People vs. Landicho

Where conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of all; an accused need not have fired the fatal shot to be liable for murder, and treachery may be appreciated where the attack was sudden, unexpected, and without warning against an unarmed victim, with the method deliberately adopted as shown by the number and location of the wounds.

The accused were members of the Philippine National Police, and the victim, Isagani Mazon, was a private person. The charge against them was murder for a killing in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The case reached the SC on the appeal of accused Eric Manlusoc, the only accused whose appeal was given due course.

On 8 January 1991, at 9:30 p.m., in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, four PNP members — M/Sgt. Reynaldo Landicho, Pat. Johnny Bunyi, C1C Eric Manlusoc, and C2C Leovino Canuel — gunned down Isagani Mazon, who died instantly after suffering twenty-one gunshot wounds, several of them at his back. The prosecution’s evidence showed that Mazon was walking with Herman Mejico, Jr. on J.P. Rizal Street near the Main Deck, opposite the building housing Pizza Galera Restaurant and Hotel Domini. Bunyi and Manlusoc approached them; Mazon told Mejico to move away, and after Mejico had moved about ten arms’ length away, Bunyi and Manlusoc fired their short firearms at Mazon. Landicho and Canuel then rushed toward Mazon and also fired at him. Lilian Francisco, who was ascending the stairs of the building, witnessed the shooting and recognized all four accused because she knew them before the incident.

The medico-legal evidence was dispensed with by stipulation. Dr. Arturo Alberto was to testify that he conducted the post mortem examination; that the victim sustained 21 gunshot wounds, 7 at the back, 14 in front, and 2 on the head; and that the cause of death was multiple internal injuries secondary to gunshot wounds. The defense admitted his qualifications and stipulated to the tenor of his testimony, and the prosecution marked the Necropsy Report, the sketch, and the Certificate of Death. The defense did not cross-examine Dr. Alberto at that stage.

The information for murder was filed on 30 August 1991. The accused were initially detained at the PNP Stockade upon court order, but the record shows repeated instances in which they left the stockade or were outside custody. On 9 May 1992, the four accused were reported in the Provincial Jail logbook as escaped prisoners; they left unnoticed while the guard was serving lunch. At the scheduled hearings on 20 and 21 May 1992, none of them appeared. The prosecution rested by adopting its bail evidence. The defense presented Sgt. Rogelio M. Rogelio on 8 June 1992, who identified photocopies of documents, and then sought postponements because Landicho’s wife was trying to convince the accused to return. On 16 June 1992, new counsel moved to quash the information on jurisdiction grounds, which the RTC denied. Because the accused had not been re-arrested and failed to present evidence despite opportunities, the RTC declared that they had waived presentation of evidence and set promulgation for 1 July 1992.

Manlusoc was arrested on 26 June 1992 in Tagaytay City and surrendered to the court on 3 July 1992. The RTC promulgated its decision on 1 July 1992, convicting all the accused of murder. The trial court found that the prosecution witnesses established the shooting, that the accused were not justified by any warrant against Mazon, and that their escape indicated guilt. It appreciated treachery, band, and abuse of superior strength. The SC later noted that the trial court had validly tried the accused in absentia because they escaped, and that by escaping they waived their right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses; thus, the testimony of Sgt. Rogelio and the documents he identified were rejected.

The evidence also showed that the accused belonged to the same intelligence team purposely searching for Mazon; that Bunyi shot the victim from behind; that Manlusoc, positioned in front of the victim, also shot him; that Canuel and Landicho rushed to the scene and shot the victim again while he was lying on the ground; and that the four accused dumped the victim in a Philippine Constabulary service vehicle and drove away. The victim was unarmed, and the number and location of the gunshot wounds included two in the head and wounds on both the anterior and posterior portions of the body.

• Sufficiency of Judgment: Appellant Manlusoc argued that the judgment of the trial court was a nullity because it failed to contain sufficient findings of fact to pronounce a judgment of conviction as mandated by the Constitution.
• Essential Elements of Murder: Appellant argued that he was convicted of murder despite the lack of proof of the essential elements of the crime charged in the information.
• Medico-Legal Testimony: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder despite the failure of the medico-legal officer to testify on the fact of death of the victim, the nature of the injuries sustained, and the cause of death.
• Treachery: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present notwithstanding that the prosecution’s own evidence established its absence.
• Fatal Shot and Individual Liability: Appellant argued that there was no finding or proof that the bullet from his gun hit the victim, that his gunshot was fatal, or that the victim’s death resulted from his act.
• Conspiracy: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder despite the absence of proof of conspiracy between and among him and his co-accused.
• Band: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of band to be attendant in the commission of the alleged crime.
• Escape and Flight: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in holding that he and his co-accused in fact escaped and that such escape indicated an admission of guilt.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellant argued that the testimonies of Lilian Francisco and Herman Mejico, Jr. were replete with material inconsistencies affecting their credibility and were contrary to human experience, and that the trial court failed to make a finding as to which part of their testimony it considered believable.
• Acquittal: Appellant argued that he should be acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Refutation of Assigned Errors: Respondent argued that all the errors assigned by the appellant lacked merit.
• Homicide Not Murder: Respondent recommended that the appellant should only be convicted of homicide because treachery was not proven; there was no evidence that the appellant and his co-accused had determined to commit the crime and consciously adopted the mode of attack prior to the killing.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Respondent argued that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was duly proven by the prosecution, but since it was not alleged in the information, it could only be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance.

• Sufficiency of Judgment: Whether the RTC judgment was void for failing to contain sufficient findings of fact and law as required by the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
• Treachery: Whether the killing of Isagani Mazon was attended by treachery.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength may be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is present.
• Medico-Legal Testimony: Whether the absence of the medico-legal officer’s testimony on the fact, nature, and cause of death invalidated the conviction.
• Fatal Shot and Individual Liability: Whether an accused may be convicted of murder despite lack of proof that his own bullet hit the victim or caused the fatal wound.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the four accused was proven.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the testimonies of Lilian Francisco and Herman Mejico, Jr. were credible despite alleged inconsistencies and omissions.
• Band: Whether the aggravating circumstance of band attended the killing.
• Escape and Flight: Whether the accused’s escape during trial indicated guilt.
• Trial Court’s Finding on Credible Testimony: Whether the trial court was required to make a finding on which part of a witness’s testimony it considered believable.
• Acquittal: Whether appellant should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Judgment: No. The RTC judgment substantially complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, stating the facts, law, legal qualification, modifying circumstances, participation, penalty, and civil liability.
• Treachery: Yes. The two requisites concurred: the sudden, unexpected, and without-warning attack on an unarmed victim gave him no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and the number and location of the wounds showed the method was deliberately adopted.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: No. Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength, so the latter cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance.
• Medico-Legal Testimony: No. The defense stipulated to Dr. Alberto’s testimony and did not cross-examine him; when the prosecution adopted the bail evidence, appellant lost the chance to cross-examine through his own escape.
• Fatal Shot and Individual Liability: No. Conspiracy was proven, and the act of one is the act of all; it did not matter whether Manlusoc fired the fatal shot.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Direct proof was not essential; conspiracy was inferred from the accused’s same intelligence team, simultaneous attack, and coordinated escape.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Yes. The trial court’s credibility findings were upheld; alleged inconsistencies were minor or explained, and the witnesses agreed on the material fact that the victim was shot while lying on the ground.
• Band: Yes. Four armed malefactors conspired and acted together in the killing, satisfying the definition of band.
• Escape and Flight: Yes. The escape was confirmed and constituted flight from justice, which is an indication of guilt or a guilty mind.
• Trial Court’s Finding on Credible Testimony: No. A trial court is not bound to disclose which part of a witness’s testimony it believes; testimony is considered in its entirety unless partial credence is warranted.
• Acquittal: No. The prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed.

• Sufficiency of Judgment: The SC held the first assigned error patently without merit. The challenged decision substantially complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. It set out the facts it believed were proved and the law upon which the judgment was based, and stated the legal qualifications of the offense, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, and the civil liability. The SC noted that while the trial court’s statement on treachery was a conclusion without explanation, that inadequacy did not per se justify reversal because the appellant’s appeal opened the whole case for review.

• Treachery: The SC applied the two conditions: (1) the means, method, and form of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such means, methods, or form were deliberately and consciously adopted. The victim seemed to expect trouble because he told Mejico to move away upon seeing Manlusoc and Bunyi approach, but treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned; what is decisive is that the execution made it impossible for him to defend himself or retaliate. The victim was unarmed and the accused gave no warning. The assault was sudden; the victim continued walking toward Manlusoc and Canuel and faced them, showing he had no inkling he would be fired upon. The first shot toward the head came from behind. The number and location of the wounds — two in the head and wounds on both anterior and posterior portions — banished any motive of accidental shooting and showed a calculated pursuit of a decision to kill. The SC disagreed with the OSG’s recommendation of homicide only.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: The SC held that since treachery was present, it was error for the trial court to consider abuse of superior strength as an independent aggravating circumstance. It is settled that treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.

• Medico-Legal Testimony: The SC rejected the claim that the medico-legal officer failed to testify to the fact of death. Dr. Alberto was ready to testify on 24 January 1992 in connection with the bail petition, but the defense and prosecution dispensed with his testimony based on stipulation as to the nature, tenor, and extent of his testimony and admission of his qualifications. The defense chose not to cross-examine him. When the prosecution rested on the merits by adopting the bail evidence, which included Dr. Alberto’s testimony and documents, the appellant lost the opportunity to cross-examine through his own escape, not through any fault of the prosecution. He cannot complain.

• Fatal Shot and Individual Liability: The SC held that the appellant admitted in his brief that he, Canuel, and Bunyi shot Isagani Mazon. Dr. Alberto attributed death to multiple internal injuries secondary to gunshot wounds, which was undisputed; the victim suffered no other injury aside from those inflicted by the accused. The unbroken chain of events from the wounding to death led to no other conclusion than that the accused’s acts caused the death. Since conspiracy was proven, the act of one is the act of all; it did not matter if Manlusoc did not fire the fatal shot, because all the accused are equally responsible.

• Conspiracy: The SC held that although the trial court did not mention conspiracy, its silence did not infer absence. Direct proof is not essential; conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when they point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. The accused’s synchronous presence at the crime scene was not coincidence; the appellant admitted that he and his co-accused belonged to the same intelligence team purposely searching for Mazon. Bunyi shot from behind; Manlusoc, in front, also shot; Canuel and Landicho rushed and shot the victim while he was lying on the ground; then the four dumped the victim in a PC service vehicle and drove away. The simultaneous movement, concerted attack, and coordinated escape clearly evinced conspiracy.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The SC applied the rule that appellate courts generally do not disturb the trial court’s credibility findings because the trial court heard the witnesses and observed their deportment, unless it plainly overlooked facts of substance. The appellant gave no reason to overturn the assessment. Inconsistency, not consistency, as to material facts is the mark of lack of credibility; the testimonies agreed on essential facts and corroborated each other. Francisco’s former work as a procurer did not impair her credibility; her open admission after being informed of her right not to answer emphasized her trustworthiness. Her alleged misinterpretation of the shot as a “super lolo” was clarified: the sounds were like a super lolo because the shots were successive. Omissions in her NBI affidavit were trivial; affidavits are generally incomplete and inferior to open-court testimony, and she identified the accused. The delay in reporting to the NBI was understandable because witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer information. Mejico’s bravery and lack of prior acquaintance with some accused did not discredit him. The discrepancy on whether the victim was face down or on his back when Landicho and Canuel shot him was attributed to different vantage points, and the witnesses agreed on the material point that the victim was shot while lying on the ground. Absent proof of ill motive, the testimonies were worthy of belief.

• Band: The SC held that there is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of the offense. The four accused, each armed with a gun, conspired in the killing, so band was present. The trial court erred, however, in appreciating abuse of superior strength independently because treachery absorbed it.

• Escape and Flight: The SC held that the appellant and his counsel were not serious in the escape errors. The escape on 9 May 1992 was registered in the Provincial Jail logbook and reported to the court. Their own de oficio counsel asked for postponement because he could not contact the accused who had escaped; after Rogelio’s testimony, counsel asked for cancellation because Landicho’s wife was trying to convince him to return; new counsel could not produce them on 16 June 1992. The appellant was re-arrested only on 26 June 1992 in Tagaytay City. The fact of escape was confirmed by the CA and the SC. The confirmed escape is flight from justice, and flight of an accused is an indication of guilt or a guilty mind.

• Trial Court’s Finding on Credible Testimony: The SC held that a trial court is not bound to disclose which part of a witness’s testimony it deems believable. Generally, a witness’s testimony is considered in its entirety; partial credence is an exception when the testimony can be reasonably believed as to some facts but disbelieved as to others. The presumption is that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong, including giving false testimony; unless the court finds a witness’s testimony unworthy of belief, it must lend it credence. The defense failed to prove ill motive.

• Acquittal: The SC held that affirmance was inevitable because the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It rejected the assigned errors and dismissed the appeal.

• Treachery — Requires (1) means, method, and form of execution giving the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) deliberate and conscious adoption of such means, methods, or form. The SC applied it where the victim was unarmed, the attack was sudden and without warning, the first shot came from behind, and the number and location of wounds showed a calculated decision to kill.
• Conspiracy — Direct proof is not essential; it may be deduced from the mode and manner of perpetration or inferred from acts pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. The SC found it from the accused’s same intelligence team, simultaneous attack, and coordinated escape.
• Act of One Is the Act of All — Once conspiracy is proven, each conspirator is equally liable for the killing regardless of who fired the fatal shot.
• Flight — Flight of an accused is an indication of guilt or a guilty mind. The SC treated the accused’s escape from the Provincial Jail during trial as flight.
• Band — There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors act together in the commission of the offense. The SC applied it to four armed accused who conspired to kill.
• Treachery Absorbs Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is present.
• Credibility of Witnesses — Appellate courts generally defer to the trial court’s credibility findings; inconsistency on material facts, not consistency, marks lack of credibility; affidavits are inferior to open-court testimony; absent proof of ill motive, testimony is worthy of belief.
• Trial in Absentia / Waiver by Escape — After arraignment, trial may proceed despite the accused’s absence if duly notified and failure to appear is unjustifiable; by escaping, the accused waived the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
• Sufficiency of Judgment — A decision must clearly and distinctly express the facts and law on which it is based, including legal qualification, modifying circumstances, participation, penalty, and civil liability; substantial compliance suffices.

• “For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method, and form of execution employed giving the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods, or form of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused.” — The SC used this two-part test to hold that treachery attended the killing despite the victim’s apparent warning of danger.
• “Direct proof is not essential to prove such a scheme, and its existence may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent.” — The SC relied on this rule to find conspiracy from the accused’s concerted attack and coordinated escape.
• “There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of the offense.” — The SC applied this definition to the four armed accused who conspired to kill the victim.
• “It is doctrinally settled that flight of an accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind.” — The SC used this doctrine to treat the accused’s escape from the Provincial Jail during trial as evidence of guilt.

• People vs. Hubilla, G.R. No. 114904, 29 January 1996 — Cited for the two requisites of treachery.
• People vs. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91 [1995] — Followed to hold that treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was warned, because the execution made defense or retaliation impossible.
• People vs. Kempis, 221 SCRA 628 [1993] — Followed to hold that a sudden attack against an unarmed victim shows treachery.
• People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 [1993] — Followed to hold that the number and location of gunshot wounds showed a deliberate method and negated accidental shooting.
• People vs. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712 [1992] — Cited for conspiracy by inference and flight as an indication of guilt.
• People vs. Rostata, Jr., 218 SCRA 657 [1993] — Followed for the rule that where conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. de Leon, 218 SCRA 609 [1995] — Followed for the rule that treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Lee, 204 SCRA 900 [1991] — Cited for the definition of band under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the SC affirmed the conviction for murder and the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Article 14(6), Revised Penal Code — Defines band as more than three armed malefactors acting together; applied to the four armed accused.
• Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Requires a decision to express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based; the SC found substantial compliance.
• Section 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Prescribes the form and contents of judgment, including facts proved, law, legal qualification, modifying circumstances, participation, penalty, and civil liability; the SC found compliance.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides for trial in absentia after arraignment if the accused was duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable; the SC noted the accused were validly tried in absentia after escape.
• Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits a lawyer from counselling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system; the SC directed Atty. Dela Cruz to show cause.