People vs. Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes

The exempting circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible force under Article 12(5) of the Revised Penal Code demands clear and convincing evidence that the duress was present, imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm, leaving the accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape; a threat of future injury is insufficient. Moreover, for alibi to prevail over positive identification, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

On August 10, 1998, Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay were abducted at gunpoint from Co’s Goodies Pares Marni House in Sampaloc, Manila, by five armed men. They were taken to a safehouse in Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina, where they were detained and a ransom of ₱10 million was demanded through calls to Co’s brother. The victims escaped on the afternoon of August 11, 1998, when one of their guards fell asleep. Police raided the safehouse and arrested Roberto Lara; Roderick Licayan was arrested thereafter. Both were positively identified by Co and Manaysay. The trial court convicted Licayan and Lara of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentenced them to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction with finality in 2001, and a writ of execution was later issued scheduling their execution for January 30, 2004. Shortly before that date, two long-time co-accused—Pedro Mabansag, a double-arm amputee suspected as mastermind, and Rogelio Delos Reyes—were arrested, prompting the Court to exceptionally reopen the final judgment to receive further evidence.

• The Abduction: At around 1:45 a.m. on August 10, 1998, Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay were at Co’s Goodies Pares Marni House in Sampaloc, Manila. Three armed men approached Co, who was loading leftover food into his Tamaraw FX. One of the men fired a shot. When Manaysay came out, the men refused offers to take money from the store. Both victims were forced into the rear of the Tamaraw FX where two other men were already seated in front. Co identified Roderick Licayan as one of the five abductors. A man seated in the middle portion of the vehicle, later identified as Rogelio Delos Reyes, demanded the vehicle key from Co, saying “Akina ang susi.” Co handed the key after a gun was pointed at him.
• Detention and Escape: The victims’ hands were tied and their eyes taped; caps were placed over their heads. After about 45 minutes, they arrived at a safehouse in Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina. Inside, the eye coverings were removed. Co’s wallet (containing ₱5,000), his watch, and Manaysay’s necklace and earrings were taken. A person identified as Roberto Lara guarded them shortly after arrival, provided a plastic container for Manaysay to urinate in, and refused Co’s pleas and bribe for their release, stating he was just following orders. On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan, who was then on guard, fell asleep, allowing Co and Manaysay to escape. They sought refuge in a nearby house on Kaolin Street, Twinriver Subdivision, Parang, Marikina, from where Co called the police.
• Investigation and Initial Arrests: Police officers, including a SWAT team, responded. The case was turned over to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). At around 6:30 p.m. on August 11, 1998, PAOCTF operatives raided the safehouse. SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr. arrested a man running away, later identified as Roberto Lara. Lara pointed to Licayan as a companion and led authorities to a house at the back of the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall, where Licayan was arrested. Both were brought to Camp Crame and positively identified by Co and Manaysay in a police line-up consisting of ten persons.
• First Trial and Final Conviction: At the initial trial, Licayan and Lara interposed alibi, which the RTC rejected. The trial court convicted them of Kidnapping for Ransom and imposed the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on August 15, 2001, with finality on November 9, 2001. The RTC issued a Writ of Execution scheduling the execution for January 30, 2004.
• Arrest of Co-Accused and Pro Hac Vice Reopening: On January 9, 2004, Pedro Mabansag, a double-arm amputee and suspected mastermind, was arrested in Escalante City. On January 12, 2004, Rogelio Delos Reyes was arrested in Agusan del Sur. Based on an Urgent Motion to Reopen filed by the PAO, the Supreme Court, voting 8-6, granted the motion pro hac vice on February 17, 2004, suspended the execution, and remanded the case for further reception of evidence.
• Retrial and Additional Evidence for the Accused: During the retrial, the prosecution adopted the earlier testimony and recalled Co to testify on Delos Reyes’s participation. Co identified Delos Reyes in court as the person who demanded the vehicle key. On cross-examination, Co maintained he was positive about the faces of Licayan and Lara and was merely more assured after looking at their feet.
• Defense Evidence: Delos Reyes claimed he went to Mabansag’s house on August 10, 1998, to accompany a friend buying a fighting cock. He saw Mabansag, and upon entering to drink water, he encountered “Tata” and “Jojo,” who pointed a gun at him and forced him to stay. He saw a man and a woman (the victims), noticed the woman’s hands were tied, but did not find it unusual. He was allowed to leave after one hour and did not report the incident, claiming fear. Licayan and Lara presented witness Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, who recounted Mabansag’s statements that Lara was innocent and that Licayan had not been seen for a long time, although Mabansag also admitted participating in the safekeeping of the victims. Co-worker Abelardo Ramirez and employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador testified that Lara was working at a construction site in Antipolo on August 10 and 11, 1998, from morning until late afternoon. Licayan, recalled, testified that the victims initially identified them by pointing at their feet.

• Exempting Circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear (Delos Reyes): Delos Reyes argued that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force because co-accused “Tata” Placio pointed a gun at him and threatened to kill him if he reported the matter. He maintained that this exempted him from criminal liability under Article 12(5) of the Revised Penal Code, insisting he was merely forced to guard the victims.
• Unreliable Identification and Newly Discovered Evidence (Licayan and Lara): Licayan and Lara sought acquittal based on purportedly newly discovered evidence. They contended that the victims’ identification was unreliable because Co at first identified them by their feet rather than faces, and that Co’s testimony contained inconsistencies—including uncertainty whether Licayan was among the abductors and inaccuracies in describing Mabansag. They further argued that the affidavits and testimonies of the recently arrested co-accused Mabansag and Delos Reyes categorically stated that Licayan and Lara were not involved. Lara also relied on alibi witnesses (Ramirez and Salvador) who claimed he was at work in Antipolo during the critical times.

• Positive Identification and Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution maintained that Co and Manaysay positively identified Licayan and Lara during the police line-up and in open court, and that their credibility remained unimpeached. Their detailed recollection of the events inside the safehouse, including specific interactions with each accused, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Failure to Prove Exempting Circumstance: The People countered that Delos Reyes’s claim of irresistible force was a mere afterthought, unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. His testimony was riddled with inconsistencies and improbable assertions, such as not finding a woman with bound hands unusual, and his failure to report the incident after freeing himself negated any genuine fear.
• Weakness of Alibi and New Evidence: The prosecution emphasized that Lara’s alibi placed him in the same vicinity as the safehouse (Daang Bakal) and that he parted ways with his witness at Kaolin Street, the very street where the victims escaped. Physical impossibility was thus not established. The affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes were characterized as self-serving, with Mabansag’s denial rendered worthless by his simultaneous claim of ignorance of the kidnapping, and Delos Reyes’s timeline irrelevant to the period when the victims positively placed Lara at the scene.

• Exempting Circumstance: Whether the exempting circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible force under Article 12(5) of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant Rogelio Delos Reyes.
• Acquittal Based on Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether accused-appellants Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara should be acquitted on the basis of purportedly newly discovered evidence, consisting of alleged unreliability of the victims’ identification, exculpatory statements by co-accused, and alibi.

• Exempting Circumstance: The exempting circumstance was not established. A person invoking compulsion of irresistible force must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the force reduced him to a mere instrument acting against his will, leaving no opportunity for self-defense or escape. The duress must be present, imminent, and impending, of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm; a threat of future injury is insufficient. Delos Reyes’s testimony was found inherently incredible and contradictory. The trial court, which had the unique opportunity to observe his demeanor, expressly stated he was “obviously lying [through] his teeth.” He stayed at the safehouse for an hour, saw the victims with tied hands, yet claimed he did not find it unusual; after being allowed to leave, he did not report the matter. These facts negated any genuine uncontrollable fear and indicated voluntary participation.
• Acquittal Based on Newly Discovered Evidence: The conviction of Licayan and Lara was affirmed. The victims’ identification was positive and categorical. Co clarified that he was already certain of their faces; looking at their feet merely provided additional assurance. Minor inconsistencies in his testimony, such as momentary uncertainty about Licayan’s role during the initial abduction, strengthened rather than weakened credibility because they negated a rehearsed account. The exculpatory statements of co-accused Mabansag and Delos Reyes carried no weight: Mabansag simultaneously denied any knowledge of the kidnapping, rendering his disclaimer of Licayan and Lara’s involvement hollow, while Delos Reyes’s claim that Licayan merely “passed by” the safehouse was unintentionally inculpatory. Lara’s alibi failed because his own witnesses placed him at Daang Bakal—the very location of the safehouse—on the morning of the abduction, and he parted ways with them on Kaolin Street, the escape route of the victims. Physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene was therefore not demonstrated. Positive identification thus prevailed.

• Compulsion of Irresistible Force (Article 12[5], Revised Penal Code): To avail of this exempting circumstance, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) an irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but against his will; (2) the compulsion was of such a character as to leave no opportunity for self-defense or escape; and (3) the duress was present, imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be not done. A threat of future injury is insufficient. Applied here, Delos Reyes’s inconsistent and improbable narrative failed to meet this exacting standard.
• Alibi versus Positive Identification: Alibi is one of the weakest defenses and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else at the time of the crime’s commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here, Lara’s whereabouts were traced to the very vicinity of the safehouse, foreclosing the defense.
• Credibility of Witnesses and Minor Inconsistencies: Discrepancies in testimony concerning minor details that do not touch upon the central fact of the crime do not impair credibility; instead, they strengthen it by discounting the possibility of a rehearsed statement. The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is accorded the highest respect because of its unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.

• “He must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his will. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough.” — The Court’s restatement of the requisites of the exempting circumstance under Article 12(5), decisive in rejecting Delos Reyes’s defense.
• “[I]t is the trial judge that can capture the truth from the ‘forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch.’” — The classic formulation justifying deference to the trial court’s credibility findings, applied to sustain the rejection of Delos Reyes’s testimony.

• People v. Dansal, 341 Phil. 549 (1997) — Set forth the stringent standard for proving the exempting circumstance of irresistible force; followed to deny Delos Reyes’s claim.
• People v. Ramirez, 409 Phil. 238 (2001) — Reiterated the rule that the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is best and most competent; applied to uphold the trial court’s finding that Delos Reyes was untruthful.
• People v. Bagaua, 442 Phil. 245 (2002) — Established that minor testimonial inconsistencies strengthen credibility; relied upon to dismiss challenges to Co’s testimony.
• People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 158797, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 407 — Affirmed the requirement of physical impossibility for alibi to overcome positive identification; applied to reject Lara’s alibi.
• People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508 — Prescribed the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in kidnapping for ransom cases where the death penalty is prohibited; followed in modifying the award.

• Article 12(5), Revised Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force. The provision was invoked by Delos Reyes but found inapplicable because the requisite imminent, well-grounded apprehension of death or serious harm and the lack of opportunity to escape were not proven.
• Article 267, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Kidnapping for Ransom. The accused were proved to have detained the victims for the purpose of extorting ransom, making the provision applicable.
• Rule 121, Sections 1, 2(b) and 6(b), Rules of Court — Governs new trial. The Supreme Court’s pro hac vice resolution granted the effects of Section 6(b), directing that previously adduced evidence stand and additional evidence be taken together with it.
• Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The Court recognized that with the passage of this law, only reclusion perpetua could be imposed notwithstanding the death-penalty-worthy nature of the crime.

Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Jose Portugal Perez, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. (Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio certified the consultation.)

None.