by Myrna Yap's mother-in-law, while the second was received by Ricardo Yap. Lorena Sumilew, the caller, instructed Ricardo Yap to bring P3,000.00 to the island in front of the Davao Regional Hospital and to go there alone without any policeman or companion, after which his son Oliver would be left to the security guard of the hospital at the emergency exit. The Yaps borrowed P3,000.00. Upon instructions of the NBI, the money was marked with Myrna Yap's initials "MY." Ricardo Yap wrapped the P3,000.00 in a piece of paper and went to the Regional Hospital at 9:30 in the evening of May 28, 1975. He placed the money near the Imelda Playground. He proceeded to the hospital and looked for his child from the security guard, but the guard said nobody left a boy with him. Ricardo Yap stayed at a corner looking and calling for his child but could not locate him. After ten minutes, he went back to where he had placed the money, but the money was not there anymore. He waited until 11:00 o'clock, after which he went home.

The following morning, May 29, 1975, Myrna Yap received a phone call from the accused informing her that her son was at the Minrapco Terminal and that she was asking for another P3,000.00. Myrna Yap proceeded to the terminal, where she learned that the terminal had moved to a place near a theatre. When she arrived, she saw the accused board a Minica bus. She followed and grabbed the accused. As the accused said that Myrna Yap's son was brought to the Regional Hospital, they proceeded there. Upon arriving, a couple, Mr. and Mrs. Bonahos, said that the Yap son was in Panacan. Myrna Yap and the accused went to Panacan. After arriving there, the accused told Myrna Yap that her son was in the custody of a woman whom she paid P100.00 and that the woman would return her son at 6:00 o'clock P.M. that day. Myrna Yap made the accused sign a promissory note that she would return Oliver on the same day. After the accused boarded a bus for Surigao, Myrna Yap listed down the bus number and seat number and reported to Lt. Mesias of the Davao City Police Force that the "kidnapper" was on board the Surigao bus. Lt. Mesias stopped the bus and placed the accused under arrest. From the body of the accused was taken an improvised pouch containing 36 pieces of P50.00 bills and 24 pieces of P20.00 bills. The money had initials reading "MY" below the serial numbers.

The following morning, May 30, 1975, upon waking up at around 6 o'clock in his house, Ricardo Yap noticed that blood was dripping from the ceiling. He went upstairs, which was being utilized as a bodega, to verify, and found his son placed inside the carton of Marlboro cigarettes. The head of the child was inside the carton while his feet protruded outside. His mouth was tied with stockings. The child was already dead. He had died of "asphyxhia due to suffocation." The defendant presented evidence only for the purpose of proving alleged mitigating circumstances. She claimed that she did not intend to kill the child. To support her plea for mercy, she stated that she had three children aged from one to five years whom she left in Pagadian. On objection to the materiality of the evidence, the appellant's counsel pleaded that she be allowed to prove those facts for "humanitarian consideration" which might enable the Supreme Court to review the penalty with compassion. The defendant requested life imprisonment and repented. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that she gagged the child's mouth with stockings; placed the child inside the box with head down and legs up; covered the box with some sacks and boxes; and left the child in that condition inside the store room of the house of Ricardo Yap. When the defendant left the store room, the voice of the child, who was previously shouting, "was already slow and to make sure that his voice would not be heard I closed the door."

The trial court found the facts undisputed. Dr. Juan Abear, Jr., who performed the autopsy on May 30, 1975 at 8 o'clock in the morning, testified that the body of the child was already in a state of decomposition and opined that the child must have died three days before the autopsy; the child therefore died practically on the very day he was stuffed into the box on May 28, 1975.

• Plea of Guilt: Appellant invoked her voluntary plea of guilt as a mitigating circumstance.
• Lack of Intent to Kill: Appellant maintained that she did not intend to kill the child and did not intend to commit so grave a wrong.
• Fear and Necessity: Appellant claimed that she was overcome by fear that her mother would die unless she was able to raise money for her mother's hospitalization, and that she thus committed kidnapping for ransom.
• Children and Compassion: Appellant argued that she should live so that her children of tender years would not be deprived of a mother, and invoked a compassionate society.
• Penalty: Appellant requested that life imprisonment be imposed, stating that she really committed the crime but did not really intend to kill the child, and expressed repentance.

• Classification of the Crime: Whether the crime committed is the complex crime of serious illegal detention with murder or simple murder qualified by treachery.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether lack of respect due to the age of the victim, cruelty, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the offense.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the appellant's plea of guilt, claimed lack of intent to kill, fear for her mother, maternal circumstances, and compassionate society mitigate her liability.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty was correctly imposed.

• Classification of the Crime: No. The crime is simple murder qualified by treachery, not the complex crime of serious illegal detention with murder. Kidnapping requires actual confinement or restraint for some time and purpose; no appreciable interval existed between restraint and death, and the gagging and boxing were methods of murder; the ransom demand did not convert the offense.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was present because the victim was only a three-year-old child.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Lack of respect due to the tender age of the victim, cruelty, and abuse of confidence attended the killing.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Only the voluntary plea of guilt was appreciated. The claim of no intent to kill lacks merit because the accused knew the acts would cause suffocation; the other invoked circumstances were not appreciated.
• Penalty: Yes. The death penalty was correctly imposed; three aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance were appreciated.

• Classification of the Crime: Kidnapping is a crime against liberty defined in Article 267, Title IX, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, and its essence is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation of liberty. Where there is no showing that the accused intended to deprive the victim of liberty for some time and for some purpose, and there is no appreciable interval between the taking and the killing from which kidnapping may be inferred, the crime is murder and not the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In this case, the gagging of the child with stockings, placing him in a box with head down and legs upward, and covering the box with sacks and other boxes were only the methods of the defendant to commit murder. The child instantly died of suffocation. Dr. Juan Abear, Jr., who performed the autopsy on May 30, 1975 at 8 o'clock in the morning, found the body already in a state of decomposition and opined that the child must have died three days before the autopsy; the child thus died practically on the very day he was stuffed into the box on May 28, 1975. The demand for ransom did not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder because the defendant was well aware that the child would be suffocated to death in a few moments after she left; the demand for ransom was only part of the scheme to murder the child, conceal his body, and then demand money before the discovery of the cadaver. The crime actually committed is therefore simple murder qualified by treachery.
• Treachery: There is treachery because the victim is only a three-year-old child.
• Aggravating Circumstances: The commission of the offense was attended with the aggravating circumstances of lack of respect due to the age of the victim, cruelty, and abuse of confidence. The circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies where the victim is of tender age as well as of old age; it was applied in a case where one of the victims in a murder case was a twelve-year-old boy, and here the victim was only three years old. The gagging of the mouth of a three-year-old child with stockings, dumping him with head downwards into a box, and covering the box with sacks and other boxes, thereby causing slow suffocation, is cruelty. There was also abuse of confidence because the victim was entrusted to the care of the appellant; the appellant's main duty in the household was to take care of the minor child, and there existed a relation of trust and confidence between the appellant and the one against whom the crime was committed, which the appellant made use of to commit the crime. When the killer of the child is the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's amah, the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence is present.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The defendant invoked as mitigating circumstances that she pleaded guilty; that she did not intend to commit so grave a wrong; that she was overcome by fear that her mother would die unless she was able to raise money for her mother's hospitalization, thus committing kidnapping for ransom; that she should live so that her children of tender years would not be deprived of a mother; and that we have a compassionate society. The only mitigating circumstance that may be appreciated in favor of the defendant is her voluntary plea of guilt. Her contention that she had no intention to kill the child lacks merit because the defendant was well aware that her act of gagging the mouth of the child with stockings, placing him with head down and feet up in a box, and covering the box with sacks and other boxes would result in the instant suffocation of the child.
• Penalty: There being three aggravating circumstances, namely, lack of respect due to the tender age of the victim, cruelty, and abuse of confidence, and only one mitigating circumstance in favor of the defendant, she deserves the death penalty imposed upon her by the lower court.

• Kidnapping or Serious Illegal Detention Distinguished from Murder — The essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation of liberty. Where there is no showing that the accused intended to deprive the victim of liberty for some time and for some purpose, and there is no appreciable interval between the taking and the killing from which kidnapping may be inferred, the crime is murder and not the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. The Court applied this doctrine because the child died almost immediately from suffocation and the gagging and boxing were merely methods of committing the murder.
• Ransom Demand Does Not Convert Killing into Kidnapping — A demand for ransom does not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder where the accused was well aware that the victim would be suffocated to death in a few moments after she left, and the demand was only part of the scheme to murder the child, conceal the body, and demand money before discovery of the cadaver.
• Treachery and Tender Age — Treachery is present where the victim is only a three-year-old child.
• Lack of Respect Due to Age — The aggravating circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies where the victim is of tender age as well as of old age. It was applied where the victim was only three years old.
• Cruelty — Gagging the mouth of a three-year-old child with stockings, dumping him with head downwards into a box, and covering the box with sacks and other boxes, thereby causing slow suffocation, constitutes cruelty.
• Abuse of Confidence — Abuse of confidence is present where the victim was entrusted to the care of the appellant, whose main duty in the household was to take care of the minor child, and there existed a relation of trust and confidence between the appellant and the one against whom the crime was committed, which the appellant made use of to commit the crime. When the killer of the child is the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's amah, the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence is present.
• Voluntary Plea of Guilt as Mitigating Circumstance — The only mitigating circumstance that may be appreciated in favor of the defendant is her voluntary plea of guilt. A claim of no intent to kill lacks merit where the accused was well aware that her acts would result in the instant suffocation of the child.
• Penalty for Murder with Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances — With three aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance, the death penalty is deserved.

• "The crime actually committed is not the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, as found by the trial court, but the simple crime of murder qualified by treachery." — This states the ratio decidendi on the proper classification of the offense.
• "Where there is no showing that the accused intended to deprive their victims of their liberty for some time and for some purpose, and there being no appreciable interval between their being taken and their being shot from which kidnapping may be inferred, the crimes committed were murder and frustrated murder and not the complex crimes of kidnapping with murder and kidnapping with frustrated murder." — This is the controlling test for distinguishing kidnapping from murder where the restraint is incidental to the killing.
• "The demand for ransom did not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder. The defendant was well aware that the child would be suffocated to death in a few moments after she left. The demand for ransom is only a part of the diabolic scheme of the defendant to murder the child, to conceal his body and then demand money before the discovery of the cadaver." — This explains why the ransom demand did not change the legal character of the killing.
• "The only mitigating circumstance that may be appreciated in favor of the defendant is her voluntary plea of guilt." — This defines the mitigating circumstance credited in favor of the accused.

• People vs. Suarez, 82 Phil. 484; People vs. Ching Suy Siong, 96 Phil. 975; People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 178 — Cited for the definition and essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention as actual confinement or restraint of the victim or deprivation of liberty.
• People vs. Sacayanan, 110 Phil. 588 — Followed for the rule that absent intent to deprive liberty for some time and purpose, and with no appreciable interval between the taking and the killing, kidnapping may not be inferred; the crimes are murder and frustrated murder, not complex kidnapping with murder.
• People vs. Espare, 61 Phil. 140; People vs. Ludday, 61 Phil. 216 — Cited for treachery where the victim is only a three-year-old child.
• US vs. Butag, 38 Phil. 746 — Cited for the rule that lack of respect due to age applies where the victim is of tender age; applied in a murder case where one victim was a twelve-year-old boy.
• People vs. Caliso, 58 Phil. 283 — Cited for grave abuse of confidence when the killer of the child is the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's amah.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code — Defines kidnapping or serious illegal detention as a crime against liberty under Title IX, Book II; its essence is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation of liberty. The information charged the offense under this article, but the Court held it was not the crime actually committed.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder; the information invoked it, and the Court held that the crime actually committed was simple murder qualified by treachery.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Defines complex crimes; the trial court applied it in convicting the accused of the complex crime of serious illegal detention with murder, but the Court rejected that application.
• Article 270, Revised Penal Code — Cited in Justice Aquino's concurring opinion as the basis for the complex crime of murder and kidnapping of a minor.
• Article 294(5), Revised Penal Code — Cited in Justice Aquino's concurring opinion as the basis for the separate crime of robbery (extortion).

• Concurring: Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Ericta, Plana, and Escolin, JJ.
• In the Result: Teehankee, J.
• Concurring Opinion: Aquino, J. — Concurred in the result. He noted that the penalty imposed by the trial court was death with an indemnity of P12,000. He opined that the crime committed by the accused is the complex crime of murder and kidnapping of a minor penalized in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, and that she also committed the separate crime of robbery penalized under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code (extortion).
• Took No Part: Fernando, C.J.