People vs. Lindo

The failure of the accused to object to a duplicitous information before trial waives the defect, and the trial court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; accordingly, a single information alleging both carnal knowledge of a child under twelve and anal sexual insertion sufficiently supports two separate convictions for rape under Article 266-A, paragraphs 1(d) and 2, respectively.

AAA, born on May 6, 1989, was 11 years old and living in San Andres Bukid, Malate, Manila. Michael Lindo y Vergara, her neighbor, was a painter whose work schedule usually ran from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. On April 3, 2001, AAA attended a pabasa (a Lenten religious gathering) at a neighbor’s house. She fell asleep under a platform that served as a stage. Lindo took her while she was asleep to a place near a creek used for drying clothes. There she awoke as Lindo removed her shorts and underwear and undressed himself. He attempted to insert his penis into her vagina; although contact with her sex organ occurred, he could not achieve full penetration. He then made her bend over and inserted his penis into her anus, causing her to cry out in pain. Hearing the approach of AAA’s friend, Lindo stopped, told her to dress and go home. AAA reported the incident to her parents, who informed barangay authorities. Lindo was arrested the same day. An examination by an NBI medico-legal officer revealed extragenital physical injuries and abrasions on the anal orifice consistent with the insertion of a blunt object.

• The Victim: The private complainant, referred to as AAA, was born on May 6, 1989. At the time of the incident on April 3, 2001, she was 11 years old. She and the accused, Michael Lindo y Vergara, were neighbors in San Andres Bukid, Malate, Manila.

• The Incident: On April 3, 2001, AAA attended a pabasa (a Lenten religious activity) at a neighbor’s residence. During the pabasa, she fell asleep under a platform that served as a stage. While AAA slept, Lindo carried her away to a place near a creek where clothes were customarily placed to dry. AAA awoke there. Lindo undressed her—removing her short pants and underwear—and undressed himself. He tried to insert his penis into her vagina, and his penis made contact with her sex organ, but complete penetration was not achieved. After failing to achieve full vaginal penetration, he made her bend over and inserted his penis into her anus, causing her to cry out in pain. Sensing the arrival of a friend of AAA, Lindo ceased and told AAA to put on her clothes and go home. AAA complied, reported the events to her parents, who then reported the matter to barangay authorities. Lindo was arrested the same day.

• Medical Findings: On the same day, AAA was examined by Dr. Evelyn B. Ignacio, an NBI Medico-Legal Officer. The examination disclosed extragenital injuries and abrasions on AAA’s anal orifice. Dr. Ignacio opined that the anal injuries could have been caused by the insertion of a blunt object such as a penis, finger, or pencil.

• Defense of the Accused: Lindo raised denial and alibi. He claimed to be a painter working in Ayala, Makati, whose regular schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. He alleged that on April 3, 2001, he reported for work from 8:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m. of the following day. When he arrived home at around 6:00 a.m., he was arrested by a barangay official and brought to the police precinct for investigation for rape.

• The Information: An Information dated April 6, 2001 charged Lindo with “sexual abuse” by “carrying said AAA, a minor, 11 years old, and bringing her to a vacant lot, trying to insert his penis into her vagina but said accused was not able to do so, thereafter inserting his penis into her anus, thereby endangering her normal growth and development.”

• Credibility of the Victim: Lindo argued that AAA’s testimony was contrary to human experience and unworthy of belief. He contended that no rape could have occurred because the place was in public view and that it was incredible for AAA to remain asleep while being lifted and carried away.

• Defense of Alibi: Lindo maintained that he was at work in Makati from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and therefore could not have been at the scene of the crime. He claimed that his arrest upon returning home was based solely on suspicion.

• Credibility and Corroboration: The People relied on the trial court’s assessment that AAA testified in a straightforward and clear manner. It was pointed out that her account was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Ignacio, which showed extragenital injuries and anal abrasions consistent with the reported sexual assault.

• Sufficiency of Proof and Alibi: The People argued that Lindo’s denial and alibi were self-serving and unsubstantiated, offering no corroborating witness or documentary evidence. Positive identification by the victim, who had no ill motive to falsely accuse him, was pressed as prevailing over bare alibi.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the testimony of the minor victim, allegedly improbable because the incident occurred in a place open to public view and because she claimed to have been carried while asleep, was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Applicable Law and Number of Counts: Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code instead of Article 266-A (as amended by R.A. No. 8353), and in convicting the accused of only one count of rape despite the Information alleging both attempted vaginal penetration and anal sexual assault.
• Penalty and Damages: What are the proper imposable penalties and the correct amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages for the rape offenses proved.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: The victim’s testimony was found credible. Rape can be committed anywhere, even in places where people congregate; there is no rule that it must occur in seclusion. The trial court, which had the best opportunity to observe the witness, found AAA’s narration straightforward and clear. Her account was fully corroborated by the medico-legal findings of extragenital injuries and anal abrasions. Against this positive, consistent identification, Lindo’s alibi—unsupported by any corroborating witness or documentary evidence—failed; alibi, to prevail, must prove that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime, not merely that he was elsewhere. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the victim’s genitalia consummates rape, and here Lindo’s penis made contact with AAA’s sex organ.

• Applicable Law and Number of Counts: The lower courts erred in citing Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; the applicable law is Article 266-A as introduced by Republic Act No. 8353 (the Anti-Rape Law of 1997), which reclassified rape as a crime against persons. A more critical error was convicting the accused of only one count of rape. The Information explicitly described two distinct acts: the attempt to insert the penis into the vagina and the subsequent insertion into the anus. These constitute two separate offenses—statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) (carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age) and rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2 (insertion of the penis into the anal orifice). Although the Information charged two offenses in violation of the rule against duplicity under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused did not file a motion to quash before trial. Consequently, under Section 3, Rule 120, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved. The Information sufficiently informed the accused of the nature of the accusations, enabling him to prepare his defense.

• Penalty and Damages: For statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. For rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2, the penalty is prision mayor; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper indeterminate penalty is two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The awards of damages were likewise modified to reflect two separate convictions. For statutory rape: civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages increased to P30,000.00, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. For rape through sexual assault: civil indemnity of P30,000.00, moral damages of P30,000.00, and exemplary damages of P30,000.00, also in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of rape. Exemplary damages are proper given the highly reprehensible conduct of subjecting a child to sexual depredations, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code.

• Rape in a public place — Rape is not a crime that requires seclusion; it can be committed anywhere, even in places where people congregate such as parks, along roadsides, within school premises, or inside a house with other occupants. The absence of seclusion does not negate the commission of rape. The Court applied this to reject the argument that the presence of public view made the victim’s account incredible.

• Consummation of rape by slight penetration — The crime of rape is consummated by the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the victim’s genitalia. Even the mere touching of the labia by the penis is sufficient. Thus, the failure to achieve full vaginal penetration does not preclude conviction for consummated rape. The Court relied on this principle to hold that Lindo’s contact with AAA’s sex organ constituted statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d).

• Waiver of duplicity by failure to object before trial — When two or more offenses are charged in a single information, the defect of duplicity is deemed waived if the accused fails to file a motion to quash before trial. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may thereafter convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, specifying separately the findings of fact and law for each offense. The Court invoked this rule to convict Lindo of both statutory rape and rape by sexual assault.

• Alibi versus positive identification — Alibi is the weakest of defenses and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim, especially when such identification is categorical, consistent, and unattended by any showing of ill motive. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Lindo’s bare, uncorroborated claim of being at work fell short of this standard.

• Crime against persons under R.A. No. 8353 — Effective October 22, 1997, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 reclassified rape as a crime against persons, removing it from Title Eleven (Crimes Against Chastity) of the Revised Penal Code. Rape is now defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B. Because the incident occurred in 2001, the applicable provisions were Article 266-A, not Article 335.

• “The evil in man has no conscience—the beast in him bears no respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere, even in places where people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where there are other occupants.”

• “The mere introduction of the male organ in the labia majora of the victim’s genitalia consummates the crime; the mere touching of the labia by the penis was held to be sufficient.”

• “What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.”

• “When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.”

• People v. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5, 2009 — Followed on the principle that rape can be committed in public places; no rule requires seclusion.

• People v. Montinola, G.R. No. 178061, January 31, 2008; People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 177136, June 30, 2008 — Followed for the same principle that the commission of rape is not hindered by time or place.

• People v. Cañada, G.R. No. 175317, October 2, 2009 — Followed for the rule that testimonies of young and immature rape victims deserve full credence.

• People v. Tablang, G.R. No. 174859, October 30, 2009 — Followed on the rule that slight penetration of the labia majora consummates rape.

• People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005 — Applied to determine the sufficiency of the Information; the operative facts in the body of the Information control over the designation of the offense.

• People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009 — Applied to support the award of exemplary damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code for highly reprehensible conduct.

• Flordeliz v. People, G.R. No. 186441, March 1, 2010 — Followed on the schedule of damages for rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2.

• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 8353) — Defines the crime of rape. Paragraph 1(d) covers carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age; paragraph 2 covers sexual assault by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice. The Court applied paragraph 1(d) to the vaginal contact with AAA (statutory rape) and paragraph 2 to the anal insertion.

• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1; and prision mayor for sexual assault under paragraph 2. The Court imposed these penalties accordingly, with application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the latter.

• Section 13, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Prohibits duplicity of offenses in a single Information, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. The Court noted the violation but held the defect waived.

• Section 3, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Allows conviction for multiple offenses charged in a single complaint or information when the accused fails to object before trial. The Court invoked this rule to sustain two convictions.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms for the penalty of prision mayor imposed for rape through sexual assault.

• Article 2229, Civil Code — Provides for exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good. The Court awarded exemplary damages as a deterrent against sexual abuse of children.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez.