People vs. Jacinto

A child in conflict with the law who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years for suspended sentence remains entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration under R.A. No. 9344, including confinement in an agricultural camp or training facility under Section 51, provided the offense was committed while the offender was still of tender age; and for purposes of graduating the penalty under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is still the starting point even though its imposition is prohibited by R.A. No. 9346.

The accused-appellant Hermie M. Jacinto and the victim's family were neighbors in a rural barangay, with the appellant's residence located approximately 80 meters behind the house of the victim's father, FFF. The appellant and FFF were close friends, and the victim, AAA — born on 3 December 1997 — knew the appellant well, calling him "kuya." The appellant lived with his aunt, Gloria Perocho, whose house was near the rice field where the crime was committed. The case required the application of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), enacted on 28 April 2006, to an offender who was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on 28 January 2003 but had already turned 25 by the time of the Supreme Court's decision.

Hermie M. Jacinto and the family of the victim, AAA, were neighbors in a rural barangay. The house of AAA's father, FFF, stood along the road, while the appellant's family home lay approximately 80 meters behind it, such that the appellant had to pass by FFF's house to access the road. The appellant and FFF were close friends, and the appellant occasionally worked for FFF. AAA, born on 3 December 1997, knew the appellant well, calling him "kuya" and seeing him regularly at the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by on his way to the road.

At about past 6 o'clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes, and AAA followed. A neighbor, Julito Apiki, went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum. There, Julito saw the appellant place AAA on his lap; the appellant was wearing a sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants. All three left the store at the same time, with Julito proceeding to the house of Rita Lingcay to watch television while the appellant, holding AAA's hand, walked toward the "lower area." According to AAA, the appellant led her to the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho, made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty, and boxed her on the chest. He then mounted her, pushed her legs apart, and inserted his penis into her vagina, making a push and pull movement. AAA felt pain and cried. Afterwards, the appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos' house, while AAA went straight home, crying and without slippers.

FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. He found her face greasy, with mud on her head and blood oozing from the back of her head. There was a contusion on her neck turning black, and she had no underwear on; he observed white substance and mud on her vagina. AAA told him that the appellant had brought her from the store to the grassy area behind the Perochos' house, thrown away her slippers, removed her panty, choked her, and boxed her breast. FFF went to the Perochos' house and found the appellant there. When asked what he did to AAA, the appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him. FFF returned home to check on his daughter, then went back and boxed the appellant. Meanwhile, Julito, still watching television at Rita's house, saw AAA arrive with her mother, crying. Julito embraced the child and asked what happened; she replied that the appellant raped her. Julito then found the appellant at the Perochos' and asked him whether he really raped the child, but the appellant ignored the question. When the appellant's aunt Gloria warned that policemen were coming, the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow and my knees." Julito observed that the appellant's elbows and knees were indeed dirty.

That same evening, FFF and AAA went to the police station to have the incident blottered, and FFF had AAA examined at the municipal health center. Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar issued a medical certificate dated 29 January 2003 documenting multiple abrasions on the neck, petechial hemorrhages on both periorbital areas, hematomas on the left upper arm and upper anterior chest wall, abrasion on the posterior trunk, genital and perianal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material, erythematous introitus with minimal bleeding, and hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions. Upon Dr. Gaspar's recommendation, AAA was examined the following day at the provincial hospital by Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, who issued a medico-legal certificate confirming Dr. Gaspar's findings except that there was no longer any bleeding at the time of the second examination.

The appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that at about 8 o'clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, he went to the Perochos' house to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while gathered in a drinking session with visitors including his uncle Alejandro Perocho, his uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store was only about 20 meters away, he returned within three minutes. His aunt Gloria confirmed that he was at her house attending the party and went out briefly between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy Tanduay, returning about five minutes later with clean white shorts and white sleeveless shirt. Another defense witness, Luzvilla Balucan, testified that at about 6:30 in the evening she saw Julito — not the appellant — carry AAA on the road near the Perochos' house, with the child's face covered and wiggling. Luzvilla claimed that about three minutes later she saw Julito, now wearing a white T-shirt, running toward Rita's house with AAA slowly following behind. The defense also presented Antonia Perocho, who testified that at around 7:10 in the evening, Julito entered Rita's house drunk, wearing only black short pants and no shirt, and that AAA arrived crying about 10 minutes later. The defense attempted to impute the crime to Julito. However, the trial court found the defense witnesses' testimonies riddled with inconsistencies: Gloria contradicted the appellant's claim that Alejandro sent him to the store by revealing that her husband was at work the entire time and that it was actually a fish vendor who asked the appellant to buy Tanduay; Luzvilla's account of Julito's clothing and the timing of AAA's arrival at Rita's house conflicted with Antonia's testimony; and the defense witnesses were all related to or connected with the appellant, failing to qualify as disinterested corroborators.

• Reasonable Doubt: Appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him beyond reasonable doubt, invoking the principle that if inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction.
• Alibi: Appellant maintained that he was at the Perochos' house attending a birthday party at the time of the commission of the crime, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis.
• Imputation to Another: Appellant attempted to impute the crime to Julito Apiki, presenting witnesses who testified that they saw Julito carry AAA on the road near the Perochos' house.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution established the accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.
• Credibility of Identification vs. Alibi: Whether the victim's positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator prevails over the defense of alibi.
• Retroactivity of R.A. No. 9344: Whether Republic Act No. 9344 applies retroactively to the accused-appellant who was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
• Discernment: Whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment such that he is not exempt from criminal liability under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344.
• Proper Imposable Penalty: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly computed the imposable penalty by excluding death from the graduation of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Suspended Sentence: Whether the benefits of automatic suspension of sentence under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 apply to the accused-appellant despite having exceeded the maximum age of 21 years.
• Appropriate Disposition: What is the appropriate disposition for a child in conflict with the law who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years for suspended sentence.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt through the victim's straightforward and consistent testimony, corroborated by medical findings of hymenal lacerations and soft tissue injuries consistent with penetration.
• Credibility of Identification vs. Alibi: No, the alibi cannot prevail. Positive identification by the victim, who was well acquainted with the appellant, prevails over alibi, especially where physical impossibility was not established and corroborating witnesses were biased and inconsistent.
• Retroactivity of R.A. No. 9344: Yes. Section 68 of R.A. No. 9344 allows retroactive application to those convicted of offenses committed while below 18 years of age, with more reason where the conviction is still under review.
• Discernment: Yes. The accused-appellant acted with discernment, as shown by his choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime and boxing the victim to weaken her defense, indicating mental capacity to appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
• Proper Imposable Penalty: No, the Court of Appeals erred. The penalty of death remains the starting point for graduation under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code; reducing it one degree yields reclusion perpetua, not reclusion temporal.
• Suspended Sentence: No. The benefits of suspended sentence can no longer apply because the appellant had already reached 25 years of age, exceeding the maximum age limit of 21 years under Section 40 of R.A. No. 9344 and Section 48 of the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law.
• Appropriate Disposition: The case is remanded to the court of origin for the appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility pursuant to Section 51 of R.A. No. 9344, giving effect to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Court applied three well-entrenched principles in rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility and is difficult to disprove; (2) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits. AAA's testimony was straightforward and consistent, answering questions phrased and re-phrased to test her understanding. She described how the appellant mounted her, pushed her legs apart, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made a push and pull movement, causing pain. Youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty. The medical findings of Dr. Gaspar and Dr. Micabalo — hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions, erythematous introitus, and soft tissue injuries — corroborated the testimony and conclusively established carnal knowledge. Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, a man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under 12 years of age even without force, threat, intimidation, or other circumstances. AAA was only five years old at the time.

• Credibility of Identification vs. Alibi: A victim of rape can readily identify her assailant, especially when he is not a stranger. AAA had known the appellant all her life and even walked with him from the store to the situs criminus, making recognition certain. The trial court's credibility findings deserve full weight and respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. The defense attempted to impute the crime to Julito, but AAA was steadfast on rebuttal, asserting that it was the appellant, not Julito, who molested her. The defense of alibi cannot prosper because it was not physically impossible for the appellant to be at the locus criminis. Physical impossibility refers to distance and facility of access between the situs criminus and the accused's location. The farmland where the crime occurred was just behind the Perochos' house, and the appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned. The defense witnesses' testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies: Gloria contradicted the appellant's claim that Alejandro sent him to the store; Luzvilla's account of Julito's clothing and the timing of events conflicted with Antonia's testimony; and all corroborating witnesses were related to or connected with the appellant, failing to qualify as disinterested witnesses. In People vs. Paraiso, a distance of 2,000 meters was held not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even on foot. In People vs. Antivola, the Court disregarded corroborating testimonies where the locus criminis was a stone's throw away from where the accused claimed to be.

• Retroactivity of R.A. No. 9344: Section 68 of R.A. No. 9344 allows retroactive application of the Act to persons convicted and serving sentence at the time of its effectivity who were below 18 years at the time of the offense. Following People vs. Sarcia, with more reason should the Act apply where the conviction is still under review. The crime was committed on 28 January 2003, three years before the Act was enacted on 28 April 2006, but the appellant was 17 years old at the time of the offense.

• Discernment: Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 exempts a child above 15 but below 18 years of age from criminal liability unless the child acted with discernment. Discernment is the mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act, determinable from all facts and circumstances in the record. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong, including the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime to prevent detection, and boxing the victim to weaken her defense, were indicative of his mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.

• Proper Imposable Penalty: The victim was only five years old at the time of the rape, bringing the case within Article 266-B, paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven years old. Two factors called for reduction: (1) the prohibition against the death penalty under R.A. No. 9346; and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reduces the penalty one degree lower than prescribed. The Court of Appeals, relying on People vs. Bon, excluded death from the graduated scales in Article 71 and lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal. The Supreme Court disagreed, citing People vs. Sarcia, where the Court En Banc clarified that for purposes of determining the proper penalty under Article 68, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, reducing death by one degree yields reclusion perpetua, not reclusion temporal.

• Suspended Sentence: Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 mandates automatic suspension of sentence for a child in conflict with the law under 18 years at the time of the offense, without need of application, even if the juvenile is already 18 or older at the time of pronouncement of guilt. The earlier ruling in Declarador vs. Gubaton — which held that suspension of sentence does not apply to those convicted of offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — was overturned by People vs. Sarcia. R.A. No. 9344 makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense, and under the principle that when the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, promulgated En Banc on 24 November 2009, reflected the same position. However, the suspension of sentence lasts only until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years, pursuant to Section 40 of the Act and Section 48 of the Rule. The appellant was already 25 years old, so the benefits of suspended sentence could no longer apply.

• Appropriate Disposition: Notwithstanding the lapse of the period for suspended sentence, the legislative intent of R.A. No. 9344 — the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law — should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21, so long as the crime was committed while the offender was still a child. The offender is entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with the Act. The age of the child at the time of promulgation of judgment is not material; what matters is that the offense was committed while of tender age. Pursuant to Section 51 of R.A. No. 9344, the appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility in lieu of a regular penal institution. Following Sarcia, the case was remanded to the court of origin to effect such confinement.

• Three Principles in Rape Cases — (1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Applied in this case to uphold the conviction based on AAA's credible testimony corroborated by medical findings.

• Alibi Cannot Prevail Over Positive Identification — The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator, except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the crime. Applied in this case: the appellant was positively identified by AAA, and physical impossibility was not proven because the crime scene was only a few minutes' walk from where the appellant claimed to be.

• Physical Impossibility — Refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminus and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity. Applied: the farmland where the rape occurred was just behind the Perochos' house, and the appellant could have committed the rape during his brief errand to the store.

• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344 — Section 68 of R.A. No. 9344 allows retroactive application to persons convicted and serving sentence at the time of the Act's effectivity who were below 18 years at the time of the offense. With more reason, it applies where the conviction is still under review.

• Discernment — The mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act, determinable from all facts and circumstances in the record. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong, including the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness. Applied: the appellant's choice of an isolated place and boxing the victim indicated discernment.

• Death as Starting Penalty for Graduation Under Article 68 — For purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with, even though its imposition is prohibited by R.A. No. 9346. Reducing death by one degree yields reclusion perpetua. This clarified and corrected the approach in People vs. Bon, which excluded death from the graduated scales.

• Automatic Suspension of Sentence Under R.A. No. 9344 — Section 38 mandates automatic suspension of sentence for a child in conflict with the law under 18 at the time of the offense, without need of application, even if the juvenile is already 18 or older at the time of pronouncement of guilt. R.A. No. 9344 makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. However, suspension lasts only until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.

• Right to Restoration, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration Beyond Age 21 — A child in conflict with the law who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years for suspended sentence remains entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration under R.A. No. 9344. The age of the child at the time of promulgation of judgment is not material; what matters is that the offense was committed while the offender was still of tender age. The offender may be confined in an agricultural camp or training facility under Section 51 in lieu of a regular penal institution.

• "However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the proper computation of the imposable penalty when the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority applies to a crime originally punishable by death, clarifying that death remains the baseline for graduation under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code notwithstanding R.A. No. 9346.

• "The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. xxx Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime." — This quotation, adopted from People vs. Sarcia, articulates the canonical formulation of the rule that automatic suspension of sentence under R.A. No. 9344 applies regardless of the gravity of the offense, overturning the prior exclusion of capital offenses in Declarador vs. Gubaton.

• "to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age." — This passage defines the scope of the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration under R.A. No. 9344, extending protective disposition beyond the age limit for suspended sentence and forming the basis for the remand to the court of origin for confinement in an agricultural camp under Section 51.

• "When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape was committed." — This frequently cited formulation encapsulates the principle that the credible testimony of the victim alone may suffice to establish the crime of rape, particularly when the victim is a minor whose youth and immaturity serve as badges of truth and honesty.

• People vs. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009 — Controlling precedent on three points: (1) retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 to those below 18 at the time of the offense; (2) automatic suspension of sentence applies regardless of the nature of the offense, overturning Declarador vs. Gubaton; and (3) death remains the penalty to be reckoned with for graduation under Article 68, so that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Court also followed Sarcia in remanding the case for confinement in an agricultural camp under Section 51.

• People vs. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, 30 October 2006 — Distinguished and corrected. The Court of Appeals relied on Bon to exclude death from the graduated scales in Article 71, thereby reducing the penalty to reclusion temporal. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding per Sarcia that death is still the starting point for graduation.

• People vs. Antivola, G.R. No. 139236, 3 February 2004 — Followed on the principles that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification and that physical impossibility must be clearly established. The Court quoted Antivola's reasoning that where the locus criminis is a short distance from where the accused claims to be, the claim of continuous presence is unacceptable.

• People vs. Paraiso, G.R. No. 131823, 17 January 2001 — Followed on the requirement of physical impossibility for alibi. A distance of 2,000 meters was held not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even on foot.

• Declarador vs. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, 18 August 2006 — Overturned by People vs. Sarcia on the issue of whether suspension of sentence applies to a child convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. The Court noted that R.A. No. 9344, unlike P.D. No. 603, makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense.

• People vs. Mateo — Cited for the procedural rule allowing intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, which caused the transfer of the case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.

• Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), Revised Penal Code (as amended by The Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — Defines rape as committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a child under 12 years of age, even without force, threat, intimidation, or other circumstances. Applied because the victim was only five years old at the time of the offense.

• Article 266-B, paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code (as amended by The Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — Prescribes the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven years old. Applied as the prescribed penalty before consideration of mitigating circumstances, establishing death as the baseline for graduation.

• Article 68, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. Applied to reduce the penalty one degree from death to reclusion perpetua.

• Article 71, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the graduated scales for penalties lower or higher by one or more degrees than a given penalty. Scale No. 1 lists death as the first degree, reclusion perpetua as the second, and reclusion temporal as the third. The Court clarified that death remains the starting point for graduation notwithstanding R.A. No. 9346.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. Applied as one of two factors calling for reduction of the penalty, the other being the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344 — Exempts a child above 15 but below 18 years of age from criminal liability unless the child acted with discernment. Applied: the appellant, being 17 at the time of the offense, was not exempt because he acted with discernment.

• Section 38, Republic Act No. 9344 — Mandates automatic suspension of sentence for a child in conflict with the law under 18 at the time of the offense, without need of application, even if the juvenile is already 18 or older at the time of pronouncement of guilt. Applied: the provision was discussed but its benefits could no longer apply because the appellant had exceeded the age limit of 21.

• Section 40, Republic Act No. 9344 — Provides that suspension of sentence may be extended only until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Applied: the appellant was already 25, so the benefits of suspended sentence could no longer apply.

• Section 51, Republic Act No. 9344 — Authorizes confinement of a convicted child in conflict with the law in an agricultural camp or other training facility in lieu of a regular penal institution, under the coordination of the Bureau of Corrections and the DSWD. Applied: the case was remanded to the court of origin to effect the appellant's confinement in such a facility.

• Section 68, Republic Act No. 9344 — Allows retroactive application of the Act to persons convicted and serving sentence at the time of its effectivity who were below 18 at the time of the offense. Applied: the Act was applied retroactively to the appellant, whose conviction was still under review.

• Article 192, Presidential Decree No. 603 (as amended) — The prior law on suspension of sentence for youthful offenders, which excluded those convicted of offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. Discussed as superseded by R.A. No. 9344, which makes no such distinction.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, and Mariano C. del Castillo. No separate concurring opinions were written.