People vs. Licayan y Sucano

Circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction for rape with homicide when the proven circumstances form an unbroken chain excluding every other hypothesis but guilt, as where the accused was last seen dragging the child victim away, fled twice, and pointed searchers to the location of the body.

Aldrin Licayan y Sucano was a friend of Bernard Agcopra and an acquaintance of Romeo Bangcong, whose five-year-old daughter Rowena was the victim. The charge was rape with homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which imposed the death penalty for the offense; the crime was later reclassified and incorporated as Articles 266-A and 266-B.

Rowena C. Bangcong was the five-year-old daughter of Romeo Bangcong and the only girl among her siblings. According to the prosecution, on June 25, 1999, Aldrin Licayan y Sucano returned after years of absence to Bernard Agcopra’s machine shop in Barangay Inobulan, Salay, Misamis Oriental, to apply for work as a grinder of engine valves. Agcopra and Licayan drank rum to celebrate their reunion, and Romeo Bangcong later joined them; they finished drinking at Agcopra’s shop at 5:00 p.m. The group continued drinking at Wenny Rajal’s house, where after consuming two bottles of Beer Grande they bought a case of the same drink and brought it to Romeo’s house. Rosalinda, Romeo’s wife, and the children Rey Oriente, Raymundo, and Rowena were there. Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink beer anymore; he went with Romeo to the barangay captain, leaving Licayan in Romeo’s house. When Romeo returned, Licayan was embracing and kissing Rowena, justifying it by saying that he missed his daughter.

Licayan kept embracing Rowena. At about 6:00 p.m., Rowena asked permission to watch television at the nearby house of Dorbit, fifteen meters away, and Romeo allowed her. An hour later, Romeo told Rey Oriente to fetch Rowena. Licayan also left, saying that he would look for Agcopra. When Rey reached Dorbit’s house, he saw Licayan there with Rowena. Licayan told Rowena, “Day, come here because your father asked you to go home so you can eat your supper.” He then held Rowena’s hand and dragged her into a dark area. Rey did not go with them, thinking that they were heading for the Bangcong house.

When Romeo got tired of waiting for Rowena, he went to Dorbit’s house to inquire about her. Rey Oriente told him what happened, and Romeo cried. Neighbors were alerted and formed a posse to look for the girl. While searching, one group spotted Licayan about twenty meters away when they trained a flashlight on him. Licayan ran toward the ricefield; the posse chased him but failed to catch him when he jumped into the deep Inobulan River. At about 9:30 p.m. that same night, Licayan emerged at the place where Wilson Salvana and companions were drinking. His clothes were wet, his body was muddy, he had no slippers, and he wore a striped blue shirt; he accepted the offer to drink and then proceeded away. The police arrested him that night.

The following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was found in the nipa swamp, at the place where Licayan told Rogelio “Jun-jun” Dahilan, Jr. she would be. At about 4:00 o’clock of June 26, Licayan told Jun-jun Dahilan, who in turn told the searchers, the location of the body; when the searchers went to the place described by Licayan, they found the child. A postmortem examination revealed hematomas, lacerations, and abrasions all over Rowena’s body, as well as a deep incomplete hymenal laceration at the 6:00 o’clock position. The cause of death was asphyxia by submersion in water. Photographs were taken of the girl.

Upon arraignment, Licayan, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had rested its case and formally offered its evidence, Licayan escaped detention on April 26, 2000 by scaling the perimeter fence of the Provincial Jail; he remained at large despite efforts to apprehend him. Defense counsel submitted the case for decision without presenting evidence for the accused. The RTC rendered judgment on June 14, 2000. The RTC relied on the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, including Licayan’s being last seen with Rowena, his flight, and his statement pointing to the location of the body.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the RTC gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death despite the glaring insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against him.
• First Three Circumstances: He argued that the first three circumstances relied upon by the RTC do not point to his guilt.
• Credibility of Hernando Zambrano: He argued that prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano, who was among those who organized the search party, was not credible because he did not shout upon finding accused-appellant.
• Visibility and Identification: He argued that the witnesses could not have seen him in the darkness and could have seen somebody else.
• Flight: He argued that, assuming he was the person seen by the posse, he was not committing any wrong by running away.
• Hearsay on the Body’s Location: He argued that the claim of prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them where Rowena’s body could be found, based on accused-appellant’s admission, is hearsay.
• Scope of Admission: He argued that, granting he revealed where Rowena’s lifeless body could be found, he never admitted having raped and killed her, and that the admission to Dahilan, Jr. is inadmissible.
• Wet Pants and Muddy Body: He argued that the circumstance that he was seen with wet pants, muddy body, and without slippers lacks probative value.
• Dragging: He argued that there were no tell-tale signs that he was dragging Rowena to the swamp.

• Affirmance of Conviction: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, recommended affirmance of the appealed Decision in toto.

• Effect of Escape: Whether accused-appellant’s escape from detention after the prosecution rested its case waived his right to seek relief and allowed the RTC to decide the case without awaiting his re-arrest.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for rape with homicide.
• Credibility and Identification: Whether prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano was credible and whether accused-appellant could be identified from about twenty meters away in the dark.
• Flight: Whether accused-appellant’s running away from the search party and his escape from jail may be taken as evidence of guilt.
• Admissibility of Admission: Whether the statement attributed to accused-appellant as to the location of Rowena’s body was hearsay or an inadmissible extra-judicial confession.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the death penalty and the awards of moral damages and civil indemnity were proper.

• Effect of Escape: Yes. An accused who escapes from confinement loses standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief unless he surrenders or submits to jurisdiction; the RTC may continue and decide the case.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The circumstantial evidence formed an unbroken chain excluding every other hypothesis but guilt; direct evidence is not indispensable.
• Credibility and Identification: Yes. Zambrano’s failure to shout did not impeach him, and flashlight illumination was sufficient for identification.
• Flight: Yes. Unexplained flight, especially flight twice, is an indication of guilt.
• Admissibility of Admission: No. The statement was not hearsay because Dahilan testified to it; it was an extra-judicial admission, not a confession, and was admissible; even if treated as a confession, it was corroborated by corpus delicti.
• Penalty and Damages: Yes. Death is mandatory for rape with homicide, and the awards of P50,000.00 moral damages and P100,000.00 civil indemnity are proper.

• Effect of Escape: The SC ruled that once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, he loses standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief unless he surrenders or submits to jurisdiction. His escape is a waiver of the right to be present at trial, and the inability to notify him of subsequent hearings does not prevent trial because the escapee is deemed to have received notice. The escape made his failure to attend unjustified because he placed himself beyond the law. The RTC thus had the duty to rule on the prosecution’s evidence and render judgment without waiting for his appearance or re-arrest, since the State and the accused both have an interest in speedy trial and disposition. The SC cited People vs. Alvarez and People vs. Tabag. Licayan escaped after the prosecution rested and remained at large; the RTC properly decided the case.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The SC reiterated that direct evidence is not the only matrix for conviction; circumstantial evidence suffices when (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It must be acted upon with caution; all essential facts must be consistent with guilt; the facts must exclude every other theory but guilt; and the facts must establish certainty of guilt. The SC viewed the circumstances not singly but together, as strands creating a pattern or an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion excluding all others. The proven circumstances included Licayan’s presence with Rowena, his embracing and kissing her, his taking and dragging her from Dorbit’s house, his being spotted and fleeing, his wet and muddy appearance without slippers, his statement to Dahilan pointing to the swamp, the recovery of the naked body there, and his being last seen with Rowena. These circumstances sufficiently established his guilt.

• Credibility and Identification: The SC held that Zambrano’s credibility cannot be impeached by his failure to rouse other search party members when he found Licayan; people react differently to a strange, startling, or frightful experience, and there is no standard behavioral response. The claim that Licayan could not have been identified from about twenty meters in the dark was untenable because illumination from a flashlight or kerosene lamp is sufficient to allow identification of persons; when visibility is favorable and witnesses do not appear biased, their identification should be accepted. The SC cited People vs. Binas.

• Flight: The SC held that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him; flight is one such act. In criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. Unexplained flight may generally be taken as evidence tending to establish guilt. Licayan fled twice: first when spotted by the search party and second by scaling the Provincial Jail fence while in custody and undergoing trial. His flight was unexplained and damaging. The SC cited People vs. Templo.

• Admissibility of Admission: The SC held the statement to Dahilan was not hearsay because Dahilan testified to Licayan’s own statement, and the opportunity to cross-examine Dahilan negated hearsay. The statement was not an extra-judicial confession but an extra-judicial admission: a confession acknowledges guilt in express terms, while an admission is a statement of facts pertinent to the issue that, with proof of other facts, tends to prove guilt. Dahilan was not a law enforcement or public officer conducting custodial interrogation; he was a jeepney driver and acquaintance who asked about the missing child. There was no showing of collusion with police or instruction to extract information. The SC cited People vs. Agustin and People vs. Andan. Even if treated as an extra-judicial confession, it was admissible because corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti—the bruised and battered body recovered at the exact spot described by Licayan—and its details reflected voluntariness.

• Penalty and Damages: The SC held rape with homicide is defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, later incorporated as Articles 266-A and 266-B. Under Article 266-B, when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of rape, the penalty is death. Death is a single indivisible penalty and must be imposed regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances under Article 63; Article 47 mandates death except in specified cases not present. The SC affirmed the death penalty. On damages, prevailing jurisprudence fixed civil indemnity for rape with homicide at P100,000.00, and moral damages of P50,000.00 were proper for the pain and anguish of the victim’s family.

• Circumstantial Evidence — Conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence when (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The SC also applied four guidelines: it must be acted upon with caution; all essential facts must be consistent with guilt; the facts must exclude every other theory but guilt; and the facts must establish certainty of guilt. In this case, the circumstances—last seen with the victim, dragging her away, flight, wet and muddy appearance, and pointing to the body’s location—formed an unbroken chain excluding every other hypothesis but guilt.
• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — Flight is an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. Unexplained flight may generally be taken as evidence tending to establish guilt. Licayan fled when spotted by the search party and again escaped from jail during trial, making his flight particularly damaging.
• Extra-judicial Admission vs. Extra-judicial Confession — A confession is an express acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged; an admission is a statement of facts pertinent to the issue that, with proof of other facts, tends to prove guilt. Licayan’s statement to Dahilan on where the child could be found was an admission, not a confession, and was admissible because Dahilan was a private person, not a law enforcement officer conducting custodial interrogation.
• Corpus Delicti Corroboration — An extra-judicial confession is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, which means that a crime was actually committed. Even if Licayan’s statement were treated as a confession, the recovery of Rowena’s bruised and battered body at the exact spot he described supplied the corroboration.
• Escape Waives Standing — An accused who escapes from prison or confinement loses standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief unless he surrenders or submits to jurisdiction. The RTC may continue and decide the case without waiting for his re-arrest. Licayan’s escape after the prosecution rested justified the RTC’s decision in absentia.
• Credibility and Visibility — Different people react differently to a strange, startling, or frightful experience, and there is no standard behavioral response. Illumination from a flashlight or kerosene lamp is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Zambrano’s failure to shout did not impeach him, and the flashlight illumination supported Licayan’s identification at about twenty meters.
• Penalty for Rape with Homicide — Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of rape, the penalty is death. Death is a single indivisible penalty and is imposed regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The SC applied this to affirm the death penalty and the damages.

• “The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but together. Like strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.” — The SC used this to explain why the circumstances must be assessed collectively, not one by one, in upholding the conviction.
• “In criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of the accused person may as a general rule be taken as evidence having tendency to establish his guilt.” — The SC used this to treat Licayan’s running from the posse and escaping jail as evidence of guilt.
• “A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt.” — The SC used this distinction to classify Licayan’s statement on the body’s location as an admissible extra-judicial admission, not a confession.
• “Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court.” — The SC used this to justify proceeding with the case and deciding it despite Licayan’s escape.

• People vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364 [1991] — Cited for the rule that an accused who escapes from confinement loses standing and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief unless he surrenders or submits to jurisdiction.
• People vs. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115 [1997] — Cited for the RTC’s duty to proceed with the case and render judgment after the accused escapes, without waiting for his re-arrest.
• People vs. Binas, 320 SCRA 22 [1999] — Cited for the rule that illumination from a flashlight or kerosene lamp is sufficient to allow identification of persons.
• People vs. Templo, 346 SCRA 626 [2000] — Cited for the rule that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him, and that flight is such an act.
• People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995] — Cited for the distinction between a confession and an admission.
• People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 [1997] — Cited for the rule that constitutional custodial-investigation procedure does not apply to a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by authorities, as where the accused admits the crime in an ordinary manner to a private person.
• People vs. Comesario, 306 SCRA 400 [1999] — Cited for the rule that circumstantial evidence may sustain conviction when the circumstances form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the guilty person.
• People vs. Robles, 305 SCRA 273 [1999] — Cited for the prevailing rule fixing civil indemnity in rape with homicide at P100,000.00.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — Defined and penalized rape with homicide; the SC applied it to the charge and conviction, noting that the felony was later reclassified and incorporated as Articles 266-A and 266-B.
• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape, including carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age; applied because Rowena was five years old.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of rape, the penalty is death; applied to impose the death penalty.
• Article 47, Revised Penal Code — Mandates the death penalty in all cases where it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen or more than seventy years old or when the required majority vote is not obtained; applied because no exception was present.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Provides that death is a single indivisible penalty and shall be imposed regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances; applied to affirm the death penalty.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court — Sets the requisites for circumstantial evidence; applied to uphold the conviction based on the combination of proven circumstances.
• Section 26, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him; applied to Licayan’s statement on the body’s location.
• Section 33, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — Defines confession as the declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt of the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein; distinguished from the extra-judicial admission in this case.
• Section 3, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that an extra-judicial confession is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti; applied even assuming Licayan’s statement were a confession.
• Section 12(1) and (3), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides custodial-investigation rights; held inapplicable because Dahilan was a private person, not a law enforcement officer conducting custodial interrogation.
• Article 83, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 — Requires forwarding the record to the Office of the President for possible clemency after finality; applied in the dispositive portion.