People vs. Janssen

A priest or minister is not required to ensure that church banns or proclamations are published for ten days prior to solemnizing a marriage, provided the church's rules require such proclamations, as the ten-day posting period under Section 2 of Act No. 3412 applies only to the municipal secretary and not to the ecclesiastical proclamation.

H. Janssen was a Catholic parish priest in San Jose, Antique. Section 2 of Act No. 3412 governs the posting of notices for marriage licenses, requiring a ten-day posting by the municipal secretary, but contains a proviso dispensing with this requirement for churches requiring banns or publications prior to marriage.

On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdena and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Reverend Father H. Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the marriage registry. On December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish. Because classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked Janssen to marry them before that date. Upon Janssen's petition, the Bishop of Jaro issued a dispensation on December 29, 1928, from one call of the banns, citing urgent business of both parties who were government employees. On January 1, 1929, another proclamation was made.

On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued an authority to solemnize the marriage, authorizing Janssen to marry the parties in accordance with the rites of the Catholic Church and the laws of the Philippine Islands. By virtue of the dispensation and the municipal secretary's authority, Janssen solemnized the marriage on January 6, 1929. The trial court found that Janssen violated Section 2 of Act No. 3412 because the marriage was solemnized before the expiration of ten days from the initial proclamation, and held that he had a duty to inquire into the bride's habitual residence to ensure the proper municipal secretary issued the license.

• Ten-Day Posting Requirement: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in holding that he could not solemnize the marriage without publishing or proclaiming it for ten days prior, asserting that the law does not impose a ten-day requirement on church proclamations.
• Duty to Inquire into Residence: Appellant maintained that it was not his duty to inquire into and determine the habitual residence of the bride before solemnizing the marriage.
• Habitual Residence Finding: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding the bride's habitual residence to be Banga, Capiz, rather than San Jose, Antique.

• Statutory Construction of Act No. 3412: Whether the proclamation or publication of banns required by a church must be made during ten days prior to the celebration of the marriage.
• Duty of the Solemnizing Officer: Whether the law imposes upon a priest or minister the duty to investigate and determine the habitual residence of the bride to ensure the license was issued by the proper official.

• Statutory Construction of Act No. 3412: No. The ten-day posting requirement applies to the municipal secretary, not to the church proclamation; the penal statute must be strictly construed and does not require the church proclamation to last ten days.
• Duty of the Solemnizing Officer: No. The law does not impose this duty upon priests; it is sufficient that the license was issued by a competent official, whose compliance with duties is presumed.

• Statutory Construction of Act No. 3412: Section 2 of Act No. 3412 requires the municipal secretary to post a notice for ten days before issuing a marriage license. However, the proviso states that if the contracting parties desire to marry in a church requiring previous proclamation, there is no need for the municipal secretary's publication, and the license issues immediately. The law does not specify that the church's proclamation must last ten days. Because the statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed against the government. Since the law merely requires that the church requires a proclamation, the number of days the proclamation is made is immaterial. Thus, solemnizing the marriage after two proclamations, with the third dispensed with by ecclesiastical authority, did not violate the statute.
• Duty of the Solemnizing Officer: The trial court found that the priest was bound to investigate whether the license was issued by the official of the municipality where the woman habitually resides. The law, however, does not impose this duty upon priests or ministers. It is sufficient for the solemnizing officer to know that the license was issued by a competent official. Under Section 334, No. 14 of Act No. 190, it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that the official complied with his duty to ascertain the woman's habitual residence.

• Strict Construction of Penal Laws — Penal statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. The Court applied this principle to Section 2 of Act No. 3412, holding that because the law did not explicitly require church proclamations to last ten days, the priest could not be penalized for solemnizing the marriage before ten days had elapsed.
• Presumption of Regularity in Official Duty — Public officials are presumed to have regularly performed their official duties in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The Court applied this presumption (under Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 14) to the municipal secretary who issued the license, presuming he had verified the bride's habitual residence, thereby relieving the priest of any duty to investigate.

• "As section 2 of Act No. 3412 is penal in character, it should be strictly construed. And as said section does not require that the proclamation be made during ten days, but that it is sufficient that the church in which the marriage is to take place requires a proclamation, it is immaterial how many days said proclamation is made in." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, applying the rule of strict construction of penal statutes to conclude that the ten-day period does not apply to church proclamations.
• "The law does not impose this duty upon priests or ministers of religion. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality." — This defines the limits of a solemnizing officer's duty regarding the validity of the marriage license, relying on the presumption of regularity of official acts.

• Section 2, Act No. 3412 — Governs the posting of notices for marriage licenses. The Court construed its proviso, holding that the ten-day posting requirement applies to the municipal secretary, not to church banns.
• Section 334, No. 14, Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) — Provides the presumption that an official has complied with his duty. The Court used this to presume the municipal secretary properly ascertained the bride's residence, negating any duty on the priest to investigate.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concurred.