People vs. Likiran

An accused is criminally liable for the death of a victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated, or contributed to the death, even if other causes cooperated in producing the result; further, treachery does not qualify a killing to murder when the attack is spur-of-the-moment and not deliberately planned.

Town fiesta celebration on the eve of March 19, 2000, at a basketball court in Barangay Bugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon, where a dance was being held.

• Filed in RTC Malaybalay City, Branch 8 (Criminal Case No. 10439-00)
• RTC Decision dated July 17, 2006: Convicted accused-appellant of Murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, actual damages, and attorney’s fees
• Appealed to CA
• CA Decision dated July 27, 2011 (CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00484): Affirmed RTC in toto
• Elevated to SC via appeal (G.R. No. 201858)

• March 19, 2000, wee hours, town fiesta dance at basketball court
• Victim: Rolando Sareno, Sr.
• Prosecution eyewitness Celso Dagangon was positioned 3 meters away from the attack with an unobstructed view
• Jerome Likiran (accused-appellant’s brother, not charged as co-accused) punched Prescado Mercado and brandished a short firearm; accused-appellant held a hunting knife
• Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times; with Sareno fallen, accused-appellant stabbed him in the back
• Sareno died from multiple gunshot wounds (GSW) and a stab wound at the left scapular area
• Defense theory: Denial and alibi—accused-appellant and Jerome stayed inside the dance area near the sound machine and only heard gunshots outside; claimed physical impossibility to be at the scene
• Defense witness Edgar Indanon claimed an unknown person committed the stabbing
• Pre-trial agreement signed by prosecution and defense counsel stipulated that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Cidric Dael “is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area” [sic - actually showed GSW and stab wound]

• Prosecution failed to prove his identity as the assailant beyond reasonable doubt
• Impossible for Dagangon to have seen the assailant due to lack of lighting at the scene
• Information charged him with both shooting and stabbing the victim, but evidence established he was not the shooter (only stabbed); his brother Jerome was the shooter, and therefore he should not be liable for the death caused by the gunshots
• Relied on defense of denial and alibi, asserting he remained inside the dance hall during the commotion

• Identity sufficiently established by positive identification of eyewitness Dagangon who was only 3 meters away with no distractions and who immediately identified the accused-appellant during police investigation
• Treachery attended the killing (sudden attack on unarmed victim with no opportunity for self-defense)
• Pre-trial stipulation binds the accused to the admission that the victim died from both gunshot and stab wounds
• Under the contributing cause doctrine, the accused-appellant is liable for the death despite his brother being the shooter because his stabbing contributed to the fatal result

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the prosecution proved the identity of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt
  • Whether the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the death of the victim despite evidence showing his brother Jerome was the one who shot the victim while he only inflicted the stab wound
  • Whether the killing was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to Murder, or whether it constituted only Homicide

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • Identity: Yes. The SC gave weight to the positive identification by eyewitness Dagangon, who was 3 meters away with no distractions and no shown ill motive, over the accused-appellant’s alibi and denial.
  • Causation/Contributory Liability: Yes. The accused-appellant is liable because: (a) the pre-trial stipulation signed by counsel (and not objected to by the defense) admitted the death certificate showing the cause of death included both multiple GSW and stab wound; and (b) under the contributing cause doctrine, an offender is criminally liable if his act caused, accelerated, or contributed to the death, even if other causes cooperated.
  • Nature of the Crime: The crime is Homicide, not Murder. The SC ruled out treachery because the attack was spur-of-the-moment, triggered by a brawl during the dance, and not deliberately or consciously planned by the accused-appellant and his brother.
  • Penalty: Modified from reclusion perpetua to an indeterminate penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law: 10 years of prision mayor medium as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
  • Damages: Affirmed civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00, and actual damages of P30,000.00; deleted attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 for lack of factual basis (no proof of actual expense); imposed 6% interest per annum on all damages from finality of judgment until fully paid.

• Primary Duty of Prosecution — The first duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the criminal, not merely the commission of the crime. The SC applied this to affirm that the prosecution satisfied its burden through eyewitness testimony.
• Positive Identification vs. Alibi/Denial — Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators is entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial, particularly when the witness has no ill motive to falsely testify. The SC applied this to uphold the identification by Dagangon.
• Contributing Cause Doctrine — An offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated, or contributed to the death, even if other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The SC applied this to hold the accused-appellant liable despite his brother being the actual shooter.
• Treachery — Two elements must concur: (a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (b) the means, method, or manner was deliberately or consciously adopted. Treachery is absent when the killing is spur-of-the-moment, triggered by sudden infuriation, or not preconceived and deliberately adopted. The SC found the attack was triggered by a brawl, not planned, thus treachery did not qualify the killing to murder.
• Binding Effect of Pre-Trial Stipulations — Under Rule 118, Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, stipulations of facts during pre-trial that are reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel (or not objected to by the defense) bind the parties and limit the trial. The SC applied this to hold the accused-appellant bound by the admission of the death certificate.
• Death Certificate as Prima Facie Evidence — A death certificate issued by a municipal health officer (or physician) in the regular performance of duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death.

• "The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal."
• "If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim."
• "Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment."

• Quinto v. Andres, 493 Phil. 643 (2005) — Established the contributing cause doctrine regarding liability for death when multiple causes contribute to the result; controlling precedent followed by the SC.
• People v. Javier Cañaveras, G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013 — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• People v. Pilola, 453 Phil. 1 (2003) — Cited by the CA and affirmed by the SC for the principle that an accused is liable for the death even if not the sole assailant.
• Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 15 (2000) and People v. Marollano, 342 Phil. 38 (1997) — Cited for the procedural rule that pre-trial agreements bind the parties, and that failure to object to the admission of such agreements validates their use.

• Rule 118, Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs pre-trial agreements and their binding effect on parties; the SC applied this to hold the accused bound by the stipulation admitting the death certificate.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 249 — Defines Homicide and prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal; applied by the SC in determining the penalty for the modified conviction.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 64(1) — Prescribes that in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period; applied to fix the medium period of reclusion temporal.
• Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), Section 1 — Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty range (minimum within prision mayor, maximum within reclusion temporal medium).
• Revised Penal Code, Article 27 — Defines the duration of prision mayor and reclusion temporal for purposes of applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Civil Code, Article 2208 — Governs attorney's fees as actual damages; the SC applied this to delete the award for lack of factual basis showing actual expense.