People vs. Lamosa

Where the original criminal design of the accused is to kill and the taking of the victim's property is merely an afterthought, the crimes committed are separate offenses of Homicide and Theft, not the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. The existence of a "band" does not create a special complex crime of "Robbery in Band with Homicide" but merely serves as a generic aggravating circumstance under the general denomination of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused-appellants Oscar Lamosa, Gualberto Lamosa, Santiago Lamosa, and Sofronio Quiter were residents of Barangay Sirab, Dagami, Leyte, living near the spouses Iluminado and Barbara Lucinario. The dispute arose from the closure by the Lucinarios of a pathway inside their coconut plantation that led to the house of Santiago Lamosa, which the Lamosa family resented. The day before the incident, the Lucinarios had complained to Barangay Captain Bienvenido Servando and the Dagami police station commander about alleged destruction of their land and threats to their lives by Oscar and Santiago Lamosa, but a conference called by the police produced no settlement.

On October 18, 1977, Iluminado Lucinario, together with his wife Barbara and daughter Elnora, went to the house of Barangay Captain Bienvenido Servando of Sirab, Dagami, Leyte, to seek assistance regarding the alleged destruction of their land by Oscar and Santiago Lamosa, who they claimed had threatened to kill them. Servando reported the matter to Dagami Station Commander Captain Andrade, who summoned both the Lucinarios and the Lamosas to a conference and advised them to settle the dispute amicably as they belonged to the same family. No agreement was reached, and the parties failed to meet later that afternoon as instructed.

The following evening, October 19, 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., while Iluminado was having supper with Barbara at their house and their children were resting in the sala, someone knocked on the kitchen door identifying himself as Gualberto Lamosa. Barbara allowed him in, and when Gualberto asked whether he was included in the complaint filed with the barangay captain, Barbara answered that he was not. Suddenly, Oscar Lamosa pushed aside the kitchen door, entered, and began hacking Barbara with a bolo approximately thirty inches long. Barbara fell after being hit, and both Gualberto and Oscar immediately jumped out of the house. Iluminado closed and secured the kitchen door with a bamboo lock, then carried the bleeding Barbara upstairs and treated her wound with a crushed penicillin tablet on cotton. While administering first aid, Iluminado heard Santiago Lamosa instructing his companions to push the door with a piece of wood to gain entry and kill all occupants, including the children. The door was rammed open, and Sofronio Quiter immediately hacked Iluminado with a bolo, hitting him on both arms. Before Santiago and Oscar could join in the attack, Iluminado jumped out the window, landing on the porch and then the ground, and fled toward the house of Barangay Captain Servando about half a kilometer away, where he found Servando absent.

Meanwhile, Reynaldo Tobe, a neighbor who heard cries for help from the Lucinario house, went to report the matter to Servando, who proceeded to the Municipal Building to request police assistance. Only one policeman was on duty, so Servando left word for the other officers to proceed to Barrio Sirab upon arrival. The appellants, having discontinued their chase of Iluminado, returned to the Lucinario house and attempted to hack Elnora, but Barbara intervened, swinging her arms to protect her daughter and enabling Elnora to run and hide in her room. The appellants then concentrated their attack on Barbara, who pleaded for her life to no avail. After she fell from the blows, the appellants dragged her body out of the house — Oscar holding her hair, Sofronio her shoulder, Gualberto her breast, and Santiago her feet — and left her on the road. Elnora seized the opportunity to escape and join her father at Servando's house. The appellants returned to the Lucinario house and ransacked it, taking money and jewelry from the bookstand.

When Servando returned from the Municipal Building, he found the wounded Iluminado and Elnora waiting. Sgt. Jose Catoligo arrived in response to the call for assistance, and the group proceeded to the Lucinario house, leaving Iluminado behind. Along the way, they found Barbara's body lying near a ditch on the left side of the road, approximately fourteen meters from the house. They continued to the house and found the appellants gone and the house ransacked. Dra. Pacencia Ofalla conducted an autopsy and found eleven stab wounds on Barbara, five of which were fatal, involving severe injuries to the brain and chest cavity. The cause of death was shock due to profuse hemorrhage. Iluminado was examined by Dr. Dionisio Conde, who found two wounds on his forearms; one wound was fatal as it involved superficial blood vessels and nerves, but death was averted by tourniquets applied to the wounds.

The accused-appellants presented divergent defenses. Oscar Lamosa admitted inflicting the injuries on both spouses but claimed self-defense, alleging that Barbara and Iluminado attacked him while he was retrieving his father's carabao from the coconut plantation. Gualberto Lamosa claimed he was sleeping at home due to a swollen foot, corroborated by his wife. Santiago Lamosa claimed he was at the house of Celestino Garcia in Sagkahan, Tacloban City, corroborated by his uncle. Sofronio Quiter claimed he was attending to his wife who had suffered a miscarriage, corroborated by his wife. The trial court credited the prosecution witnesses' testimony over the defense, finding the accused guilty. The Supreme Court found no reason to overturn the trial court's factual findings, noting that the alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence pertained only to minor details.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court was correct in giving more weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to the testimony of the accused-appellants and their witnesses.
• Proper Classification of the Crime: Whether the crime committed is the special complex crime of "Robbery in Band with Homicide" as found by the trial court.
• Self-Defense: Whether Oscar Lamosa validly acted in self-defense when he inflicted the fatal injuries on Barbara Lucinario.
• Alibi: Whether the alibis of Gualberto Lamosa, Santiago Lamosa, and Sofronio Quiter should prevail over the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Evident Premeditation: Whether the killing of Barbara Lucinario was qualified to Murder by evident premeditation as alleged in the information.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes. The trial court's factual findings were sustained, the appellate court finding no overlooked or misapplied fact of weight and substance, and the alleged inconsistencies in prosecution testimony being confined to minor details insufficient to destroy credibility.
• Proper Classification of the Crime: No. There is no special complex crime of "Robbery in Band with Homicide" under the Revised Penal Code; and on the facts, the original design was to kill, with the taking of property being an afterthought, resulting in two separate crimes of Homicide and Theft.
• Self-Defense: No. Oscar Lamosa failed to discharge the burden of proving self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, his claim being uncorroborated and contradicted by the absence of medical findings of injuries on his person.
• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by prosecution witnesses, and the accused failed to show it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene given the proximity of their residences to the victim's house.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not proven because there were no overt facts showing when the accused resolved to commit the crime and that they coolly and dispassionately reflected on the means of execution; mere threats the day before were insufficient.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The well-settled rule is that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's factual findings absent a showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of weight and substance that would have affected the result. The trial court, having observed the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses, is in a better position to gauge credibility. After reviewing the records, the Supreme Court found no justification to overturn the trial court's crediting of the prosecution witnesses. The alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pointed out by the accused-appellants referred to minor details that could not destroy the credibility of the prosecution's case.

• Proper Classification of the Crime: The trial court erred in two respects. First, there is no special complex crime of "Robbery in Band with Homicide" under the Revised Penal Code, as held in People vs. Pedroso — if robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the offense is still denominated as robbery with homicide under Article 294(1), with "band" being merely a generic aggravating circumstance. Second, even robbery with homicide was not established on the facts because the original design of the accused was to kill, and the taking of money and jewelry was an afterthought. The prevailing rule is that where the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or minor incident, the acts constitute two separate offenses rather than a single complex crime. The murderous design was shown by the number and gravity of wounds inflicted on Barbara, the dragging of her body to the road, and the pursuit of Iluminado — acts unnecessary if the original intent had been to rob. Furthermore, the prosecution's evidence did not establish robbery because there was no showing that the accused used force upon persons or things in taking the property; the witness testified only that the accused returned to the house and took the money and jewelry from the bookstand. The asportation thus constituted simple Theft.

• Self-Defense: One who admits inflicting injuries causing the death of another bears the burden of proving self-defense, which is an affirmative allegation. The evidence of self-defense must be clear and convincing, and the accused must plant his case on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's. Oscar Lamosa failed to discharge this burden: his claim that Barbara stabbed him was uncorroborated, and the lack of any medical finding of injuries on his person impaired his credibility. He should have been examined by a doctor, as this would have been necessary for his defense. Moreover, he declared that the attack occurred about 100 meters from Santiago Lamosa's house, but Barangay Captain Servando testified that Barbara's body was found about 14 meters from the Lucinario house — far from the place indicated by Oscar. Bloodstains found inside the Lucinario house corroborated the prosecution's version that Barbara was attacked and killed inside the house.

• Alibi: Alibi must yield to and cannot prevail over the positive identification made by prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused were elsewhere when the crime was committed; it must also be shown that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime. The houses of the accused-appellants were near the Lucinario house, making it not impossible for them to have been present at the time of the commission. None of the accused established physical impossibility.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation requires proof of the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to that determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the offender's conscience to overcome his resolution. While the accused had threatened the Lucinarios the day before the killing, there were no overt facts of record showing when the accused resolved to commit the crime or that they coolly and dispassionately reflected on the means and consequences of their criminal design. As held in People vs. Lacao, it is not sufficient to suspect that premeditation preceded the crime; the criminal intent evidenced by outward acts must be notorious and manifest, and the purpose and determination must have been adopted after mature consideration. The killing was accordingly classified as simple Homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, breaking a wall or door to gain entry, abuse of superior strength, and disregard of sex, with no mitigating circumstances to offset them.

• Original Design Test for Robbery with Homicide — Where the original design comprehends robbery in a dwelling and homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, the crime is the complex offense of robbery with homicide, even if homicide precedes the robbery. Where the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or minor incident, the criminal acts constitute two separate offenses and not a single complex crime. In this case, the Court applied the test by examining the number and gravity of wounds, the dragging of the victim's body, and the pursuit of the surviving spouse — all indicating an original intent to kill rather than to rob.

• No Special Complex Crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide — Under the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 373, there is no special complex crime of robbery in band with homicide. If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense is still denominated robbery with homicide under Article 294(1), with the circumstance of "band" being merely a generic aggravating circumstance that may be offset by mitigating circumstances.

• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense — One who admits inflicting injuries causing the death of another bears the burden of proving self-defense, which is an affirmative allegation. The evidence must be clear and convincing, and the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's. Failure to present medical evidence of injuries sustained, or lack of corroboration, is fatal to the claim.

• Requisites of Alibi — For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was elsewhere when the crime was committed; it must likewise be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by prosecution witnesses.

• Elements of Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires: (1) proof of the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the offender's conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. Mere threats preceding the killing, without overt acts showing cool and dispassionate reflection, are insufficient.

• "There is no special complex crime of robbery in band with double homicide and/or serious, less serious or slight physical injuries under the present Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 373. If robbery with homicide (or with the other crimes enumerated above) is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as robbery with homicide under Article 294(1), but the circumstance that it was committed by a band is not an element of the crime but is merely a generic aggravating circumstance which may be offset by mitigating circumstances." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Pedroso, articulates the rule that "band" is not an element of robbery with homicide but a generic aggravating circumstance, and that no special complex crime of "robbery in band with homicide" exists.

• "if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not as a single complex offense." — This passage states the controlling test for distinguishing the complex crime of robbery with homicide from separate crimes of homicide and theft, and is the ratio decidendi for the reclassification of the offense in this case.

• "one who admits the infliction of the injuries which caused the death of another, has the burden of proving self-defense, which is an affirmative allegation. Where the evidence of self-defense is of doubtful veracity, the defense must fail." — This passage states the burden of proof rule for self-defense, which the Court applied to reject Oscar Lamosa's claim.

• "For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused appellants were somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must likewise be shown that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." — This passage restates the two-pronged requisites of alibi, which the Court applied to reject the alibis of Gualberto, Santiago, and Sofronio.

• People vs. Pedroso, G.R. No. L-32997, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 599 — Controlling authority for the proposition that there is no special complex crime of "robbery in band with homicide" under the Revised Penal Code; "band" is merely a generic aggravating circumstance. Followed and applied to correct the trial court's erroneous denomination of the crime.
• People vs. Lacao, G.R. No. L-32078, Sept. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 89 — Cited for the rule that evident premeditation requires that the criminal intent be evidenced by notorious and manifest outward acts, and that the purpose and determination must have been adopted after mature consideration. Applied to hold that evident premeditation was not proven.
• People vs. Camano, G.R. Nos. L-36662-63, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 688 — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation. Followed in holding that the qualifying circumstance was not established.
• People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173 — Cited for the rule on the trial court's superior position to gauge witness credibility and the appellate court's deference thereto. Followed.
• People vs. Mercado, L-39511-13, April 28, 1980, 97 SCRA 232 — Cited for the requisites of alibi. Followed.
• People vs. Rosario, L-46161, Feb. 25, 1985, 134 SCRA 496 — Cited for the burden of proof in self-defense. Followed.

• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The Court held that the facts did not fall under this provision because the original design was to kill, not to rob, and accordingly reclassified the offense as separate crimes of Homicide and Theft.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Lists aggravating circumstances. The Court applied No. 3 (dwelling), No. 19 (breaking a wall or door to gain entry, distinguished from "unlawful entry"), abuse of superior strength, and disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances attending the Homicide.
• Republic Act No. 373 — Amended the Revised Penal Code provisions on robbery. Cited in People vs. Pedroso for the proposition that "band" is not an element of robbery with homicide but a generic aggravating circumstance.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. Sarmiento, J., was on leave.