People vs. Lagarto and Cordero

A deaf and mentally retarded person is competent to testify provided she can perceive and make known her perception to others, and her positive identification of the accused, if consistent and credible, suffices to convict beyond reasonable doubt — even where her sworn statement contains discrepancies attributable to her illiteracy and lack of a hearing aid at the time it was taken. Conspiracy was established by the concerted acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of rape with homicide, rendering each conspirator liable for the acts of all regardless of the precise extent of individual participation.

Angel Alquiza y Lagman was a seven-year-old Grade 2 student residing at 1200 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila. Accused-appellant Ernesto Cordero operated a fleet of pedicabs parked along Tagumpay St., a dimly lit area near the victim's neighborhood; his co-accused Henry Lagarto was a garbage collector and occasional pedicab driver. Abundio Lagunday, who was killed before arraignment, was one of Cordero's pedicab drivers. The warehouse of the late Mang Gorio (Mauro Gregorio) at Kagitingan St., formerly a junk shop, served as the crime scene — a structure within a densely populated area of Tondo, Manila. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Section 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, following the trial court's imposition of the death penalty upon the directive of the Court in a prior certiorari proceeding.

At around 9:30 p.m. on 1 August 1994, seven-year-old Angel Alquiza left her home at 1200 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila, to buy champorado from Rosalina Puno's store at nearby Kagitingan St. She ate the champorado at the store and headed home via Bougainvillea St., which leads to Tagumpay St. — a dimly lit area where accused-appellant Ernesto Cordero and his wife Ligaya parked their fleet of pedicabs. Jose Soriano, who was buying a cigarette at Puno's store at the time, saw Angel being led by the hand by Abundio Lagunday, one of the Corderos' pedicab drivers, at the corner of Bougainvillea and Kagitingan Sts. He thought nothing of it because Lagunday sometimes picked up Angel from school. When Angel failed to return home, her family searched the neighborhood through the night and reported her missing to the police at 1:25 p.m. the following day.

At approximately 4:30 p.m. on 2 August 1994, residents discovered a sack floating in the flooded street of Del Pan near the corner of Lavizares St., Binondo, Manila. Inside the sack, the victim's body was wrapped in a round yellow tablecloth tied with a nylon cord. Responding policemen observed the victim's feet and left hand protruding from the wrapping. Upon opening it, they found a young girl wearing nothing but a duster, with gaping wounds on her left ear and chin, lacerated genitals, missing eyes, and a bashed-in head. The body was brought to the Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel, where Angel's brother Romezen identified it as his missing sister. He requested the NBI Medico-Legal Office to conduct an autopsy. NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Ludivino Lagat concluded that Angel died due to multiple stab wounds and traumatic injuries. The autopsy report documented, among other findings, two stab wounds on the head, one at the neck, a skull fracture with brain matter leaking out, an incised wound 21 centimeters long from the vagina to the anus and beyond with evisceration of the intestines, fractures of the mandibular bone, right femur, and first to tenth ribs, and the absence of both eyes. No spermatozoa was found, which Dr. Lagat attributed to the body's soaking in floodwater and the exposure of the genital area with intestines protruding.

Police investigation led to the arrest of Lagunday on 4 August 1994 as the primary suspect. During custodial investigation, after being apprised of his constitutional rights, Lagunday admitted his culpability and identified Henry Lagarto and two others known only by the aliases "Boboy" and "Boyet" as his cohorts. A major breakthrough came when Herminia Barlam, a 50-year-old deaf and illiterate laundry woman, was brought to the Homicide Section on 4 August 1994 by SPO2 Enrico Miranda, a neighbor and occasional laundry client. Barlam claimed that at around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994, during a heavy downpour, she had gone to the warehouse of Mang Gorio at Kagitingan St. to relieve herself and, peeping through a hole in the wall, saw three men molest and kill a little girl. She positively identified Lagunday and Lagarto from a police line-up. Her sworn statement was taken by PO3 Ko with SPO2 Miranda acting as interpreter, as Barlam was hearing-impaired. The statement described the events in fragmented Tagalog but did not initially name Cordero.

Cordero was not initially implicated by Lagunday. He was linked to the crime through the testimony of Ofelia Lagman, a laundry woman who had washed clothes for the Cordero family in the last week of July 1994 and had seen on top of their washing machine a round yellow tablecloth matching the one in which Angel's body was wrapped. Lagman also confirmed that the Corderos had a round table with a glass top. While in detention together, Lagunday tagged Cordero as the mastermind and identified Rolando Manlangit, Richard Baltazar, and Catalino Yaon as lookouts. Two separate informations for rape with homicide were filed: Criminal Case No. 94-138071 against Lagunday and Lagarto, and Criminal Case No. 94-138138 against Cordero, Manlangit, Baltazar, and Yaon. Before arraignment, Lagunday was shot and killed while allegedly trying to grab a gun from a police escort on 12 August 1994. His name was dropped from the information, and the two cases were consolidated.

The prosecution presented five key witnesses. PO3 Edgardo Ko testified on the investigation and the physical evidence recovered with the body. Dr. Lagat presented the autopsy findings. Ofelia Lagman testified about the yellow tablecloth she had seen at the Cordero residence. Rolando Javar, a mason and resident of Tagumpay St. who was related to Cordero by affinity — his son being married to Cordero's daughter — testified that between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994, he saw Cordero and Lagarto standing in front of the warehouse at Kagitingan St. as if waiting for someone, and then saw Lagunday driving "Ernie Sidecar No. 14" with Angel as passenger. Javar did not initially report what he knew because Cordero was his balae, but his conscience eventually prevailed. The most critical witness was Herminia Barlam, who testified on three separate dates — 26 August, 3 October, and 4 October 1994 — and positively identified Cordero and Lagarto as two of the three men she saw rape and kill Angel inside the warehouse. She described Cordero as the man wearing eyeglasses who slashed Angel's face and vagina, gouged out her eyes, removed her earrings, and raped her; Lagarto as the one who hit Angel's head with a piece of wood and stood by the door; and Lagunday as the one who saw her, told her to leave, and hit her with a piece of wood when she refused. The defense sought to disqualify Barlam on grounds of incompetence due to her deafness and mental condition, and the trial court ordered her to undergo psychiatric evaluation at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). The NCMH report, signed by Dr. Benjamin Vista and Dr. Isagani Gonzales, classified Barlam as having moderate mental retardation associated with deafness but declared her competent to testify, noting no evidence of insanity or psychosis, consistency in relating her story, appreciation of the meaning of the oath, and capability of cooperating with counsel.

The defense of both Cordero and Lagarto consisted of denial and alibi. Cordero claimed he was at home on the night of 1 August 1994, talking to a certain Gerardo Eriste who was asking his help in borrowing money, then watching television with his children before sleeping at 11:00 p.m. His alibi was corroborated by his daughter Emily and Eriste, but only up to the time he supposedly went to sleep. Cordero denied knowing Lagunday and denied knowledge of the warehouse, which was about ten blocks from his house. Lagarto claimed he was at home sleeping from 7:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994 to 5:00 a.m. the following day, corroborated by neighbors Rosita Besonia and Janet Badilla and his mother Noriana Lagarto, though on cross-examination he admitted he was alone in the house when he slept. The defense also presented SPO2 Miranda, who testified that Barlam's sworn statement did not mention Cordero or Lagarto, and Gloria Sigua, who claimed she saw a companion of Angel's mother showing Barlam a newspaper with Cordero's picture. Vivencio Singalawa testified that Lagunday confessed to him that he was the sole author of the crime. The trial court gave full credit to the prosecution's version, convicted Cordero and Lagarto, and exonerated Manlangit for lack of evidence.

• Corpus Delicti and Cause of Death: Lagarto and Cordero argued that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of death because the death certificate was not presented in evidence, and that the autopsy report could not serve as proof because there was no proper identification of the victim mentioned therein. They further maintained that the fact of stabbing as the cause of death was not adequately established, suggesting that Angel may have been run over by a motor vehicle.
• Fact of Rape: Cordero argued that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of rape because the autopsy report did not categorically state that Angel was raped, and that Dr. Lagat's finding that the genital injury was caused by a sharp-bladed weapon should prevail over Barlam's testimony regarding the rape.
• Credibility and Competency of Barlam: Both accused argued that Barlam was not qualified to become a witness due to her deafness and mental retardation, that her testimony was full of discrepancies and self-contradictions, that she was a perjured, biased, and rehearsed witness, and that it was highly improbable for her to have seen what supposedly happened inside the warehouse. They also questioned the evidentiary value of the NCMH psychiatric report, claiming it was hearsay because the doctors were not presented in court and was not offered in evidence by the prosecution.
• Identification: Lagarto argued that there was no credible and acceptable identification free from doubt that he participated in the crime, that prosecution witnesses were coached, and that Barlam changed her testimony several times. Cordero claimed he was never properly identified as a perpetrator and that Barlam was merely coached by Angel's family to implicate him.
• Situs of the Crime: Both accused argued that the warehouse could not have been the situs of the crime because it was within a populated area surrounded by houses, an unusual commotion would invite attention, and no evidence or traces were found inside it during the police inspection.
• Conspiracy: Cordero argued that conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that criminal liability should be individual, not collective, thereby exempting him. He also maintained that Lagunday was the sole author of the crime.
• Alibi: Both accused maintained that their alibi assumed importance where the prosecution's evidence was weak and came from a source that could not be characterized as fully unbiased and disinterested.
• Illegal Arrest and Preliminary Investigation: Cordero claimed he was illegally arrested and not accorded the right to preliminary investigation.
• Promulgation of Death Penalty: Cordero argued that the trial court never amended or modified its original decision as mandated by the Supreme Court, claiming the court merely ordered that an order be promulgated without stating that the penalty being imposed was death.

• Competency of Witness: Whether a deaf and mentally retarded person who can perceive and make known her perception to others is competent to testify as an eyewitness.
• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: Whether the testimony of Herminia Barlam, despite inconsistencies between her sworn statement and her open-court testimony and her erratic behavior, is credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Corpus Delicti and Cause of Death: Whether the prosecution adequately proved the fact and cause of death of Angel Alquiza notwithstanding the non-presentation of the death certificate.
• Fact of Rape: Whether the prosecution proved the fact of rape despite the absence of spermatozoa and the autopsy report's finding that the genital injury was caused by a sharp-bladed weapon.
• Identification of Accused: Whether the accused were properly and positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime.
• Situs of the Crime: Whether the warehouse at Kagitingan St. could reasonably have been the site of the crime despite its location in a populated area.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among Lagarto, Cordero, and Lagunday was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Validity of Arrest and Procedure: Whether Cordero's alleged illegal arrest and lack of preliminary investigation affected the validity of his conviction.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Whether the trial court properly imposed the death penalty pursuant to the Supreme Court's directive in G.R. Nos. 119987-88.
• Damages: Whether the awards of damages by the trial court were proper and whether exemplary damages should be awarded.

• Competency of Witness: Yes. Barlam was competent to testify under Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, as she could perceive and make known her perception to others, and the NCMH found no evidence of insanity or psychosis.
• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: Yes. Barlam's testimony was consistent in its material points, her sworn statement's discrepancies were attributable to her illiteracy and lack of a hearing aid when it was taken, and the trial court's assessment of her credibility is accorded respect and finality on appeal.
• Corpus Delicti and Cause of Death: Yes. The autopsy report, the certificate of identification signed by the victim's brother, and the request for autopsy sufficiently established the fact and cause of death; no rule requires a death certificate as the exclusive proof of death.
• Fact of Rape: Yes. The finding that the genital wound was caused by a sharp-bladed instrument does not negate rape, and Barlam's testimony that she witnessed the rape was credible and corroborated by the severity of the genital injuries.
• Identification of Accused: Yes. Barlam positively and consistently identified Cordero and Lagarto in open court, and her identification was corroborated by Javar's testimony placing them at the warehouse; the defense's claim of coaching was unsubstantiated.
• Situs of the Crime: Yes. The crime was committed at 2:00 a.m. during a heavy downpour, providing sufficient cover; the ocular inspection was conducted months later after alterations to the warehouse had been made.
• Conspiracy: Yes. The concerted acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime — from waiting at the warehouse to jointly assaulting the victim and disposing of her body — established a common design, rendering the act of one the act of all.
• Validity of Arrest and Procedure: No. Cordero's voluntary plea of "not guilty" at arraignment submitted him to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived any irregularity in his arrest; an illegal arrest does not negate a conviction proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Yes. The trial court issued two orders on 22 May 1996, one imposing the death penalty and another dealing with its promulgation, in full compliance with the Supreme Court's directive.
• Damages: Modified. The award of moral damages was reduced from P500,000 to P100,000; exemplary damages of P100,000 were awarded due to the aggravating circumstance of cruelty; indemnity was fixed at P100,000; and actual damages of P52,000 were maintained.

• Competency of Witness: The Court applied Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which provide that all persons who can perceive and make known their perception to others may be witnesses, and that only those whose mental condition renders them incapable of intelligently making known their perception are disqualified. Barlam could perceive — she saw what happened — and she could make known her perception, as demonstrated by her statements to the police, to the NCMH psychiatrists, and to the trial court. The NCMH report, made upon order of the trial court, declared her competent, finding no evidence of insanity or psychosis, consistency in her recollection, appreciation of the meaning of the oath, and capability of cooperating with counsel. The report was in the nature of an official document in aid of judicial determination, not evidence for the prosecution, and thus need not be offered in evidence and cannot be rejected as hearsay. The Court has ruled that even a mental retardate or feeble-minded person can qualify as a competent witness.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Court adhered to the principle that factual findings of the trial court are accorded respect and finality on appeal, as the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and deportment. The trial court keenly observed Barlam during her testimony and was convinced she was speaking the truth. While Barlam exhibited erratic behavior — pretending to pick lice, claiming her father's cousin was a tin can, and allegedly exposing her private part to defense counsels — such idiosyncrasy had no bearing on the consistency and veracity of her testimony. Her sworn statement did not entirely jibe with her oral testimony, but the Court has ruled that in case of conflict between a sworn statement and testimony in open court, the latter generally prevails, as ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate because they are prepared by someone other than the affiant. The sworn statement was taken when Barlam was illiterate and had not yet been fitted with a hearing aid, making it highly probable that the true essence of her narration was not captured. The absence of any improper motive on her part to falsely testify further sustained her credibility.

• Corpus Delicti and Cause of Death: The argument that the death certificate was indispensable was rejected. The autopsy report stated that the body was identified by Romezen Alquiza, the victim's brother, who also signed the certificate of identification and submitted the request for autopsy. There is no rule specifying who may identify a victim; it is enough that the person knows the one being identified. A brother can recognize his own sister even with manifest physical injuries. The autopsy report is an official document whose authenticity is presumed. As to the cause of death, the defense's suggestion that Angel may have been run over by a motor vehicle was a mere probability. The victim suffered numerous injuries that could not all have been caused by a motor vehicle, and the body was wrapped in a tablecloth and placed in a sack — acts inconsistent with a vehicular accident. Barlam's testimony that Angel's head was hit with a piece of wood provided a more plausible explanation for the cranial injuries.

• Fact of Rape: The defense's argument that the absence of spermatozoa and the finding that the genital wound was caused by a sharp-bladed instrument negated rape was rejected as non sequitur. The finding that the incised wound was caused by a sharp-bladed instrument does not necessarily mean that Angel was not raped. Dr. Lagat explained that the absence of spermatozoa could be due to the soaking of the body in floodwater and the exposure of the genital area with intestines protruding. Barlam testified that she saw Cordero rape Angel, and her competence and credibility were upheld.

• Identification of Accused: Barlam positively and consistently identified Cordero and Lagarto in open court, even slapping and boxing them to demonstrate her indignation. Her identification was corroborated by Javar, who saw Cordero and Lagarto standing in front of the warehouse between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994. Javar was related to Cordero by affinity, giving him no plausible reason to lie, especially when his balae faced a death sentence. The claim that Barlam was coached was unsubstantiated: SPO2 Miranda, who was standing beside Barlam when the alleged coaching occurred, heard nothing, and believed she was telling the truth. Lagunday's alleged confession to Singalawa that he was the sole author was hearsay, as Lagunday died before arraignment. The defense's reliance on the absence of Cordero's name in Barlam's sworn statement was misplaced, as the statement was taken without a hearing aid and she never read it because she was illiterate.

• Situs of the Crime: The argument that the crime could not have been committed in the warehouse because it was in a populated area was untenable. The Court has ruled that rape is no respecter of time or place and can be committed in small, confined spaces. The assault occurred at 2:00 a.m. during a heavy downpour, conditions that provided a perfect cover. The ocular inspection conducted on 22 November 1994 — over three months later — was of limited probative value because the Barangay Captain and residents confirmed that alterations had been made to the warehouse, including the patching up of the holes through which Barlam had witnessed the crime. Maj. Gacutan's failure to find evidence inside the dark warehouse was attributable to his not bringing any forensics expert or instruments, and did not eliminate the fact that a crime was committed therein.

• Conspiracy: The Court found that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Lagarto, Cordero, and Lagunday shared a common design to rape and kill Angel. Although there was no direct proof of unity of purpose, conspiracy was properly appreciated because their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed they were acting in unison and cooperation. Lagunday was last seen leading Angel by the hand and driving her in pedicab No. 14, which belonged to Cordero's fleet. Javar saw Cordero and Lagarto waiting in front of the warehouse. Barlam saw all three inside the warehouse, each performing distinct roles: Cordero slashed Angel's face and vagina and raped her, Lagarto hit her head with a piece of wood and stood by the door, and Lagunday also struck her. After she died, all three wrapped her in a yellow tablecloth, placed her in a sack, and set it adrift in floodwater. The conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime demonstrated conspiracy. Where conspiracy is shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each conspirator becomes secondary; the act of one is the act of all.

• Validity of Arrest and Procedure: Cordero's claim of illegal arrest and lack of preliminary investigation was rejected. By voluntarily pleading "not guilty" at his arraignment on 22 August 1994, Cordero submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. His plea amounted to a waiver of the right to question any irregularity in his arrest. It was too late to protest after a valid information had been filed, he was properly arraigned, trial was conducted and terminated, and a judgment of conviction rendered. An illegal arrest does not deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all facts on record point to culpability.

• Imposition of Death Penalty: The trial court issued two orders on 22 May 1996 at the National Penitentiary. The first expressly imposed the penalty of death pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. Nos. 119987-88, and the second dealt with the promulgation of that order. Cordero's apprehension that the trial court never stated the penalty being imposed was death was unwarranted.

• Damages: The penalty of death being single and indivisible under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be applied regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. However, for purposes of civil liability, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was appreciated, warranting the award of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code. The cruelty was manifest in the systematic mutilation of a seven-year-old child — the gouging of her eyes, the slashing of her vagina with evisceration of the intestines, the bashing of her head, and the rape committed while she was bleeding to death. The award of P500,000 as moral damages was reduced to P100,000 conformably with current jurisprudence fixing the indemnity in rape with homicide cases at P100,000. Exemplary damages were fixed at P100,000, and actual damages of P52,000 were maintained.

• Competency of Mentally Retarded or Deaf Witnesses — Even a mental retardate or feeble-minded person may qualify as a competent witness, provided she can perceive and make known her perception to others. The test is not the witness's mental capacity in the abstract but whether, at the time of production for examination, her mental condition is such that she is incapable of intelligently making known her perception to others. The NCMH report, made upon order of the trial court, is in the nature of an official document in aid of judicial determination and need not be offered in evidence by the prosecution; its contents cannot be rejected as hearsay.

• Supremacy of Open-Court Testimony over Sworn Statements — In case of conflict between the contents of a sworn statement and testimony in open court, the latter generally prevails, as ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate because they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than the affiant. This is especially true where the affiant is illiterate and was not equipped with a hearing aid at the time the statement was taken.

• Conspiracy by Concerted Action — Conspiracy may be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, even without direct proof of a prior agreement. Where conspiracy is adequately shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each conspirator becomes secondary; the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

• Waiver of Irregularity of Arrest by Plea — A voluntary plea of "not guilty" at arraignment constitutes submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court and a waiver of the right to question any irregularity in the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused and does not negate a conviction proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Respect for Trial Court's Credibility Findings — Factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect and finality on appeal, the trial judge having had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and deportment. Exceptions exist when the evaluation was arbitrary or when substantial facts or circumstances have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.

• "Barlam could certainly perceive and make known her perception to others. Even if she is deaf, she saw what happened on 2 August 1994. She related what she saw to the police on 4 August 1994; to the psychiatrists who examined her at NCMH on 26, 29, and 31 August 1994; and to the trial court on 26 August, 3 and 4 October 1994." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the competency of a deaf and mentally retarded eyewitness, applying the statutory test under Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.

• "Having been made upon order of the trial court, such report is in the nature of an official document in aid of judicial determination. It is not evidence for the prosecution or against the defense but a document – a specific report – prepared and issued by an entity totally removed from the criminal proceedings, hence, indifferent, objective, and impartial." — This defines the evidentiary character of a court-ordered psychiatric report, establishing that it need not be offered in evidence and cannot be rejected as hearsay.

• "Although there is no direct proof of such unity of purpose, conspiracy was properly appreciated in these premises by the trial court because their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed that they were acting in unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective." — This states the governing principle on inference of conspiracy from concerted acts, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty warrants the award of exemplary damages." — This links the statutory aggravating circumstance of cruelty under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code to the civil-law entitlement to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, in the context of a death penalty case.

• People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244 (1995) — Controlling precedent in the prior certiorari proceeding (G.R. Nos. 119987-88) where the Court ordered the trial court to impose the death penalty, subject to automatic review. The present case is the automatic review thus contemplated.
• People vs. Palma, 144 SCRA 236 (1986); People vs. Rizo, 189 SCRA 265 (1990); People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 (1991); People vs. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999) — Followed for the proposition that even a mental retardate or feeble-minded person can qualify as a competent witness.
• People vs. Manuel, 236 SCRA 545 (1994); People vs. Cruza, 237 SCRA 410 (1994); People vs. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 (1999) — Followed for the rule that open-court testimony prevails over sworn statements in case of conflict, ex parte affidavits being inherently incomplete and inaccurate.
• People vs. Villafuerte, 232 SCRA 225 (1994); People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285 (1995) — Followed for the principle that the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of a prosecution witness strongly sustains the conclusion that no such motive existed and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
• People vs. Torio, G.R. Nos. 132216 & 133479, 17 November 1999; People vs. Geromo, G.R. No. 126169, 21 December 1999 — Followed for the rule that alibi is a weak defense, further emasculated where it was not physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene.
• People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 (1995); People vs. Lising, 285 SCRA 595 (1998) — Followed for the rule that where conspiracy is shown, the act of one conspirator is the act of all, regardless of the precise extent of individual participation.
• People vs. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256 (1996); People vs. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995); People vs. Silang, 254 SCRA 491 (1996) — Followed for the propositions that a voluntary plea submits the accused to the court's jurisdiction, cures defects in arrest, and that an illegal arrest does not negate a valid conviction.
• People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998) — Followed for the rule that moral damages in rape cases no longer require proof.
• People vs. Tahop, G.R. No. 125330, 29 September 1999 — Followed for the current jurisprudential standard fixing indemnity in rape with homicide cases at P100,000.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes rape with homicide. When by reason or on occasion of the rape a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. Applied to convict Lagarto and Cordero of the special complex felony of rape with homicide, the victim being under twelve years of age.
• Article 47, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Governs automatic review by the Supreme Court of cases where the death penalty is imposed. Provided the jurisdictional basis for the present review.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applied to impose the death penalty without need to consider qualifying or generic aggravating circumstances for purposes of the penalty.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Defines aggravating circumstances, including cruelty. The circumstance of cruelty was appreciated for purposes of civil liability, given the systematic mutilation and torture of the seven-year-old victim.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages shall be awarded when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Applied to justify the award of P100,000 as exemplary damages.
• Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence — Govern the qualifications and disqualifications of witnesses. Section 20 provides that all persons who can perceive and make known their perception to others may be witnesses; Section 21 disqualifies only those whose mental condition renders them incapable of intelligently making known their perception. Applied to uphold Barlam's competency despite her deafness and mental retardation.
• Section 10, Rule 122, Rules of Court — Provides for automatic review of death penalty cases. Together with Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, formed the procedural basis for elevation to the Supreme Court.
• Article 83, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659 — Requires that upon finality of a death penalty decision, the records be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Buena, J., was on leave. Four Justices maintained their stand that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty but submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed.