People vs. Lising

Extrajudicial confessions independently executed and identical in material details constitute interlocking confessions admissible as corroborative evidence against all persons implicated therein. Where conspiracy is shown by the concerted acts of the accused, the degree of individual participation is immaterial; the act of one is the act of all. A mistake in the identity of the victim does not exonerate an accused under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

Rodolfo Manalili sought to avenge the killing of his brother, Delfin, by hiring individuals to effect the arrest of the suspect, Robert Herrera. He enlisted the help of Felimon Garcia, who introduced him to Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon, and Robin Manga—members of the Integrated National Police. What transpired was not a lawful arrest but the abduction of the wrong persons: Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castaños, mistaken for Herrera and his companion. The victims were taken to Pampanga, detained, and killed. Their bodies were buried in shallow graves and discovered months later.

• The Plot: Sometime in March 1990, Rodolfo Manalili asked his townmate Felimon Garcia to find persons who could effect the arrest of Robert Herrera, the suspect in the killing of Manalili’s brother. Garcia arranged a meeting with policeman Roberto “Rambo” Lising and his companions.

• The Meeting and Agreement: On April 22, 1990, Manalili met Lising, Enrico Dizon, and another armed man at Mabalacat, Pampanga. Manalili offered P50,000.00 for the “job,” initially giving P2,000.00 as downpayment. He instructed them to contact his employee Vic Nabua (also referred to as Vic Lisboa) who would point out the target.

• Surveillance and Abduction: On April 23–25, 1990, the group conducted surveillance at the Castaños residence in Quezon City. On the evening of April 25, Lisboa alerted the group after allegedly spotting Herrera entering the residence. Shortly thereafter, Cochise and Beebom left in a green Lancer and drove to Dayrit’s Ham and Burger House along Timog Circle. Lising, Dizon, and Manga followed in a black car. As the couple parked, Dizon and Manga, both armed and identifying themselves as policemen, accosted them. Dizon handcuffed Cochise, shoved him into the Lancer, and Beebom was similarly forced into the back seat. The Lancer was then driven away by Dizon and Manga, followed by the black car.

• Detention and Killing: The victims were brought to a warehouse in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned by Ligaya Fausto, Lising’s common-law wife. At the warehouse, Lising and Garcia arrived with the victims. Manalili also arrived and was seen by Beebom, who pleaded, “Uncle, parang awa mo naman, wala naman kaming kasalanan.” Cochise was blindfolded, bound with wire by Lising and Dizon. Garcia retrieved a spade and dug a shallow grave. Garcia stabbed Cochise once; Lising then took the knife and stabbed Cochise repeatedly until he died. Lising, Garcia, Dizon, and Manga carried the body out and buried it. Beebom was taken away by Dizon and Manga and killed elsewhere. The following morning, Lising encashed a P40,000.00 check given by Manalili as balance for the contract.

• Discovery and Arrest: After a two-month search, the bodies were exhumed in June 1990. Cochise died of multiple stab wounds, Beebom of severe hemorrhage due to stab wounds. Raul Morales, a helper at the warehouse, testified to observing the events. Security guard Froilan Olimpia witnessed the abduction at Dayrit’s. On June 30, 1990, Lising was arrested and executed an extrajudicial confession. Garcia surrendered on January 4, 1991, and gave a statement. Manalili was brought back from Australia by NBI officials and also executed a statement. The extrajudicial confessions, along with eyewitness testimony, formed the basis of the prosecution’s case.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statements: Appellants Lising, Dizon, Manga, and Garcia contended that the extrajudicial confessions of Manalili and Garcia were inadmissible against them as they were not presented as witnesses and the declarants did not take the stand, violating the rule that a confession is evidence only against its maker. Lising separately claimed his own confession was coerced and taken without counsel.

• Credibility of Raul Morales: Manalili, Garcia, and Lising assailed Morales as a rehearsed and perjured witness. They pointed to inconsistencies between his sworn statement and trial testimony, such as the order in which the cars entered the warehouse and whether he saw the actual stabbing. Manalili emphasized that Morales did not initially mention him in his sworn statement. Lising attributed ill motive to Morales, claiming the latter had been reprimanded for job performance and for leading a pay-rally.

• Credibility of Froilan Olimpia: Dizon and Manga argued that Olimpia’s testimony was inconsistent with other evidence and that he identified different policemen during the initial investigation.

• Conspiracy Not Established: Manalili and Garcia maintained that no conspiracy existed. Manalili asserted he had no criminal intent and had contracted policemen solely for a legal arrest. He argued that upon discovering the mistake in identity, he insisted the victims be released and left for Manila, believing they would be freed.

• Lack of Criminal Intent and Irresistible Force (Garcia): Garcia claimed he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of Lising, and that he lacked intent to commit so grave a wrong. He alternatively argued he should be held liable only as an accomplice, given his voluntary surrender.

• Mistake in Identity and Motive (Manalili): Manalili contended that the victims were killed by Lising’s group after he had left, and that he had every reason to keep Beebom alive since she was a material witness against Herrera.

• Physical Impossibility (Manga): Manga claimed it was physically impossible for him to participate, as he was still nursing gunshot wounds sustained a year earlier.

• Irregularities in the Information (Dizon): Dizon argued that the trial court erred in dropping the names of other suspects (Quezon City policemen) who were initially implicated, and in admitting the amended information naming him.

• The People, through the prosecution, maintained that all accused conspired to abduct and kill the victims, as proven by the interlocking extrajudicial confessions and the positive testimonies of Olimpia and Morales.
• The Solicitor General, however, recommended the acquittal of Manalili, contending that he lacked criminal intent and had no motive to kill the victims, and that his intention was limited to effecting the arrest of Herrera.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions: Whether the extrajudicial statements of Manalili, Garcia, and Lising were admissible against all accused despite not taking the witness stand and despite claims of coercion.
• Credibility of Prosecution Eyewitnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight and credibility to the testimonies of Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales despite alleged inconsistencies, omissions, and improbabilities.
• Existence of Conspiracy: Whether the prosecution established conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, rendering all accused equally liable for the crimes.
• Criminal Liability of Manalili: Whether Manalili’s lack of criminal intent, mistake in the identity of the victims, and alleged insistence on their release exonerated him.
• Exempting and Mitigating Circumstances (Garcia): Whether Garcia acted under irresistible force or uncontrollable fear, and whether voluntary surrender warranted a reduced penalty.
• Proper Designation of the Detention Offense: Whether the trial court correctly convicted Lising, Dizon, and Manga only of slight illegal detention or whether the offense constituted kidnapping under Article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions: The extrajudicial confessions were admissible against their respective declarants under the rule that a party’s act, declaration, or omission is evidence against him. Lising’s claim of torture was uncorroborated; the statement bore indicia of voluntariness, including detailed facts only he could supply and corrections bearing his initials. The confessions of Manalili, Garcia, and Lising—independently executed and without collusion—were identical in material details and thus constituted interlocking confessions admissible as circumstantial evidence against all persons implicated and as corroborative evidence. The rule that extrajudicial confessions are evidence only against the declarant admits the exception of interlocking confessions.

• Credibility of Prosecution Eyewitnesses: The trial court’s assessment of credibility was accorded great respect. Inconsistencies between Morales’ sworn statement and his court testimony referred to minor details and did not impair his credibility; they negated any suggestion of a rehearsed narrative. That Morales initially omitted Manalili’s name was explained by his fear of Lising and his companions—a common initial reluctance of witnesses. The positive identification of Dizon and Manga by Olimpia at the abduction scene carried greater weight than the mere denials of the accused.

• Existence of Conspiracy: Conspiracy was established by the concerted acts of the accused: the agreement to apprehend Herrera for a fee, the stake-out, the tailing of the victims, the abduction at Dayrit’s, the detention at Valle Verde Motel, and the killing of both victims. The acts showed a unity of purpose and community of interest. Where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all; the precise extent of individual participation becomes immaterial.

• Criminal Liability of Manalili: Manalili’s claim of merely desiring a lawful arrest was rejected. The surreptitious meeting, the use of Pampanga policemen instead of local authorities, the detention of victims at a motel, and the failure to bring the victims to a police station belied a legitimate law enforcement purpose. Even assuming the arrest was intended, the manner of abduction—blindfolding, handcuffing, and gagging—was inconsistent with lawful arrest. His leaving the victims behind, knowing Lising’s resolve to silence them, demonstrated his complicity. The mistake in the identity of the victims did not exonerate him; Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code holds a person liable for all consequences of a criminal act even if the victim was not the intended one.

• Exempting and Mitigating Circumstances (Garcia): The defense of irresistible force was unavailing; the compulsion must leave the accused no opportunity for escape or self-defense. Garcia’s continuous participation from the inception of the plan to the killing and his failure to report the crime or deter its commission negated any claim of mere compulsion. Conspiracy rendered the degree of his participation immaterial; he was properly convicted as a principal. Voluntary surrender, while present, could not reduce his liability from principal to accomplice given the established conspiracy.

• Proper Designation of the Detention Offense: The trial court’s finding of slight illegal detention was erroneous. The detention of a female victim, Beebom, qualified the offense as kidnapping under Article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, Lising, Dizon, and Manga were found guilty of kidnapping. Manalili and Garcia could not be convicted of kidnapping in this appeal due to double jeopardy, but their liability for double murder remained.

• Interlocking Confessions Doctrine — Where several persons charged with an offense independently execute extrajudicial confessions without collusion and their statements are identical in all material respects, the confessions are admissible as circumstantial evidence against all implicated and may serve as corroborative evidence. The identity of material facts confirms the confessions of co-accused. (Citing People v. Encipido, 146 SCRA 478; People v. Domondon, 43 SCRA 486; People v. Sta. Maria, 15 SCRA 222.)

• Conspiracy: Act of One is Act of All — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from acts before, during, and after the crime showing a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all, and the precise degree of individual participation becomes secondary. A conspirator can free himself from liability only by performing an overt act to prevent the commission of the felony or to abandon the conspiracy. (Citing People v. Degoma, 209 SCRA 266; People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369.)

• Mistake in Identity (Error in Personae) — Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who performs a criminal act is liable for all its consequences, even if the victim was not the person intended to be injured. The mistake in identity does not exonerate the accused.

• Irresistible Force as Exempting Circumstance — To be exempt from criminal liability under irresistible force or uncontrollable fear, the force must be of such character as to reduce the accused to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will, leaving no opportunity for self-defense or escape. (Citing People v. Loreno, 130 SCRA 311; People v. De Los Reyes, 215 SCRA 63.)

• Credibility of Witnesses and Inconsistencies — Inconsistencies on minor details do not impair a witness’s credibility; they tend to strengthen it by negating any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. An affidavit does not purport to be a complete compendium of the facts; discrepancies between an ex-parte sworn statement and trial testimony are not necessarily fatal. The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information does not affect credibility. The trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility is accorded great respect on appeal.

• “Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true.”

• “One such exception worth noting is the rule that where several extrajudicial statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the facts that the statements are in all material respects identical, is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.”

• “One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent.”

• “Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all.”

• “All these only show that Manalili has premeditated in his mind a more sinister plot than merely effecting a ‘legal arrest.’”

• People v. Encipido, 146 SCRA 478 (1986); People v. Domondon, 43 SCRA 486 (1972); People v. Sta. Maria, 15 SCRA 222 (1965) — Established the interlocking confessions rule: independently executed confessions without collusion and identical in material respects may be used against co-accused.

• People v. Degoma, 209 SCRA 266 (1992) — Affirmed that a conspirator is liable for all acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and can only escape liability by performing an overt act to prevent the crime or dissociate from the conspiracy.

• People v. Machete, 231 SCRA 272 (1994); People v. Camaddo, 217 SCRA 162 (1993) — Applied the rule that appellate courts give great respect to the trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility.

• People v. Salamat, 225 SCRA 499 (1993) — Inconsistencies in minor details do not destroy witness credibility.

• People v. Gabas, 233 SCRA 77 (1994) — A sworn statement does not purport to contain a complete narration of events; discrepancies between an affidavit and trial testimony are not necessarily discrediting.

• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Criminal liability attaches for all consequences of a wrongful act even if the victim is different from the intended one. Applied to hold Manalili liable despite the mistaken identity of the victims.

• Article 267(4), Revised Penal Code — Defines kidnapping and serious illegal detention, including when the victim is a female. Applied to upgrade the conviction of Lising, Dizon, and Manga from slight illegal detention to kidnapping because the victim, Beebom, was a female.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Vitug, JJ., concurred.