People vs. Hipolito

An extrajudicial confession executed before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution is admissible even if the accused was neither informed of his right to remain silent nor assisted by counsel, because the right to counsel during custodial investigation was first introduced by the 1973 Constitution and operates prospectively. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price or reward are not incompatible; both may be separately appreciated to qualify the killing and determine the penalty.

Concepcion Bustamante Ang was shot twice and killed on September 18, 1966 while making a telephone call outside a store in Malate, Manila. The crime remained unsolved for more than a year and a half. In May 1968, the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary ordered Agent Pedro Jesuitas to investigate and to file charges if evidence warranted. The investigation quickly led to Feliciano Hipolito, who confessed and implicated Cirilo Malagamba, the driver of the victim’s husband.

• The Killing: On September 18, 1966, Concepcion Bustamante Ang was shot and mortally wounded while making a telephone call outside a small tienda near the corner of San Bartolome Street and Harrison Boulevard (now Pres. Quirino Avenue) in Malate, Manila. The necropsy report showed two through-and-through gunshot wounds to the chest that penetrated the left lung, right lung, heart, and aorta, causing hemorrhage and shock.
• Investigation and Arrests: The crime was unsolved for over a year and a half. On May 9, 1968, the CIS ordered Agent Pedro Jesuitas to investigate. During the investigation, Jesuitas learned that Feliciano Hipolito was responsible. Hipolito was arrested on May 16, 1968 and brought to Camp Crame. Upon questioning, Hipolito admitted killing the victim and implicated “Cirilo,” the driver of Ang Kung alias Vicente Ang, as the person who hired him to kill the deceased for ₱5,000 at the instance of Vicente Ang. Cirilo Malagamba was taken into custody on May 20, 1968; after questioning, he also admitted participation.
• Prosecution’s Version of the Confession: Hipolito executed a written extrajudicial confession on May 16, 1968. CIS Agent Jesuitas testified that Hipolito furnished the statements freely and voluntarily. Captain Protacio Laroya, before whom Hipolito subscribed and swore to the confession, testified that Hipolito read the document in his presence, acknowledged understanding its contents, and affixed his signature voluntarily. On May 17, 1968, Hipolito was brought before Col. Dumlao, the CIS chief, and confronted with Vicente Ang; Hipolito pointed to Vicente Ang as the mastermind. Photographs taken on May 17, 1968 showed no signs of maltreatment.
• Defense Version: Hipolito claimed that after his arrest, Jesuitas took him first to Jesuitas’s house in Santolan, Pasig, then to the Manhattan Hotel in Pasay City. There, Jesuitas allegedly urged him to admit being the triggerman and to implicate Vicente Ang so they could get money from Ang, promising Hipolito he would not be jailed. Hipolito initially refused but relented after Jesuitas slapped him and dunked his head in a toilet bowl containing excreta. He was given soap and a towel to bathe, then made to sign papers without being allowed to read them; when he insisted, he was maltreated until he lost consciousness. He signed upon regaining consciousness. The next day, he was brought to Col. Dumlao and instructed to point at Vicente Ang. Hipolito did not complain to Col. Dumlao or to Fiscal Modesto Obispo, before whom he later acknowledged the confession.
• Trial Court Findings: The CFI found that Hipolito agreed to kill the victim on the afternoon of September 15, 1966 upon Cirilo Malagamba’s promise of ₱5,000. That afternoon, Hipolito and Malagamba rode in a car to locate the victim; at 6:00 p.m., Hipolito accepted a .38 caliber pistol with six bullets. On September 16, 1966, from 8:00 a.m. to noon, Hipolito waited near the victim’s residence; he returned on September 17 and September 18, 1966, finally shooting her at 11:00 a.m. on the latter date. The court found evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of price or promise of reward.

• Involuntariness of Confession: Hipolito argued that the extrajudicial confession was obtained through deceit, force, and violence—specifically, slapping, dunking his head in a toilet bowl, and preventing him from reading the document—and thus was involuntary and inadmissible.
• Promise of Immunity: Hipolito maintained that CIS Agent Jesuitas promised him he would not be jailed if he implicated Vicente Ang, constituting an unlawful inducement that vitiated the confession.
• Absence of Counsel During Custodial Investigation: The confession was taken without counsel and without informing Hipolito of his right to remain silent; it was therefore inadmissible under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution.
• Absorption of Evident Premeditation: The aggravating circumstance of price or reward necessarily implies premeditation; therefore, evident premeditation should not have been separately appreciated to qualify the killing to murder.
• Non-prosecution of Mastermind: The circumstance of price, reward, or promise was not established because Vicente Ang, the alleged giver of the reward, was not prosecuted.

• Voluntariness of Confession: The prosecution maintained that the confession was given freely and voluntarily, as shown by the presence of details only the declarant could have known and by Hipolito’s failure to complain of maltreatment to Col. Dumlao, the CIS Chief, when confronted with Vicente Ang the day after the confession.
• No Corroboration of Maltreatment: Hipolito’s claim of coercion was uncorroborated; he never filed any administrative, criminal, or civil case against those who allegedly maltreated him; photographs taken the day after showed no signs of abuse.
• Promise of Immunity Ineffective: Any alleged promise of immunity came from Agent Jesuitas, a non-prosecuting officer without authority to grant immunity; such a promise does not render a confession inadmissible.
• Right to Counsel Not Retroactive: The right to counsel during custodial investigation under the 1973 Constitution applies only from its effectivity and does not retroact to confessions taken in 1968, when no such right existed under law.
• Separate Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation and price or reward are not incompatible; jurisprudence allows both to be appreciated separately, and the non-prosecution of the mastermind does not negate the circumstance as long as payment was made.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession was obtained through force, violence, or deceit, and whether the alleged promise of immunity rendered it inadmissible.
• Right to Counsel: Whether the right to be informed of silence and to have counsel during custodial investigation under the 1973 Constitution applies retroactively to a confession executed in 1968.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether evident premeditation is absorbed by the circumstance of price or reward, such that the killing should be classified as homicide rather than murder.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Confession: The confession was held voluntary and admissible. Hipolito’s claim of maltreatment was uncorroborated; he did not complain to Col. Dumlao despite the opportunity, nor file any complaint thereafter. Photographs taken the day after the confession showed no signs of abuse. The confession contained details about the planning and execution of the crime that only the declarant could have supplied, contradicting the claim that it was prepared beforehand under duress. The promise of immunity allegedly made by CIS Agent Jesuitas—who lacked prosecutorial authority and could not honor such a promise—was insufficient to render the confession inadmissible.
• Right to Counsel: The right to counsel during custodial investigation was introduced by Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution and does not apply retroactively. At the time Hipolito executed his confession in May 1968, no law required that the accused be informed of his right to silence and to counsel. The confession was, therefore, admissible notwithstanding the absence of counsel.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation was properly appreciated. Hipolito agreed to kill the victim on the afternoon of September 15, 1966; from that moment until the shooting three days later, he performed overt acts—accepting the firearm and ammunition, repeatedly going to the victim’s residence, and lying in wait—that demonstrated persistence and reflection. The time lapse was sufficient for him to reconsider. The circumstance of price or reward does not absorb evident premeditation; under U.S. vs. Rabor, there is no incompatibility: evident premeditation may exist without a price, and both may be present and separately aggravating. The non-prosecution of Vicente Ang did not negate the circumstance because the arrangement and payment were made through Cirilo Malagamba, and the payment of ₱2,800 was proven. The trial court correctly found Hipolito guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by price or reward.

• Prospective Application of Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigation — The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel during custodial investigation, guaranteed under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively from the date of the Constitution’s effectivity. It does not extend to confessions obtained before that date, when no statute or constitutional provision imposed such a requirement. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession executed in 1968 is admissible even without a counsel-assisted waiver.

• Separate Appreciation of Evident Premeditation and Price or Reward — The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and commission of the crime for a price, reward, or promise are not mutually exclusive. A killing for a price does not necessarily imply that the killer reflected on the act; likewise, deliberate premeditation can exist without a pecuniary motive. Both circumstances may be present and independently considered to qualify the crime and determine the penalty. The Court adopted the Spanish Supreme Court doctrine cited in U.S. vs. Rabor (7 Phil. 726).

• “The fact that the accused was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation, as required under Art. IV, Sec. 20 of the 1973 Constitution, and that he had not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel, does not also render the confession in question, which was executed by the accused previous to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, inadmissible, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.” — This passage encapsulates the non-retroactive application of the constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.

• “The claim that the confession in question was prepared beforehand and obtained under duress or by force is further contradicted by the presence of details which only the declarant could have known.” — The Court used the intrinsic reliability of the confession’s content as an indicator of voluntariness.

• “At any rate, the alleged promise of immunity by Pedro Jesuitas, who is not a prosecuting officer and cannot honor nor comply with his promise is not sufficient ground to render the confession in question inadmissible.” — The rule that an invalid promise of immunity by an unauthorized officer does not vitiate a confession.

• U.S. vs. Rabor, 7 Phil. 726 — Distinguished; affirmed the rule that evident premeditation and the circumstance of price or reward can co-exist as separate aggravating circumstances without one implying the other.
• People vs. Abejero, G.R. No. L-36039, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 647 — Followed; applied the principle that an accused’s failure to complain of maltreatment to authorities at the earliest opportunity militates against the claim of coercion.
• People vs. De Torres, 110 Phil. 982 — Followed; held that a promise of immunity from an officer without authority to grant it does not render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.
• People vs. Urminita, G.R. No. L-33314, Dec. 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 666 — Followed; supported the rule that the right to counsel during custodial investigation is not retroactive to confessions made before the 1973 Constitution.
• People vs. Molleda, G.R. No. L-34248, Nov. 21, 1978, 86 SCRA 667 — Followed; similarly held that the right to counsel at custodial investigations applies only after the 1973 Constitution, not before.

• Article IV, Section 20, 1973 Constitution — Guarantees the right to remain silent and to counsel during custodial investigation. The Court applied this provision prospectively, finding it inapplicable to a confession executed in 1968, prior to the Constitution’s effectivity.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., concurred in the result.
Fernando, C.J., was on leave.