People vs. Latag

The precise date of the commission of rape need not be alleged in the information unless it is an essential element, and the death penalty for qualified rape cannot be imposed where the offender’s relationship with the victim is not alleged in the complaint or information; the conviction is only for simple rape.

Stephanie L. Sarmiento was a minor, and appellant Avelino Latag y Dita alias “Pauto” is her uncle, being the son of her maternal grandfather Enrique Latag and the brother of her mother. The rape charge was governed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of RA No. 7659, before RA No. 8353 took effect, which allowed the death penalty where the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree.

Stephanie L. Sarmiento was born in Manila to Spouses Virgilio and Babylita Latag Sarmiento and lived with her family in Paco, Manila until they transferred to Sitio Santol, Barangay Nangkaan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, in the house of her maternal grandparents. In June 1996, the Spouses Sarmiento left all their children at that house because Virgilio had to attend to his work as a taxi driver in Manila. Appellant Avelino Latag y Dita alias “Pauto” is Stephanie’s uncle, being the son of her maternal grandfather Enrique Latag and the brother of her mother.

According to the prosecution, on a night in April 1997, while Stephanie was sleeping with her brothers and sisters Charen May (12), Daisy (4), Regienalyn (3), Jandie (1), and Jenevecher (7), and their Tiya Nancy (10) and Tiyo Ronaldo (11) at the second floor of the house, appellant removed her short pants and panty, which roused her from sleep. After removing his short pants and briefs, he placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Stephanie tried to resist by removing his penis, but appellant boxed her whenever she tried; she felt pain in her vagina, and she could not shout because appellant slapped her every time she attempted to do so. Appellant stayed on top of her for about one minute while her grandparents, siblings, aunt, and uncle were sound asleep. After raping her, appellant went back to the lower portion of the house where he normally slept; Stephanie recognized him because of the lighted kerosene lamp placed on top of the cabinet at the place where she had been sleeping.

After the incident, Stephanie reported it to her older sister Charen May. The sisters reported it to their maternal grandparents, but the grandparents did not believe the children. Stephanie and Charen May submitted themselves to a medical examination on May 8, 1997 at the Lipa City District Hospital before Dr. Alex Agato. Dr. Agato found Stephanie’s vaginal opening inflamed and admitted the fifth digit of his examining finger, right hand, with difficulty up to 2 cms in depth; he noted that the hymen was absent, which was not natural, and that its absence was due to penetration of an object, probably a finger or a penis; he also found that the vaginal opening could be seen and not coopted, which was unusual for a ten-year-old girl. Dr. Agato issued a medico-legal certificate in Stephanie’s favor dated May 8, 1997 and concluded that she was no longer a virgin.

The Complaints, both dated June 24, 1997, charged appellant with two counts of rape. Criminal Case No. 0458-97 charged him with raping Charen May on or about April 5, 1997, while Criminal Case No. 0460-97 charged him with raping Stephanie sometime in the month of April 1997, both by means of force and intimidation. During his arraignment on August 27, 1997, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges.

Appellant denied the allegation. He testified that in April 1997 he was living in the house of his father’s kumpare near the lakeshore at Sitio Santol, where he worked in construction with the kumpare’s son, and that he had lived there from February 1996 to May 1997; he claimed that he never slept in his own house during that period because he always came home late from work. He claimed that Stephanie is his niece, being the daughter of his sister, and that Stephanie and her siblings had arrived at their house in Nagkaan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, to reside there. Enrique Latag testified that Stephanie is his granddaughter and appellant is his son; that Stephanie and Charen Mae arrived at their house sometime in June and lived with him for almost one year; that he supported them; that he first learned his sons Yolito and Avelino were charged with rape when Avelino was apprehended; that Stephanie did not complain to him about the alleged rape; and that when he talked to Stephanie during the trial about the filing of the cases, she just kept quiet. Enrique also testified that appellant lived at the house of his kumpare in April 1997 because appellant was working with the latter’s son, and that appellant had lived there from February 1996 to May 1997. Appellant also testified that his brother-in-law had mauled his sister many times, the last time in April 1997 in their house, and that he and his brother Yolito helped each other in mauling their brother-in-law.

The trial court found Stephanie credible after observing her conduct and demeanor on the witness stand. It gave weight and credence to her candid and sincere testimony because, aside from being clear and positive, it was devoid of any artificiality and infused with truth and sincerity, and it found it unthinkable that a ten-year-old child would fabricate such a serious charge as rape against her own uncle and expose herself to the humiliation and embarrassment of a medical examination and a public trial. The trial court discarded appellant’s denial and alibi as inherently weak and held that he palpably failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

• Sufficiency of the Information — Date of Commission: Appellant argued that Section 6 of Rule 110 requires the approximate time of the commission of the offense to be stated in the complaint or information, and that the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 0460-97 failed to comply because it alleged only “sometime in the month of April, 1997.” He maintained that the sexual act in rape must be proved to have been committed on a precise date and time, that the Complaint was fatally defective and void, and that the doctrine in United States vs. Javier Dichao applied because the indefinite date deprived him of an opportunity to prepare his defense and made alibi impossible. Citing Ilo vs. Court of Appeals, he argued that evidence presented by the prosecution could not cure the defect and that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Relationship: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in appreciating his relationship with Stephanie as a qualifying circumstance and in imposing the death penalty when his being her uncle was not alleged in the Complaint; the relationship should not have been used to qualify the crime.

• Sufficiency of the Information — Date of Commission: Whether the Information in Criminal Case No. 0460-97 is insufficient to support a conviction because it failed to state the precise date of the commission of the rape.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Relationship: Whether the death penalty may be imposed where the Information failed to allege appellant’s relationship with the victim.

• Sufficiency of the Information — Date of Commission: No. The precise time or date of rape need not be alleged unless it is an essential element; “sometime in the month of April, 1997” was sufficient, and appellant’s failure to object before arraignment waived any defect.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Relationship: No. The death penalty cannot be imposed where the relationship is not alleged in the complaint or information; appellant is guilty only of simple rape and should suffer reclusion perpetua.

• Sufficiency of the Information — Date of Commission: Section 11 of Rule 110 provides that the precise date of the offense need not be stated unless it is a material ingredient, and the offense may be alleged on a date as near as possible to the actual date. In rape, time is not an element; the gravamen is carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances in Article 335. People vs. Gianan held that allegations such as “sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter” sufficiently comply, and any defect is cured by evidence and waived if no objection is raised before arraignment. The Complaint’s “sometime in the month of April, 1997” was definite enough; appellant’s counsel cross-examined the witnesses and presented evidence without surprise. United States vs. Javier Dichao is inapplicable because the information there alleged an interval between October 1910 and August 1912, and the accused filed a motion to quash; appellant filed no such motion. Objections to form or substance cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; the remedy was a bill of particulars or a motion to quash.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Relationship: The rape was committed before RA No. 8353 took effect, so Section 11 of RA No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, governed. That provision authorized the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent. The death penalty cannot be imposed if the relationship is not alleged in the complaint or information; if the offender is merely a relation, the specific relationship must be alleged, and both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved. Here, the Complaint alleged Stephanie’s minority but did not specifically state appellant’s relationship to her. Hence, the RTC’s finding of qualified rape cannot stand; appellant is guilty only of simple rape. The SC nevertheless affirmed the trial court’s credibility finding, because the competence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the trial court and its factual findings bind the SC absent arbitrariness; the victim’s testimony established the rape.

• Sufficiency of information as to date in rape — The precise date of the commission of rape need not be alleged in the complaint or information unless it is an essential element; the offense may be alleged on a date as near as possible to the actual date. In this case, “sometime in the month of April, 1997” was sufficient, and the failure to object before arraignment waived any defect.
• Qualifying relationship must be alleged — The death penalty for qualified rape cannot be imposed where the offender’s relationship with the victim is not alleged in the complaint or information. If the offender is merely a relative, the specific relationship must be alleged, and both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved; otherwise, the conviction is for simple rape only.
• Credibility of rape victim and trial court findings — The competence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe their deportment while testifying. When a woman, more so a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment; the trial court’s factual findings are binding absent arbitrariness.
• Civil liability in simple rape — In simple rape, the indemnity ex delicto is ₱50,000, moral damages are ₱50,000, and exemplary damages are ₱25,000. Exemplary damages may be awarded even if the relationship was not alleged in the Complaint, because the prosecution proved the relationship during trial and that proof supports the civil liability.

• “Although the Complaint alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in the month of April, 1997," the trial court did not err in convicting him of rape.” — The SC rejects the argument that the information was insufficient for failing to state the precise date.
• “Indeed, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon the perpetrator, if his relationship with the victim is not duly alleged in the complaint or information.” — The SC holds that the qualifying relationship must be alleged to justify the death penalty.
• “Both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved; if not, a conviction for rape in its qualified form will be barred.” — The SC states the requisites for qualified rape based on relationship.
• “It is doctrinal that the competence and the credibility of witnesses are best determined by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe their deportment while testifying.” — The SC defers to the trial court’s credibility finding and affirms the rape conviction.

• United States vs. Javier Dichao, 27 Phil. 421, March 30, 1914 — Distinguished; the information there alleged an interval between October 1910 and August 1912 and the accused filed a motion to quash, unlike the present case.
• People vs. Gianan, 340 SCRA 477, September 15, 2000 — Relied on; time is not an element of rape, and an information alleging the offense on a date as near as possible is sufficient; defects are cured by evidence and waived if not objected to before arraignment.
• People vs. Magbanua, 377 Phil. 750, December 3, 1999 — Relied on; explained that Dichao involved an information with an indefinite two-year interval and a motion to quash.
• People vs. Esperas, GR No. 128109, November 18, 2003 — Relied on; if the offender is merely a relation, the specific relationship must be alleged in the information.
• People vs. Labayne, 357 SCRA 184, April 20, 2001 — Relied on; both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved for qualified rape.
• People vs. Razonable, 386 Phil. 771, April 12, 2000 — Relied on; objections to the information not raised before trial are waived, and the remedy is a bill of particulars or motion to quash.
• People vs. Elpedes, 350 SCRA 716, January 31, 2001 — Relied on; objections to matters of form or substance in the complaint or information cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• People vs. Lachica, 382 SCRA 162, May 9, 2002 — Relied on; exemplary damages may be awarded even if the relationship was not alleged, because the relationship was proven during trial for civil liability.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of RA No. 7659 — Defines rape and authorizes the death penalty where the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent; applied because the rape was committed before RA No. 8353 took effect, but the death penalty was not imposed because the relationship was not alleged.
• Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that the precise date of the offense need not be stated unless it is a material ingredient, and the offense may be alleged on a date as near as possible to the actual date; applied to hold “sometime in the month of April, 1997” sufficient.
• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires the complaint or information to state the approximate date of the offense; appellant invoked it, but the SC held that the Complaint sufficiently apprised him of the charge and that any defect was waived.
• RA No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — Not applied because the rape was committed prior to its effectivity; the old provision under RA No. 7659 governed.
• Article 2219(3), Civil Code — Basis for moral damages; the RTC awarded ₱10,000, which the SC increased to ₱50,000.
• Article 2229, Civil Code — Basis for exemplary damages; the RTC awarded ₱5,000, which the SC increased to ₱25,000.
• Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation (Constitution) — Appellant invoked it; the SC held it was not violated because the Complaint stated all the facts with sufficient definiteness and clarity to apprise him of the accusation.