People vs. Likiran

An accused who inflicts a fatal wound contributing to a victim's death is criminally liable for homicide even if gunshot wounds from another assailant concurrently caused the death, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code; however, treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the attack is not deliberately or consciously adopted but is merely triggered by sudden infuriation in the heat of a brawl.

• On the eve of the town fiesta, March 19, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., a dance was being held at the basketball court in Barangay Bugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. The victim, Rolando Sareno, Sr., was present with prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon, Prescado Mercado, and Constancio Goloceno.
• A brawl erupted when Jerome Likiran (the accused-appellant's brother) punched Prescado Mercado inside the dance area. Constancio Goloceno attempted to assist Mercado but retreated upon seeing that Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife.
• Celso Dagangon and the victim, who were outside the dance area, heard the commotion. Jerome Likiran subsequently approached Sareno and shot him several times. After Sareno fell to the ground, the accused-appellant stabbed him in the back, specifically at the left scapular area.
• Dagangon, positioned only three meters away from the incident, witnessed the attack first-hand and immediately identified both the accused-appellant and Jerome during the subsequent police investigation. The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound, was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital, and a Certificate of Death was issued by Dr. Cidric Dael indicating the underlying cause of death as "Stab wound scapular area (L)" and antecedent cause as "Multiple GSW."
• During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and defense stipulated that the Certificate of Death was admitted as proof of the fact and cause of death due to the stab wound, though the agreement was signed only by counsel and not by the accused personally.
• The accused-appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi, claiming he and Jerome remained inside the dance area near the sound machine and only heard the gunshots outside. Defense witness Edgar Indanon testified that an unknown person committed the stabbing, while Eleuterio Quiñopa claimed he was with the accused-appellant and Jerome inside the hall during the commotion.

• The prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt through the positive and credible identification by eyewitness Celso Dagangon, who was only three meters away from the crime scene with an unobstructed view and no distracting elements.
• The absence of any showing of ill motive on the part of Dagangon to falsely implicate the accused-appellant renders his testimony entitled to greater weight than the defenses of denial and alibi.
• The accused-appellant is bound by the pre-trial stipulation admitting the Certificate of Death as proof of the cause of death; even assuming the cause of death was at issue, the accused-appellant remains criminally liable under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code for the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act of stabbing the victim.
• Treachery attended the commission of the crime, qualifying it to murder, as the victim was attacked suddenly without opportunity to defend himself.

• The prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant beyond reasonable doubt because it was allegedly impossible for Dagangon to see the accused-appellant given that the place was not lighted.
• The Information charged the accused-appellant with attacking, assaulting, stabbing, and shooting the victim, causing instantaneous death; however, the evidence established that Jerome Likiran was the one who shot the victim, while the accused-appellant allegedly did not participate in the attack.
• The defenses of denial and alibi should prevail; the accused-appellant claimed he was inside the dance hall near the sound machine with his brother at the time of the incident and could not have been at the scene of the crime.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the accused-appellant is bound by the pre-trial stipulation admitting the Certificate of Death as proof of the cause of death despite the agreement being signed only by counsel and not by the accused personally.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the prosecution proved the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Whether the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the death of the victim under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code when the evidence indicated that gunshot wounds inflicted by his brother Jerome were also antecedent causes of death.
  • Whether treachery attended the killing so as to qualify the crime to murder.

• Procedural:
  • The pre-trial stipulation is binding upon the accused-appellant. While Section 2 of Rule 118 requires that agreements during pre-trial be signed by the accused and counsel to be used against the accused, the defense failed to object to the admission of the pre-trial agreement during trial, thereby waiving any defect in its formal execution. Furthermore, Section 4 of Rule 118 provides that the pre-trial order reciting the facts stipulated binds the parties and limits the trial to matters not disposed of.
• Substantive:
  • Identity established: The positive identification by eyewitness Celso Dagangon, who was three meters away from the accused-appellant with a clear view and no distractions, outweighs the defenses of denial and alibi. The accused-appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during the attack.
  • Criminal liability under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code: An offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated, or contributed to the death, even if other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The accused-appellant's act of stabbing the victim in the scapular area with a hunting knife contributed to the death, regardless of the concurrent gunshot wounds inflicted by his brother.
  • Absence of treachery: Treachery requires that the means, method, or manner of execution be deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The evidence showed that the killing was a spur-of-the-moment incident triggered by a brawl during the town fiesta dance, not a premeditated attack. The accused-appellant and his brother acted in a sudden rampage without deliberate planning of the mode of attack.
  • Downgrade to Homicide: Without the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusion temporal.
  • Penalty: Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code (no modifying circumstances), the accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
  • Damages: The awards of P50,000.00 civil indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages, and P30,000.00 actual damages are affirmed. The award of P10,000.00 attorney's fees is deleted for lack of evidence that the heirs actually incurred such expense. All monetary awards shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

• Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Liability for Causes Producing a Different Result) — An offender is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act. If the act caused, accelerated, or contributed to the victim's death, the offender remains liable even if other concurrent causes (such as gunshot wounds from another assailant) cooperated in producing the death. The doctrine prevents immunity for crimes where multiple factors contribute to the fatal result.
• Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery requires: (a) employment of means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (b) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner. Treachery is absent when the attack is not premeditated but is merely triggered by sudden infuriation or occurs at the spur of the moment during a heated altercation.
• Positive Identification Over Denial and Alibi — Positive identification by a credible prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators is entitled to greater weight than the defenses of denial and alibi, particularly when the identification is immediate, the witness had a clear view, and there is no showing of ill motive to falsely testify.
• Binding Effect of Pre-Trial Stipulations — Agreements or admissions made during pre-trial conferences bind the parties and limit the scope of trial, provided the defense does not object to their admission or execution, pursuant to Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

• "If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim."
• "Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment."
• "The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal."
• "Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial."

• People v. Pilola — Cited by the Court of Appeals regarding the rule that an accused is criminally liable for contributing to death even if other causes are present; the Supreme Court affirmed this principle while directly applying Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Quinto v. Andres — Source of the doctrine that an offender is criminally liable for death if his act caused, accelerated, or contributed to the death, even if other causes cooperated in producing the result.
• People v. Nazareno — Cited for the principle that factual findings of the trial court are conclusive to the Supreme Court when supported by evidence and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
• People v. Villarico, Sr. — Cited for the rule that the primary duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the criminal.
• People v. Cañaveras — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• People v. Teriapil, People v. Tigle, People v. Badajos — Cited for the principle that treachery is absent when the killing is done at the spur of the moment or triggered by sudden infuriation.
• Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals — Cited regarding the formal requirements for pre-trial agreements under Rule 118.
• People v. Marollano — Cited for the rule that failure to object to a pre-trial agreement allows its admission despite procedural defects.
• People v. Crisostomo — Cited for the rule that a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer is prima facie evidence of the cause of death.

• Article 4(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines criminal liability for acts producing a result different from that intended, specifically holding offenders liable for causing, accelerating, or contributing to death regardless of concurrent efficient causes.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of Homicide and prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal.
• Article 27, Revised Penal Code — Defines the durations of the penalties of reclusion temporal and prision mayor for purposes of determining the indeterminate sentence.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Prescribes that when the penalty does not specify periods and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the medium period shall be imposed.
• Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), Section 1 — Provides the rule for determining the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence.
• Rule 118, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 — Requires that pre-trial agreements be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel to be used against the accused.
• Rule 118, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 4 — Provides that the pre-trial order reciting actions taken, facts stipulated, and evidence marked binds the parties and controls the course of the action during trial.
• Article 2208, Civil Code — Governs the award of attorney's fees as actual or compensatory damages, requiring evidence of actual incurrence of such expense.