People vs. Jayson

A person who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2, and the retroactive application of R.A. No. 8294's reduced penalty is barred where the unlicensed firearm was used in the commission of another crime, the proviso in §1 expressly excluding such cases.

Wenceslao Jayson was a reserve member of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) attached to the Davao Metropolitan District Command, but worked as a bouncer at the "Ihaw-Ihaw" nightclub on Bonifacio Street, Davao City. The possession and carrying of firearms by civilians and military personnel were governed by P.D. No. 1866 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, which prescribed the officers authorized to issue mission orders and the qualifications required of recipients. Memorandum Circular No. 8 of the then Ministry of Justice further regulated the issuance of mission orders, requiring that the issuing AFP officer be lawfully authorized and that the recipient be an organic member of the command or a civilian agent in the regular plantilla of a government law-enforcement agency receiving regular compensation.

In the evening of March 16, 1991, Wenceslao Jayson, then working as a bouncer at the "Ihaw-Ihaw" nightclub on Bonifacio Street, Davao City, shot one Nelson Jordan. At around 10:00 p.m., SPO1 Loreto Tenebro and Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio Racolas were patrolling in their car when they received a radio message directing them to proceed to the nightclub, where a shooting had occurred. Upon arrival, they found the victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to Jayson as the gunman. Jayson had fled but was only about ten meters away from the nightclub when the officers arrested him. Seized from his person was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955, four live bullets, and one empty shell.

The firearm and ammunition were covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command. The mission order authorized Jayson to carry the firearm and twelve rounds of ammunition "[t]o intensify intel[ligence] coverage" and was valid for a three-month period from February 8, 1991 to May 8, 1991. It contained restrictions prohibiting the carrying of firearms in places where people gather for political, religious, social, educational, and recreational purposes, including nightclubs, bars, and liquor drinking places, except when the holder was on official mission in such places.

Jayson was initially charged with murder on March 20, 1991 in Criminal Case No. 22,456-91 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Davao City. After plea-bargaining, he pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and was sentenced on September 24, 1991 to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. On July 15, 1991, he was separately charged with illegal possession of firearm. The information was amended on October 8, 1991 to allege that the firearm had been used in the killing of Nelson Jordan on March 16, 1991.

On June 17, 1993, the Regional Trial Court found Jayson guilty and sentenced him to 20 years imprisonment. The trial court found that Jayson had acted in good faith, believing the mission order and memorandum receipt were valid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua and certified the case to the Supreme Court for review. The appellate court held that Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to civilian agents and that Jayson was not qualified to receive one, being a mere CAFGU reserve without regular monthly compensation. The Court of Appeals further ruled that good faith and absence of criminal intent were not valid defenses because the offense was malum prohibitum punishable by special law.

• Good Faith Belief in Authority: Accused-appellant maintained that he acted in the good faith belief that he was authorized to carry the firearm by virtue of the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him by Major Francisco Arquillano of the Davao Metropolitan District Command.
• Failure to Present Certifying Witness: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution's failure to present as witness the government official (SPO4 Welliejado S. Sim) who had certified that Jayson did not appear in the list of license holders was fatal to the prosecution's case, as the certification was merely marked as an exhibit without calling the issuing authority to testify and be cross-examined.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 8294: Accused-appellant contended that the provisions of R.A. No. 8294, which amended P.D. No. 1866 and reduced the penalty for illegal possession of firearm, should be applied retroactively as it was more favorable to him, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest and Search: Whether the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant and the seizure of the firearm from his person were valid.
• Liability for Illegal Possession of Firearm: Whether accused-appellant is liable for illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866 notwithstanding the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him.
• Admissibility of Certification: Whether the prosecution's failure to present the certifying officer as a witness is fatal to the prosecution's case.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 8294: Whether R.A. No. 8294, which reduced the penalty for illegal possession of firearm, may be applied retroactively in favor of accused-appellant.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest and Search: Yes. The warrantless arrest was valid under Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offense having just been committed and the arresting officers having personal knowledge of facts indicating accused-appellant was the assailant. The search and seizure were valid as incident to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, §12.
• Liability for Illegal Possession of Firearm: Yes. Accused-appellant is liable under P.D. No. 1866 because the mission order was issued by an officer not authorized to issue mission orders to civilians and accused-appellant was not qualified to receive one, being a mere CAFGU reserve without regular compensation. Good faith is not a defense to a malum prohibitum offense.
• Admissibility of Certification: No, the objection was waived. Accused-appellant's counsel failed to object to the presentation of the certification during the stipulation of facts and when it was offered in evidence. In any event, accused-appellant did not claim to hold a regular license but only a mission order and memorandum receipt, which were invalid.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 8294: No. R.A. No. 8294 cannot be applied retroactively in this case because the proviso in §1 excludes cases where another crime was committed, and the firearm was used in the killing of Nelson Jordan.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest and Search: Rule 113, §5(b) authorizes a warrantless arrest when an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Here, a shooting had just occurred. The policemen, summoned to the scene, found the victim and were told by bystanders that accused-appellant was the assailant. Accused-appellant had not gone far—only ten meters from the nightclub—and was fleeing when arrested. The arresting officers thus acted on personal knowledge of the victim's death and of facts indicating accused-appellant was the assailant. The subsequent search of his person and seizure of the firearm were likewise lawful under Rule 126, §12, which authorizes a search of a person lawfully arrested for dangerous weapons or evidence of the commission of an offense. The Court relied on People vs. Tonog, Jr., People vs. Gerente, People vs. Acol, and People vs. Lua as analogous precedents upholding warrantless arrests and searches incident thereto.

• Liability for Illegal Possession of Firearm: There was no dispute that accused-appellant possessed the firearm. His defense rested on the mission order and memorandum receipt issued by Major Arquillano. However, under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, §5(a), only specified officers—including the Minister of National Defense, the Chief of Staff AFP, commanders of AFP intelligence units, and METRODISCOM commanders, among others—were authorized to issue mission orders. Major Arquillano was not among them. His claim that Colonel Calida had authorized him to exercise this function was unsupported by any written delegation, and it was doubtful whether Calida could delegate this authority to his deputy. Furthermore, accused-appellant was not qualified to receive a mission order because he was a mere CAFGU reserve without regular monthly compensation; he worked as a nightclub bouncer, and it was in that capacity that he used the firearm. Even assuming the mission order was validly issued, accused-appellant violated its express restrictions by carrying the firearm inside a nightclub, a place where people gather for recreational purposes. His claim that Major Arquillano told him he could carry the firearm anywhere in Davao City was denied by Arquillano, who testified that he had called accused-appellant's attention to the restrictions. Good faith and absence of criminal intent were not valid defenses because the offense is malum prohibitum punishable by special law, as held in People vs. Quijada.

• Admissibility of Certification: The objection based on the prosecution's failure to present the certifying officer was deemed waived because accused-appellant's counsel did not object when the certification was marked during the stipulation of facts, nor when it was offered in evidence. In any event, accused-appellant did not claim to hold a regular license but only a mission order and memorandum receipt, both of which were invalid. The certification was therefore not essential to establishing the absence of a license, as the invalidity of the mission order and memorandum receipt was independently established.

• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 8294: Although Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides for retroactive application of penal laws favorable to the accused, and this provision has been applied to special offenses, R.A. No. 8294 could not benefit accused-appellant. The first paragraph of §1, which provides a lighter penalty, expressly states "Provided, That no other crime was committed." Since the firearm was used in the killing of Nelson Jordan, the proviso excluded this case from the reduced penalty. Nor could the third paragraph of §1, which treats illegal possession as a mere aggravating circumstance when homicide or murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm, be applied, because the case before the Court concerned solely the charge of illegal possession of firearm; the homicide case was not under consideration. The case was therefore governed by People vs. Quijada, which held that a person who kills another with an unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2.

• Malum Prohibitum — Good Faith Not a Defense — When an offense is punished by a special law as malum prohibitum, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. The Court applied this principle to reject accused-appellant's claim that he believed in good faith that the mission order and memorandum receipt authorized him to carry the firearm.

• Warrantless Arrest Under Rule 113, §5(b) — A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant when an offense has in fact just been committed and the officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The Court found this satisfied where policemen responded to a shooting, found the victim, and were pointed to the accused by bystanders moments after the crime, the accused being only ten meters away and fleeing.

• Search Incident to Lawful Arrest Under Rule 126, §12 — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or evidence of the commission of an offense without a search warrant. The seizure of the firearm from accused-appellant's person was upheld as a valid incident of his lawful warrantless arrest.

• Retroactive Application of Penal Laws (Article 22, Revised Penal Code) — Penal laws have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused, and this provision has been applied to special offenses. However, retroactive application is precluded where the new law itself contains a proviso excluding cases where another crime was committed, as in R.A. No. 8294, §1.

• Authority to Issue Mission Orders — Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, §5(a), only enumerated AFP officers may issue mission orders authorizing the carrying of firearms. An officer not among those enumerated cannot issue mission orders, and any purported oral delegation of such authority is insufficient absent written authority. The recipient must be an organic member of the command or a civilian agent in the regular plantilla receiving regular compensation; a mere CAFGU reserve without regular compensation does not qualify.

• "Considering these facts, we hold that the warrantless arrest and search were valid." — This passage states the Court's ruling on the validity of the warrantless arrest and search, applying Rule 113, §5(b) and Rule 126, §12 to facts where officers responded to a shooting and were pointed to the assailant by bystanders moments after the crime.

• "Nor can accused-appellant claim to have acted in the good faith belief that the documents issued to him sufficed as legal authority for him to carry the firearm. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses because the offense committed is malum prohibitum punishable by special law." — This passage articulates the doctrine that good faith is not a defense to a malum prohibitum offense, a principle frequently cited in Philippine criminal law jurisprudence involving violations of special laws.

• "[A] person who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder as the case may be under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2." — This passage states the controlling rule under People vs. Quijada for cases where an unlicensed firearm is used in a killing, affirming that two separate offenses arise and that R.A. No. 8294's reduced penalty does not apply when another crime was committed.

• People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 774 (1992) — Followed. The Court upheld a warrantless arrest where police found a stabbing victim and an informer pointed to the accused as the killer. The blood-stained pants seized as an incident of the lawful arrest were held admissible. Cited to support the validity of the warrantless arrest in the present case.

• People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993) — Followed. The Court upheld a warrantless arrest made three hours after the killing, where a neighbor-witness pointed to the accused as one of the assailants. Cited as analogous precedent under Rule 113, §5(b).

• People vs. Acol, 232 SCRA 406 (1994) — Followed. The Court upheld the warrantless seizure of unlicensed firearms from persons arrested after a jeepney holdup, where victims identified the accused to responding policemen. Cited to support the validity of the search and seizure as incident to a lawful arrest.

• People vs. Lua, 256 SCRA 539 (1996) — Followed. The Court upheld the search of an accused arrested in a buy-bust operation, where a bulge at his waistline turned out to be an unlicensed firearm. Cited as precedent for a valid search incident to lawful arrest under Rule 126, §12.

• People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996) — Controlling precedent. The Court held that a person who kills another with an unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2. Applied as the governing rule for the present case, precluding retroactive application of R.A. No. 8294.

• People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) — Cited. Referenced for the proposition that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code on retroactive application of favorable penal laws has been applied to special offenses.

• P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2 — Prescribes the penalty for illegal possession of firearm, with an aggravated penalty where the unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a person. Applied as the governing law to convict accused-appellant of aggravated illegal possession of firearm.

• P.D. No. 1866, IRR, §5(a) — Enumerates the AFP officers authorized to issue mission orders for the carrying of firearms. Applied to determine that Major Arquillano was not among the authorized officers and therefore could not validly issue the mission order to accused-appellant.

• Memorandum Circular No. 8 (Ministry of Justice, Oct. 16, 1986) — Governs the issuance of mission orders, requiring that the issuing AFP officer be authorized by law and that the recipient be an organic member of the command or a civilian agent in the regular plantilla receiving regular compensation. Applied to show that accused-appellant, a mere CAFGU reserve without regular compensation, was not qualified to receive a mission order.

• Rule 113, §5(b), Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Authorizes warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating the person arrested committed it. Applied to uphold the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.

• Rule 126, §12, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Authorizes search of a person lawfully arrested for dangerous weapons or evidence without a search warrant. Applied to uphold the seizure of the firearm from accused-appellant's person.

• R.A. No. 8294, §1 — Amends P.D. No. 1866, reducing the penalty for illegal possession of low-powered firearms but containing a proviso that the reduced penalty does not apply when another crime is committed, and providing that use of an unlicensed firearm in homicide or murder is an aggravating circumstance. Held not applicable retroactively because the proviso excluded cases where another crime was committed.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not a habitual criminal. Acknowledged as applicable to special offenses but held insufficient to warrant retroactive application of R.A. No. 8294 due to the latter's restrictive proviso.

Regalado, J., and Puno, J., concurred.