People vs. Lopez

For a conviction of rape to be affirmed where the complainant is over twelve years of age, the prosecution must affirmatively demonstrate that force or intimidation was employed; absent such proof, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused must be acquitted.

Expedito Lopez was the live-in paramour of Francisca Tuazon, the elder sister of complainant Eligrace Abalos's mother, Imelda Abalos. At the time of the alleged offense on June 11, 1973, complainant was thirteen years of age and had just graduated from elementary school. The case was governed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which then defined rape as carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation, when the woman is deprived of reason or unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age. Because complainant was over twelve, the prosecution was required to prove force or intimidation as an element of the offense.

On June 11, 1973, at around one o'clock in the afternoon, thirteen-year-old Eligrace Abalos was at the house of her maternal aunt, Francisca Tuazon, who lived with appellant Expedito Lopez. Appellant borrowed P0.60 from her and asked her to buy cigarettes, which she did. Upon her return, he called her to go inside the room where he was. After closing the door, he held her hand, laid her on the floor, and took a pillow and a blanket. She testified that she was quite nervous and a little suspicious of his motive, but obeyed him because he told her he would tell her something. He covered her face with the blanket, went on top of her, removed her panties and his trousers, and performed the sexual act. There were no other people inside the house, although her grandmother, Corea Rovillos, was asleep downstairs. After the incident, she ran to the street, waited for a ride to Laoac, and told her mother what happened. Her mother and a sister took her to Dagupan City, where Dr. Fe Manaois examined her at 6:13 P.M. the same day. The medical examination found no external signs of physical injury, an old healed laceration of the hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock, and a vaginal smear positive for spermatozoa.

On cross-examination, complainant stated that appellant had a hard time inserting his male organ into her private part, and that the whole incident lasted thirty minutes. She testified that she was in tears, that her two hands were held by him, and that he removed his trousers with one hand while holding her with the other. He did not have a gun or any other weapon. When asked why she did not cry for help despite knowing her grandmother was downstairs, she answered that she was afraid because appellant told her he would kill her if she shouted. When reminded that he had no weapon, she replied he might strangle her. The blanket that covered her face was flimsy and transparent, being a flour sack, so she could see what appellant was doing.

Appellant denied the charge in its entirety. He testified that on June 11, 1973, complainant, her cousin Evangeline, and her grandmother Corea took lunch with him. After lunch, complainant and Evangeline left the house. He conversed with his mother-in-law for about twenty minutes, then went to his piggery, and later slept in the balcony until past five o'clock. He denied having carnal knowledge of complainant at any time and denied using force or intimidation. He suggested that the charge was motivated by ill will, as complainant's mother had a liking for him but he chose her elder sister instead. The grandmother, Corea Rovillos, testified for the defense and explained that the two sisters had a grudge against each other because appellant courted the older sister and did not mind the younger one.

• Element of Force or Intimidation: Whether the prosecution established the element of force or intimidation necessary for a conviction of rape where the complainant was over twelve years of age.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution overcame the constitutional presumption of innocence and proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

• Element of Force or Intimidation: No. The complainant's own testimony showed obedience and acquiescence rather than resistance, and no evidence of actual force or intimidation was established.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The constitutional presumption of innocence was not overcome, as culpability was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.

• Element of Force or Intimidation: Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation, when the woman is deprived of reason or unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age. Because complainant was over twelve, the prosecution was required to prove force or intimidation. The complainant's own testimony showed that she obeyed appellant when he called her into the room, and that she was suspicious of his motive but nonetheless complied. There was no struggle and no resistance. As held in United States vs. de Dios, where no struggle ensued and no resistance was offered, and the complainant's assent was shown tacitly by her yielding, quietude, and passivity, no conviction is proper. The blanket covering her face was flimsy and transparent, yet she made no outcry. Appellant had no weapon. The evidence showed acquiescence, not force.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The complainant did not cry for help despite her grandmother sleeping downstairs in the same house. In People vs. Belmonte, a conviction was reversed where the complainant did not shout to awaken her sister sleeping nearby. In People vs. Jervoso, a conviction was likewise reversed where the complainant did not shout for help although several houses were close to the scene. The grandmother testified for the defense and offered an explanation for the filing of the charge — a grudge between the two sisters arising from appellant's choice of the elder sister over the younger. The burden of demonstrating guilt falls on the prosecution under the accusatorial system, and the standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence fell short of that standard, and the constitutional presumption of innocence under Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution prevailed.

• Presumption of Innocence — The accused in all criminal prosecutions is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The burden of demonstrating guilt falls on the prosecution, and the standard to overcome the presumption is proof of culpability beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this doctrine to reverse the conviction, finding that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to establish the indispensable element of force or intimidation.

• Element of Force or Intimidation in Rape — Where the complainant is over twelve years of age, force or intimidation must be affirmatively proven for a rape conviction. Where the complainant's own testimony shows obedience, acquiescence, and passivity rather than resistance, and where no weapon or actual physical compulsion is shown, the element is lacking. The Court traced this principle to United States vs. de Dios, citing commentators Pacheco and Viada to the effect that rape is not to be presumed and that consent, not physical force, is the common origin of acts between man and woman.

• Failure to Cry for Help — The absence of any outcry or cry for help by the complainant, especially where persons who could assist are nearby or in the same house, is a significant circumstance undermining the claim of force or intimidation. The Court relied on People vs. Belmonte and People vs. Jervoso as precedents where convictions were reversed on this ground.

• "The feeling of sympathy for complainant in this appeal from a conviction for rape, then a girl of thirteen at the time of the alleged offense, was a natural reaction. Moreover, the accused, appellant Expedito Lopez, was the live-in paramour of her aunt, elder sister of her mother de facto, if not de jure, a relative. A careful and thorough examination of the records of the case reveals, however, that her testimony was insufficient." — This opening passage frames the Court's approach: natural sympathy for the complainant cannot substitute for legally sufficient evidence.

• "Clearly then, there was lacking the element of force and intimidation. Rather there was obedience on her part to what was asked of her. She testified that she was a little bit suspicious of his motive but nonetheless there was no resistance. Instead, there was acquiescence. The law requires that there be evidence of force or intimidation. Such evidence is lacking." — This is the ratio decidendi: the complainant's conduct demonstrated acquiescence, not force or intimidation, and the law requires evidence of the latter.

• "It is of the essence of the accusatorial system that the burden of demonstrating guilt falls on the prosecution. The standard to satisfy the constitutional requirement of the presumption of innocence being overcome is that culpability be shown beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage articulates the constitutional standard governing the prosecution's burden in all criminal cases.

• United States vs. de Dios, 8 Phil. 279 (1907) — The first leading case on the subject, cited as controlling authority for the proposition that where no struggle ensued and no resistance was offered, and the complainant's assent was shown by her yielding, quietude, and passivity, no rape conviction is proper. The Court relied on commentators Pacheco and Viada as cited therein.

• People vs. Belmonte, G.R. No. 58199, July 5, 1983, 123 SCRA 335 — Followed for the principle that failure to cry for help when persons are nearby undermines the claim of force; the lower court's conviction was reversed where the complainant did not shout to awaken her sister sleeping nearby.

• People vs. Jervoso, G.R. No. L-36530, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 765 — Followed for the same principle regarding absence of outcry; the conviction was reversed where the complainant did not shout for help despite several houses being close to the scene.

• People vs. Dramayo, L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59 — Cited in connection with the constitutional standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required to overcome the presumption of innocence.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape as committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of three circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age. The provision was applied to require proof of force or intimidation because the complainant was over twelve years of age, placing the case under paragraph (1).

• Article IV, Section 19, Constitution (1973) — Provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The Court invoked this provision as the constitutional basis for reversing the conviction, the prosecution having failed to overcome the presumption.

Aquino, Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concurred. Makasiar, J., concurred in the result. Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., were on leave.

• Abad Santos, J. — The dissent argued that while actual force may not have been employed, intimidation was clearly present. The complainant testified that appellant told her he would kill her if she shouted, and she was afraid. The dissent emphasized that rape is committed not only by force but also by intimidation under Article 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code. It further contended that appellant, then forty-two years old and the live-in paramour of complainant's aunt, exercised strong moral and physical ascendancy over the thirteen-year-old complainant, such that the degree of force or intimidation need not be acute, citing People vs. Modelo, L-29144, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 639. The dissent also noted that the medical examination conducted immediately after the incident was positive for spermatozoa, belied appellant's flat denial of having had carnal knowledge, and that complainant promptly reported the incident to her mother, negating any possibility of a fabricated story.