People vs. Latosa y Chico

The exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code requires the accused to prove with clear and convincing evidence that she was performing a lawful act with due care, and that the injury was caused by mere accident without fault or intention. Pointing a gun towards the victim's head and pulling the trigger cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered a lawful act performed with due care, especially where the accused had previously handled the firearm and was deemed to know the basic firearms safety rule that the muzzle is never pointed at a person.

The accused-appellant Susan Latosa y Chico was charged with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, in relation to PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294, for the killing of her legitimate husband, Major Felixberto Latosa, Sr. The couple had six children, including twins Sassymae and Michael Latosa, who testified for the prosecution. The victim was a military officer who was asleep at the time of the shooting incident. The defense of the accused was that the shooting was accidental, occurring while she was handing the gun to her husband who had just awakened and asked for his service pistol.

On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant Susan Latosa y Chico was at their house in Fort Bonifacio with her husband, Major Felixberto Latosa, Sr., and two of their children, Sassymae and Michael Latosa. Felixberto, Sr. was asleep when Sassymae saw appellant take his gun from the cabinet and leave the house. When Sassymae asked where she was going and if she could come along, appellant refused. Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice cream at the commissary, giving her money and asking her to leave. After Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to follow his sister, but he refused as he was hungry. Appellant insisted and told Michael not to make any noise as his father was sleeping. Appellant then went back inside the house and turned up the volume of the television and the radio to full. Shortly after, she came out again and gave Michael money to buy food at the grocery.

Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and returned to the barracks located at the back of their house. There, his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos told him that he saw appellant running away from their house. Michael did not pay attention to this comment. Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their house. Michael replied in the negative, then entered the house and saw his father lying on the bed with a hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand. Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos, who told him that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office. Sassymae then arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand. Felixberto Latosa, Jr., another legitimate son, testified that sometime in December 2001, their father told him and his siblings over dinner about a threat to their lives by a certain Efren Sta. Inez.

Appellant, testifying on her own behalf, claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. woke up, he asked her to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him, it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down. Shocked, she ran quickly to Felixberto, Sr.'s office and asked for help. She claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. asked her for his gun, she was on her way out of the house to follow her children who left for the market on an errand she had earlier given Sassymae. She ran after them but realized she did not have the keys to their jeep, so she went back to the house, where Felixberto, Sr. asked again for his gun, and it was then that it fired as she was handing it to him. Appellant described herself as a good mother and provider for their six children whom she raised by herself while Felixberto, Sr. was in Mindanao. She claimed her children testified against her because they were manipulated by her brother-in-law, Francisco Latosa. She denied that Sassymae saw her holding a gun when she asked her to buy ice cream, alleging that Michael and Sassymae saw her holding the gun only when she placed it inside the cabinet before they proceeded to the hospital. She also denied her children's testimony that she was having an affair with a certain Col. Efren Sta. Inez, a policeman, claiming she first met him when her youngest brother was killed on June 6, 2001, and that Sta. Inez was the one who assisted her. She denied that she was terminated from her job at the Philippine Public Safety College due to immorality, claiming instead that she was terminated because of numerous absences as she grieved the death of her youngest brother.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt, holding that the claim of accidental shooting was inconsistent with the evidence considering the location of the gunshot wound at the left temple of Felixberto, Sr., and the fact that the gun was found near his left hand despite his being right-handed. The trial court found that appellant planned the killing by asking her two children to leave the house and, after the shooting, placing the gun near the victim's left hand to suggest suicide. The RTC considered the following circumstantial evidence: (1) shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two children to do errands not usually asked of them; (2) at the time of the shooting, only appellant and Felixberto, Sr. were in the house; (3) appellant was seen running away from the house immediately after the shooting; (4) Michael found his father with a hole in the head and a gun in his left hand; (5) the medico-legal report showed the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage due to gunshot wound with point of entry at the left temporal region; (6) the Firearms Identification Report concluded that appellant fired two shots; (7) Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and the gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassymae testified that she heard Sta. Inez tell appellant "bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok"; (9) appellant's children testified that they were informed by Felixberto, Sr. regarding the threat of appellant's paramour, Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and (10) Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum showing that appellant was terminated from her teaching job by reason of immorality.

• Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Appellant argued that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to prove that she intentionally killed her husband.
• Accidental Discharge: Appellant insisted that the gun fired accidentally while she was giving it to Felixberto, Sr., and that since she had no experience in handling firearms, she was not able to foresee that it would fire accidentally and hit her husband.
• Immediate Assistance: Appellant claimed that after her husband was hit, she immediately rushed to his office and asked for assistance.

• Burden of Proof on Appellant: The prosecution maintained that since appellant admitted having killed her husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving the presence of the exempting circumstance of accident to relieve herself of criminal responsibility.
• Strength of Own Evidence: The prosecution argued that appellant must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing.
• Implausibility of Defense: The prosecution contended that appellant's version of accidental shooting was negated by the facts that a revolver is not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire, and that when handing a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle is never pointed to that person.

• Exempting Circumstance of Accident: Whether the exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code was established by appellant.
• Intent to Kill: Whether the prosecution's circumstantial evidence sufficiently established appellant's intent to kill her husband.

• Exempting Circumstance of Accident: No. Appellant failed to establish the exempting circumstance of accident because pointing a gun towards her husband's head and pulling the trigger cannot be considered a lawful act performed with due care. The essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code were not proven with clear and convincing evidence.
• Intent to Kill: Yes. The circumstantial evidence satisfactorily established appellant's intent to kill her husband. Intent to kill is presumed when the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, and the evidence showed appellant's deliberate acts of sending her children away, turning up the volume of the television and radio, and the location of the gunshot wound.

• Exempting Circumstance of Accident: The Court applied Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which exempts from criminal liability any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. The Court enumerated the four essential requisites: (1) the accused was performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) the injury was caused by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The Court held that by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her husband's head and pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. The Court quoted the CA's finding that appellant's manner of carrying the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of "due care" in the performance of an act. The location of the wound sustained by the victim showed that the shooting was not merely accidental. The Court also noted that a revolver is not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire, and that when handing a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle is never pointed to that person. The Court found it contrary to human nature that a newly awakened military man would suddenly ask his wife for his firearm and patiently wait for her return when the firearm was just inside the cabinet about two meters away from his bed. The Court further held that appellant was deemed to have known the basic firearms safety rule since she admitted during trial that she sometimes handed over the gun to her husband.

• Intent to Kill: The Court held that there is no merit in appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial evidence her motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which her conviction rests. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist of the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing, the circumstances under which the crime was committed, and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed. The Court enumerated the circumstantial evidence that satisfactorily established appellant's intent to kill: (1) appellant asked her twins to do errands for her, which was not the usual thing she would do; (2) thereafter, only the accused and the victim were left alone in the house; (3) appellant was seen running away from the house by Michael's friend Macmac; (4) Michael saw his father with a hole in the head, blood on the nose, and a gun in his left hand; (5) the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the head; (6) appellant's paraffin test yielded positive result for the presence of gunpowder nitrate in her right hand; (7) the point of entry of the gunshot wound was at the left temporal region; (8) the victim was right-handed and the gun was found on his left hand; (9) Sassymae heard Col. Sta. Inez tell appellant "bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok"; and (10) the children testified that they were informed by the victim regarding the threat of Sta. Inez to the whole family who allegedly had an amorous relationship with their mother. The Court also found no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, noting that it is doctrinally settled that assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.

• Exempting Circumstance of Accident (Article 12(4), RPC) — For the exempting circumstance of accident to apply, the accused must prove with clear and convincing evidence the following essential requisites: (1) she was performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) she caused the injury by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that pointing a gun towards the victim's head and pulling the trigger cannot be considered a lawful act performed with due care, especially where the accused had previously handled the firearm and was deemed to know the basic firearms safety rule that the muzzle is never pointed at a person.

• Burden of Proof on Accused Who Admits Killing — When the accused admits having killed the victim but invokes an exempting circumstance, she has the burden of proving the presence of that circumstance to relieve herself of criminal responsibility. She must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.

• Intent to Kill Presumed from Deliberate Act — If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist of the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing, the circumstances under which the crime was committed, and the motives of the accused.

• Credibility of Witnesses Best Undertaken by Trial Court — Assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. Findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.

• "However, by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her husband's head and pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the case, rejecting the defense of accident because the act itself was not lawful nor performed with due care.

• "There is no merit in appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial evidence her motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which her conviction rests." — This passage clarifies the distinction between intent to kill and motive, establishing that the prosecution need not prove motive where intent to kill is sufficiently established.

• "It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination." — This passage articulates the doctrine of deference to trial court findings on witness credibility, which the Court applied in affirming the conviction.

• People vs. Reyes, No. L-33154, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 474 — Cited by the CA and relied upon by the Court for the propositions that a revolver is not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire, and that when handing a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle is never pointed to that person.

• Toledo vs. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004, 439 SCRA 94 — Cited for the enumeration of the essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No. 127818, November 11, 1998, 298 SCRA 450 — Cited for the rule that the accused who admits the killing must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

• Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 188 — Cited for the rule that intent to kill is presumed when the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, and for the enumeration of evidence that may prove intent to kill.

• People vs. Pili, G.R. No. 124739, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 118 — Cited for the doctrine that findings of the trial court on witness credibility will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.

• People vs. Mortera, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010 — Cited as prevailing jurisprudence fixing the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00, which the Court applied to increase the award.

• Article 12, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — The exempting circumstance of accident, which exempts from criminal liability any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. The Court applied this provision by requiring appellant to prove the four essential requisites, which she failed to do.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 — The crime of parricide, under which appellant was charged and convicted for killing her legitimate husband.

• PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 — Cited in the information and RTC decision in relation to the use of an unlicensed gun in the commission of the crime.

• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification portion of the decision regarding the consultation requirement before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Conchita Carpio Morales (Chairperson, Third Division)
• Arturo D. Brion
• Lucas P. Bersamin
• Roberto A. Abad (Additional member per Special Order No. 843)