People vs. Lao-as

A sudden, unexpected and unprovoked attack on an unarmed victim who could not anticipate it constitutes treachery qualifying homicide to murder, and guilt beyond reasonable doubt may rest on credible positive eyewitness identification corroborated by the victim's immediate ante-mortem statement identifying the assailant.

Leonardo Bastuten invited Felixberto Lao-as, Armando Ramirez, Demetrio Candelisas and a certain Lanchiola, all from Bacolod City, to his house in Tabing Ilog, Marilao, Bulacan to celebrate Christmas. Drinking inside Bastuten's compound began at about 4:00 in the afternoon of December 24, 1988 and continued until 5:00 in the morning of Christmas Day, consuming about four to five big bottles of Tanduay ESQ. Bastuten himself did not join the drinking and went to sleep at about 10:00 in the evening while his guests continued.

At about 5:00 in the morning, Bastuten woke up and went outside his house, speaking briefly with Ramirez that he still wanted to sleep. At about 5:30, he went downstairs again without speaking to Ramirez or doing anything. According to the prosecution, appellant, who was then drunk and without saying a word, took a knife from his left sock and stabbed Bastuten. When appellant attempted a second thrust, Ramirez, who was only about two feet away, parried it and sustained a wound to his left thumb. Ramirez knew of no reason for the stabbing, after which appellant ran away.

Demetrio Candilosas, who was resting in the victim's house, heard Bastuten shout, pare, nasaksak ako. When asked who had stabbed him, Bastuten named appellant. Candilosas brought Bastuten to the hospital, where Bastuten asked him to inform his parents. Concepcion Bastuten, the victim's wife, was unable to speak with her husband, who soon could no longer speak and died on December 27, 1988 from septicemia and reversible shocks due to the stab wounds.

Appellant, for his part, denied stabbing the victim while simultaneously claiming self-defense, asserting that there was a fight in which he merely tried to grab the knife that eventually killed Bastuten and that he was defending his life. Defense witness Bienvenido Porlaje testified that he heard a commotion inside the victim's house and found appellant and the victim fighting, with appellant holding a knife and thereafter running away, claiming appellant had entered to awaken Bastuten to continue drinking. On cross-examination Porlaje contradicted himself on whether he was part of the drinking group or merely a neighbor and on who went inside the house. The trial court credited Ramirez as an unbiased eyewitness without improper motive and found the stabbing attended by treachery.

• Absence of Eyewitness and Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner argued that no one witnessed the stabbing of the victim, hence his culpability was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and conviction for murder was erroneous.
• Absence of Criminal Intent and Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that there was no criminal intent established against him, asserting that there was a fight between him and the victim in which he defended himself but did not stab the victim, only trying to grab the knife that eventually killed him.

• Positive Identification by Eyewitness: Respondent countered that appellant was identified by prosecution witness Armando Ramirez as the assailant who inflicted the fatal wound, and that no improper motive attended the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.
• Dying Declaration and Res Gestae: Respondent argued that the victim's utterance to Demetrio Candilosas identifying appellant as the one who stabbed him is admissible as a dying declaration, if not as part of the res gestae.
• Flight and Admission: Respondent maintained that appellant's flight after the incident is indicative of guilt and that appellant in effect admitted stabbing and wounding the victim.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the witnesses' testimonies were credible and sufficient to establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Defenses of Accident, Self-Defense and Lack of Motive: Whether appellant's mélange of accident, self-defense and lack of motive negates criminal liability.
• Treachery and Dwelling: Whether the killing was attended by treachery qualifying it to murder and by dwelling as a generic aggravating circumstance, with reclusion perpetua as the proper penalty.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt by Ramirez's positive, unbiased eyewitness testimony corroborated by the victim's ante-mortem identification admissible as dying declaration or res gestae.
• Defenses of Accident, Self-Defense and Lack of Motive: No. Accident and self-defense are mutually exclusive and inconsistent with denial of stabbing, and lack of motive does not preclude conviction where identity is positively established.
• Treachery and Dwelling: Yes as to treachery, No as to dwelling. The sudden, unprovoked attack with a concealed weapon qualified the offense to murder, but dwelling was absent as the stabbing occurred outside the house and was not alleged in the information; reclusion perpetua was properly imposed absent other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Ramirez testified under oath that appellant stabbed the victim with a balisong concealed in appellant's left sock from about two feet away, saw appellant attempt a second thrust and then run away, and no one directly contradicted him. As friends without improper motive to falsely testify, his testimony was entitled to full faith and credit. Candilosas, though not cross-examined because defense counsel waived cross-examination, testified that the staggering victim named appellant when asked who stabbed him; the statement qualified as a dying declaration, evidence of the highest order, and alternatively as res gestae, having been made shortly after a startling occurrence without opportunity to contrive.
• Defenses of Accident, Self-Defense and Lack of Motive: Appellant simultaneously denied stabbing, claimed self-defense, invoked accident and professed unawareness that a mortal wound was inflicted, positions that are mutually exclusive since accident presupposes lack of intention while self-defense presumes voluntary action induced by necessity. One who accidentally injures another perceives no aggression to repel, and one claiming accident or self-defense cannot credibly claim ignorance of having stabbed. Lack of motive was immaterial because motive becomes essential only when identity is in question, whereas Ramirez positively identified appellant, and persons have been killed for no reason at all; Porlaje's contradictions further undermined the defense.
• Treachery and Dwelling: Treachery attended the killing because appellant stabbed Bastuten just as the latter descended, without prior altercation, using a concealed balisong against an unarmed victim who had just awakened and could not have anticipated the attack. Such sudden, unexpected attack without the slightest provocation constitutes alevosia, even if frontal when the victim is unarmed. Dwelling was not present because Ramirez witnessed the stabbing outside the victim's house and Candilosas stated the victim staggered into his house only after being stabbed, and dwelling was not alleged in the information. With treachery qualifying the offense to murder and no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances, reclusion perpetua was correct.

• Treachery or Alevosia — There is treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without warning, ensuring execution without risk to the offender. Applied here, concealment of the balisong, absence of prior altercation, and attack on a victim who had just awakened established alevosia, qualifying the killing to murder; even a frontal stab is treacherous when sudden and the victim is unarmed, as in People vs. Belaro.
• Dying Declaration — An ante-mortem statement identifying the assailant is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of death all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. Applied here, the victim's statement to Candilosas naming appellant as the one who stabbed him was given highest credence.
• Res Gestae — The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries, shortly after a startling occurrence and under its influence without opportunity to contrive, is admissible as the incident speaking through the victim. Applied here, the victim's identification of appellant even if not a dying declaration remained admissible as part of the res gestae.
• Credibility of Unbiased Witness — Testimony of a witness with no improper motive to falsely testify is entitled to full faith and credit. Applied here, Ramirez's friendship with both sides and lack of bias sustained his positive identification.
• Motive When Identity Established — Proof of motive becomes relevant and essential only when the identity of the assailant is in question. Applied here, lack of motive did not preclude conviction because Ramirez positively identified appellant.
• Accident vs. Self-Defense — Accident presupposes lack of intention while self-defense presumes voluntariness induced by necessity, so the two defenses are mutually exclusive and inconsistent with denial of the act. Applied here, appellant's mélange of accident, self-defense and denial negated his defense.
• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance — Dwelling requires that the crime occur inside the victim's dwelling and, to be appreciated, must be alleged in the information. Applied here, dwelling was rejected because the stabbing occurred outside the house and was not alleged.

• "Such ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled." — States the rationale for giving highest credence to the victim's dying declaration identifying appellant.
• "The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered the incident speaking through the victim." — Defines the res gestae basis for admitting the victim's immediate post-stabbing statement.
• "There is treachery or alevosia when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected, and without warning." — Provides the canonical formulation used to qualify the killing to murder.
• "It is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all." — Supports the rule that absence of motive does not preclude conviction where identity is positively established.

• People vs. Payot, 308 SCRA 43, 62-63 (1999) — Cited to support giving full faith and credit to Ramirez's unbiased testimony.
• People vs. Rada, 308 SCRA 191, 204 (1999) — Cited for the principle that an ante-mortem statement is evidence of the highest order.
• People vs. Montilla, 211 SCRA 119, 128 (1992) — Cited for admitting the victim's immediate utterance as the incident speaking through the victim.
• People vs. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353, 366 (1998) — Cited for admitting a statement made shortly after a startling occurrence as part of the res gestae where there was no opportunity to contrive.
• People vs. Carlos, 115 Phil. 704, 706 (1962) — Cited for the incompatibility of accident and self-defense, accident presupposing lack of intention and self-defense presuming voluntariness.
• People vs. Benito, 303 SCRA 468, 477 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that persons have been killed for no reason, so lack of motive does not preclude conviction.
• People vs. Bautista, 308 SCRA 620, 641 (1999) — Cited for the rule that proof of motive is essential only when identity is in question.
• People vs. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1, 16 (1999) — Cited to define treachery as sudden, unexpected attack on an unarmed, unprovoking victim.
• People vs. Belaro, 307 SCRA 591, 607 (1999) — Cited to hold that even a frontal stab is treacherous when sudden, unexpected and the victim is unarmed.

• Art. 247, Revised Penal Code — Cited by the trial court as the penal provision for murder under which appellant was found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua; affirmed on appeal with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and no attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.