People vs. Lacao

Treachery proved at trial but not expressly alleged in the information cannot qualify a killing as murder; it is treated only as a generic aggravating circumstance, and where it is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the accused is guilty only of homicide and the penalty is imposed in its medium period.

Baltazar Lacao was the barrio captain of Barrio Manibad, Mambusao, Capiz, and Sergio Gallardo was his barriomate. The two stood on opposite sides of Lacao's own proposal, made in his capacity as barrio captain, to change the name of the barrio to Hontiveros.

On the evening of March 27, 1969, around one hundred persons gathered at the house of Francisco Labo in Sitio Guimba, Barrio Manibad, Mambusao, Capiz, for the last night of the wake for Labo's deceased wife. Among those present were Baltazar Lacao, the barrio captain, his brother David Lacao, and Sergio Gallardo.

At about eleven o'clock, Gallardo decided to go home. As he was descending the stairs, Baltazar Lacao followed him, called him "Ser, Ser," and stabbed him with a knife at the right side of his body. Baltazar tried to pull out the knife; Gallardo ran, and Baltazar followed him. When Gallardo reached the bamboo grove, he was assaulted by David Lacao, who was armed with a carbine, by Benedicto Lacao, David's son, and by Salvador Lacao, Jose Mansilla and Federico Lata, Salvador and Federico being Baltazar's first cousins. Gallardo sustained fourteen wounds, and his assailants dragged him "to the field." He died of massive hemorrhage resulting from his numerous wounds, which were caused by different bladed instruments, and each of nine of those wounds could have caused his death if there had been no timely medical attendance.

The killing was motivated by resentment. Baltazar Lacao, as barrio captain, had drafted a resolution recommending that the name of Barrio Manibad be changed to Hontiveros, and Gallardo vigorously opposed the change, an opposition sufficient to provoke Baltazar to liquidate him.

Less than twelve hours after the killing, or at five to eleven o'clock in the morning of March 28, Baltazar surrendered to the Constabulary detachment at Loctugan Hills, Roxas City, evidently realizing that he had to assume responsibility for the killing so that his relatives would not be implicated and fearing reprisals from the victim's family, and he placed himself under the protective custody of the Constabulary. As proof of his surrender and to show that he waived the issuance of a warrant of arrest or commitment, he executed in the Ilongo dialect a certification, Exhibit C, admitting that he killed Gallardo, in which he stated that he voluntarily surrendered because he stabbed Sergio Gallardo, his barriomate, who died in the evening of March 27, 1969, and that, there being no charge or complaint against him in court and being afraid of the relatives of the deceased, he was asking for the protection of the PC and to stay in the PC camp. On the basis of that statement, Constabulary Sergeant Jose B. Blancaflor prepared a spot report, Exhibit B, which was sent at three o'clock in the afternoon of March 29 to the Provincial Commander and which stated that Baltazar Lacao had surrendered to the Constabulary at five to eleven o'clock in the morning of March 28 for having stabbed Sergio Gallardo to death in the evening of March 27.

Also on March 28, Eulogio Lipura, Caridad Laurilla and Alfredo Vergabera executed sworn statements implicating Baltazar Lacao in the killing, and a police sergeant filed the complaint for murder. After the complaint was amended and the case elevated to the Court of First Instance and transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court at Roxas City, the Provincial Fiscal filed the information for murder on April 25, 1969.

Baltazar Lacao gave a different account. He claimed that he arrived at Labo's house at eight-thirty in the evening, advised Gallardo and the others in the yard to desist from discussing politics because the elections were still far away, and later went down to pacify Gallardo, who was armed with a knife, after Arturo Labo reported that Gallardo was chasing several persons. He announced himself as the barrio captain and asked for the knife; Gallardo instead tried to stab him, and he moved backward and retreated until he reached the bamboo grove, where Gallardo again tried to stab him and he parried the blow. He grappled with Gallardo, wrested the knife away, and lost it when Gallardo squeezed his neck with his right hand and held his right hand with his left; he freed himself and fled, pursued by Gallardo and by seven persons whom he surmised were Gallardo's companions, and he said that Gallardo might have been wounded in the right breast and on the hand and fingers. The trial court found his testimony riddled with improbabilities, observing that, considering that many persons were present when Gallardo allegedly assaulted Lacao, it was incredible that they would not have intervened to prevent Gallardo from killing their barrio captain, and that his credibility was gravely impaired by his denial of the undeniable fact that he had voluntarily surrendered to the Constabulary on the morning following the killing.

• Self-Defense: Appellant contended that the trial court's decision was contrary to law and the evidence, that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that his plea of self-defense should be upheld on his account that Gallardo was the unlawful aggressor, that he had merely grappled with and disarmed Gallardo, and that he fled when Gallardo and seven others pursued him.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Eyewitness: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in believing prosecution eyewitness William Artuz, who declared that Gallardo was stabbed by Baltazar Lacao, David Lacao, Salvador Lacao, Benedicto Lacao, Jose Mansilla and Federico Lata, and pointed out that, according to Alfredo Vergabera, another prosecution eyewitness, Baltazar Lacao initially wounded Gallardo with a knife on the right side of his body and the knife got stuck in the wound and Baltazar was not able to pull it out.
• Extent of Liability for the Fourteen Wounds: Appellant argued that, since according to the prosecution Baltazar Lacao stabbed Gallardo only once, the trial court erred in concluding that he was responsible for the fourteen wounds sustained by Gallardo, and that he should be held liable for physical injuries only because the prosecution failed to prove which of the fourteen wounds were inflicted by him, the doctor having testified that the wounds were caused by different weapons or bladed instruments.
• Probative Value of Exhibit C: Appellant assailed the probative value of his written acknowledgement of surrender, which his counsel de oficio categorized as "an admission and confession of the commission of an offense," and impugned the veracity of the testimony of Sergeant Blancaflor who typed that statement.

• Cruelty: The Solicitor General, for the State, disagreed with the trial court's appreciation of cruelty, observing that the numerousness of the wounds is not the criterion for appreciating cruelty (ensañamiento).

• Self-Defense: Whether the plea of self-defense should be upheld.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Eyewitness: Whether the trial court erred in believing prosecution eyewitness William Artuz and in finding appellant's testimony riddled with improbabilities.
• Extent of Liability for the Fourteen Wounds: Whether appellant may be held responsible for Gallardo's death although the prosecution's evidence showed he inflicted only one wound and the fourteen wounds were caused by different bladed instruments.
• Probative Value of Exhibit C: Whether the certification of surrender is admissible as a deliberate admission and was voluntarily executed.
• Treachery: Whether treachery may qualify the killing as murder when it was not expressly alleged in the information.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was proven.
• Cruelty: Whether cruelty may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Self-Defense: No. The plea fails; the trial court found appellant's testimony riddled with improbabilities and his credibility gravely impaired by his denial of the surrender, and his admission in Exhibit C removed any doubt as to his guilt.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Eyewitness: No. The contention is fallacious, for it ignores the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that Lacao pursued Gallardo when the latter ran in order to escape from Lacao's felonious assault.
• Extent of Liability for the Fourteen Wounds: No. Whichever of the two wounds on the right side of Gallardo's body was inflicted by Baltazar Lacao would have been fatal, so that even assuming he inflicted only one wound, that wound alone was sufficient to hold him responsible for the death.
• Probative Value of Exhibit C: Yes. The SC was satisfied that Lacao signed Exhibit C voluntarily and understood its contents, and deliberate admissions of a party charged with a crime are always admissible to show his guilt.
• Treachery: No, as a qualifying circumstance. Treachery was proven but, not having been expressly alleged in the information, it could not qualify the killing as murder and was treated only as a generic aggravating circumstance.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to prove premeditacion conocida; resentment over the renaming proposal is not conclusive proof of evident premeditation.
• Cruelty: No. The numerousness of the wounds is not the criterion for appreciating cruelty, and the evidence shows that several persons inflicted the fourteen wounds.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Although appellant denied surrendering, the record is conclusive that he was not arrested and that he was turned over to the municipal jail by the Constabulary, entitling him to the mitigating circumstance.

• Self-Defense: The trial court analyzed Lacao's testimony and found it riddled with improbabilities. Considering that many persons were present when Gallardo allegedly assaulted Lacao, it was incredible that they would not have intervened to prevent Gallardo from killing Lacao, their barrio captain. Lacao's credibility was further gravely impaired by his denial of the undeniable fact that he voluntarily surrendered to the Constabulary on the morning following the killing, a denial the SC described as rendering the plea of self-defense fabricated. Against this, the SC weighed Lacao's own written admission that he stabbed Gallardo, which removed any doubt as to his guilt.

• Credibility of the Prosecution Eyewitness: The SC rejected the attack on the trial court's reliance on William Artuz. The argument that only one stab wound was inflicted is fallacious because it ignores the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that Lacao pursued Gallardo when he ran in order to escape from Lacao's felonious assault. The medical certificate itself shows that among the fourteen wounds there were two on the right side of Gallardo's body: a stab wound two and one-half inches long in the right epigastric region which eviscerated the small intestines and omentum, and a stab wound one and one-fourth inches long which penetrated the thoracic cavity above the right nipple.

• Extent of Liability for the Fourteen Wounds: Whichever of those two wounds on the right side was inflicted by Baltazar Lacao would be fatal, because both injured vital organs and caused much hemorrhage. Hence, assuming that he inflicted only one wound, that wound in itself was sufficient to hold him responsible for Gallardo's death, and the SC added that Lacao probably inflicted other wounds. The contention that he should answer only for physical injuries was not well taken: Lacao was the initiator of the assault, he had the motive for getting rid of Gallardo, who spearheaded the opposition against the renaming proposal, he was armed with a deadly weapon when he stabbed Gallardo, his intent to kill was manifest, and his admission in Exhibit C removed any doubt as to his guilt.

• Probative Value of Exhibit C: The SC weighed the probative value of Lacao's statement, the spot report based on it, and Blancaflor's testimony, and was satisfied that Lacao signed Exhibit C voluntarily and understood its contents. The salutary rule is that the admissions of a party charged with a crime, deliberately made, are always admissible to show his guilt. There was no ulterior motive for Blancaflor to fabricate such a statement just to prejudice Lacao, and no reason why, as a Constabulary officer, he would make a false spot report regarding the killing. Exhibits B and C were executed in the course of Blancaflor's regular performance of his official duties; he had to require Lacao to state in writing that he wanted to be detained in the Constabulary camp, otherwise the Constabulary men would be guilty of arbitrary or illegal detention, and it was standard operating procedure to apprise the Provincial Commander that a killing had been perpetrated and that the perpetrator was under protective custody in a Constabulary camp.

• Treachery: The trial court held that the killing was murder because there was treachery when Lacao, after calling Gallardo, unexpectedly and suddenly stabbed him, and the SC agreed. Lacao adopted a mode of execution which insured the wounding of Gallardo without giving him a chance to repel the initial aggression; there was no risk to Lacao arising from any defense Gallardo could have made, as the latter was unarmed. Gallardo was not able to make any defense at all; he ran in order to avoid further injury, but Lacao pursued him and the other assailants pounced on him. Because treachery was not expressly alleged in the information, however, it could not be used to qualify the killing as murder and had to be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Hence Lacao could only be held guilty of homicide aggravated by treachery, following the treatment of an unalleged aggravating circumstance in the cited jurisprudence where the accused was convicted only of homicide.

• Evident Premeditation: Although the information charged murder qualified by evident premeditation, the prosecution failed to prove premeditacion conocida. It is true that Lacao might have nursed a grudge or resentment against Gallardo for having blocked his proposal to change the name of Barrio Manibad to Hontiveros, but that circumstance is not conclusive proof of evident premeditation. It is not sufficient to suspect that premeditation preceded the crime; the criminal intent evidenced by outward acts must be notorious and manifest, and the purpose and determination must be plain and must have been adopted after mature consideration on the part of the persons who conceived and resolved upon the perpetration of the crime, as a result of deliberation, meditation and reflection sometime before its commission.

• Cruelty: The trial court's ruling that cruelty should be appreciated because Lacao inflicted fourteen wounds is not supported by the evidence. The testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses tend to show that several persons inflicted the fourteen wounds, and the nature of the wounds indicates that they could not have been caused solely by one person using only a knife, which was the weapon used by Baltazar Lacao. The numerousness of the wounds is not the criterion for appreciating cruelty; the test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.

• Voluntary Surrender: Lacao denied that he surrendered to Sergeant Blancaflor and repudiated the instrument of surrender because, from his viewpoint, he found it incompatible with his plea of self-defense, which appeared to be fabricated. In fairness to him, however, and as the record is conclusive that he was not arrested and that he was turned over to the municipal jail by the Constabulary, he was given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities. Treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance was offset by that mitigating circumstance, so that reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide, was imposed in its medium period.

• Qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information — A circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder must be expressly alleged in the information; if proven but not alleged, it cannot qualify the crime and is appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance. The SC applied this to treachery, reducing Lacao's liability from murder to homicide despite finding that treachery attended the stabbing.
• Treachery (alevosia) — Treachery attends when the offender adopts a mode of execution which insures the wounding of the victim without giving the latter a chance to repel the initial aggression, so that no risk arises to the offender from any defense the victim could have made. The SC found it present because Lacao called Gallardo, suddenly stabbed him, and pursued him when he fled, the victim being unarmed and unable to make any defense.
• Evident Premeditation (premeditacion conocida) — Not presumed from mere resentment or motive. The criminal intent evidenced by outward acts must be notorious and manifest, and the purpose and determination must be plain and adopted after mature consideration as a result of deliberation, meditation and reflection sometime before the commission of the crime. Lacao's grudge over the blocked renaming proposal did not satisfy this standard.
• Cruelty (ensañaamiento) — The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering, or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. The numerousness of the wounds is not the criterion; where several persons inflicted the wounds and the nature of the wounds shows they could not have been caused by one person using only a knife, cruelty cannot be appreciated against the accused.
• Admissions of a party charged with a crime — Admissions deliberately made by a person charged with a crime are always admissible to show his guilt. The SC applied this to Lacao's written certification of surrender, which he signed voluntarily and understood, and which was executed in the course of the Constabulary officer's regular performance of official duties.
• Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance — The mitigating circumstance may be credited notwithstanding the accused's own denial of the surrender, where the record conclusively shows that he was not arrested and was turned over to the municipal jail by the Constabulary.
• Offsetting of aggravating and mitigating circumstances — A generic aggravating circumstance is offset by a mitigating circumstance, and the penalty, which for homicide is reclusion temporal, is imposed in its medium period.
• Liability of the initiator of the assault — One who initiates the assault, is armed with a deadly weapon, and manifests intent to kill is responsible for the victim's death even if he inflicted only one wound, where that wound was fatal.

• "the admissions of a party charged with a crime, deliberately made, are always admissible to show his guilt" — The rule the SC used to uphold the probative value of Lacao's written certification of surrender, Exhibit C, against the objection that it was an involuntary confession.
• "Since treachery was not expressly alleged in the information, it could not be used to qualify the killing as murder. It should be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance" — The ratio of the reduction of the conviction from murder to homicide, and the case's central procedural-substantive rule on qualifying circumstances.
• "the numerousness of the wounds is not the criterion for appreciating cruelty (ensañaamiento). The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse" — The canonical formulation of the cruelty test, applied to reject the trial court's appreciation of cruelty from the mere number of wounds.
• "Lacao adopted a mode of execution which insured the wounding of Gallardo without giving him a chance to repel the initial aggression." — The finding of treachery, which would have qualified the killing had it been alleged in the information.

• People vs. Hernane, 75 Phil. 554, 558 — Controlling authority for the rule that the deliberate admissions of a party charged with a crime are always admissible to show his guilt; used to sustain Exhibit C.
• U.S. vs. Banagale, 24 Phil. 69, 73 — Source of the formulation of evident premeditation applied to reject premeditacion conocida from mere resentment.
• U.S. vs. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457 — Cited for treachery where the victim was unarmed and could make no defense.
• U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 — Authority that a circumstance not alleged in the information cannot qualify the killing but may be taken as generic aggravating.
• People vs. Peje, 99 Phil. 1052 — Followed; where the qualifying circumstances were not proven and the proven aggravating circumstance was not alleged, the accused was convicted only of homicide.
• People vs. Navarro, L-20860, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 530 — Cited with Peje for the same treatment of an unalleged aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil. 610 — Cited for the test of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Manzano, L-33463, July 31, 1974 — Cited with Aguinaldo and Dayug for the same cruelty test applied to reject the aggravating circumstance.

• Article 14(21), Revised Penal Code — Defines cruelty as an aggravating circumstance; the SC applied its test and found the circumstance absent despite the fourteen wounds.
• Article 248(6), Revised Penal Code — Murder with cruelty; cited in the same discussion of the cruelty test.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Fixes reclusion temporal as the penalty for homicide; applied because the killing was homicide, not murder.
• Article 64(4), Revised Penal Code — Where a mitigating circumstance and an aggravating circumstance offset each other, the penalty is imposed in its medium period; applied to impose reclusion temporal in its medium period.

• Justice Barredo (Concurring) — Reserved his view as to the correctness of the conclusion in People vs. Peje, considering that the superiority which was proven in that case could be deemed included in the allegation of alevosia.
• Justice Fernandez (Concurring) — Added an admonition to the Fiscal to be careful in preparing informations so as to prevent omissions, as in this case, which are prejudicial to the State.