People vs. Itlanas

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt; and an extrajudicial confession obtained after full compliance with Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution — where the accused is informed of and voluntarily waives the right to remain silent and to counsel — is admissible in evidence.

Adventor Itlanas y Bautiso served as the oiler aboard Tugboat M/V San Pedro San Pablo, a vessel transporting cement between ports in the Visayas and Mindanao. The tugboat's crew numbered sixteen, including Captain Diosdado Gaje and 3rd Engineer Nilo Pantoja. For security during voyages, three members of the Philippine Constabulary — Sgt. Amelito Perez, CIC Edmar Mag-aso, and CSC Winifredo Villamor — were detailed as escorts. The killings occurred during the return leg of a cement-delivery trip from Zamboanga City to Danao City in July 1978.

In June 1978, Tugboat M/V San Pedro San Pablo departed Danao City for Zamboanga City carrying 35,000 bags of cement, with sixteen crew members aboard including Captain Diosdado Gaje, 3rd Engineer Nilo Pantoja, and appellant Adventor Itlanas y Bautiso, the vessel's oiler. Three Philippine Constabulary members — Sgt. Amelito Perez, CIC Edmar Mag-aso, and CSC Winifredo Villamor — were assigned as security escorts. The cement was unloaded at Zamboanga City port on July 2, 1978. On the evening of July 11, 1978, the tugboat began its return voyage to Danao City, with apprentice Manuel Flores joining the group.

At approximately ten o'clock in the morning of July 12, 1978, Sgt. Perez was playing cards with a crew member inside the sergeant's cabin, while CIC Mag-aso was on deck duty, unarmed. Itlanas went to the upper deck and took Mag-aso's armalite rifle, which was hanging on the wall. He returned to the lower deck and concealed himself behind the steering wheel, facing Perez's cabin. When Perez's card companion left the cabin, Itlanas approached the sergeant, who was seated on a cot still holding the playing cards, and suddenly fired, hitting him on the neck and killing him instantaneously. Itlanas then proceeded to the upper deck, where Mag-aso attempted to grab the armalite but was instead fired upon and killed on the spot. Manuel Flores was struck by stray bullets and was found profusely bleeding when Captain Gaje and the other crew members emerged from their rooms.

For his part, Itlanas testified that 3rd Engineer Pantoja had reminded him of a plan to disarm the PC escorts, informing him that his contact man was already on the upper deck and that one of the oilers was entertaining one of the escorts. Fearing for his life, Itlanas went to the upper deck, followed by Pantoja, and upon seeing an opportunity to escape, jumped overboard. He heard explosions while clinging to a rope and reached the barge. When told the tugboat was returning, he jumped overboard again, fearing that Pantoja and Gaje might order him shot for refusing to help disarm the escorts. He was later fished out, directed to the upper deck where he saw Perez already dead, instructed to pick up the gun and put it down, and then tied to the stern of the tugboat. This testimony was not corroborated.

The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, in its decision dated May 12, 1982, found Itlanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the death of Sgt. Perez, homicide for the death of CIC Mag-aso, and homicide thru reckless imprudence for the death of Manuel Flores. The trial court credited the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, noting that when Itlanas jumped into the sea from the barge and was aimed at by CSC Villamor, he raised his hands and shouted that he would surrender.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellant contended that he could not be convicted beyond reasonable doubt because there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crimes despite the presence of fifteen crew members on the small tugboat.
• Inadmissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Appellant argued that his extrajudicial confession (Exhibits P and P-7) should not have been admitted in evidence because it was taken without the assistance of counsel and obtained through physical and psychological coercion employed by Nilo Pantoja, Diosdado Gaje, and peace officers.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution while disregarding the defense's theory.
• Failure of Moral Certainty: Appellant asserted that his guilt did not pass the test of moral certainty.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether circumstantial evidence, absent an eyewitness to the killings, is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession was obtained in compliance with Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution and is therefore admissible in evidence.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court properly credited the prosecution's testimonies over the defense's theory.
• Classification of the Death of Manuel Flores: Whether the death of Manuel Flores, who was hit by stray bullets during the shooting of CIC Mag-aso, constitutes homicide thru reckless imprudence or homicide under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The circumstantial evidence — motive, flight, and admission as part of the res gestae — satisfied the three requisites of Section 5, Rule 133 of the New Rules of Court and produced conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Yes. The accused was fully apprised of his constitutional rights under Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution, including the right to remain silent and to counsel, and voluntarily waived those rights without coercion; the confession was therefore admissible.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes. The prosecution's testimonies were properly credited, and the defense's uncorroborated theory that Pantoja and Gaje masterminded a plan to disarm the escorts was deemed incredible.
• Classification of the Death of Manuel Flores: Modified to homicide. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; the stray bullets that killed Flores resulted from the felony of shooting Mag-aso.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Section 5, Rule 133 of the New Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court identified three proven circumstances. First, motive was established through the testimony of prosecution witness Apolinar Banzon, who recounted that Itlanas had told him on a prior voyage that he wanted to disarm the PC escorts to "get rich overnight." Second, flight was proven: immediately after the gun explosions, Nilo Pantoja saw appellant holding an armalite, and upon being asked about the incident, appellant ran away and jumped into the sea. The Court found his explanation — that he jumped for fear that Pantoja and Gaje might harm him — incredible, noting that he could have reported the matter to the PC escorts instead of risking the dangers of the sea, and that if Pantoja and Gaje were truly the masterminds, they would not have advised Villamor not to shoot him. Third, appellant admitted the commission of the crime immediately after the startling occurrence, telling witness Tomas Ramonida in the barge that "he was the one who made the firing in the tugboat" and that he was going to escape. This conversation was held admissible as part of the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court concluded that these circumstances, even without the extrajudicial confession and eyewitness identification, all pointed to appellant as the author of the crimes.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The Court held that Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution had been fully complied with. The investigator, Sgt. Ludivico Q. Floreza, informed appellant of his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, and that the government would shoulder the expenses if he could not afford a lawyer. Appellant acknowledged understanding these rights, expressly stated that a lawyer was not necessary, and volunteered to answer questions. The Court found that appellant was fully apprised of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his waiver. The Court further noted the absence of physical injuries on appellant's body, the absence of any complaint filed for maltreatment, and the fact that the confession contained details only appellant could have known and could not have been concocted by the investigator.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The defense's theory that Pantoja and Gaje had planned to disarm the PC escorts and that Itlanas was merely a coerced participant was rejected as incredible and uncorroborated. The Court found that appellant's flight and his admission to Ramonida were inconsistent with innocence, and that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were properly credited by the trial court.

• Classification of the Death of Manuel Flores: The trial court had convicted appellant of homicide thru reckless imprudence for Flores's death, reasoning that Flores was hit by stray bullets fired under a "desperate impulse." The Supreme Court corrected this, holding that the proper crime is homicide under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Because appellant was committing the felony of shooting Mag-aso, the stray bullets that killed Flores rendered him criminally liable for homicide, not homicide thru reckless imprudence. The penalty was accordingly modified to imprisonment of from eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence — Under Section 5, Rule 133 of the New Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this test by identifying three proven circumstances — motive, flight, and admission as part of the res gestae — and holding that their combination established guilt beyond reasonable doubt even without an eyewitness or the extrajudicial confession.

• Res Gestae as Exception to the Hearsay Rule — Statements made by a person immediately after a startling occurrence, relating to that occurrence, are admissible as part of the res gestae and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court applied this doctrine to admit appellant's admission to witness Ramonida in the barge that he "was the one who made the firing in the tugboat."

• Constitutional Rights During Custodial Investigation — Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution requires that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and shall be informed of such rights; no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any means vitiating free will shall be used; any confession obtained in violation shall be inadmissible. The Court found full compliance, as the investigator informed appellant of all rights and appellant voluntarily waived them.

• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Criminal Liability for a Felony Though Wrongful Act Differs from Intent — Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The Court applied this provision to hold that appellant was guilty of homicide — not homicide thru reckless imprudence — for the death of Flores, who was struck by stray bullets while appellant was committing the felony of shooting Mag-aso.

• "The preceding circumstances, even without the extrajudicial confession (Exhibits 'P' and 'P-7') and the positive Identification of eyewitnesses, all point to appellant as the author of the crimes." — This passage articulates the Court's holding that circumstantial evidence alone — motive, flight, and admission as res gestae — sufficed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, independent of the confession.

• "The provision of the law is so clear that there is no room for interpretation." — This statement accompanies the Court's application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code to reclassify the death of Flores from homicide thru reckless imprudence to homicide, emphasizing the straightforward textual basis for the ruling.

• "Thus, appellant was fully apprised of his constitutional rights under custodial investigation and the consequences of his waiver of said rights. Nonetheless, he volunteered to give an extra-judicial confession, Exhibits 'P' and 'P-7', which are unquestionably admissible." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the admissibility of the confession, finding that constitutional safeguards were satisfied and the waiver was voluntary.

• People vs. Layos, 60 Phil. 224 — Cited by the trial court for the proposition that multiple killings constitute distinct and juridically independent acts that should be separately punished; the Supreme Court did not disturb this ruling.

• Section 5, Rule 133, New Rules of Court — Sets forth the three requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction: (a) more than one circumstance; (b) proven facts from which inferences are derived; and (c) combination of circumstances producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found all three satisfied.
• Section 20, Article IV, New Constitution — Guarantees the right against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent and to counsel during custodial investigation; renders confessions obtained in violation inadmissible. The Court held that this provision was fully complied with.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Applied to reclassify the killing of Flores from homicide thru reckless imprudence to homicide.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, and Alampay, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

• Teehankee, J. — Concurred in the affirmance of the conviction, finding sufficient evidence — particularly the positive identification by eyewitnesses, apart from the extrajudicial confession — to establish guilt. Dissented, however, from the majority's finding that the extrajudicial confession was admissible. Justice Teehankee argued that the "foreword" question and answer exchange between the military investigator and the accused reeked of formulism, with the accused's unusually glib and voluble answer appearing to have been put in his mouth rather than genuinely given. He cited People vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2), where the Court struck down a perfunctory monosyllabic "Yes" as an unacceptable voluntary and intelligent waiver, and Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA 538), which held that the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Justice Teehankee emphasized that formulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over facts that contradict them and may not become a cloak for inquisitorial practices.