People vs. Hon. Francisco Men Abad

The Court held that an Information for "Theft of Minerals" under P.D. No. 463, as amended, is sufficient if it alleges that the accused (1) extracted, removed, and/or disposed of minerals; (2) the minerals belong to the Government or were taken from a mining claim leased, held, or owned by another person; and (3) the accused did not possess the requisite mining lease or permit from the proper government authority. The act constitutes a crime malum prohibitum under a special law, and the presence of malice or criminal intent is not an essential element.

The Director of Mines had issued a commercial lease permit to Felix de Castro, granting him the exclusive right to quarry sand and gravel from the Sumigar Quarry in Banawe, Ifugao. On the strength of de Castro's complaint, an Information was filed against private respondents (Julius Robles and thirteen others) in the Court of First Instance of Ifugao, charging them with "Theft of Minerals." The Information alleged that from March to September 1978, the respondents, without a permit, willfully extracted and disposed of sand and gravel from the permitted quarry site for their own gain, causing damage to the permittee.

• Prior to March 27, 1978, the Director of Mines issued a commercial lease permit to Felix de Castro for the exclusive right to quarry sand and gravel from the Sumigar Quarry in Banawe, Ifugao.
• Based on de Castro's complaint, an Information was filed charging private respondents with "Theft of Minerals" under Section 78 of P.D. No. 463, as amended.
• The Information alleged that from March to September 1978, the respondents conspired to extract and dispose of sand and gravel from the quarry without a permit, using force and intimidation against the permittee's workers, and disposed of the minerals for gain under contracts with government and private entities.
• Respondents moved to quash, presenting official receipts for "sand and gravel tax" paid to the Municipal Treasurer and invoking LOI No. 243, which they argued permitted the extraction.
• The prosecution opposed, arguing that municipal tax payments are not the mining permits required by the Bureau of Mines and that LOI No. 243 applies only to government entities.
• Respondent Judge quashed the Information, ruling that the violation was merely administrative and that the element of malice for theft was lacking.

• Petitioner (represented by the Solicitor General) argued that the Information alleged all essential elements of "Theft of Minerals" under P.D. No. 463.
• It contended that the lower court erred by considering evidence extrinsic to the Information (the tax receipts and LOI No. 243) at the quashal stage, as these matters constituted defenses that should be proven during trial.
• Petitioner maintained that payment of local taxes does not equate to the mining permit required by national mining laws, and LOI No. 243 does not authorize private individuals to extract minerals from a leased area.

• Respondents-accused argued that the facts charged did not constitute an offense because their taking of sand and gravel was with the consent of the government, evidenced by their payment of "sand and gravel tax" to the Municipal Treasurer.
• They invoked LOI No. 243, which they interpreted as allowing persons to extract sand and gravel even within a leased area for use in government infrastructure projects.
• Respondent Judge, in quashing the Information, reasoned that the violation was merely administrative under P.D. No. 463 and that the crime of Theft under the Revised Penal Code was not committed due to lack of malice.

• Procedural Issues: Whether respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information based on matters outside its allegations.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the facts alleged in the Information constitute the offense of "Theft of Minerals" under Section 78 of P.D. No. 463, as amended.

• Procedural: The Court found that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion. In resolving a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court's inquiry is limited to the sufficiency of the Information's allegations. By considering the tax receipts and LOI No. 243 as evidence to negate an element of the offense, the judge prematurely adjudicated matters of defense that should be ventilated during trial.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the Information was sufficient. It alleged all three elements of "Theft of Minerals": (1) the extraction and disposal of minerals; (2) from a quarry covered by another's permit; and (3) without the accused possessing the required permit from the Secretary or Director of Mines. The Court emphasized that offenses under special laws like P.D. No. 463 are mala prohibita; the act alone, irrespective of motive or malice, constitutes the offense. Therefore, the lower court's finding of lack of malice was erroneous.

• Sufficiency of Information in Mala Prohibita Offenses — For crimes defined by special laws, the Information is sufficient if it alleges all the acts constituting the offense as defined by the statute. The prosecution need not allege or prove criminal intent (mens rea), as the doing of the prohibited act constitutes the crime itself. The Court applied this to find the Information for "Theft of Minerals" under P.D. No. 463 sufficient.
• Limited Scope of Quashal on Ground of "No Offense Charged" — When a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the Information. Its inquiry is confined to whether those facts, if admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense as defined by law. It cannot consider evidence aliunde or matters of defense. The Court found the lower court violated this principle by relying on the respondents' tax receipts.

• "In crimes punished by special laws, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense." — This passage underscores the nature of mala prohibita and was central to the Court's rejection of the lower court's "lack of malice" rationale.

• People vs. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 (1958) — Cited for the basic rule that in resolving a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the test is whether the facts alleged in the Information, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense as defined by law.

• Section 78, Presidential Decree No. 463 (as amended by P.D. No. 1385) — The substantive provision defining and penalizing the crime of "Theft of Minerals." The Court dissected its elements to test the sufficiency of the Information.
• Section 2(a), Rule 117, Rules of Court — The procedural rule providing that a motion to quash may be filed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
• Article 308, Revised Penal Code — The general theft provision, which the lower court erroneously applied by requiring malice. The Court distinguished the offense charged as one under a special law.