People vs. Hernandez

A stipulation of facts entered into by defense counsel in open court during trial, unqualified by objection and confirmed by the court, constitutes a judicial admission that dispenses with the need for independent proof of the stipulated matter and operates as a waiver of the accused’s right to confront and cross‑examine the witness on that point. Additionally, life imprisonment is distinct from reclusion perpetua and must be imposed as such when so prescribed by law.

Complainants, a group of individuals seeking employment abroad, were introduced to Cristina Hernandez at the office of the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. in Ermita, Manila. Hernandez introduced herself as the general manager and offered them factory work in Taipei with a monthly salary of $800. The complainants were required to pay placement and passport fees totaling P22,500 each in three installments. Receipts were issued, some signed by a Liza Mendoza in Hernandez’s presence and others co‑signed by Hernandez. Despite full payment, the promised deployment never materialized, and Hernandez refused to return the money. The complainants subsequently filed a complaint leading to the criminal charge.

• The Inducement and Payments: On December 12, 1988, complainants Benito L. Bernabe, Robert P. Velasquez, Gregorio P. Mendoza, Arnel Mendoza, and others were brought by a certain Josefa Cinco to the office of the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. in Ermita, Manila. The accused, introducing herself as general manager, offered them employment as factory workers in Taipei at a salary of $800 per month. Each complainant was required to pay placement and passport fees of P22,500 (except Benito Bernabe who paid P28,500), payable in three installments: P1,500 on December 14, 1988; P10,000 on December 16, 1988; and P11,000 on December 22, 1988.
• Receipts and Representation: Upon payment of the first two installments, receipts were issued by Liza Mendoza, the alleged treasurer, in the presence of the accused. The receipts for the final installment were signed by both Liza Mendoza and the accused.
• Breach of Promise: The accused assured the complainants they would leave for Taipei before the end of December 1988. No deployment occurred. Demands for refund were made but went unheeded.
• Defense Version: The accused denied the charges. She claimed she never met any of the complainants and never received money from them. She disavowed any knowledge of Liza Mendoza. She admitted having an office in the Ermita Building but asserted it belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products Corporation, a logging business. She further admitted being the president of Philippine Thai Association, Inc. but only in a nominal capacity, insisting the entity was engaged solely in the barong tagalog business and that she did not participate in any transactions.
• Prosecution Evidence on Lack of License: During trial on June 6, 1990, the prosecution proposed a stipulation that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would testify that the accused was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers. Defense counsel agreed. The court then clarified on the record that the parties stipulated both that POEA records showed the accused was not licensed and that the authorized POEA representative, if called, would confirm that fact. No objection was interposed. Additionally, the prosecution offered and the court admitted Exhibit “I,” a certification from the POEA Licensing Branch attesting that neither the accused nor Philippine Thai Association, Inc. was licensed or authorized to recruit for overseas employment.

• Failure to Prove Non‑Licensee Element: Appellant maintained that the stipulation that the POEA licensing officer, if presented, would testify to the accused’s lack of license was an admission only of what the witness would say, not an admission of the facts themselves. She contended the prosecution remained duty‑bound to present independent evidence of the non‑licensee element and that the stipulation could not relieve it of that burden.
• Invalidity of Stipulation of Facts in Criminal Cases: Appellant argued that stipulations of facts in criminal cases are null and void as contrary to law and public policy, citing early jurisprudence that disallowed convictions based solely on such agreements because they defeat the purpose of criminal procedure and violate the accused’s right to be presumed innocent.
• Improper Judicial Notice of Another Case: Appellant assailed the trial court’s taking judicial notice of another illegal recruitment case pending against her in the same court, and its consideration of that pendency as evidence of a scheme or strategy. She claimed the court did not announce its intention to take judicial notice nor afford her an opportunity to be heard, in violation of Rule 129, Section 3.
• Disregard of Defense Evidence: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in not giving credence to her denial and her affirmative defense that she was a mere nominee‑president of the association.

• Sufficiency of Proof: The prosecution relied on the in‑court stipulation as a binding judicial admission that the accused lacked the requisite license, and further pointed to Exhibit “I” (the POEA certification) which was admitted without objection, establishing the same fact independently.
• Validity of Stipulation: It was maintained that the stipulation was made in open court with the conformity of defense counsel and confirmed by the trial judge, thus constituting a judicial admission under Rule 129, Section 4, which dispensing with further proof. The earlier prohibition against stipulations of facts in criminal cases was superseded by Rule 118 expressly allowing them, and the accused waived her right to confront the witness by entering into the stipulation and failing to call the witness herself.

• Proof of Non‑Licensee Element: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was a non‑licensee or non‑holder of authority to recruit workers, in view of the stipulation entered into by defense counsel.
• Judicial Notice of Another Case: Whether the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the accused and considering it as evidence of a scheme.
• Credibility of Defense Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the accused’s denial and her claim of being a nominal president.

• Proof of Non‑Licensee Element: The assignment of error was deemed insignificant because the prosecution had presented independent evidence — Exhibit “I,” a POEA certification admitted without objection — establishing that neither the accused nor the association was licensed. In any event, the stipulation made in open court amounted to a judicial admission. The court’s contemporaneous clarification showed that the parties stipulated to the fact of non‑licensure as reflected in POEA records, not merely to what a witness would testify to. The former prohibition against stipulations of facts in criminal cases (as in U.S. v. Donato and U.S. v. Pobre) was superseded by Rule 118, which expressly allows stipulations of facts during pre‑trial and, by extension, during trial to expedite proceedings. The stipulation, being a judicial admission under Rule 129, Section 4, dispensed with further proof. Defense counsel’s agreement bound the accused, as the general rule attributes an attorney’s acts to the client, absent serious injustice. No such injustice existed because the stipulation was consistent with the defense theory that the accused never engaged in recruitment. Furthermore, the accused’s failure to call the POEA officer or present contrary evidence constituted a waiver of both the right to confront witnesses and the right to present evidence.
• Judicial Notice of Another Case: The accused herself introduced the pendency of the other illegal recruitment case during her testimony, and the trial court’s reference to it was made with her knowledge and without objection. Even assuming error, it was not fatal because the conviction rested on the overwhelming evidence in the instant case, not on the pendency of the other case.
• Credibility of Defense Evidence: The trial court’s assessment of credibility was upheld. Bare denials, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The claim of being a mere nominee‑president was unavailing where the witnesses directly identified the accused as the person who performed the recruitment acts.

• Stipulation of Facts in Criminal Cases — Under Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, stipulations of facts in criminal cases are expressly sanctioned to expedite trial, and the same rationale applies to stipulations made during the trial itself. A stipulation entered into by defense counsel in open court and confirmed by the judge constitutes a judicial admission under Rule 129, Section 4, which requires no further proof and can be contradicted only by showing palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
• Judicial Admission by Counsel — An attorney has prima facie authority to make admissions in the course of proceedings, including stipulations, which bind the client. The rule extends even to mistakes or negligence of counsel, unless serious injustice would result.
• Waiver of Right to Confrontation — The right to confront and cross‑examine witnesses is a personal privilege that may be waived. Agreeing to a stipulation that a witness, if present, would testify to a certain fact, without later calling that witness to contradict the fact, constitutes such a waiver.
• Judicial Notice of Other Cases — As a general rule, courts may not take judicial notice of the records of other cases. However, where a party herself introduces the matter and the opposing party does not object, the court may treat the original record as read into the pending case.
• Life Imprisonment vs. Reclusion Perpetua — Life imprisonment is distinct from reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code; they are not synonymous, and a sentence of life imprisonment should not carry the accessory penalties prescribed for reclusion perpetua.

• “A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: ‘. . . an attorney who is employed to manage a party’s conduct of a lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive.’”
• “The right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused is a personal privilege which may be waived. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio, this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution.”
• “Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative, self‑serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.”
• “Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua.”

• U.S. v. Donato, 9 Phil. 701 — Prohibited stipulations that witnesses would testify to certain facts; this prohibition was superseded by Rule 118.
• U.S. v. Manlimos, 11 Phil. 547 — Explained that such agreements prevented the court from observing witness credibility; the rationale was overcome by subsequent rules allowing stipulations.
• People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164 — Recognized that stipulations on key elements (lack of license) had been accepted as judicial admissions.
• People v. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 — Held that admissions made by the accused to dispense with oral testimony constitute judicial admissions binding on the parties.
• People v. Hare, 185 N.E.2d 178 (U.S.) — Stated that an accused may by stipulation waive proof of all or any part of the case and cannot complain on appeal.
• U.S. v. Anastasio, 6 Phil. 413 — Deemed an admission that a witness would testify to certain facts as a waiver of the right of confrontation.
• Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 — Enunciated the exception allowing courts to treat original records of another case as read into the pending case when the party with knowledge does not object.
• People v. Alvero, 224 SCRA 16; People v. Avendaña, 216 SCRA 187 — Distinguished life imprisonment from reclusion perpetua.

• Article 38, Labor Code (P.D. No. 442, as amended) — Defines illegal recruitment and deems it committed in large scale when perpetrated against three or more persons individually or as a group. Applied as the basis for the offense charged.
• Article 39, Labor Code — Prescribes life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000 for illegal recruitment committed in large scale. Applied in imposing the penalty as modified.
• Rule 118, Rules of Court (Pre‑trial) — Sections 1 and 2 expressly allow stipulation of facts in criminal cases to expedite trial. Applied by analogy to validate the stipulation made during trial.
• Rule 129, Section 4, Rules of Court (Admissions) — Provides that a judicial admission made in the course of proceedings does not require proof and may only be contradicted by showing palpable mistake. Applied to treat the in‑court stipulation as a binding admission.
• Rule 115, Section 1(f), Rules of Court — Guarantees the right to confront and cross‑examine witnesses. Applied in holding that this right was waived.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.