People vs. Lapan

To sustain robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven conclusively as any other essential element; where robbery is not proved but homicide is, the accused is liable only for homicide. The SC applied this to convict appellant of two homicides attended by morada and disregard of age.

Violeta Sayaman Parnala lived with her common-law husband Clark Din, her six-year-old son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, and housemaid Teresita Minorca Rosalinas in a two-storey house at 8790 Bautista St., Dalahican, Cavite City. Appellant Ernie Lapan, Florentino Bracamonte, and Manuel Reginaldo were residents of the same Dalahican area and were known to Violeta from prior encounters in the neighborhood.

Violeta Parnala and Clark Din lived with Violeta's six-year-old son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio and housemaid Teresita Minorca Rosalinas in their two-storey house at 8790 Bautista St., Dalahican, Cavite City. On the evening of September 23, 1987, Violeta and Clark Din had come from the Kingdom Hall of the Jehovah's Witnesses at Cavite City, while Jay Vee, who was last seen wearing a necklace worth P660.00 and a ring worth P440.00 at around 6:00 p.m., and Teresita remained in the house.

Around 8:30 p.m., Violeta and Clark Din knocked on the main door but got no response, so Clark Din went to the back and stoned the window of the room occupied by Jay Vee and Teresita while Violeta continued knocking and pushing the doorbell. The front door suddenly opened and three men rushed out, whom Violeta identified as Manley Reginaldo followed by Nonoy Bracamonte and appellant Ernie Lapan. Caught by surprise, Violeta shouted magnanakaw, prompting Clark Din and neighbors Celodonio Furtona and Roger Tupaz to pursue the three men, and during the flight Rosita Ordoñez, who was washing clothes outside her house on Dalahican Street, was shoved against the wall by appellant as he evaded Clark Din. The chase proved futile and Clark Din returned to the house where Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal met him at the gate.

Inside the house the lights were off but the television set was on. Clark Din turned the lights on and, with the patrolmen, searched for Teresita and Jay Vee, finding the upstairs bathroom door locked. With a key obtained from Violeta, they opened the door and found Teresita lying dead on the floor bathed in blood with feet and hands tied and mouth gagged, and Jay Vee dead with his body immersed in a water container in the washroom. Autopsy showed Teresita suffered 1 incised and 6 stab wounds and Jay Vee sustained 3 incised and 14 stab wounds, and photographs taken hours after the killing documented the scene. For his part, appellant testified that at about 8:20 p.m. on September 23, 1987 he was at the birthday party of Leopoldo Pareja at his sister-in-law's house at 777 Dalahican St., Caridad, Cavite City with Guillermo Papa, Leopoldo Pareja, Roberto Mendoza, Eduardo Sagpao and Junior, drinking beer and lambanog after arriving at 7:00 p.m., briefly leaving to buy more lambanog, leaving at 9:00 p.m. for the Aguinaldo monument and then home, and reporting for work the next morning before Captain Rebullar brought him to the station at about 10:00 a.m. for interrogation after witnesses pinpointed him. The loss of Jay Vee's necklace and ring, with total value P1,100.00, came to the knowledge of Violeta and Clark Din only after Jay Vee's interment, after several persons including policemen who lifted the body from the pail and funeral parlor employees had handled the body.

• Credibility and Weight of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the RTC gravely erred in giving more weight and credence to the version of the prosecution and in disregarding the version of the defense, thus finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide as charged.
• Robbery Not Proved: Petitioner argued that robbery had not been independently and adequately proved, with no conclusive evidence of the physical act of asportation by appellant himself.

• Statement of Facts and Identification: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, maintained that Violeta Parnala positively identified appellant as one of three men rushing out of her house, corroborated by Rosita Ordoñez and Clark Din, with supporting autopsy and photographic evidence.
• Robbery Not Proved: Respondent countered through the Solicitor General that the loss of the ring and necklace came to light only after interment, Clark Din failed to notice at discovery whether the jewelry remained on Jay Vee, and the time lag left open that someone other than appellant could have taken them.

• Positive Identification vs. Alibi: Whether the positive identification of appellant by prosecution witnesses prevails over his defense of alibi to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Robbery with Homicide: Whether appellant may be convicted of robbery with double homicide where the killings were proved but the taking of the necklace and ring was not conclusively proved, and what aggravating circumstances attend.

• Positive Identification vs. Alibi: Yes. The SC held appellant's guilt was proved beyond moral certainty by positive, unwavering identification and corroborating circumstantial evidence, while alibi failed because the crime scene was only 200 meters away.
• Robbery with Homicide: No. Robbery was not conclusively proved so the composite crime fails, and appellant is guilty of two homicides aggravated by morada and disregard of age.

• Positive Identification vs. Alibi: The SC ruled that Violeta's identification was worthy of full faith and credence, made while in shock upon seeing appellant rush out of her well-lighted house, explaining she knew Bracamonte as a jeepney driver, Reginaldo as a gold buyer, and appellant as a neighborhood resident, and corroborated by Rosita Ordoñez whom appellant shoved while fleeing and by Clark Din whose immediate pursuit and report showed spontaneity without ulterior motive. Against this, alibi as one of the weakest defenses required clear and convincing proof that appellant was elsewhere for such time as to negate presence, but appellant admitted the party house was just walking distance and his own witnesses placed Parnala's house only 200 meters away reachable in five minutes, with inconsistent accounts on whether he left alone or with Papa to buy lambanog, so denial could not prevail. The SC added that the requisites for circumstantial evidence under Section 4, Rule 133 were met through Violeta seeing the three rush out before discovery of the bodies, Rosita's testimony on the flight, recovery of Reginaldo's blue and white baseball cap at the scene, and Clark Din's pursuit, all consistent with guilt.
• Robbery with Homicide: The SC ruled that robbery with homicide requires conclusive proof of robbery itself as any other element, following People vs. Pacala and People vs. Moro Ambahang where loss discovered after the fact without seeing who took the items rests on conjecture. Here Violeta and Clark Din learned of the loss only after interment, Clark Din did not notice at discovery if the jewelry was still on Jay Vee, testimony only showed Jay Vee wore them at 6:00 p.m., and several policemen and funeral employees handled the body in the interim, creating strong possibility others took them and requiring strict construction of penal laws in favor of appellant. The SC further held the RTC erred in omitting aggravating circumstances, since Jay Vee was barely six years old when stabbed fourteen times and the killings deliberately invaded the tranquility and privacy of the victims' domicile constituting morada.

• Alibi — Alibi is one of the weakest defenses because it is inherently weak, unreliable, and easily fabricated; for it to prosper it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused was at some other place for such period as to negate presence at the time and place of the crime, which failed here because appellant was only 200 meters away.
• Circumstantial evidence — A valid conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence where (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt, which the SC found in the eyewitness accounts of flight, cap found at the scene, and pursuit.
• Robbery with homicide — The special complex crime under Article 294(1) does not limit killing to one victim and homicide is a generic term including murder, but robbery itself must be proven conclusively; absent such proof there is no composite crime, only homicide duly proved.
• Identification in shock — Identification of an accused while in a state of shock is worthy of full faith and credence, applied to Violeta who shouted upon surprise and positively identified intruders fleeing her well-lighted house.
• Morada and disregard of age — Dwelling aggravates when the crime is committed in the victims' house showing greater perversity in invading domicile, and age aggravates for a barely six-year-old victim stabbed multiple times; both raised the penalty for each homicide.
• Strict construction of penal laws — Penal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused, so doubt on asportation was resolved in favor of appellant on the robbery charge.

• "Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused," — States the canonical caution on alibi and why the SC demands clear proof of physical impossibility, which appellant failed to show.
• "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt." — Recites the requisites for conviction on circumstantial evidence under Section 4, Rule 133 applied to the flight and discovery facts.
• "to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery 'with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven conclusively as any other essential element of a crime." — Defines the decisive rule that defeated the composite crime where taking was based on conjecture.
• "the identification of an accused while in a state of shock is worthy of full faith and credence." — Upholds Violeta's positive identification despite her distraught state upon confronting the intruders.

• People vs. Pecato, No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 14 — Followed on burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, generic scope of robbery with homicide, and weakness of alibi due to easy fabrication.
• People vs. Ampo-an, G.R. No. 75366, July 4, 1990, 187 SCRA 173 — Followed to credit Violeta's identification made in a state of shock.
• People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83207, February 28, 1992 — Followed on requisites for alibi and for circumstantial evidence to sustain conviction.
• People vs. Moro Ambahang, 108 Phil. 325 (1960) — Followed to hold robbery cannot be imputed on mere conjecture where witness did not see who stole items.
• People vs. Pacala, No. L-26647, August 15, 1974, 58 SCRA 370 — Controlling precedent that robbery must be conclusively proved to sustain robbery with homicide.
• People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 67173, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 728 — Followed that absent conclusive proof of robbery only homicide duly proved stands.
• U.S. vs. Butag, 38 Phil. 746 (1918) — Followed to treat the victim's tender age as aggravating.
• People vs. Roncal, G.R. No. L-26857-58, October 21, 1977, 79 SCRA 509 — Followed to treat morada as aggravating the invasion of domicile.

• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes robo con homicidio; the SC explained killings are merged in the composite regardless of number of victims but held it inapplicable for lack of conclusive proof of robbery.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide; the SC applied it to convict appellant for each death of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets requisites for circumstantial evidence; the SC applied its three requisites to the multiple proven circumstances pointing to appellant.
• Aggravating circumstances — morada and disregard of age, Revised Penal Code — The SC applied dwelling because the crime occurred in the victims' house and disregard of age because Jay Vee was barely six, to impose the penalty in its higher range.