People vs. Liwanag

A person may be convicted separately of Illegal Recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 and Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code for the same acts, and the absence of receipts evidencing payment of placement fees does not preclude conviction where the complainants' testimonies are credible and corroborated, and the accused's receipt of money is admitted in the barangay blotter.

Mildred Coching Liwanag was acquainted with the private complainants—spouses Allan and Carol Sepina, and spouses Christopher and Jennifer Claudel—through her father, who was a barangay police and a co-worker of Carol's mother, Dolores Pagulayan. Liwanag had previously worked in Saudi Arabia. The legal framework governing the charges includes Republic Act No. 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), which defines and penalizes illegal recruitment, particularly when committed in large scale as an offense involving economic sabotage, and Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts. Republic Act No. 10951, which adjusted the threshold amounts for penalties under the Revised Penal Code, was subsequently enacted and applied retroactively in fixing the proper penalty for estafa.

Sometime in March 2009, Mildred Coching Liwanag met private complainants—spouses Allan and Carol Sepina, and spouses Christopher and Jennifer Claudel—and promised them employment abroad. Christopher and Jennifer were Carol's uncle and aunt, respectively, with Christopher being the brother of Dolores Pagulayan, Carol's mother. Liwanag informed the four complainants that she had a sister in Japan, Evangeline Motosawa, who knew owners of noodle factories where they could work as factory workers. She accompanied Carol and Jennifer to the Provider Travel Corporation along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, and introduced them to a certain Agnes, telling them that Agnes would handle the processing of their application papers and that they would leave for Japan on October 4, 2009.

Liwanag demanded from the complainants the amount of ₱3,000.00 each, or a total of ₱12,000.00, for their visa application. This amount was collected and paid to Liwanag in the presence of Carol, Jennifer, and Dolores, though no receipt was issued. The complainants did not request one because they trusted Liwanag, her father being a co-worker of Dolores. On July 23, 2009, Liwanag required them to pay ₱37,500.00 each, or a total of ₱150,000.00, for their visas and plane tickets. This pooled amount was handed to Liwanag by Dolores while Carol and Jennifer were present, again without any receipt issued.

On the scheduled date of departure, Liwanag went to the complainants' residence in Muntinlupa City and informed them that their flight was cancelled because her sister would come home soon. It turned out that there were no plane tickets, visas, passports, or job orders from any prospective employer in Japan. Liwanag did not reimburse any of the amounts given by the complainants despite their demands. The complainants filed a complaint against Liwanag with the barangay, where she admitted having received certain amounts and promised to repay them, as shown in the barangay blotter. The complainants also submitted a POEA certification dated September 4, 2012, certifying that Liwanag was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

For her part, Liwanag denied the charges. She confirmed that her sister lived in Japan but stated that her sister was a housewife, not a manager of a noodle factory. She denied promising to send the complainants abroad for work or receiving any money or documents from them for that purpose. She claimed she met Carol and Jennifer at a lugawan owned by Carol sometime in March and June 2009, where the complainants merely inquired about her experience working in Saudi Arabia and the process of going abroad. She was unaware of any personal grudge that would compel the complainants to file the complaints. The RTC credited the prosecution's evidence and convicted Liwanag of all charges; the CA affirmed, modifying only the estafa penalty.

• Inconsistencies in Prosecution Testimony: Accused-appellant maintained that inconsistencies in Carol's testimony cast doubt on her credibility as a witness.
• Failure to Prove Elements of the Offenses: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the offenses charged, particularly that the money allegedly taken was in consideration of promising overseas employment.
• Absence of Receipts: Accused-appellant emphasized that the private complainants failed to present any receipt to establish that she received money from them, contending this was fatal to the prosecution's cause.
• Absence of Jennifer's Testimony: Accused-appellant argued that she could not be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale since Jennifer, one of the four complainants, was not presented as a prosecution witness.

• Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Office of the Solicitor General stressed that accused-appellant's guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt, with the testimony of the prosecution witnesses entitled to full faith and credit.

• Guilt of Accused-Appellant: Whether accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and four counts of Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Guilt of Accused-Appellant: Yes. All elements of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 and all elements of Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code were established beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of receipts and the non-presentation of one complainant as a witness were not fatal to the prosecution's case.

• Guilt of Accused-Appellant: The essential elements of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale are: (1) the accused undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) the accused did not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and (3) the accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. All three elements were satisfied: Liwanag's acts of offering and promising to deploy the four complainants to Japan as factory workers, and collecting money for passports, plane tickets, visa processing, and placement fees, constituted recruitment activity under Section 6; the POEA certification established that she was neither licensed nor authorized; and the offense was committed against four persons. The absence of receipts was not fatal because a person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of credible complainant testimonies, and Liwanag's receipt of money was admitted in the barangay blotter. The law does not require that at least three victims testify at trial to convict for illegal recruitment in large scale, so long as sufficient evidence proves the offense was committed against three or more persons; the absence of Jennifer's testimony was not fatal because the other witnesses were privy to her recruitment and payment of fees and sufficiently testified on the same. The categorical and corroborated statements of the complainants prevailed over Liwanag's bare denial, which is inherently weak and self-serving. The trial court's factual findings and credibility assessment, as affirmed by the CA, were entitled to great weight and respect.

For Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, the elements are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. Both elements were present: Liwanag defrauded the four complainants by making them believe she had the capacity to deploy them to Japan as factory workers despite lacking authority or license, and the complainants suffered damages of ₱40,500.00 each when the promised employment never materialized and the money was never recovered. The same evidence establishing liability for illegal recruitment confirmed culpability for estafa. The presentation of receipts was not essential to a conviction for estafa, since payment of placement fees to illegal recruiters may be established by witness testimonies, corroborated by Liwanag's admission in the barangay blotter.

As to penalties, the fine for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale was increased from ₱500,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00 because under Section 7(b) of RA 8042, the maximum penalty shall be imposed when the offense is committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. The estafa penalties were modified pursuant to Republic Act No. 10951, which adjusted the amount thresholds under Article 315 of the RPC: since the amount defrauded in each case was ₱40,500.00, the proper imposable penalty was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law with no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty for each count of estafa was fixed at three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum.

• Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale — Elements — The essential elements are: (1) the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) the accused did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and (3) the accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. All three were found present in this case.

• Illegal Recruitment Constituting Economic Sabotage — Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale and considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. Under Section 7(b) of RA 8042, the maximum penalty (life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱500,000.00 nor more than ₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if the offense is committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.

• Conviction Without Receipts — The absence of receipts evidencing payment of placement fees does not automatically warrant acquittal for illegal recruitment or estafa. A conviction may rest on the credible and convincing testimonies of complainants, particularly when corroborated by other evidence such as a barangay blotter admission.

• Number of Testifying Victims — The law does not require that at least three victims testify at trial to convict an accused for illegal recruitment in large scale, so long as there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. Witnesses who were privy to the recruitment and payment of fees by a non-testifying complainant may sufficiently testify on the same.

• Separate Conviction for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa — A person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. The same pieces of evidence that establish liability for illegal recruitment in large scale confirm culpability for estafa.

• Categorical Testimony vs. Bare Denial — Categorical statements of private complainants prevail over the bare denial of an accused. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony, especially when the former comes from a credible witness. Denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

• Deference to Trial Court's Credibility Assessment — Factual findings of trial courts, including their assessment of witness credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect, particularly when affirmed by the CA. The trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of testimonies, and the absence of any showing that it overlooked facts of substance impels appellate deference.

• "The fact that no receipt was issued by the accused-appellant is not fatal to the prosecution's cause, more so if the respective testimonies of private complainants clearly narrated accused-appellant's involvement in illegal recruitment activities." — This passage establishes the principle that the absence of receipts does not preclude conviction for illegal recruitment where complainant testimonies are credible, a frequently invoked rule in illegal recruitment cases.

• "The law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial to convict an accused for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, for so long as there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons." — This clarifies the evidentiary threshold for the "three or more persons" element of illegal recruitment in large scale, dispelling the notion that each victim must testify.

• "It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC." — This articulates the settled doctrine permitting separate convictions for illegal recruitment and estafa arising from the same acts, a principle central to the case's disposition.

• People vs. David, G.R. No. 233089, June 29, 2020 — Cited for the proposition that illegal recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or license holders, and that illegal recruitment in large scale is considered an offense involving economic sabotage when committed against three or more persons.

• People vs. Palicpic, G.R. No. 240694, September 7, 2020 — Cited for the essential elements of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, itself citing People vs. Matheus, 810 Phil. 626 (2017).

• People vs. Matheus, 810 Phil. 626 (2017) — Cited for the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa, and for the doctrine that a person may be convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa for the same acts, citing People vs. Tolentino, 761 SCRA 332 (2015).

• People vs. Imperio, G.R. No. 232623, October 5, 2020 — Cited in support of the rule that the absence of receipts is not fatal to the prosecution's cause in illegal recruitment cases.

• People vs. Saulo, 398 Phil. 544 (2000) — Cited for the principle that a person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of complainant testimonies if found credible and convincing, even without receipts.

• People vs. Ocden, 665 Phil. 268 (2011) — Cited for the rule that the law does not require at least three victims to testify to convict for illegal recruitment in large scale, and for the principle of deference to the trial court's credibility assessment.

• People vs. Gallemit, 734 Phil. 698 (2014) — Cited for the proposition that categorical statements of complainants prevail over bare denial, and that the presentation of receipts is not necessarily essential to a conviction for estafa.

• People vs. Racho, 819 Phil. 137 (2017) — Cited for the doctrine that the same evidence establishing liability for illegal recruitment in large scale confirms culpability for estafa.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) — Defines illegal recruitment as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, including referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Illegal recruitment committed against three or more persons is deemed committed in large scale and considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Applied to classify Liwanag's acts as illegal recruitment in large scale.

• Section 7(b), Republic Act No. 8042 — Provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱500,000.00 nor more than ₱1,000,000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage, with the maximum penalty imposed when committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Applied to increase the fine from ₱500,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00.

• Article 315(2)(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts, including falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions. Applied to convict Liwanag of four counts of estafa for falsely representing her capacity to deploy the complainants to Japan.

• Section 85, Republic Act No. 10951 — Amended Article 315 of the RPC by adjusting the penalty thresholds based on the amount defrauded. For amounts over ₱40,000.00 but not exceeding ₱1,200,000.00, the penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Applied retroactively to reduce the estafa penalty.

• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for the application of penalties containing three periods; when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period. Applied to fix the maximum term of the estafa penalty.

• Section 1, Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Requires the court to impose an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which is that which could be properly imposed under the RPC rules, and the minimum within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed. Applied to fix the minimum term of the estafa penalty.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concurred.