People vs. Lizada

The special qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and the relationship of the accused as common-law husband of the victim's mother must be specifically alleged in the Information to warrant conviction for qualified rape and the imposition of the death penalty; absent such allegation, the accused may be convicted only of simple rape. Additionally, where the accused commences the commission of rape by overt acts but fails to achieve penetration due to the intervention of an external cause rather than his own spontaneous desistance, the crime is attempted rape, not consummated rape.

Accused-appellant Freedie Lizada and the victim's mother began living together as common-law spouses in 1994 at No. 1252 Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. The victim AAA was born on December 18, 1985, and had two younger siblings. The mother worked as a waitress and later ran a video shop business from their home, while the accused-appellant was employed as a utility worker at a bank until he was retrenched in 1997. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659, rape committed against a victim under eighteen years of age by the common-law husband of the victim's mother is qualified rape punishable by death.

Accused-appellant Freedie Lizada met the victim's mother in 1994, and they agreed to live together as husband and wife at No. 1252 Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. The mother had three children: AAA, born on December 18, 1985, and two younger siblings aged eleven and nine. The mother worked as a waitress and later ran a video shop from their home, selling Avon products house to house to augment income. The accused-appellant was a utility worker at the Navotas branch of Philippine Banking Corporation until he was retrenched in 1997, after which he helped manage the household and the video shop business.

Sometime in 1996, when AAA was approximately ten years old, the accused-appellant entered her room, laid on top of her, removed her clothing, inserted his finger into her vagina, then inserted his penis. AAA felt a sticky substance and pain in her sex organ. Afterward, the accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone. From 1996 to 1998, the accused-appellant sexually abused AAA approximately two times a week, placing himself on top of her, holding her arms and legs, touching her sex organ, and inserting his finger and penis into her vagina, ejaculating in the process. AAA did not report the abuse because of the threats on her life.

On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., AAA was lying in bed in her room when the accused-appellant, wearing short pants and naked from the waist up, entered. He sat on the side of her bed, placed himself on top of her, held her hands and legs, fondled her breasts, removed her panty, and touched her sex organ. He inserted his finger into her vagina and then his penis. However, AAA's nine-year-old brother, who had gone to the refrigerator to drink water, peeped through the open door and saw the accused-appellant on top of AAA. The accused-appellant saw the brother, dismounted, berated the boy, and ordered him to go to his room and sleep. The accused-appellant then left. AAA likewise left the house and stayed outside for an hour. She did not immediately tell her mother what had happened.

On November 9, 1998, the accused-appellant told AAA to go to the sala, but she refused because nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated the accused-appellant, who threatened to slap and kick her. When the mother returned, a heated argument ensued between the accused-appellant and AAA, and the mother sided with her paramour and hit AAA. AAA shouted, "Ayoko na, ayoko na." When the mother inquired what she meant, AAA revealed that the accused-appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body and had been on top of her. The mother and AAA proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have the accused-appellant arrested, and on November 10, 1998, AAA gave her affidavit-complaint to the Western Police District. AAA underwent a genital examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, who found AAA's hymen intact with an orifice measuring 1.5 centimeters in diameter, small enough to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing genital injury. On December 15, 1998, AAA executed a supplemental sworn statement charging the accused-appellant with rape.

The accused-appellant denied the charges. He testified that he loved the children as his own, cooked and prepared their food, and ironed their school uniforms. He claimed AAA was hard-headed and disobedient, causing frequent quarrels between him and the mother. He ventured that the mother coached AAA and her brother to fabricate the charges because she wanted to manage the business and control the properties they had acquired during their coverture, and because she was exasperated that he had no job.

• Defective Trial Court Decision: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court's decision was null and void for failing to comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the trial court made no findings of fact, merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses, and failed to state the factual and legal basis for imposing the death penalty.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for four counts of rape, asserting that the medical findings showing an intact hymen belied the claim that AAA had been deflowered on four different occasions.
• Defective Information (August 1998): Accused-appellant asserted that the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-171390 was defective because the date "on or about August 1998" was too indefinite, violating Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that the prosecution failed to prove he raped AAA in August 1998.
• No Rape on November 5, 1998: Accused-appellant maintained that he was not criminally liable for rape on November 5, 1998, as the evidence showed no penetration occurred.

• No Mechanical Reliance on Constitutional Provision: The Solicitor General argued that there should be no mechanical reliance on the constitutional requirement, as trial courts may simplify decisions given crowded dockets and time constraints, and that even without elucidation of grounds, the decision remained valid.
• No Need to Remand: The Solicitor General contended that despite any infirmity in the trial court's decision, there was no need to remand the case, as the Supreme Court could resolve it on the merits to avoid delay and afford the accused his right to speedy trial.
• Sufficiency of the Information: The Solicitor General argued that the date "on or about August 1998" was sufficiently definite, as the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime, and that the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant raped AAA on or about August 1998.
• Proof of Guilt: The Solicitor General contended that the prosecution proved the guilt of accused-appellant for the crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393 through the testimony of the private complainant.

• Validity of Trial Court Decision: Whether the trial court's decision was null and void for failing to state findings of fact and the legal basis for conviction as required by the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Sufficiency of Evidence (September 15 and October 22, 1998): Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant raped AAA on or about September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998, notwithstanding the medical finding of an intact hymen.
• Definiteness of the Information (August 1998): Whether the Information alleging the offense was committed "on or about August 1998" was defective for indefiniteness.
• Consummated vs. Attempted Rape (November 5, 1998): Whether accused-appellant was guilty of consummated rape or only of attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness for the November 5, 1998 incident.
• Qualified vs. Simple Rape: Whether accused-appellant was guilty of qualified rape warranting the death penalty or only of simple rape.

• Validity of Trial Court Decision: Yes, the trial court's decision was deficient. It failed to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements that a decision must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. However, the Court resolved the case on the merits rather than remanding, to avert further delay.
• Sufficiency of Evidence (September 15 and October 22, 1998): Yes, accused-appellant was guilty of two counts of simple rape. The testimony of the complainant that she was sexually abused two times a week from 1996 to 1998, admitted without objection, established the charges, and an intact hymen does not preclude a finding of rape.
• Definiteness of the Information (August 1998): No, the Information was not defective. The precise date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime, and the phrase "on or about August 1998" sufficiently apprised the accused of the charge, he having failed to move for a bill of particulars or object before arraignment.
• Consummated vs. Attempted Rape (November 5, 1998): No consummated rape; accused-appellant was guilty only of attempted rape. The evidence showed no introduction of the penis into the aperture or within the pudendum, and the accused's desistance was not spontaneous but was impelled by the unexpected arrival of the victim's brother.
• Qualified vs. Simple Rape: Simple rape only. Although the prosecution proved the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and the accused's relationship as common-law husband of the victim's mother, these circumstances were not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was given retroactive effect as it was favorable to the accused.

• Validity of Trial Court Decision: Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution requires that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This requirement is implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which mandates that a judgment of conviction state the legal qualification of the offense, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, and the civil liability. The purpose is to inform the parties how the decision was reached, to assure them they were accorded their right to be heard, and to provide a body of case law for future reference. The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses and forthwith rendered judgment without stating the facts proven, the issues, or the factual and legal bases for conviction and for imposing the death penalty. While the Court would normally remand, it resolved the case on the merits because all records and evidence had been elevated and to avert further delay.

• Sufficiency of Evidence (September 15 and October 22, 1998): Accused-appellant contended that the intact hymen and small orifice belied the claim of defloration. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the barefaced fact that the complainant remained a virgin does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused. Being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration went only as deep as the labia. Even the slightest penetration of the labia or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. The Court cited People vs. Baculi, where rape was found despite repeated intercourse over four years with the complainant retaining an intact hymen. Although AAA did not specifically testify that she was raped on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998, the Informations alleged the acts were committed "on or about" those dates, which envisages a period that includes the two-times-a-week abuse from 1996 to 1998. The accused's failure to object to the presentation of evidence covering the broader period constituted a waiver of his right to object to any variance between the Informations and the evidence.

• Definiteness of the Information (August 1998): The precise date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge under the circumstances enumerated in Article 335. Failure to specify the exact date does not render the Information defective. The phrase "on or about August 1998" substantially apprised the accused of the charge. Critically, the accused did not file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 before arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty without complaint, and adduced his evidence. It was only on appeal that he questioned the sufficiency of the Information — too late in the day. The Court cited People vs. Salalima, which held that allegations such as "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110.

• Consummated vs. Attempted Rape (November 5, 1998): The collective testimony of AAA and her brother established that on November 5, 1998, the accused-appellant entered AAA's room, placed himself on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her breasts, and touched her sex organ. However, when the brother peeped through the door, the accused saw him, dismounted, berated the brother, and left. The evidence showed no introduction of the penis into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina. The Court distinguished this from consummated rape by applying the principle that even the slightest penetration of the labia suffices, but here there was no such penetration. The Court then distinguished attempted rape from acts of lasciviousness. The elements of attempted felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code require that the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, does not perform all acts of execution, the non-performance is not due to spontaneous desistance, and the non-performance was due to a cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance. The accused's overt acts — entering the room, lying on top of AAA, removing her panty, fondling her breasts, touching her sex organ — were not mere preparatory acts but commenced the execution of rape. His desistance was not spontaneous; it was impelled by the sudden and unexpected arrival of the brother. The Court cited People vs. Alcoreza, where the accused was convicted of attempted rape after commencing rape but failing to complete it due to the timely arrival of the victim's brother.

• Qualified vs. Simple Rape: The evidence showed that the accused-appellant was the common-law husband of AAA's mother and that AAA was still 13 years old as of October 1998. Under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the concurrence of the victim's minority and the accused's relationship as common-law husband of the victim's mother is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the death penalty. However, this circumstance was not alleged in the Informations. Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that qualifying circumstances be specifically alleged in the Information. The Court gave this rule retroactive effect because it was favorable to the accused. Accordingly, even though the prosecution proved the qualifying circumstances, the accused could be convicted only of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua.

• Constitutional Requirement for a Valid Decision — Under Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, every decision must clearly and distinctly state the facts proved or admitted and the law on which it is based. A judgment of conviction must state (a) the legal qualification of the offense, (b) the participation of the accused, (c) the penalty imposed, and (d) the civil liability. A trial court may not merely summarize testimonies and forthwith render judgment without stating findings of fact and the legal basis for conviction. The Court applied this doctrine to find the trial court's decision deficient, though it resolved the case on the merits rather than remanding.

• Qualifying Circumstances Must Be Alleged in the Information — Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information to warrant conviction for the qualified offense and the corresponding higher penalty. If the prosecution proves the qualifying circumstance but it was not alleged, the accused may be convicted only of the simple offense. This rule was given retroactive effect where favorable to the accused. The Court applied this to reduce the conviction from qualified rape (death penalty) to simple rape (reclusion perpetua) because the Informations did not allege the victim's minority or the accused's relationship as common-law husband of the victim's mother.

• Slightest Penetration Constitutes Consummated Rape — Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ, or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture of the female organ, constitutes consummated rape. An intact hymen does not preclude a finding of rape, as penetration may go only as deep as the labia, especially when the victim is of tender age. The Court applied this to sustain the convictions for simple rape despite the medical finding of an intact hymen.

• Attempted Rape vs. Acts of Lasciviousness — Attempted rape requires: (1) the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts; (2) he does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony; (3) the offender's act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to a cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. An overt act is a physical activity indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination would ripen into a concrete offense. The Court distinguished attempted rape from acts of lasciviousness by examining whether the accused's acts, by their nature and circumstances, were aimed at consummating rape. Where the accused commenced rape by overt acts (lying on top of the victim, removing her panty, fondling her) but was interrupted by an external cause (the arrival of the victim's brother) before penetration, the crime is attempted rape, not acts of lasciviousness.

• Spontaneous Desistance — If the malefactor does not perform all acts of execution by reason of his spontaneous desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony. However, if the desistance is not spontaneous but is impelled by an external cause or accident, the offender is guilty of attempted felony. Spontaneous desistance exempts the offender from liability for the intended crime but not from the crime committed before desistance. The Court found the accused's desistance was not spontaneous because he was impelled to stop only by the sudden arrival of the victim's brother.

• Date of Commission Not an Essential Element of Rape — The precise date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime; the gravamen is carnal knowledge under the circumstances enumerated in Article 335. An Information alleging the offense was committed "on or about" a date sufficiently complies with Section 11, Rule 110, provided the date is as near as possible to the actual date. Failure to object to the sufficiency of the Information before arraignment constitutes a waiver.

• "The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The private complainant being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-appellant's commission of the crime." — This passage articulates the doctrine that an intact hymen does not negate rape, as the slightest penetration of the labia suffices for consummation, a principle frequently cited in subsequent rape jurisprudence.

• "Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum." — This is the canonical formulation of the "slightest penetration" rule for consummated rape, a standard repeatedly invoked in Philippine criminal law.

• "In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of [the brother]. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape." — This passage sets out the ratio decidendi for the attempted rape conviction, distinguishing non-spontaneous desistance (interruption by external cause) from spontaneous desistance and from acts of lasciviousness.

• "However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant being the common-law husband of her mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape." — This passage states the controlling rule that qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the Information to warrant the higher penalty, and that this procedural rule is given retroactive effect when favorable to the accused.

• People vs. Gianan, 340 SCRA 481 (2000) — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that allegations of "on or about" a date in an Information sufficiently covers offenses committed within a broader period, and that failure to timely object to variance between the Information and the evidence constitutes a waiver. The Court upheld conviction for multiple rapes committed over a span of years based on an Information alleging "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto."

• People vs. Salalima, 363 SCRA 192 (2001) — Cited for the rule that the precise date of rape is not an essential element of the offense and that failure to specify exact dates does not render the Information defective, provided the allegation is "as near as possible" to the actual date. The Court applied this to reject the accused's challenge to the sufficiency of the Information alleging "on or about August 1998."

• People vs. Baculi, cited in People vs. Gabayron, 278 SCRA 78 (1997) — Cited for the doctrine that rape may be found even where the complainant retains an intact hymen despite repeated intercourse over a period of years, supporting the conclusion that an intact hymen does not preclude consummated rape.

• People vs. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 (2000) — Cited as authority for the proposition that where there is no introduction of the penis into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina, the accused is not liable for consummated rape, providing the doctrinal basis for distinguishing the November 5, 1998 incident.

• People vs. Lamahang, 62 Phil. 703 (1935) — Cited for the definition and requisites of overt acts in attempted felonies: the relation between the acts performed and the intended offense must be direct, and the intention must be ascertained from the facts. The Court relied on this to determine that the accused's acts on November 5, 1998 constituted overt acts commencing the commission of rape, not mere preparation.

• People vs. Alcoreza, G.R. No. 135452-53, October 5, 2001 — Cited as a case with a similar factual backdrop where the accused was convicted of attempted rape after commencing rape but failing to complete it due to the timely arrival of the victim's brother, directly supporting the Court's ruling on the November 5, 1998 incident.

• People vs. Torio, 318 SCRA 345 (1999) — Cited for the rule that under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the victim concurring with the accused being the common-law husband of the victim's mother is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the death penalty.

• People vs. Alcala, 307 SCRA 330 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring qualifying circumstances to be alleged in the Information, was given retroactive effect because it is favorable to the accused.

• Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — Provides that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." The Court found the trial court's decision deficient for non-compliance, as it merely summarized testimonies without stating findings of fact or the legal basis for conviction.

• Rule 120, Section 2, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (as amended) — Requires that a judgment of conviction state (a) the legal qualification of the offense, (b) the participation of the accused, (c) the penalty imposed, and (d) the civil liability. The trial court failed to comply with these requirements.

• Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that it is not necessary to state the precise date of the offense except when it is a material ingredient, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date. The Court applied this to uphold the sufficiency of the Information alleging "on or about August 1998."

• Rule 110, Section 8, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires that qualifying circumstances be specifically alleged in the Information. The Court gave this provision retroactive effect as favorable to the accused, reducing the conviction from qualified rape to simple rape because the Informations did not allege the victim's minority or the accused's relationship as common-law husband of the victim's mother.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act 7659) — Defines and penalizes rape. The seventh paragraph, no. 1, as amended, provides the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is the common-law husband of the victim's mother. The Court applied this provision but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua for simple rape because the qualifying circumstances were not alleged in the Informations.

• Article 336, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness. The Court distinguished this offense from attempted rape, finding the accused's overt acts were aimed at consummating rape rather than merely committing lewd acts.

• Article 6, last paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Defines attempted felony: "There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." The Court applied this to convict the accused of attempted rape for the November 5, 1998 incident.

• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for an attempted felony is two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony. The Court applied this to impose the penalty of prision mayor (two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua) for attempted rape.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred. Bellosillo, J., was on leave.