People vs. Jose

A conditional pardon granted by the executive of a de facto government becomes ineffective upon restoration of the legitimate government when the original sentence it purported to remit was of political complexion and thus void under the right of postliminium, and the accused cannot thereafter be prosecuted for violating such pardon.

During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, a so-called Republic of the Philippines was established with its own President, National Assembly, courts, and laws. The Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was created by the National Assembly of that Republic to try offenses under its enactments, including food control regulations. Upon the liberation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government, questions arose as to the validity of judicial and executive acts of the Japanese-sponsored Republic, particularly punitive sentences and pardons issued under its authority. The right of postliminium in international law governs the effectivity of such acts upon restoration of the legitimate sovereign.

On or about some time prior to April 19, 1944, Benedicto Jose y Santos was prosecuted and convicted in Criminal Case No. 3 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of the City of Greater Manila, a court created by the National Assembly of the Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines. The conviction was for a violation of sections 3(b) and 2(b) of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of said Republic, in connection with section 11 of Ordinance No. 1 of the President thereof. Section 11 of Ordinance No. 1 prohibited any person except the control organization or persons designated by it from engaging in the purchase, importation, sale, or transfer of rice and corn, or acting as agent, broker, or intermediary in such transactions, unless authorized by the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. He was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment and commenced serving the sentence on April 19, 1944.

After serving approximately six months of his sentence, Jose was granted a conditional pardon on October 15, 1944 by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The condition was that he should not again violate any penal laws of the Philippines, which he duly accepted, and he was immediately released from confinement. Some time prior to April 5, 1945, while enjoying the conditional pardon, Jose committed qualified theft in the City of Manila. He was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced in Criminal Case No. A-605 of the Municipal Court of said city, and was received at the New Bilibid Prison on April 5, 1945 to serve that sentence.

On May 24, 1945, the City Fiscal of Manila filed an information charging Jose with a violation of Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code for having willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously violated the condition of his conditional pardon by committing qualified theft. Jose filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the facts charged did not constitute an offense, because both the judgment rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the conditional pardon were void and without legal effect under General Douglas MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944; that the proceedings of said court were null and void as it was a creature and agency of the Imperial Japanese Army; and that the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution were denied to accused under the procedure adopted by said court. He further alleged lack of jurisdiction, the court having no authority to take cognizance of proceedings commenced in courts under the so-called Republic.

The City Fiscal opposed the motion, arguing that the defunct Republic being a de facto government, its courts, laws, and ordinances should be upheld as legal in conformity with principles of international law, citing Williams vs. Bruffy. The lower court, after considering both the motion and the opposition, rendered a resolution dismissing the case with costs de oficio. It held that the facts constituted no offense because Article 159 punishes one convicted by a court of the legitimate or Commonwealth Government who violates a conditional pardon granted by the Chief Executive thereof, not one convicted by a summary court of the Japanese-sponsored Republic; that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3 were void under General MacArthur's proclamation; and that even granting the Republic was a de facto government, the validity of its acts hostile to the lawful government depended on ultimate success, and having been overthrown, such acts perished with it. The City Fiscal appealed to the Supreme Court. Notably, the Solicitor General, in his brief for the appellant, upheld the lower court's resolution, arguing that while the Republic was a de facto government whose legislative and judicial acts were generally valid, acts hostile to the authority of the national government or impairing constitutional rights were null, and the summary proceedings of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — which denied a fair hearing and the right to appeal — fell within that exception.

• Validity of De Facto Government Acts: The City Fiscal argued that the defunct Republic being a de facto government, the courts created by it as well as the laws and ordinances under it should be upheld as legal in conformity with principles of international law, citing Williams vs. Bruffy for the proposition that the legislation of a de facto government is generally recognized and rights acquired under it are respected after restoration of the expelled authorities.
• Solicitor General's Concession: The Solicitor General, while nominally representing the appellant, upheld the lower court's resolution, arguing that although the Republic was a de facto government whose legislative and judicial acts were valid as a general rule, acts hostile in purpose and mode of enforcement to the authority of the national government, or impairing the rights of citizens under the Constitution, were null and of no effect; the summary procedure of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, which denied the accused a fair hearing and the right to appeal, impaired constitutional rights and was in excess of the de facto government's powers, rendering the sentence and consequent conditional pardon null and ineffective.

• Void Judgment and Pardon: Defendant maintained that both the judgment rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic were void and without legal effect pursuant to General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944.
• Illegitimate Court: Defendant argued that the proceedings of said court were null and void because it was exclusively a creature and agency of the Imperial Japanese Army, and the motives behind its creation were diametrically opposed to the political policies of the present regime.
• Denial of Constitutional Rights: Defendant contended that the fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Commonwealth were denied to an accused under the procedure adopted by said court.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Defendant alleged that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case because it had no authority to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment proceedings commenced and pending in courts under the so-called Republic.

• Validity of the Original Sentence: Whether the sentence of ten years' imprisonment imposed upon the defendant by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied validity after the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
• Prosecution for Violation of Conditional Pardon: Whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having allegedly violated the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.

• Validity of the Original Sentence: The sentence was of no effect upon restoration of the Commonwealth Government. It was of political complexion, penalizing an act not criminal by municipal law, and thus ceased under the right of postliminium.
• Prosecution for Violation of Conditional Pardon: No. The defendant cannot be prosecuted, the effectivity of a conditional pardon depending on that of the sentence it remits; a void sentence renders the pardon ineffective, and no penalty can be imposed for violating a pardon that has no legal basis.

• Validity of the Original Sentence: Pursuant to Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945), judicial acts of the de facto government established by Japanese occupation forces remained good and valid upon restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those of a political complexion. In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (G.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945), the Court expounded on the nature of punitive sentences of political complexion. Applying those principles, the sentence convicting the appellee to ten years' imprisonment was of political complexion because it penalized as a crime an act "not criminal by the municipal law" — namely, a violation of food control regulations promulgated under the Japanese-sponsored Republic. As Hall stated in his treatise on International Law, upon restoration of the legitimate government by virtue of the right of postliminium, "the execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to the acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state." The sentence therefore became of no effect upon reoccupation and restoration.

• Prosecution for Violation of Conditional Pardon: The effectivity of a conditional pardon depends on that of the sentence which inflicts upon a defendant the punishment from which the latter was exempted by the pardon. If a punitive sentence is or becomes null and void, the conditional pardon which remits the punishment inflicted by that sentence ceases to be of any effect insofar as the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned, for the latter cannot be required to serve a void sentence even without such pardon. Furthermore, under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a violator of a conditional pardon must suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence; since the unexpired portion exceeded six years (the appellee having served only about six months of ten years), conviction would require him to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence — but that sentence was now invalid and of no effect. Additionally, violation of a conditional pardon is not a substantive or independent offense but is tied to the original sentence; a conditional pardon constitutes a contract between the sovereign power and the criminal, and if the culprit violates its conditions, the original sentence — which was not nullified but only suspended by the pardon — shall be enforced. But if that sentence can no longer be enforced, no prosecution for violation of the pardon can lie.

• De Facto Government Acts — Political Complexion Exception — Judicial acts of a de facto government established by enemy occupation forces remain good and valid upon restoration of the legitimate government, except those of a political complexion. Political acts and punitive sentences referencing acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state fall through upon restoration by virtue of the right of postliminium. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the sentence imposed by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction for violation of food control regulations under the Japanese-sponsored Republic was of political complexion and ceased upon restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

• Effectivity of Conditional Pardon Depends on Validity of the Sentence — A conditional pardon remits the punishment to be served by virtue of a sentence; it does not set aside the sentence itself. Pardon is prospective, remitting only the penalty not yet suffered. The effectivity of a conditional pardon depends on that of the sentence it remits: if the sentence is or becomes null and void, the conditional pardon ceases to be of any effect. The Court applied this principle to conclude that because the original sentence was void, the conditional pardon was ineffective and no prosecution for its violation could lie.

• Violation of Conditional Pardon Is Not a Substantive Offense — Violation of a conditional pardon is not a substantive or independent offense separate from the crime for which the punishment was remitted. A conditional pardon constitutes a contract between the sovereign power and the criminal; upon violation of its conditions, the original sentence — suspended but not nullified by the pardon — is enforced. If the original sentence can no longer be enforced, the defendant cannot be criminally prosecuted for violation of the conditional pardon.

• "judicial acts of the government de facto established by the Japanese forces of occupation in these Islands remained good and valid, except those which were of a political complexion, upon the restoration of the Commonwealth Government" — This passage restates the controlling doctrine from Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon as applied to the case, distinguishing valid judicial acts from void political acts of a de facto government.

• "the effectivity of a conditional pardon depends on that of the sentence which inflicts upon a defendant the punishment from which the latter was exempted by the pardon. If a punitive sentence is or becomes null and void, the conditional pardon which remits the punishment inflicted by that sentence ceases to be of any effect in so far as the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned" — This is the ratio decidendi for the second issue, articulating the dependency of a conditional pardon's effectivity on the validity of the underlying sentence.

• "Violation of a conditional pardon is not substantive offense or independent of the crime for the commission of which the punishment inflicted in the sentence was remitted by the pardon." — This passage defines the legal nature of a conditional pardon violation, establishing that it is derivative of the original sentence rather than a freestanding offense.

• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945 — Controlling precedent establishing that judicial acts of the de facto government established by Japanese occupation forces remained valid upon restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those of political complexion. Followed and applied to the present case.
• Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945 — Followed for its exposition on the nature and description of punitive sentences of political complexion under international law.
• United States vs. Ignacio, 35 Phil., 202, 204 — Cited for the proposition that a pardoned person who violates the conditions of his pardon is left in the exact situation he was when the pardon was granted, and the original sentence may be enforced against him.
• Williams vs. Bruffy, 26 U.S. 176, 185 — Cited by the City Fiscal in opposing the motion to quash, for the proposition that legislation of a de facto government is generally recognized and rights acquired under it are respected after restoration of expelled authorities.

• Article 159, Revised Penal Code — Punishes violation of a conditional pardon; provides that if the penalty remitted is higher than six years, the convict shall suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence, and if six years or less, he shall suffer prision correccional in its minimum period. The Court held this provision could not be applied because the original sentence it referenced was void.
• Article 36, Revised Penal Code (second paragraph) — Provides that "a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of civil indemnities imposed upon him by the sentence." Cited to confirm that a pardon is prospective and does not nullify the sentence itself, but only suspends its enforcement.
• Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561 — The sources of Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence irrespective of its length. Cited to show the historical basis of the penalty for violating conditional pardon.
• Section 11, Ordinance No. 1 of the President of the Republic — Prohibited unauthorized persons from engaging in the purchase, sale, or transfer of rice and corn. This was the provision the defendant was originally convicted of violating, which the Court characterized as penalizing an act not criminal by municipal law.
• Sections 3(b) and 2(b), Act No. 65, National Assembly of the Republic — Provided for the imposition of the penalty under section 14 of Ordinance No. 1 for violation of the food control provisions by private individuals. The defendant's original conviction was under these provisions.

Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, De Joya, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concurred.

Perfecto, J., concurred, agreeing with the grounds in the lower court's resolution and citing the Court's opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons.

Paras, J., concurred on different grounds, reasoning that under the circumstances of severe food scarcity and starvation during the occupation, the instinct of self-preservation and necessity rendered further prosecutions implausible, and even authorities themselves violated the regulations; he would consider the conditional pardon as having become absolute and beyond the purview of Article 159.

Hilado, J., concurred in the result, reiterating his view from prior cases that the so-called Republic was not even a de facto government within the meaning of international law, citing the Pact of Alliance with Japan, the proclamation of martial law, and the declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain as conclusive evidence that the "Republic" was merely an instrumentality or agency in aid of Japan's war effort, not a genuine de facto government.

• Ozaeta, J. — Concurred in the result but dissented from the ratio decidendi of the majority. He agreed the conditional pardon had no legal basis because the original sentence was null and void. However, he argued the majority's reasoning was untenable: if the sentence was valid and effective during the occupation, the conditional pardon must also have been valid, and the penalty having already been remitted by the pardon, there was no need to declare the sentence "became of no effect" upon restoration. He characterized the majority's theory as illogical — akin to saying a person who died in October 1944 was killed by a bomb dropped in February 1945. He further argued that the majority's resort to Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561 was misplaced because the accused was prosecuted under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, not those earlier acts, and under Article 159 the accused could be sentenced to prision correccional in its minimum period if the conditional pardon were valid. He also disputed the majority's dictum that violation of a conditional pardon is not a substantive offense, noting that under Article 159, when the unexpired portion is less than six years, the convict suffers a distinct penalty of prision correccional minimum.