People vs. Lagman

A killing is attended by treachery when the accused deliberately and suddenly attacks an unarmed and unsuspecting victim without warning, leaving the victim no chance to resist or escape; and where the records do not show incapacity for labor or medical attendance for ten days or more, the accused can only be convicted of slight physical injuries, not less serious physical injuries.

On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m., Donna Maniego was in front of her banana cue store on Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila, seated alongside her mother, Violeta Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle. Cecilia Lagman approached Maniego and punched her face several times without warning. Lagman then turned on Sicor, grabbed her, and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help; finding the barangay chairman absent, she went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago, at the house of Santiago’s mother. On her way there, she saw Lagman stab Santiago four times from a distance of five to six meters; the distance between where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine meters. Maniego saw Lagman flee carrying a knife toward Juan Luna Street. Santiago was rushed to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but later expired. At the hospital, Maniego saw Lagman being treated after an angry crowd mauled her, and Maniego told the policeman escorting Lagman that Lagman had stabbed and killed Santiago. Lagman was arrested and brought to police headquarters.

Maniego testified on cross-examination that she had known Lagman for almost ten years and had a close relationship with her; Lagman got angry with Maniego when Maniego eloped with Santiago. Sicor corroborated Maniego’s testimony: she saw Lagman punch Maniego several times while they were inside the sidecar on February 24, 2002; Lagman then grabbed Sicor and stabbed her in the buttocks with a small knife; after she was stabbed, two sidecar boys came to her aid and brought her to the hospital; she was released from the hospital two hours after receiving treatment. PO3 Ricardo M. Alateit testified that on the day of the incident he was riding his motorcycle on his way home; at the corner of Juan Luna and Moriones Streets, he was told that a stabbing incident had taken place; he headed toward an area where a crowd was causing a commotion; he saw a woman who looked like a lesbian running toward him with her head bloodied; he handcuffed the injured woman after being informed that she had stabbed someone; at the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell from the woman’s waist; he confiscated the item and brought the woman to the police station and to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital; he identified the woman as Lagman. The prosecution and defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2 Edison Bertoldo was the police investigator and prepared the Sworn Statement of Maniego (Exhibit “A”), Affidavit of Apprehension of PO3 Alateit (Exhibit “C”), Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibit “E”), Crime Report dated February 25, 2002 (Exhibits “F,” “F-1,” and “F-2”), and Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 27, 2002 (Exhibit “F-3”). PO3 Ronaldo Samson testified that on the date of the incident he was assigned at the Western Police District Crime Laboratory Division; he presented the sharp object used in stabbing the victim (Exhibit “M”) and the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit “M-1”).

Lagman claimed that on the date of the stabbing incident, she confronted Maniego and asked if it was true that Maniego had been spreading the rumor that Lagman was insane; Maniego answered in the affirmative; angered, Lagman slapped Maniego and left, leaving Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit; Santiago then hit her with a lead pipe; since she needed medical treatment after the attack, her mother and a barangay kagawad brought her to Gat Andres Bonifacio Medical Hospital. At the police station, Lagman denied killing Santiago; she averred that nothing was found on her body when she was frisked; she said the knife recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that there were other people in the area where it was found; she added that she had an argument only with Maniego, not with Sicor or Santiago. Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated Lagman, who had a laceration on the head possibly caused by a hard object such as a pipe; she sustained a two-centimeter laceration in her mid-pectoral area.

After the wound on Sicor’s buttocks was treated, she was released two hours after she was admitted to the hospital. She later returned to the hospital for removal of the suture on her wound after a certain period of time. The Medico-Legal Report on Sicor (Exhibit “H”) did not indicate how many days of medical treatment her injury would need. Sicor testified that she lost two days of work on account of the injury. The testimony of her attending physician, Dr. Christian Dennis Cendeno, was dispensed with following a stipulation by the parties. The RTC found that the stabbing injury sustained by Sicor was not on a vital part of the body and that she was able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving medical treatment.

• Credibility of Maniego: Accused-appellant argued that Maniego’s testimony had irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions that affected her credibility; she also argued that Maniego’s credibility was improperly appreciated because Maniego testified before Judge Romulo A. Lopez while the Decision was penned by Judge Myra Garcia-Fernandez.
• Maniego’s Presence: Accused-appellant contended that Maniego did not actually witness Santiago being stabbed because Maniego admitted during trial that she found out Santiago had been stabbed when she was already at the hospital attending to her injured mother.
• Physical Impossibility: Accused-appellant pointed out that Santiago was 5’8” and of average build while she was only 4’11”, making it incredible that she could have inflicted fatal wounds on him.
• Treachery: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove treachery; assuming she stabbed Santiago, it was not proved that she deliberately and consciously adopted her mode of attack; the encounter was preceded by a confrontation between her and Maniego, and Sicor and Santiago followed her after the confrontation; the stabbing should have been considered as having occurred in the spur of the moment.
• Denial: Accused-appellant denied killing Santiago and claimed the knife recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers; she said she had an argument only with Maniego, not with Sicor or Santiago.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Donna Maniego despite alleged patent inconsistencies.
• Treachery: Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of Jondel Santiago was attended by treachery.
• Proper Offense for Sicor’s Injury: Whether the records support accused-appellant’s conviction for less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 02-200107.
• Damages: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, temperate damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and interest are proper.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution established the elements of murder, including treachery, and accused-appellant was positively identified by eyewitness Maniego; her denial and alibi did not overcome the positive identification.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: No. The trial court’s credibility findings are generally conclusive; accused-appellant failed to show ill motive, and the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear the witnesses does not invalidate the conviction where the evidence is sufficient.
• Treachery: No. Treachery attended the killing: the victim was unarmed and unsuspecting, and accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him four times without warning, leaving him no chance to defend himself.
• Proper Offense for Sicor’s Injury: No. The records do not show that Sicor was incapacitated for labor or required medical attendance for ten days or more; only slight physical injuries were established.
• Damages: Partly. Civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and six percent interest are proper; the temperate damages to Sicor are deleted for lack of proof of medical expenses.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The elements of murder are (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any qualifying circumstance under Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The prosecution established that Santiago was killed and that accused-appellant killed him through eyewitness Maniego. The killing was attended by treachery. The killing was not parricide or infanticide. Accused-appellant’s denial and alibi were unconvincing: she was positively identified by eyewitnesses; she admitted confronting Maniego moments before she was seen attacking Maniego, Santiago, and Sicor; and alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration but also does not demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accused’s presence at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. There was no corroborative evidence of her alibi or proof of physical impossibility.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: The SC saw no reason to overturn the findings on credibility. When issues concern credibility, the trial court’s findings of fact, calibration of testimonies, assessment of probative weight, and conclusions based on said findings are generally given conclusive effect because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. Accused-appellant failed to show why Maniego and her mother would falsely accuse her; Maniego was the common-law spouse of the victim and would naturally want to seek justice for his death and for her mother’s injury. The records show Maniego witnessed the stabbing: she testified that accused-appellant first stabbed Santiago on the chest, then on the side of his neck, then twice on his back. The fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of conviction; it does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.
• Treachery: Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Maniego’s testimony proved these elements: Santiago was lighting a cigarette when accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him; he was shocked because he did not know he was going to be stabbed; accused-appellant stabbed him on the chest, on the side of the neck, and twice on the back. The victim was caught off guard, without warning, and had no chance to evade the knife thrusts or defend himself. The disparity in height did not matter because accused-appellant’s method ensured she would fatally wound Santiago without risk to herself; the victim’s height advantage was of no use because he was not afforded a means to defend himself as accused-appellant suddenly started stabbing him repeatedly with an improvised knife.
• Proper Offense for Sicor’s Injury: The RTC correctly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated murder because intent to kill was not shown. Article 265 of the RPC provides that any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor. Nothing in the records supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten days or more or that she required medical attention for the same period. After the wound on her buttocks was treated, Sicor was released two hours after she was admitted to the hospital. She later returned for removal of the suture after a certain period. The Medico-Legal Report did not indicate how many days of medical treatment her injury would need. Sicor testified she lost two days of work. The attending physician’s testimony was dispensed with by stipulation. The prosecution therefore failed to establish less serious physical injuries. The SC could only convict accused-appellant of slight physical injuries under paragraph 1 of Article 266 of the RPC, which covers physical injuries that incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days or require medical attendance during the same period. With no modifying circumstances, Article 64, paragraph 1 required the penalty in its medium period; under Article 76, arresto menor in its medium period has a duration of eleven to twenty days. The SC imposed twenty days of arresto menor.
• Damages: The CA affirmed the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 25,000 as temperate damages. The SC reiterated the rule in People vs. Combate: when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. People vs. Tubongbanua ordered interest at six percent (6%) on the award of damages; this rule was applied in Mendoza vs. People, People vs. Buban, People vs. Guevarra, and People vs. Regalario. The SC adopted the rule: interest of six percent per annum should be imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. The SC affirmed the PhP 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto in favor of Santiago’s heirs; moral damages of PhP 50,000 and exemplary damages of PhP 30,000, with six percent interest per annum, were proper. The SC deleted the PhP 25,000 temperate damages to Sicor because only slight physical injuries were committed and no proof of medical expenses was presented during trial.

• Murder, elements of — The elements are (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any qualifying circumstance under Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The SC applied these elements and found all present: Santiago was killed, Lagman killed him, treachery attended the killing, and the killing was not parricide or infanticide.
• Treachery (alevosia) — Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Requisites: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed. Essence: the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Applied: Lagman suddenly stabbed Santiago four times without warning while he was lighting a cigarette; he had no chance to defend himself.
• Credibility of witnesses — Trial court findings on credibility are generally given conclusive effect because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. The fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. Applied: the SC upheld Maniego’s credibility; no ill motive was shown; the change of judge did not invalidate the conviction.
• Alibi — Alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration but also does not, on its face, demonstrate the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Applied: Lagman was positively identified; she admitted confronting Maniego moments before; no corroborative evidence or proof of physical impossibility.
• Less serious physical injuries vs. slight physical injuries — Less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the RPC require incapacity for labor for ten days or more or medical attendance for the same period. Slight physical injuries under paragraph 1 of Article 266 require incapacity for labor from one to nine days or medical attendance during the same period. Applied: Sicor was released two hours after treatment; the Medico-Legal Report did not state the days of treatment; she lost two days of work; the attending physician’s testimony was dispensed with by stipulation; only slight physical injuries were established.
• Damages for death due to a crime — When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. Interest at six percent per annum is imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. Applied: PhP 50,000 civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 moral damages, PhP 30,000 exemplary damages, and six percent interest; temperate damages to Sicor deleted for lack of proof of medical expenses.

• “Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” — Defines treachery, the qualifying circumstance that raised the killing to murder.
• “In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.” — Sets the two requisites the SC applied to the stabbing.
• “The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.” — Explains why the sudden four stab wounds constituted treachery.
• “That the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.” — Rejects the accused’s argument that the conviction was invalid because the judge who penned the decision did not hear the witnesses.

• People vs. Gabrino, G.R. No. 189981, March 9, 2011 — Cited for the elements of murder.
• People vs. Manulit, G.R. No. 192581, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 426 — Cited for the two elements of treachery.
• People vs. Barangay Capt. Tomas, Sr., G.R. No. 192251, February 16, 2011 — Cited for the essence of treachery and for the damages rule.
• People vs. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 187 — Cited for the rule that trial court credibility findings are generally conclusive.
• People vs. Paling, G.R. No. 185390, March 16, 2011 — Cited for the rule that a judge who did not hear the witnesses may validly render judgment based on the records.
• People vs. Sally, G.R. No. 191254, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 293 — Cited for the rule on alibi.
• People vs. Aviles, G.R. No. 172967, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 265 — Cited on intent to kill in the frustrated murder charge.
• People vs. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 797 — Cited for the rule on damages when death occurs due to a crime.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the SC used it to identify the qualifying circumstances for murder and applied it because the killing was attended by treachery.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make; applied to the sudden stabbing of Santiago.
• Article 265, Revised Penal Code — Defines less serious physical injuries as physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or require medical attendance for the same period; the SC held the records did not satisfy this for Sicor.
• Article 266, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines slight physical injuries as physical injuries that incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or require medical attendance during the same period; the SC convicted Lagman under this provision.
• Article 64, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law is imposed in its medium period; applied to the slight physical injuries penalty.
• Article 76, Revised Penal Code — Fixes the duration of arresto menor in its medium period at eleven to twenty days; the SC imposed twenty days.