People vs. Hilario

One who commits an intentional felony remains liable for its natural and logical consequences even if the actual victim differs from the intended victim, and treachery qualifies the killing to murder where the attack was sudden and left the victim without opportunity to defend, while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated when the premeditation contemplated a different person.

Rodrigo Hilario y Martinez and Rodolfo Hilario y Martinez are brothers and maternal uncles of Danilo Manzanares, a watch repairman residing at 122 L. Lupa St., Caloocan City. Rodrigo was a Barangay Tanod of Barangay 32, Caloocan City. Carlos Reyes y Lascano was the son of Greg Reyes, a business associate of Danilo, and a companion of a man known only as Berong.

In the afternoon of October 30, 1990, at about 2 o'clock, Rodrigo Hilario, his brother Rodolfo, and an unidentified cumpadre went to the house of their nephew Danilo Manzanares to have the bracelet of Rodolfo's watch restored. While Danilo worked, the three conversed nearby and Danilo overheard Rodrigo say, "Pare, nandyan na ang taong titirahin natin, si Berong," to which Rodolfo replied, "Padilim tayo." After about 30 minutes the three left for the Barangay Hall two houses away.

At about 8:30 that evening, Danilo went to Mang Jack's store about 20 meters away to buy snacks for his children. In front of the store he saw Berong and Carlos Reyes squatting and talking, both wearing white shirts; shortly after, Berong removed his white shirt. Danilo then saw Rodrigo, Rodolfo and their cumpadre approaching from the other side of the store about two arms' length from him. Rodrigo handed a bolo to Rodolfo and a one-foot-long ice pick to the cumpadre, instructing, "The one in white shirt."

In a swift motion the cumpadre stabbed Carlos Reyes in the chest with the ice pick, asking "Ito ba?", while Rodrigo stood about six arms' length away watching and Rodolfo, bolo in hand, stood nearby as back-up and shouted "Walang makiki-alam!" Carlos, wounded and bleeding, fell on his back, after which the three ran away together. The place was well-lighted by electric lights from the store and lamp post. Frightened, Danilo returned home; moments later Greg Reyes, the victim's father, knocked and asked why Danilo's uncles did that to his son, and Danilo answered it was mistaken identity as they intended to kill Berong.

Thereafter Greg frequently visited Danilo for their business venture, arousing the Hilario brothers' suspicion that Danilo would testify. Rodrigo warned Danilo, "Huwag kang makikialam, huwag kang tetestigo," despite Danilo's assurance that he would not favor anyone and that the visits were purely business. On April 22, 1991 at about 8 o'clock in the evening, Rodrigo ambushed and hacked Danilo on the head and arms. Danilo transferred residence to Balagtas, Bulacan, filed a hacking case against Rodrigo, and together with Greg went to the NBI to complain against Rodrigo, Rodolfo and their cumpadre for the killing of Carlos. The victim's mother, Virginia Reyes, testified to paying P10,000.00 to Funeraria Vasquez and spending P30,000.00 for prayers and interment, while NBI Senior Agent Ferdinand Lavin testified on the investigation and referral for murder prosecution.

For his defense, Rodrigo alone testified that as Barangay Tanod he was on 12-hour duty at the Barangay Hall from 6 p.m. of October 30, 1990 to 6 a.m. the next day, responded thrice to Councilor Tiongson's calls, avoided intervening in a chase that reached Barangay 37 outside jurisdiction, and conducted roving patrol from 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. He denied seeing Danilo that night, branded Danilo's testimony as lies motivated by grudge, and gave a conflicting account of the April 22, 1991 fight as started by Danilo, noting the related case had been dismissed. The trial court credited Danilo's positive identification as nephew-eyewitness, found conspiracy from concerted acts, and convicted Rodrigo as principal.

• Credibility and Delay: Petitioner argued that star witness Danilo Manzanares' testimony was obviously fabricated and rehearsed, pointing to the long delay from October 30, 1990 until the April 23, 1991 NBI sworn statement and to the fight on April 22, 1991 as showing revenge rather than thirst for justice.
• Mistaken Identity Theory: Petitioner maintained that Danilo's mistaken-identity explanation was implausible because appellant knew Berong and Carlos well and could not have missed the intended target.
• Corroboration and Suppression: Petitioner argued that conviction beyond reasonable doubt could not rest on Danilo's uncorroborated testimony when Berong and the storeowner, likewise present, were not presented, amounting to suppression of evidence.
• Alibi: Petitioner maintained that his alibi as member of the roving Barangay Tanod team that night should be sustained in light of the weaknesses of Danilo's testimony and Danilo's admitted grudge.

• Credibility and Delay: Whether the trial court erred in crediting Danilo Manzanares despite delayed reporting and alleged motive of revenge.
• Mistaken Identity: Whether the mistaken-identity account fails because appellant knew both the intended victim and the actual victim.
• Corroboration: Whether conviction requires corroboration by other persons present and whether non-presentation constitutes suppression of evidence.
• Alibi: Whether appellant's alibi as Barangay Tanod on duty should prevail over the eyewitness identification.
• Conspiracy and Transferred Victim: Whether conspiracy was established and whether killing a different person from the one intended relieves criminal liability.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Whether evident premeditation or treachery qualifies the killing to murder where the actual victim was not the person premeditated upon.

• Credibility and Delay: No. Delay in reporting does not render testimony false where explained by natural reticence and fear of involvement, here that the suspects were the witness's maternal uncles.
• Mistaken Identity: No. The stabber was the cumpadre who did not know the victims, as shown by his asking "Ito ba?" and needing the instruction "The one in white shirt."
• Corroboration: No. The credible testimony of a single witness suffices for conviction; witnesses are weighed not numbered, and the choice of witnesses is for the prosecutor.
• Alibi: No. Positive and categorical identification prevails over alibi, which was not shown to preclude presence at the scene.
• Conspiracy and Transferred Victim: Yes. Concerted acts showed unity of purpose, making each conspirator liable as principal, and mistake in identity does not negate liability under Article 4.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Evident premeditation was not properly appreciated because it contemplated a different victim, but treachery qualified the killing to murder as the sudden attack denied defense.

• Credibility and Delay: Delay was plausibly explained: Danilo feared involvement because the accused were his mother's brothers and did not want his family involved. Well-settled rule treats reluctance to get involved in criminal cases as natural and insufficient to discredit an otherwise credible eyewitness, especially where identification was certain because the witness was the accused's nephew.
• Mistaken Identity: The premise that familiarity negated mistake was misplaced because Rodrigo was not the actual stabber. The record showed the cumpadre was a stranger to Barangay 32 and to both Berong and Carlos, necessitating guidance by shirt color and prompting his contemporaneous query confirming a prior agreement to stab.
• Corroboration: No obligation existed to call Berong or the storeowner to confirm Danilo. Conviction may rest on one credible witness, non-presentation does not imply adverse testimony and lies within prosecutorial discretion, and appellant could himself have subpoenaed them but relied solely on his own testimony.
• Alibi: Alibi, though not invariably false, cannot overcome categorical positive identification by a witness who knew appellant intimately and clearly saw the handing of weapons, the stabbing, and the flight under good lighting. No physical impossibility of presence was established against the tanod-duty claim.
• Conspiracy and Transferred Victim: All three were present; Rodrigo furnished the bolo and ice pick and acted as lookout, the cumpadre suddenly stabbed while uttering words revealing prior agreement, Rodolfo acted as back-up shouting to deter intervention, and all fled together. Such unity of purpose and common design established implied conspiracy, rendering the act of one the act of all as co-principals. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, one committing an intentional felony is responsible for all natural and logical consequences though different from that intended, per el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado; voluntary purpose to kill thus sustained liability despite error in identity.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Evident premeditation contemplated Berong, not Carlos, and premeditation on a different person cannot aggravate the killing of the actual victim, following People vs. Mabug-at and People vs. Guillen where intent to kill former President Roxas did not carry premeditation to the persons actually killed. The crime remained murder because treachery was alleged and proved: the sudden, unexpected stabbing of a seated, relaxing victim, under cover of nighttime absorbed by treachery, employed means directly insuring execution without risk from defense.

• Conspiracy as joint liability — A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. When express or implied conspiracy is proven, all conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of extent of participation, and every act done in furtherance of the common design is in contemplation of law the act of each.
• Aberratio ictus / mistake in identity under Article 4 — Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which was intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all consequences naturally or logically resulting therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not, on the rationale el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado.
• Evident premeditation inapplicable to unintended victim — Evident premeditation may not be appreciated when the person the accused proposed to kill differs from the actual victim, because premeditation on the killing of one person does not constitute premeditation on the killing of another, as applied in People vs. Guillen.
• Treachery (alevosia) — There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against persons employing means, methods or forms tending directly to insure execution without risk from defense the offended party might make, whose essence is suddenness and unexpectedness depriving the victim of opportunity to defend or retaliate.
• Credibility despite delayed reporting — Delay in reporting what a witness knows does not by itself render testimony false or incredible, as it may be explained by natural reticence and abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case.
• Single-witness rule; witnesses weighed not numbered — The credible testimony of a single witness suffices to sustain conviction, non-presentation of other witnesses is not suppression and rests in prosecutorial discretion, and positive identification prevails over alibi.

• "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible, when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the conspiracy. In a conspiracy, every act of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose, is in contemplation of the law, the act of each one of them." — States the familiar conspiracy rule applied to hold all three accused as co-principals despite differing roles.
• "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" — Expresses the rationale for holding the accused liable although the wrongful act done differed from that intended.
• "There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — Defines treachery as appreciated to qualify the sudden stabbing to murder.

• People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950) — Followed as doctrinal rule that premeditation to assassinate one person does not aggravate killing of a different actual victim.
• People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967 (1926) — Cited for the rule that evident premeditation may not be taken into account when the victim differs from the person proposed to be killed.
• People vs. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530 (1914) — Cited for the conspiracy principle that each conspirator is responsible for acts of others in furtherance of conspiracy.
• People vs. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918) — Cited for the proposition that in legal contemplation the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
• People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943) — Cited to support continued liability notwithstanding mistake in identity of victim.
• People vs. Navarro, 297 SCRA 331 (1998) — Followed that delay in reporting does not render testimony false given natural reticence.
• People vs. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67 (1995) — Followed that single credible witness suffices and choice of witnesses is prosecutorial discretion.
• People vs. Oliver, 303 SCRA 72 (1999) — Followed that positive identification prevails over alibi.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes murder when killing is attended by qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation; applied to sustain murder via treachery though evident premeditation failed.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Imposes criminal liability for a felony although the wrongful act done differs from that intended; applied to hold accused liable despite killing Carlos Reyes instead of Berong.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.